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ABSTRACT 
What happened to Afrikaner nationalism? Did the end of apartheid spell the end 
of the nationalism with which it had become synonymous? Was the decade that 
lay between South Africa‟s first universal suffrage elections of 1994 and the 
collapse of the Afrikaners‟ National Party in 2004 the final chapter in the history 
of Afrikaner nationalism? If so – and that is the question posed in this thesis – 
how is one to interpret the Afrikaner campaign that gained momentum during that 
very same decade in defence of Afrikaans – the language that gave the word 
apartheid to human history? 
Contra the lay and scholarly consensus, I argue that Afrikaner nationalism has 
outlived apartheid. What we are witnessing today, if only in certain elite circles, is 
not the end of Afrikaner nationalism but its revival. To substantiate this claim, 
chapter 3 of the thesis develops a definitional and theoretical framework from 
which I argue in chapters 4 and 5, by means of a diachronical comparison, that the 
latest movement represents a continuation of the Afrikaner nationalist past. First, 
however, the scene has to be set. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the political and 
ideological background without which no analysis would be possible of Afrikaner 
nationalism‟s consecutive language and cultural movements. 
It needs to be stressed, though, that while language and cultural activism has the 
central attention in this study, it also considers the relationship between cultural 
and political nationalism – both as concepts and as actual movements – and 
questions the notion of a dichotomy. In seeking a historical explanation for the 
contemporary Afrikaner movement, I revisit what Kellas regards as the problem 
that studies of nationalism have classically addressed, namely the relationship 
between politics, economics and culture “which in any particular case brought 
about the transition from ethnicity to nationalism”? (1991:35). Focusing on the 
Afrikaner case, my thesis explores the role of language in these dynamics – 
something that has not been done in a systematic manner. 
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Springbokke  
 
Astrale magte op hul bloed  
en soute in die grasse het bepaal  
dat uit woestyn en vlakte  
hulle as één groot trop ontmoet  
en dae lank eers in ‟n stofwolk maal  
tot een meteens koers snuif wat almal vat  
en dan geen weerstand duld  
dreunend oor veld en bult  
waar hoef en horings alles plat  
trap en voor hul vaart wegjaag,   
elkeen gewillig om sy lyf te gee  
dat die trop oor slote en riviere jaag  
en onkeerbaar afstort in die see:  
„Ons is geroepe om ‟n groot afspraak  
met die dood te maak.‟  
 
D.J. Opperman (1987:239). 
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For my mother and my father – 
Die meetsnoere het vir ons in lieflike plekke geval.  
 
And for the man in my life who has always been, to my delight,  
a metropolitan among provincials  
(to borrow Le May‟s description of Jan Christian Smuts – 1995:144). 
“That was the river, this is the sea.” 
The Waterboys  
 
“It is a kind of continuity, I suppose.” 
The character of Gudrun Velk in William Boyd‟s “Loose Continuity” (2004:113–131). 
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INTRODUCTION 
What has become of Afrikaner nationalism – the force that was born at the turn of 
the nineteenth century and, by the middle of the twentieth century, had managed 
to seize full political power in a country where Afrikaners constituted barely 
twelve percent of the population? What happened to the Afrikaner nationalist 
movement when apartheid – the one Afrikaans word that requires no translation or 
explanation – began to crumble in the 1980s? What was the fate of that movement 
when it finally, after a reign that spanned the entire Cold War period, surrendered 
control of the South African state to the African National Congress? Did the end 
of apartheid spell the end of the nationalism with which it had become 
synonymous? Was the decade that lay between South Africa‟s first universal 
suffrage elections of 1994 and the collapse of the Afrikaners‟ National Party in 
2004 the final chapter in the history of Afrikaner nationalism? If so – and that is 
the question posed in this thesis – how is one to interpret the massive campaign 
that gained momentum during that very same decade in defence of Afrikaans – the 
language that had given the word apartheid to human history? 
The reason why post-apartheid Afrikaans language activism has been called the 
New or the Third Afrikaans Language Movement is because it has two 
predecessors, at least according to mainstream historiography: the so-called First 
and Second Afrikaans Language Movements. During the late 1800s and early 
1900s, these movements set themselves the task of cultivating and 
institutionalising (to use terms that I shall adopt in chapter 3) Afrikaans – the 
variety of Dutch that was spoken on southern African shores (by colonists, slaves 
and a considerable section of the indigenous population) since the late 1600s. 
There was nothing purely linguistic or even purely cultural about the First and 
Second Afrikaans Movements: the ultimate, expressed aspiration of virtually all 
the leading language activists was to make Afrikaners – or rather, a united 
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Afrikaner volk
1
 – out of white speakers of Afrikaans and to empower this volk 
(and themselves) culturally, economically and, last but not least, politically. Fritz 
Ponelis (arguably Afrikaans‟s Noam Chomsky and also, together with Vic Webb, 
Afrikaans‟ William Labov) puts it plainly: “The Afrikaans language was 
employed to mobilise [its white speakers] against British domination and to seize 
power from the hands of their English-speaking co-citizens” (1998:19).  
The First Afrikaans Language Movement had its birth in 1875 as the Genootskap 
van Regte Afrikaners [Society of True Afrikaners]. Carried, for the most part, by 
two brothers, the project eventually lost momentum, yet not before the way was 
paved for the Second Afrikaans Language Movement. The latter emerged in the 
aftermath of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)2 and culminated two decades later 
in the recognition of Afrikaans as a co-official language of the Union of South 
Africa (alongside of English). Unlike its forerunner, the Second Language 
Movement was successful in its endeavour to transform Afrikaans into a 
standardised written language equipped for modernity and urbanity.  
                                                 
1 There is not a book on Afrikaner nationalism in the English language that does not 
complain in a footnote about the near-impossible task of translating “the Afrikaner 
nationalist lexicon” (O‟Meara 1996:xxi), and then especially the word volk, into English. 
Linguists, regarding the claims that are sometimes made about the nature of languages, may 
blush. Dan O‟Meara, to mention but one example, suggests that one of the features of 
Afrikaans that enables “blunt, muscular” political discourse in the language is the fact that 
it has no fewer than six diminutive suffixes (1996:xxi). When it comes to the word 
Afrikanervolk, though, O‟Meara is right: a direct translation as “Afrikaner nation” is 
inadequate. Part of the problem is that the Afrikaans language has a synonym of Romance 
origin for volk (as it has for many words of Germanic origin), namely nasie. Yet these two 
words are not absolute synonyms: volk has acquired connotations of organic ethnic unity 
that nasie (which can accurately be translated as “nation”) lacks. Since this primordialism 
implicit in the term volk is lost when Afrikanervolk is translated as “Afrikaner nation”, 
authors such as O‟Meara prefer to retain the Afrikaans word. The disadvantage of this 
practice, as Moodie (1975:xi) notes, is that volk may evoke false associations with Nazism 
or the völkisch tradition in German nationalism. Arguing that the original meaning of the 
Afrikaans word volk “was closer to Rousseau than to Hitler (although the latter sense 
became significant in the 1930s)”, Moodie opts for “Afrikaner People”. The capitalisation, 
he explains, points to Afrikaner nationalism‟s essentialist understanding of the concept 
volk. Without dismissing the validity of Moodie‟s objections, I leave volk untranslated as 
O‟Meara does, especially when quoting. 
2 Among historians there is a debate whether this conflict – “the bloodiest and most extensive 
war that has ever been waged among whites in Southern Africa” (Wessels 2011:19) – 
should be called the Anglo-Boer War or the South African War. I tend to agree with 
Johnson (2004:105): “[D]espite the large numbers of blacks involved it was never their 
war. They did not start it, nor could they end it and irrespective of which side won Africans 
had no say in defining their own future fate. In this sense it was, indeed, the Anglo-Boer 
War and theirs alone.” 
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Traditionally, the official recognition of Afrikaans in 1925 has been regarded as 
the successful completion of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement. For 
Afrikaner activism in the field of language and culture during the 1930s and 
1940s, the term movement has generally not been employed. This is perhaps 
ironic, not only because these two decades saw the formation of a mass movement 
of political opposition among Afrikaners, but also because the organisational 
coherence that the First and Second Language Movements lacked was finally 
achieved when the secret Afrikaner-Broederbond [League of Afrikaner Brothers] 
(est. 1918) founded the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge [Federation 
of Afrikaans Cultural Associations] (FAK) as its major front organisation in 1929. 
Through the FAK, with which all mainstream extra-parliamentary agents of 
Afrikaner nationalism were affiliated between 1929 and the end of apartheid, the 
Broederbond virtually controlled organised Afrikaner culture as it controlled, 
according to some commentators, Afrikaner politics. 
This study treats the pre-apartheid Afrikaner Broederbond-FAK project as a 
distinct Afrikaner movement, and then as a cultural rather than a language 
movement. Within the framework of Joep Leerssen‟s model of nationalism as the 
“cultivation of culture” (2006:559–578), I also consider the First and Second 
Language Movements to be cultural movements, simply because language 
activism was complemented with the production of a national(ist) literature and 
history, the creation of a material national culture, and the invention of national 
practices and traditions.  
My proposal for a re-periodisation of Afrikaner nationalism‟s language 
movements and my reinterpretation of these movements as politically directed 
cultural movements are fairly uncontroversial. What is contested, and fiercely so 
as I shall demonstrate in the introduction to chapter 3, is the claim that Afrikaner 
nationalism lives on as a non-state-oriented ethnic-based language and cultural 
movement. To substantiate this claim, chapter 3 develops a definitional and 
theoretical framework form which I argue in chapters 4 and 5, by means of a 
diachronical comparison, that the latest movement represents a continuation of the 
Afrikaner nationalist past.  
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First, however, the scene has to be set. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the political and 
ideological background without which no analysis would be possible of Afrikaner 
nationalism‟s consecutive cultural movements. Focussing on the first half of the 
twentieth century, when electoral politics in South Africa was marked by constant 
shifts in the relationship between Afrikaner nationalism and the state, chapter 1 
covers the rise of the National Party, and chapter 2 its rule and demise. This party-
political part of the story, like the cultural part (the focus of chapters 4 and 5), has 
been told and interpreted – over and over again for more than a century – by an 
array of commentators: historians and linguists (lay and academic), Afrikaners 
and non-Afrikaners, Afrikaner nationalists and their critics, liberals and Marxists, 
and revisionists of all kinds and creeds.
3
 And yet it merits to be retold and 
reinterpreted here, not least because my key objective – namely to identify 
patterns of continuation and discontinuation in the long history of Afrikaner 
nationalism – requires, as a first step, a reconstruction of that history.  
In retelling the story, I adopt a theoretically guided approach, hoping to offer 
some novel perspectives. More specifically, I attempt to apply certain classic 
theories of nationalism as well as more recently developed models (particularly 
that Leerssen (2006)) to the Afrikaner case. My first (rather clumsy) efforts in this 
direction date back to 2003 (cf. also Kriel (2004a) and Webb and Kriel (2000)). A 
similar (but un-clumsy) approach is adopted by the German scholar Christoph 
Marx in his book Oxwagon Sentinel. Radical Afrikaner nationalism and the 
history of the Ossewabrandwag (2008). According to Marx, “Afrikaner 
nationalism is a highly complex phenomenon because various movements overlap 
and influence each other, making it difficult to place it in the framework of 
theoretical models” (2008:94). He nevertheless shows that the work of Benedict 
Anderson and Ernest Gellner “open up avenues to analysis that are compatible” 
(2008:90). It is further possible, says Marx, “if not easy, to apply Hroch‟s phases 
to South Africa, when the focus is limited to cultural nationalism and one is not 
dazzled by the meteoric rise of the [National Party]” (2008:94).  
                                                 
3 For a critical analysis of the debate, cf. Lipton (2007). 
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Despite the fact that this thesis splits its focus between political nationalism 
(chapters 1 and 2) and cultural nationalism (chapters 4 and 5) it questions the 
notion of dichotomy between these concepts and demonstrates the applicability of 
Miroslav Hroch‟s periodisation model (1985) to the genesis of political-cum-
cultural Afrikaner nationalism. Like the smaller nationalisms of nineteenth 
century Europe which Hroch studied, Afrikaner nationalism began as a concern 
on the part of members of a non-dominant ethnic group about their inferior status, 
both in the realms of politics and culture. Marx may also underestimate, as I 
intend to show, the relevance of Gellner‟s theory to the Afrikaner case.  
The existing literature does contain studies of Afrikaner nationalism which draw 
on nationalism theory, including Dunbar Moodie (1975 – Elie Kedourie), Fritz 
Ponelis (1998 – Gellner) and Eric Louw (2004a – Anderson and Gellner). 
However, such theory-based orientations represent the exception rather than the 
rule. For the most part, the remark made by George Schöpflin about the trend in 
international historiography between the end of the Second World War and the 
“beginning of what might be called the Great Debate on nationalism” (circa 1980) 
is acutely true of histories of Afrikaner nationalism, also recent histories such as 
that of Hermann Giliomee (2003): they “chronicle the story [but do] not enquire 
too closely into the nature of nationalism itself” (Schöpflin 2000:2–3). They lack, 
as Dan O‟Meara puts it, theoretical road maps.4  
Needless to say, O‟Meara‟s analysis of Afrikaner nationalism (Volkskapitalisme 
covers 1934–1948 and Forty lost years 1948–1994) is marked by internal 
theoretical consistency, as is the work of scholars such as Saul Dubow (1992; 
1994; 2006), Isabel Hofmeyr (1987; 1988), Jonathan Hyslop (1995; 1996), Merle 
Lipton (1986), Debra Posal (1987; 1991) as well as Shula Marks and Stanley 
Trapido (1987). All these studies stem from the era (post 1985) when “leading 
liberal historians started including class categories and using approaches from the 
                                                 
4 In a footnote to Forty lost years, O‟Meara recalls a prominent South African historian 
telling him at a seminar at Yale University: “I don‟t have any pre-conceived theories or 
ideas. I just try to be hellish receptive to the evidence.” O‟Meara was sceptical, and rightly 
so: “the evidence never speaks for itself, it simply resonates (or not) with the analyst‟s own 
mental maps” (1996:468). 
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history of mentalities”, and when “social historians started to take cognisance of 
anthropological approaches that appreciated the dynamics of religion, worldviews 
and ideology, without subordinating this to a crude economic reductionism” 
(Marx 2008:10).  
The point that I am trying to make, though, is that (intentional) applications 
of/contributions to nationalism theory are few and far between in the literature on 
Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. This is one area where theories of 
nationalism have been underutilised as interpretative frameworks. Giliomee‟s 
Afrikaner biography (2003), for example, pays no heed to “the Great Debate on 
nationalism” between the “primordialists” or the anthropological-essentialist 
school on the one hand, and the “modernists” or the social historical-functionalist 
school on the other hand. Giliomee is no crude primordialist. Unlike less 
sophisticated nationalist historians and authors of apartheid-era school textbooks 
he is careful not to present Afrikaner nationalist mythology as Afrikaner history, 
or worse, as the most important part of South African history. But he shares the 
nationalist believe that Afrikaner history goes back three and half centuries.  
This study argues, as other modernists have done, that Afrikaner nationalism 
produced Afrikaners, and that this production process only started in earnest in the 
twentieth century. Afrikaner nationalism, which has arguably perfected the art of 
using culture in the service of politics, has telling supporting evidence to offer for 
a constructivist, modernist interpretation of nationalism. And in the post-apartheid 
South Africa, Afrikaner language and cultural activism has telling supporting 
evidence to offer for Manuel Castells‟s claim that contemporary nationalism may 
be “more oriented toward the defense of an already institutionalised culture [and a 
discursively constructed identity] than toward the construction or defense of a 
state” (1997:30). 
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CHAPTER 1  
AFRIKANER NATIONALISM AND THE STATE: 1910–1948
5
 
„Afrikaners, here in mines and factories, 
when I look at you, contemplating 
how we have been disinherited of a Republic 
and drown insults and pain in drink at night 
 
think of ‟22 when we, white against black 
fancying ourselves as labour fighting capital, 
hoping to win with hand grenade, but from the grief 
could gain nothing but the same bread and beer; 
 
[or, when I think of the Rebellion or the famed Trek,] 
 
then I have no choice but to interpret our ways as follows: 
In these struggles and crusades 
 – Come, honestly, man to man! – we are no volk 
but a failed bunch of reactionaries!‟ 
 
(Opperman 1979:33–34).6 
1.1 Union without unity 
2010, the year during which this chapter was drafted, marked the centenary of the 
creation of the South African state within its present boundaries. The South Africa 
Act of 1909, which formalised the existence of the new country, was passed by 
the imperial parliament at Westminster, but its terms were drawn up locally. 
Represented at the negotiation table – or, more specifically, at the National 
Convention which met in various South African cities between October 1908 and 
May 1909 – were four British settler colonies. The oldest was the Cape of Good 
Hope, where European settlement first took place in the mid-1600s. Initially under 
                                                 
5 For matters of historical fact, I relied – both in this chapter and the next – on the following 
sources: Berger 2009; Brits 1994; Butler 2009; Davenport and Saunders 2000; Giliomee 
2003, 2004; Giliomee and Mbenga (eds) 2007; Johnson 2004, 2010; Johnson and Jacobs 
2011; Le May 1995; Louw 2004a and 2004b; Marks and Trapido 1987; Moodie 1975; 
O‟Meara 1983, 1996; Ross 2008; Saunders and Southey 1998; Sparks 1990, 1995; 
Thompson 2000; Van der Westhuizen 2007; Welsh 2009; Wilson 2009. 
6 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Afrikaans sources are my own. 
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the control of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie [Dutch East India 
Company – VOC], the Cape became a British possession in 1806, and was 
granted representative government in 1853 and responsible government in 1872.  
Also present at the meetings of the National Convention were delegates from the 
Transvaal and Orange River Colonies where responsible government had just 
been achieved (in 1906 and 1907, respectively, following the electoral victory of 
the Liberal Party in Britain). Until the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, during 
which they were conquered by British forces, these colonies were the Boer 
republics of Transvaal (also called the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek [South 
African Republic – ZAR]) and the Orange Free State. They were established by 
Dutch-speaking farmers – known today as Voortrekkers [pioneers; literally: those 
who travel ahead]
7
 – who had left the Cape Colony in the late 1830s to escape 
colonial rule. The independence of the ZAR and the Orange Free State was 
recognised by Britain in 1852 and 1854 respectively. But then, in 1867, diamonds 
were discovered in Griqualand West
8
 and nineteen years later gold on the 
Witwatersrand [white waters reef; henceforth, Rand],
9
 and the writing was on the 
wall for Boer independence. From then on, as Robert Ross notes, “mining, and the 
industry associated with it, would always be at the centre of South African 
economic, social and political life” (2008:59). 
The final participant in the constitution-making process of 1908–1909 was Natal – 
also a former Boer republic but one with a much shorter history. The majority of 
the Voortrekkers who had settled in what they (but not Britain) considered to be 
the independent Republic of Natalia left for Transvaal after the annexation of 
“their land” to the Cape in 1843. They were replaced by immigrants from England 
and Scotland. Until 1856, when it received its own Legislative Council, Natal was 
an autonomous district of the Cape Colony. Responsible government was 
                                                 
7 To simplify matters: the Voortrekkers became the Boers. 
8 On the banks of the Vaal River, just north of its confluence with the Gariep River. In 1871, 
Britain annexed the diamond fields – which were claimed by both the Free State Boers and 
the Griquas (cf. footnote 200) – to the Cape Colony. Kimberley was born out of the ensuing 
diamond rush and the city‟s mine was to become the richest in the world. 
9 The gold rush, in turn, gave birth to the city of Johannesburg. 
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achieved in 1893, and four years later, the former Zulu kingdom (which had been 
annexed by Britain in 1887) was incorporated into Natal.  
A unified – or at least a confederated – South Africa was a British ambition dating 
back to 1875.
10
 The confederation policy introduced at the time, as Ross explains, 
was an “attempt to establish safer conditions for investment in land, labour 
recruitment and, more generally, the advance of civilisation in Africa and the 
general interests of the (British) Empire” (2008:64). Yet neither the Free State nor 
the Transvaal was prepared to surrender their sovereignty. The annexation of the 
latter republic in 1877 was tolerated by the Boers, but only until the British army 
(with the help of the Swazi, in November 1879) did what the republicans had long 
failed to do: eliminate the Pedi threat. During 1880, the Transvalers [inhabitants 
of the Transvaal] rose in revolt and on 27 February 1881 they defeated the British 
forces sent against them in battle – more specifically in the Battle of Majuba, 
which would become a key part of the myth on which Afrikaner nationalism 
would feed.  
It was not worth Britain‟s while to try to regain the region – the poorest in 
southern Africa – and in August 1881, self-rule was returned to the ZAR. 
Stephanus Johannes Paulus (Paul) Kruger, who had emerged as the chief 
negotiator and the military leader of the Transvaal Boers, was elected president of 
the newly independent republic and the Empire abandoned its hopes of a 
confederated South Africa. For the time being, control of the country‟s coasts (the 
colonies of the Cape and Natal) would suffice. “The time being”, however, proved 
to be fairly brief: within two decades of re-establishing its independence, the ZAR 
was producing more than a quarter of the world‟s “premier strategic metal – gold, 
and thus money” (Ross 2008:75). Accounting for 96 percent of its exports by 
1896, gold had transformed the state into southern Africa‟s wealthiest (Saunders 
and Southey 1998:78–79). 
                                                 
10 George Grey, then governor of the Cape Colony, also proposed, but never pursued the idea 
in the late 1850s. 
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It was gold, then, or rather the desire to create an environment within which South 
Africa‟s mineral wealth could be exploited optimally by British-based 
conglomerates, that drove Britain to war with the Transvaal and its Orange Free 
State ally in October 1899 (Butler 2009:12). Yet it was also imperial pride – the 
desire to defend British pre-eminence in southern Africa and with it, as Giliomee 
(2003:248) puts it, British honour. In the late nineteenth century, however, 
“British politicians could not have said publicly that the goal of [the war] was 
control over the gold fields and gold production; they could probably not even 
have said it to each other in private” (Ross 2008:77). What they could say, 
echoing gold-mining capitalists on the Rand frustrated with their lack of political 
influence, was that the Transvaal was politically and economically too backward 
to cater for the requirements of the emerging industry. And they could raise the 
issue of the ZAR‟s restrictive franchise laws, which made it difficult for 
uitlanders [foreigners] who had flocked to the gold fields – many of them Britons 
– to acquire citizenship and the vote. Whatever the justification, in the years 
following the discovery of gold, British imperialists concluded that “ZAR [...] 
power had to be broken so a strong (Anglo imperial) state could be built with 
enough power to radically transform Southern Africa” (Louw 2004b:10). 
Britain‟s victory in the Boer War did not straightaway result in the unification of 
the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, the Cape and Natal, but all four territories 
now came under the administration of Alfred Milner, who had been governor of 
the Cape Colony and British high commissioner in South Africa since 1897. 
Before he bid South Africa farewell in 1905, Milner oversaw, inter alia, the 
establishment of an inter-colonial council, the amalgamation of the railway 
networks of the four colonies, and the creation of a South African customs union. 
The dream of a united South Africa was, however, not only an imperial one. In 
1875 – the same year, ironically, that Carnarvon (inspired by his recent success in 
Canada) set in motion plans to confederate South Africa – an early Afrikaner 
nationalist organisation in the Cape Colony (the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners 
– cf. chapter 5) expressed the desire to see the four South African “states” under 
one flag (Meiring 1949: 21). That flag – and this was the crucial part of the Cape 
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Afrikaners‟ dream – was to replace the Union Jack that flew over their colony. In 
the wake of the Anglo-Boer war, however, many Boer leaders began to see “in 
Union and the imperial connection enhanced possibilities for economic progress, 
which would benefit their fellows as much as anyone” (Ross 2008:88). Prominent 
among them was Paul Kruger‟s former right-hand man, Jan Christian Smuts, who 
believed that unification of the four colonies would eventually eliminate “the 
disturbing influence of Downing Street” (Smuts, quoted in Moodie 1975:73). A 
leading delegate to the National Convention of 1908–1909, Smuts was the main 
architect of South Africa‟s first constitution. 
It was, finally, on 31 May 1910 that the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies and 
those of the Cape and Natal became the constituent provinces of the Union of 
South Africa – a new dominion in the British Empire. Natal, which feared 
Afrikaner domination, had hoped that the state would take the form of a federation 
as it did in Canada and Australia, but the proponents of a unitary form of 
government won the day at the National Convention. With the exception of the 
Orange River Colony, which reverted to its old name of Orange Free State,
11
 the 
provinces retained their colonial names but without the “colony”-part (cf. Map 
1.1). 
Image removed for copyright reasons 
 
Map 1.1 South Africa‟s four provinces in 191012 
An expensive compromise (with which South Africa is saddled to this day) was 
reached on the issue of the national capital: Cape Town was to be the legislative 
capital (the seat of parliament), Pretoria the administrative capital (the seat of the 
Union Building), and Bloemfontein the judiciary capital (the seat of the appellate 
division of the Supreme Court). The all-white National Convention also reached a 
compromise on the issue of the franchise. But before I turn to the political lay of 
                                                 
11 Until 1994, this province in east-central South Africa was also referred to simply as the 
Free State. After 1994, the word “Orange” was officially dropped from the name. 
12 Source: http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/natal-votes-formation-union-south-africa 
(accessed February 2012). 
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the land, it is necessary to make some remarks about the make-up of the South 
African population at the time the state was created.  
In 1910, black Africans, who spoke a variety of Bantu languages (of which the 
standardised versions are today known as the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, Tswana, Sotho, 
Tsonga, Swati, Venda and Ndebele),
13
 constituted two-thirds of the inhabitants of 
South Africa, while little more than a fifth of the new country‟s populace were 
white (or considered to be of full European descent). As indicated in Table 1.1, 
so-called coloured people accounted for nine percent of the population, and 
people of Asian (mostly Indian) origin for another three percent. The majority of 
“coloureds” lived in the Cape Province, and the majority of Indians in Natal. Of 
the latter group, some had come to South Africa as traders and merchants, but 
most had been imported (since 1860) as indentured labourers for the sugar 
plantations.
14
 
  As % of total 
African/Black 3,956,000 67% 
White 1,278,000 22% 
Coloured 517,000 9% 
Asian 148,000 3% 
Total 5,899,000  
Table 1.1 Composition of the South African population: 1910 (Source: Giliomee 2003:356) 
 
In the course of the century, these figures would change as indicated in Table 1.2: 
                                                 
13 Listed here in order of size, with the biggest language group (according to the 2011 census) 
first (Statistics South Africa 2012:24).  
14 In terms of apartheid legislation, every individual was classified at birth or upon entry into 
the country as white, black, coloured or Indian. Today, needless to say, any analysis of 
South African society – past or present – in terms of these categories smacks of racism. 
Particularly controversial, so that some scholars completely ignore it, is the distinction 
between Africans/blacks and coloured persons/coloureds (Afrikaans: kleurlinge). Jonathan 
Jansen, for example, states early on in his book on race and the apartheid past (Knowledge 
in the blood, 2009:vi) that “[t]he author uses the word „black‟ to mean every person who is 
not „white‟, since he does not acknowledge apartheid-era classifications of people by 
colour”. For reasons that will become clear, Jansen‟s practice is simply impossible to 
follow in this study. It may also be criticised for distorting reality. Jansen may disapprove 
of it, but many people continue to identify themselves as coloureds, even if they signal their 
discomfort with the term and the apartheid category (as I have done in this paragraph) by 
using the word “so-called”. What is more, recent years have seen coloured Afrikaans 
language activists asserting what they call a “brown” (i.e., neither a black nor a white) 
identity – a phenomenon that I discuss briefly in chapter 5. 
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 1911 1936 1960 1980 1996 
 Million As % of 
total 
Million As % of 
total 
Million As % of 
total 
Million As % of 
total 
Million As % of 
total 
African/Black 4,0 67% 6,6 69% 10,9 68% 20,8 72% 31,1 78% 
White 1,3 21% 2,0 21% 3,1 19% 4,5 16% 4,4 11% 
Coloured 0,5 9% 0,8 8% 1,5 9% 2,6 9% 3,6 9% 
Indian 0,2 3% 0,2 2% 0,5 3% 0,8 3% 1,0 2% 
Total 6,0  9,6  16,0  28,7  40,1  
Table 1.2 Composition of the South African population (apartheid “homelands” included): 
1911–1996 (Source: Thompson 2000:289) 
 
Who were the coloured people in 1910? Christopher Saunders and Nicholas 
Southey explain:  
During the 19
th
 century, and particularly in the decades after the emancipation of 
slaves in 1838, a nascent shared identity developed among [...] diverse components 
of the labouring class in the western Cape [who were not considered to be white]. As 
the social changes brought about by industrialization and the mineral revolution 
began to take hold at the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 centuries, a more 
distinct „Coloured‟ identity emerged. The arrival of significant numbers of Africans 
in the western Cape led Coloureds to assert their difference, on the basis of partial 
descent from European settlers and generations of incorporation into colonial 
society, but the category was an extremely fluid and ill-defined one  
 Though Coloureds had long had close contact with whites, and spoke the same 
language (Afrikaans rather than English), they were not accepted into white society 
and came to occupy an intermediate position in South Africa‟s racial hierarchy 
(1998:45).
15
 
The white population of the Union consisted mainly of two language groups. 
Slightly less than half of the whites spoke English as a first language, while 
slightly more than half spoke Dutch and/or the Dutch-like language Afrikaans – 
the origins of which are covered in chapter 4 of this study. Suffice it to say here 
that Afrikaans was still in the early stages of being codified at the time of South 
Africa‟s unification. In the discussion that follows, white speakers of 
                                                 
15 In 1911, the Cape Supreme Court found that there was no clear way in which coloured 
people could be distinguished from whites (Saunders and Southey 1998:45). The distinction 
was, of course, socially constructed, just like the distinction between “coloured‟ and 
“African/black”. It was for social reasons, too, that all the Afrikaners with a non-European 
progenitress (an estimated seven percent of all Afrikaner families – Giliomee 2003:18) 
came to be regarded as white and not as coloured. 
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Dutch/Afrikaans are referred to as Afrikaners. It should be borne in mind, though, 
that many of these people would not have identified themselves as Afrikaners 
early in the twentieth century, not least because the nationalist project of creating 
Afrikaners out of white Afrikaans speakers had only just begun. By 1910, it 
should also be noted, Afrikaners in the former Boer republics were still known as 
Boers [literally: farmers], but the ethnonym was falling into disuse because of 
urbanisation (Giliomee 2003:356).  
As can be seen in Table 1.3, some 1.3 million white people had made South 
Africa their home by 1910. Afrikaners, who constituted 54 percent of the white 
population, outnumbered English speakers in two of the provinces. In the Orange 
Free State, the ratio of English-speaking whites to Afrikaners was roughly 1:4, 
compared to 1:1.5 in the Cape. In the Transvaal, the two linguistic communities 
were almost of equal size. Only Natal‟s white population was predominantly 
English speaking. Here Afrikaners comprised one out of eight whites.  
 Total Afrikaner total Afrikaners as % of 
total 
Orange Free State 175,435 137,955 79% 
Cape 583,177 339,585 58% 
Transvaal 420,881 204,058 48% 
Natal 98,582 12,300 12% 
Total 1,278,075 693,898 54% 
Table 1.3 Composition of the white population of South Africa: 1910 (Source: Giliomee 
2003:356)  
 
Black, coloured and Indian inhabitants of the yet-to-be-created South African state 
were not represented at the constitutional negotiations of 1908–1909: the thirty 
men who made up the National Convention were drawn from the all-white 
parliaments of the four self-governing colonies. In the Cape, at the time, one tenth 
of the voters were coloured and one twentieth were African. A system of 
economic qualification allowed 80 percent of all white men, thirteen percent of all 
coloured men and 2.25 percent of all black men in the colony to vote (Ross 
2008:88). Members of parliament (MPs), however, had always been white. 
Natal‟s franchise was also non-racial, but only in theory. Indians were barred from 
the vote, while Africans who wished to qualify had to obtain exemption from 
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customary law, which was almost impossible. In the Transvaal and Orange River 
Colonies the franchise was limited to white men and extending it to non-whites 
was unthinkable, at least as far as these colonies‟ representatives at the National 
Convention were concerned.
16
 The Cape delegates, on the other hand, refused to 
disenfranchise anybody (Saunders and Southey 1998:73, 120). Only the real 
chance that the Convention might break up made both sides agree that each 
territory was to retain its own franchise system. Non-whites, however, would not 
be entitled to stand for election to the bicameral Union parliament (comprising a 
house of assembly and, until 1980, a senate). A governor-general was to represent 
the British crown. 
South Africa‟s first constitution thus left the vast majority of the country‟s 
population unenfranchised. In this sense it was “profoundly flawed” as George 
Devenish (a legal scholar turned politician) described it in one of the few articles 
that appeared in the local newspapers of May 2010 in commemoration of the 
centenary of unification.
17
 The Cape liberals, Devenish argued, only accepted the 
constitution because they “fervently hoped that their enlightened race policies 
would in the fullness of time be extended to the north in the newly established 
Union”. Liberals in the UK, too, “naively believed [the constitution] would lead to 
a victory of the Cape‟s relatively enlightened policies in relation to people of 
colour” (Sunday Times, 2010/05/23). The opposite, as we know, happened. Time 
would also prove the South Africa Act of 1909 to be flawed in another respect as 
Devenish pointed out: had its election system not been weighted in favour of rural 
constituencies, the apartheid party would not have won the general election of 
1948. 
                                                 
16 In terms of the (magnanimous) Vereeniging peace treaty, which concluded the Anglo-Boer 
War, the issue of “native enfranchisement” was left for the Boers to resolve once they were 
granted some form of representative assembly – a concession by Britain which translated 
into the betrayal of all the Africans who had supported and even fought for the British 
cause during the war. 
17 Centenary celebrations were largely limited to white circles. This was hardly surprising: to 
most South Africans, the state they found themselves in had lacked legitimacy for the first 
84 years of its existence. 
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According to Giliomee (2004:30–31), the franchise was not the only issue which 
threatened to derail South Africa‟s political unification in 1910. Language policy, 
too, was a bone of serious contention. Dutch was the official language of the Boer 
republics and was used alongside of English in the Cape parliament since 1882. 
After the Boer War, however, the British authorities introduced English as the 
sole official language in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies – a step that 
provided the catalyst to the development of the Second Afrikaans Language 
Movement. This movement, which forms part of the focus of chapter 5 of this 
thesis, enjoyed one of its early victories at the National Convention when two 
delegates from the Orange River Colony – former Free State president Marthinus 
Theunis Steyn, and former judge and Boer War general, James Barry Munnik 
Hertzog – successfully demanded absolute equality of the English and Dutch 
languages, at least before the law. As a result, the Union of South Africa had a 
constitution stipulating in Article 137 that  
[b]oth the English and Dutch languages shall be official languages of the Union, and 
shall be treated on a footing of equality, and possess and enjoy equal freedom, 
rights, and privileges; all records, journals, and proceedings of Parliament shall be 
kept in both languages, and all Bills, Acts, and notices of general public importance 
or interest issued by the Government of the Union shall be in both languages (South 
Africa Act 1909, quoted in Giliomee 2003:276.) 
This stipulation formed one of only two “entrenched clauses” in the constitution, 
the other being the clause that protected the voting rights of non-white men in the 
Cape. To change either of them required a two-thirds majority in a joint session of 
both houses of parliament. The rest of the constitution could be amended by a 
simple majority in each house. 
Together with Abraham Fischer
18
 and ex-Boer War general Christiaan de Wet, the 
language activists Hertzog and Steyn were the political leaders in the Orange 
River Colony on the eve of Union. Their party, the Orangia Unie [Orangia Union] 
(est. 1906), had won the general election that had been held in November 1907, 
                                                 
18 Grandfather of the anti-apartheid activist and communist Bram Fischer (cf. footnote 73). 
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following the granting of responsible government to the colony. In the Transvaal 
Colony, too, the first responsible government was led by two Afrikaners after the 
victory of their party, Het Volk [The Volk] (est. 1905), in the election of February 
1907. They were the former republican guerrillas, generals Louis Botha and Jan 
Smuts.
19
 Botha, as Giliomee describes him, was “a powerfully built man with a 
face that seemed to come straight from a painting by Frans Hals or Hans Holbein” 
(2003:357). The son of Voortrekker parents (like Paul Kruger), he had little 
formal education and could not deliver a speech in English until late in his 
political career (which was preceded by a successful farming career – Giliomee 
2003:271). Smuts, on the other hand, grew up in the Cape Colony and entered 
university (the Victoria College at Stellenbosch, now Stellenbosch University) at 
the age of sixteen. He went on to study law at Cambridge University and upon his 
return home he was appointed state attorney of the ZAR.  
Unlike the representatives of the Orange River Colony, neither Botha nor Smuts 
arrived at the inter-colonial convention as Dutch/Afrikaans activists. In the 1890s, 
Smuts did articulate the view that the young Afrikaans language was second to 
none for “expressing wit or humor as well as the primary emotions of the human 
heart”. In this, he said, it revealed “the character of the [Afrikaner] people” 
(Hancock 1962:359). Like a typical language activist, the Cambridge graduate 
(and former bencher of the Middle Temple) insisted on the use of an interpreter 
when speaking to Joseph Chamberlain during the latter‟s visit to South Africa in 
the wake of the Boer War (Le May 1995:129). Yet, by 1905, Smuts had come to 
believe that English should be the official language of the future South Africa, 
with the use of Dutch allowed (Giliomee 2003:272). His language-in-education 
policy for Transvaal schools, introduced in 1907 to the dismay of Hertzog, made 
English the main medium of instruction. When the official language issue arose at 
the National Convention, Smuts, according to Giliomee, “kept silent” 
(2003:276).
20
 
                                                 
19 President Paul Kruger died in exile in Switzerland in 1904. 
20 Four decades later, just before he was defeated at the polls by the apartheid party, Smuts 
(then prime minister) would complain: “They asked what I did for the Afrikaans language, 
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Holding power in the Cape at the time of unification was the South African Party 
– the newly established parliamentary wing of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr‟s 
Afrikanerbond [League of Afrikaners] (est. 1880).
21
 The Cape prime minister, 
John Xavier Merriman, was an English speaker but one who defended the Boer 
cause during the war of 1899–1902 and afterwards worked towards the 
achievement of self-rule for the defeated republics. From an Afrikaner 
perspective, only Natal was “in English hands”. Here it is vital to note, though, 
that Afrikaner dominance in the political arena was not mirrored in other spheres 
of public life. By 1910, an Anglo-imperial economic and cultural hegemony that 
would prevail for decades to come had been firmly established in South Africa 
(Louw 2004b:21).  
Determined to demonstrate how well it could make amends to its former enemy, 
London advised the first governor-general of the Union of South Africa to invite 
not Merriman, but Botha to become prime minister.
22
 (Natal premier Frederick R. 
Moor was hardly a contender for the position, and the Free State candidate, former 
president Steyn, was unavailable, owing to ill health.) In choosing his cabinet, 
Botha drew from the governments of all four colonies (now provinces) and tried 
to include as many English names as Dutch/Afrikaans names. He appointed his 
deputy and closest associate, Jan Smuts, as minister of the defence, mines and 
interior ministries and Barry Hertzog as minister of justice (and, soon afterwards, 
as minister of native affairs). Together, the parties that had governed the former 
colonies defeated the predominantly English and pro-empire Unionist and Labour 
Parties in South Africa‟s first general election, which took place four months after 
unification in September 1910. A year later, Het Volk, the Orangia Unie and the 
South African Party of the Cape merged to become the South African Party 
                                                                                                                                     
but, good heavens, how much other work did I have to do!” (Thom, quoted in Giliomee 
2003:397). 
21 The party was founded to represent white agrarian interests but gained some black support, 
following an alliance with the mining magnate and imperialist, Cecil John Rhodes.  
22 Ironically, the Dutch language activists, Hertzog and Steyn, supported Merriman. To 
Moodie (1975:74), this is proof that talk of intra-white cooperation after the Boer War was 
not simply empty rhetoric. But South Africa was never to have a first-language English 
speaker as its head of government. 
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(SAP). Two thirds of the delegates at the party‟s founding congress were 
Afrikaans speakers (Giliomee 2004:32). 
The SAP would remain in power for fourteen years. After Botha‟s death in 1919, 
Smuts took over as prime minister. This period in South African history saw the 
consolidation of a racially segregated state with an economy based on racial 
capitalism (that is, a white-owned economy with blacks providing cheap labour – 
cf. Louw 2004b:20–21). The SAP government supported (mainly English-owned) 
mining capital and (mainly Afrikaner-owned) agricultural capital inter alia 
through laws that were designed to maximise African participation in the formal 
labour market. Among the first to be enacted was the 1911 Mines and Works Act, 
which reserved certain jobs for whites and denied black workers the right to 
organise and strike. The Natives Land Act demarcated white-conquered farming 
territory from the so-called native reserves and prevented Africans (in all 
provinces but the Cape) from leasing and purchasing land outside the reserves, 
thus forcing many black renters and sharecroppers
23
 into wage labour. At the time 
of the act‟s passage in 1913, the reserves totalled a mere seven percent of land in 
South Africa. Structures to manage the reserves (including a government-
appointed “Native Conference of African Leaders”) were set up by the Native 
Affairs Act of 1920, while the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 introduced a 
system of influx control – a term that the apartheid government would later also 
use to describe its efforts to curb black urbanisation. According to the latter act, 
only Africans who served white labour needs would be tolerated in the towns and 
cities of South Africa. They had to live in separate “locations”24 on the outskirts of 
the designated white neighbourhoods or typically, if they were migrant 
mineworkers (with homes and families in the reserves), in single-sex compounds. 
                                                 
23 Sharecropping – “the practice whereby blacks were able to make use of white land and to 
recompense the landowner in any form except labour” (Ross 2008:96) – were in effect 
outlawed. 
24 Unlike the term “township” that came to replace it, “location” (Afrikaans: lokasie) has a 
strong pejorative connotation and is therefore used here – though not henceforth – in 
inverted commas. The Afrikaans language has thus far failed to produce an equivalent for 
“township”. 
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All men had to carry “passbooks”25 as proof that they were authorised to be where 
they were. And so the white citizens and the black “non-citizens” of the Union 
were segregated on the land, in the residential areas, and in state administration.  
1.2 The Hertzog years 
In the all-white country they were trying to create, conciliation between 
Afrikaners and local Anglos was the first priority of the SAP leadership. The aim 
was to combine “the best elements of both parts of the colonial population” in “a 
compact South African nationality” within the British Empire (Smuts, quoted in 
Moodie 1975:73). This is perhaps ironic: barely a decade after the end of the 
Boers‟ second war of liberation26 against the British Empire, two of their former 
generals were advocating loyalty to the empire. Yet not all the senior Boer War 
veterans shared the view of Botha and Smuts. Late in 1911, Hertzog began to tell 
public meetings that imperialism was “only good insofar as it [was] useful to 
South Africa” (quoted in Moodie 1975:77), and soon it cost him his cabinet 
position.  
On the platform of “South Africa (and not the British Empire) first”, the axed 
minister went on to found the National Party (NP) in Bloemfontein in the Orange 
Free State on 7 January 1914. It was the first Afrikaner nationalist party that 
appealed to Afrikaners across the old colonial boundaries. Afrikaners, as Hertzog 
defined them, included English-speaking South Africans who “[had] learned to 
unite their concerns with those of the land which they have made their home” 
(quoted in Moodie 1975:74). The founding father of the NP was opposed to 
exclusivism based on language. To Hertzog it was a matter of principle: as early 
as 1891, while completing a doctorate in law in Amsterdam, he expressed the 
view that “France, Holland, Germany, England each had a share in the origin of 
this People, and thus the name Afrikaner includes them all, both Hollander and 
                                                 
25 A legacy of slavery in South Africa. 
26 The Battle of Majuba, referred to in the previous section, was the first. 
30 
 
Englishman” (quoted in Moodie 1975:73–74).27 This, however, did not mean that 
he was unconcerned about the inequality between what he regarded as the two 
constituent streams of the Afrikaner volk. On the contrary, Hertzog challenged the 
English economic and cultural hegemony in South Africa by committing his party 
to compulsory bilingualism in education and the civil service.  
Yet, however welcome they were in the new party, English-speaking South 
Africans did not identify themselves as Afrikaners in 1914 (or ever). Nor were 
they likely to flock to a man who had policies in mind that would compel them 
and their children to learn a language of lesser status than their own. Dutch would 
have been bad enough, but by 1914, all indications were that it was on its way out 
to make room for a language even less prestigious – Afrikaans. Unsurprisingly, 
Hertzog‟s following was Dutch/Afrikaans speaking. Foremost among them was 
one Daniël François Malan, a dominee [clergyman] in the Dutch Reformed 
Church with a PhD in theology from the University of Utrecht in The 
Netherlands. When Cape Nationalists founded the newspaper De Burger [The 
Citizen; today: Die Burger] to promote their cause in 1915,
28
 Malan left the 
ministry to become its first editor. During the same year he was elected as the 
NP‟s provincial leader in the Cape. 
The first congress of the NP, held on 26 August 1914, unanimously condemned 
South Africa‟s active participation on the side of Britain in the First World War. 
Some 12,000 Afrikaners (many of them poor farmers) from the north-western 
Transvaal, the northern Free State and the northern Cape went further and took up 
arms against the SAP government when the latter decided, on Britain‟s request, to 
invade the German colony of South West Africa.
29
 At the time, one observer made 
                                                 
27 Hertzog was even prepared, as we shall see below, to accommodate coloured South 
Africans in the nation, albeit to a limited extent. 
28 The paper was published by Nasionale Pers [National Press] – a publishing house 
established by Cape Nationalists in 1914. 
29 South Africa conquered the territory and was mandated by the League of Nations to 
administer it. When the League was disbanded in 1946, its successor, the United Nations 
(UN), requested that South West Africa (SWA) be placed under its trusteeship system. 
South Africa refused and it was only in 1966, after a legal battle of twenty years, that the 
UN succeeded in revoking the mandate. Armed conflict about the status of the territory 
(that would last a quarter of a century) ensued in the northern parts of SWA between South 
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the following remark: “I will not say that every follower of Hertzog is seditious, 
but every seditious person claims to be a follower of Hertzog” (Merriman, then in 
retirement, quoted in Giliomee 2003:383). Unlike other famous Boer generals 
(including the commander-in-chief of the Union Defence Force, Christiaan 
Beyers), Hertzog did not participate in the three-month shootout between rebels 
and government troops that came to be known as the 1914 Rebellion. However, in 
the election of 1915, his party capitalised on the government‟s suppression of the 
uprising and exploited public outrage over the imprisonment of the ringleaders, 
and the execution of one of them, Jopie Fourie.  
An army officer who had not resigned his commission before rebelling, Fourie 
was court martialled and executed by firing squad (on a Sunday, without a 
blindfold). Afrikaner nationalist mythology would turn him into a martyr and 
Smuts, who as minister of defence and justice ignored pleas for mercy (including 
those of D.F. Malan), into a murderer of his own people. In the history of 
Afrikaner nationalism, the era of the rebels was also the era of the myth 
manufacturers (cf. section 5.1.2) – men such as Jan F.E. Celliers who, in 1915, 
wrote the following poetic tribute to Fourie (in Afrikaans, of course): 
There goes a bullet, with speed, with speed,  
it‟s wet with Afrikaner blood,  
and grief the message it conveys;  
it comes from Afrikaner rifle,  
it comes through Afrikaner heart.  
But with the mourning, the grief,  
it brings the heart‟s strengths across.  
Sleep softly, true heart so brutally pierced, 
because, moving, moving time and tide,  
still the bullet shall spread its tidings;  
and where it hits, its wound never heals;  
                                                                                                                                     
African forces and the South West African People‟s Organisation (SWAPO). On 21 March 
1990, SWA gained independence as Namibia. 
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and what it hits, it is sanctified!  
(Opperman (ed.) 1983:43).
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The NP captured half the Afrikaner vote in the party‟s first election, drawing 
mainly on the support of lower-class Afrikaners (smaller farmers and the urban 
poor), but also attracting votes of affluent western Cape farmers
31
 and a petit 
bourgeoisie “insecure in the face of anglicisation and urbanisation” (Thompson 
2000:154). Five years later, in the election of 1920, it received enough votes to 
become the ruling party, but Smuts and the Unionists merged to form a new SAP 
which won the 1921 election comfortably. What led to the SAP‟s eventual defeat 
at the polls was Smuts‟ suppression of another militant uprising: the so-called 
Rand Revolt, which broke out on the second day of 1922, when white 
mineworkers went on strike in protest of a decision by the Chamber of Mines to 
start using black labour in semi-skilled jobs that had previously been reserved for 
whites. What the mine bosses were trying to do was to cut costs: at the time, as 
Moodie (1975:90) explains, the ratio of white miners to black miners in South 
Africa was 1:9; yet, the total wages paid to blacks was barely more than half of 
the white total. Stated differently, the wages of white miners were fifteen times 
those of black miners, who could easily be employed in semi-skilled positions 
(Thompson 2000:155). 
January and February of 1922 saw white workers (and their wives) marching the 
streets of Johannesburg under banners proclaiming, rather incongruously: 
“Workers of the world unite and fight for a white South Africa”. While the leaders 
were English speakers, the majority of the strikers were Afrikaners. They formed 
commandos as in the days of the ZAR and defiantly raised the old ZAR flag as 
their English-speaking counterparts waved the red flag. As was the case in 1914, 
nostalgia for the old Boer republics was part and parcel of Afrikaner protest in 
1922. A commission of inquiry into the Rand Revolt found afterwards that “the 
majority of the revolutionary forces” were aimed at “the destruction of the 
                                                 
30 Source: http://www.afrikanergeskiedenis.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/7-September-
Genl-Beyers-verdring-en-Jopie-Fourie-gefussileer.html (accessed March 2013). 
31 The commercial maize farmers of the eastern and western Transvaal would not be 
converted to the National Party before 1948. 
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existing order and the formation of an independent Republic” (Report of the 
Martial Law Inquiry Judicial Commission, 1922, quoted in Giliomee 2003:333). 
The strike became increasingly violent, and by March, it had escalated into a full-
blown insurrection. Ten thousand workers virtually seized Johannesburg. Smuts 
declared martial law and sent in twice as many soldiers, armed to the teeth. For 
the first time in history, a government used an air force against its own civilians as 
it bombed white working-class suburbs (Louw 2004b:23). After a week of 
fighting, leaving close on 700 people injured and at least 150 dead, the workers 
surrendered. Many were imprisoned and four were executed. If earlier suppression 
of strikes had not yet alienated the white workforce from the SAP, Smuts‟ conduct 
in 1922 finally did.
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One outcome of the Rand Revolt was a seemingly unlikely electoral pact between 
Hertzog‟s anti-imperialist Afrikaner nationalist party33 and the predominantly 
English Labour Party, led by Colonel F.P.H. Creswell, which valued its imperial 
connections very highly. Yet the alliance, formed in 1923, was only natural, as the 
two parties would target the same constituency in the election the following year: 
white workers whom they would promise to protect not only from a capitalist 
regime with blood on its hands, but also from black job competition. In his 
election campaign, Hertzog accommodated his ally and steered clear of anti-
imperialist propaganda.  
Despite its call for intensified racial segregation, the Nationalist-Labour Pact also 
sought the support of the Cape‟s black and coloured electorate (who could only 
                                                 
32 One would assume that white workers would have supported the Labour Party, and some 
Afrikaner workers did. Others, however, preferred the SAP to an imperialist party with no 
Afrikaners among its MPs. 
33 According to Johnson, the NP was at that stage also an embryonic labour party: its 
supporters were “instinctively anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, tending to argue that 
capitalism and imperialism were indivisible” (2004:199). To them, Smuts now stood too 
closely not only to the British Empire but also to the English-speaking Randlords (i.e., the 
mining magnates). For a while, Hertzog even styled himself as a communist. In 1919 he 
expressed support for the Bolshevik revolution, leaving most of South Africa stunned and 
the International Socialist League, the forerunner of the South African Communist Party, 
unconvinced. Five years later, in his campaign for the 1924 election, he declared the plight 
of white workers “the most important issue for the survival and welfare of the country” 
(quoted in Giliomee 2003:335). 
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vote for white candidates) and managed to capture the majority of the coloured 
vote. In the end, the 1924 election saw the Nationalists gain sixteen parliamentary 
seats and Labour five, which was more than adequate to bring the so-called Pact 
to power. It was the first of only three elections in the history of South Africa (so 
far) that produced a change of government, and the only one in which class 
conflict played an overt role.  
Hertzog has been described as “a pragmatist who recognized the extent of Anglo 
power [in the Union and] opted to work within the empire‟s framework to 
improve the Afrikaners‟ lot” (Louw 2004b:21). During his first term as prime 
minister, that was exactly what he did – blatantly to the detriment of black 
workers. “The native cannot blame us if we look after the interests of our people 
first”, he told parliament as he introduced legislation in terms of which “civilised” 
or white labour was entitled to higher wages than “uncivilised” or black labour 
(Davids 1996:57–58). This law, the Wage Act of 1925, was designed to protect 
the interests of unskilled white workers. The rest of the white labour force 
benefited from the so-called Colour Bar Act of 1926 (the Mines and Works 
Amendment Act) which reserved skilled and semi-skilled positions for them. The 
Pact government further addressed the high levels of white unemployment 
through the expansion of secondary industries and the establishment of a state 
sector in these industries. Amongst other things, a state corporation for the 
manufacture of iron and steel (ISCOR) was created. In accordance with 
government policy, black workers were replaced with higher-paid white ones in 
state-owned or controlled enterprises. Of these, the railways became the foremost 
employer of white labour.  
The Pact‟s industrial and labour policies should be seen against the background of 
the so-called poor white problem or, more accurately, the problem of poor 
Afrikaners, which accompanied their urbanisation during the first four decades of 
the twentieth century. Afrikaner poverty had been a feature of the rural landscape 
since the late nineteenth century, but the disintegration of the community‟s 
pastoral way of life after the Boer War and the mass urbanisation that followed 
dramatically had intensified the problem. For Afrikaners, as Giliomee sums it up, 
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early urbanisation was “a rapid, chaotic, and almost always traumatic process” 
(2003:323). It did result in the development of a small middle class (which grew 
steadily over the decades), but the vast majority of Afrikaners who arrived in the 
cities and mining towns became wage labourers (if they were lucky enough to find 
work in the hostile English environment) and were extremely impoverished. The 
situation of black workers was, of course, even bleaker. But the distance was 
shrinking, and from the (obviously racist) point of view of Afrikaner nationalists 
that was the heart of the poor white problem: “[Urban Afrikaners] were working 
like black people, taking orders like black people, living in shabby residential 
streets adjacent to black shanty towns” (Salomon, quoted in Giliomee 2003:324). 
In what Louw (2004b:22) describes as racial capitalism‟s ethnic class-ranking 
system, Afrikaner workers formed an intermediate group between English-
speaking capitalists and professionals and a small Afrikaner petit bourgeoisie on 
the one hand, and black migrant workers on the other hand. Hertzog‟s mission 
was to facilitate the upward mobility of these white workers or, at least, prevent 
their downward mobility. 
Facilitating the upward mobility of middle-class Afrikaners would require a 
different strategy. John Hall (1995:17), amongst others, points out that the 
decision of a state to conduct official business in a single language has virtually 
always placed some in the position of facing blocked or downward mobility. That 
was not quite the case in South Africa when Hertzog took over the reins as prime 
minister. As a result of his campaign at the inter-colonial convention of 1908–
1909, the South African constitution compelled the state to conduct its business in 
both English and Dutch. This, however, did not solve what the Afrikaners of the 
early 1920s regarded as two language problems. The first was that Afrikaans, 
which had boasted a standardised orthography since 1917, had replaced Dutch as 
their language. The second problem was that the SAP government appeared to 
have paid only lip service to the achievement of societal bilingualism (i.e., the 
implementation of the constitution‟s language clause). Afrikaners who were 
employed or who sought employment in the civil service were not rewarded for 
being bilingual. When the Pact came into power, almost a third of the Union‟s 
13,000 civil servants could not speak Afrikaans, while the proportion of 
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monolingual Afrikaans-speaking civil servants was negligible (0.1 percent – Brits, 
Spies and Grundlingh 2007:253). Both problems were addressed by Hertzog‟s 
minister of the interior, education and public health, D.F. Malan. In 1925, owing 
to his efforts, the meaning of Dutch in the Union Constitution was redefined to 
include Afrikaans, which thus became an official language of South Africa.
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Malan was also responsible – directly or indirectly – for the appointment of more 
bilingual individuals (i.e., Afrikaners) in the civil service. If anybody‟s upward 
mobility was affected negatively, it was that of monolingual English speakers. 
The position of white farmers, the majority of whom were Afrikaners, also 
improved under Hertzog, inter alia as a result of market control activities 
(Thompson 2000:156). In short, the cause of the Hertzog administration 
was that of Afrikaner upliftment, [...] and its method was that of state intervention. 
„Socialist nationalism‟ [...] was soon to undergo a sinister inversion as some of the 
young Turks in Hertzog‟s party became infatuated with a new political philosophy 
that arose in Europe. But for the moment it was simply socialism intermixed with 
nationalism (Sparks 1990:134). 
With the ardent activist for language equality he had in Malan, Hertzog could 
pour his energies into the realisation of another major goal that he had set for the 
NP at the time of its formation: South Africa‟s independence. At the Imperial 
Conference of 1926, he played a key role in the drafting and acceptance of the 
Balfour Declaration, according to which the United Kingdom and its dominions 
formally became 
autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way 
subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though 
united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of 
the British Commonwealth of Nations (quoted in Davenport and Saunders 
2000:303).
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34 This step was not disputed by the opposition. 
35 The Balfour Declaration was reinforced by the Statute of Westminster of 1931 and the 
Status of the Union Act of 1934. Like Smuts before him and the early apartheid premiers 
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For Hertzog, the old Boer dream had come true: we are just as free as the English 
volk, he proclaimed on his return from London, 
and he who seeks more freedom seeks the impossible. With respect to the empire, 
there ought to be no fear of schism because it is in our interest to remain within it. 
We should be stupid to withdraw (Scholtz, quoted in Moodie 1975:92; Moodie‟s 
translation). 
South Africa was now entitled to a national flag. On the question of whether the 
Union Jack should form part of it, parliament was split along linguistic lines and 
the debate was bound to be prolonged and acrimonious. In the end, the Afrikaner 
nationalists capitulated, but only because the flag of their old enemy was dwarfed 
in the final design by their own symbols: the flag of the Prince of Orange and 
those of the old Boer republics (cf. Figure 1.1). On Union Day in 1928, two years 
after Malan had first introduced the Nationality and Flag Bill, South Africa‟s 
Orange-white-blue (as the tricolour became known among Afrikaners) was 
hoisted alongside the “flag of the Empire” – the latter, Hertzog told parliament, 
now merely an expression of “our relationship with the other members of the 
commonwealth of nations” (quoted in Davenport and Saunders 2000:304).  
Image removed for copyright reasons 
 
Figure 1.1 South African flag 1928–1994 
A decade after the flag debacle, shortly before the end of Hertzog‟s premiership, 
the government would adopt Die Stem van Suid Afrika [The Call of South Africa] 
as the Union‟s national anthem alongside of God save the King/Queen. Only in 
1957, when it became South Africa‟s only national anthem, was Die Stem 
officially translated into English. Written by language activist C.J. Langenhoven 
and set to music by M.L. de Villiers, the song had four verses, of which only the 
first (quoted below) was normally sung: 
                                                                                                                                     
after him, Hertzog failed to convince Britain to allow South Africa to incorporate the 
protectorates of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Swaziland. 
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Die Stem van Suid-Afrika The Call of South Africa
36
 
 
Uit die blou van onse hemel, uit die diepte van 
ons see, 
oor die ewige gebergtes waar die kranse 
antwoord gee, 
deur ons vér verlate vlaktes met die kreun van 
ossewa –  
ruis die stem van ons geliefde, van ons land 
Suid-Afrika. 
Ons sal antwoord op jou roepstem, ons sal offer 
wat jy vra: 
Ons sal lewe, ons sal sterwe, ons vir jou, Suid-
Afrika! 
 
 
Ringing out from our blue heavens, from our 
deep seas breaking round; 
Over everlasting mountains where the echoing 
crags resound; 
From our plains where creaking wagons cut 
their trails into the earth –  
Calls the spirit of our Country, of the land that 
gave us birth. 
At thy call we shall not falter, firm and 
steadfast we shall stand, 
At thy will to live or perish, O South Africa, 
dear land. 
 
Apart from introducing discriminatory labour legislation, Hertzog also contributed 
to the existing body of segregationist legislation during his first term as prime 
minister (when he was also minister of native affairs), adding inter alia the Native 
Administration Act and the Immorality Act, both of 1927. The former act laid the 
foundation for apartheid‟s system of indirect rule by formalising the role of 
traditional African leaders within the local government of the reserves, while the 
latter outlawed sexual relations between whites and Africans. In its approach to 
the coloured population – whose support it wished to retain – the Pact was more 
accommodating. It increased government spending on coloured education by 
more than half (but continued to spend much more on white education) and 
introduced old-age pensions for coloureds (which were smaller than white 
pensions). Theoretically, in terms of government policy, white and coloured 
workers had to be given preference in the job market over black workers, but in 
practice whites were always favoured over coloureds (Giliomee 2004:37–38). 
With South Africa “just as free as the English volk”, at least in Hertzog‟s mind, 
and with not much to gain from anti-big capital propaganda, the Nationalists 
fought and won the 1929 election on their own (i.e., without the Labour Party) 
under the slogan of the swart gevaar [black peril]. This issue – the so-called 
                                                 
36 Source: http://www.fak.org.za/wp-content/uploads/blerkas/woorde/002.txt and 
http://www.salanguages.com/anthem/diestem.htm (accessed July 2011). In the spirit of 
reconciliation, the first four lines of Die Stem were included – in Afrikaans – in South 
Africa‟s post-apartheid national anthem, “Nkosi Sikelel‟ iAfrika” [God bless Africa]. 
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native question
37
 – was the theme of only two elections in South Africa prior to 
1948: those of 1929 and 1938. It is crucial to understand, though, that no party 
ever opposed white supremacy. Racial segregation per se was not at stake in 
1929: the SAP stood by the segregationist principles it had embodied in 
legislation while in government. What distinguished Smuts‟s campaign from that 
of Hertzog was the way in which the latter completely ignored the question 
regarding justice for all in South Africa. Unsurprisingly, the NP lost most of its 
coloured support to the SAP.  
After the NP victory in 1929 more segregationist legislation followed. Hertzog 
failed to secure the two-thirds parliamentary majority that he needed to remove 
Cape Africans who qualified from the common voters‟ roll, but in 1930 he 
reduced that segment of the electorate from 3.1 percent to 1.4 percent by 
enfranchising white women (Davenport and Saunders 2000:326). The proportion 
of coloured voters shrunk from eleven percent to six percent (Giliomee 
2004:38).
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1.3 Fusion and the birth of “purified” Afrikaner nationalism 
Despite the bitterness that marked the election of 1929, differences between 
Hertzog and Smuts were not of such a nature that it prevented them from forming 
a coalition government before the 1933 election and fusing their parties into the 
United South African National Party – shortened to United Party (UP) – in 1934. 
Hertzog remained prime minister and Smuts became his deputy. The move was, 
for the most part, an attempt to stabilise a country that found itself in the midst of 
the Great Depression and a severe drought. For some, though, it spelled the end of 
Afrikaner nationalism. Resenting the English/imperialist/pro-big-capitalist 
                                                 
37 At the time, the term rassevraagstuk [race question] was still used to refer to tensions 
between the two white communities, which were thought of as two races. 
38 The government‟s initial plan was to enfranchise both white and coloured women, but to 
remove coloured people born from liaisons with Africans from the voters‟ roll along with 
all Africans who qualified for the franchise. According to Giliomee (2004:38), this attempt 
to classify coloured people alienated them from the NP. The latter‟s efforts to win the 
coloured vote would end with coalition and fusion in 1933 and 1934. 
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element that Smuts brought with him into the new party, a quarter of the NP‟s 
parliamentary representatives broke away to form the Gesuiwerde [Purified] 
National Party (GNP) under the leadership of D.F. Malan. They were the 
republican faction in the NP who had not shared Hertzog‟s enthusiasm about the 
Balfour Declaration back in 1926. Prominent among them was N.J. van der 
Merwe – a former dominee like the party leader. “Our ideal is the Republic of 
South Africa”, he had proclaimed in 1930 shortly after establishing a 
parliamentary pressure group to promote this ideal within the NP (Moodie 
1975:92–95). Within the new UP, Van der Merwe and his fellows knew, it would 
have been a still-born cause.  
The break between Hertzog and the “purifieds” has been described in many ways 
but Sparks‟s analogy probably summarises it best: 
[W]hen after nine years as prime minister [Hertzog] felt he had achieved [his goal], 
that all the rights he had claimed for Afrikanerdom were now secured and that the 
time had arrived for its act of reconciliation [with the English stream of the volk], the 
booster fired and Hertzog fell away like the spent shell of a launching rocket while 
Afrikaner nationalism soared away on its new course (1990:149). 
In the first election after fusion, which was held in May 1938, Malan‟s party won 
27 seats against 111 for the UP (and eight for the Dominion Party).
39
 Although 
this meant that there were seven more men on the opposition benches than before 
the election, all bar one of the GNP‟s new MPs represented constituencies in the 
party‟s stronghold: the rural Cape.40 In the Transvaal, the UP lost no seats to the 
GNP, and in the Free State only one (O‟Meara 1983:119–120). Judging by its 
performance at the polls, Afrikaner nationalism was hardly “soaring away on a 
new course”. Yet outside parliament, it was gaining momentum, and the decade to 
                                                 
39 Led by Colonel C.F. Stallard and confined mainly to Natal, this staunchly pro-empire 
Dominion Party broke away from the SAP in 1934 for reasons diametrically opposed to 
Malan‟s reasons for leaving the NP.  
40 The “purified” NP started out as a party dominated by Kapenaars [inhabitants of the Cape 
Province]. Of the nineteen founding MPs only five were northerners: four represented Free 
State constituencies, while a single one, the hardliner Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom (who 
would became prime minister of apartheid South Africa in 1954), hailed from the Transvaal 
(Van der Westhuizen 2007:23). 
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follow would provide an object lesson in the power of culture or, more accurately 
in Afrikaner case, kultuurorganisasies [cultural organisations] in the lives of 
nationalist movements. Chapter 5 of this study examines the role of these 
organisations – and then particularly the secret Broederbond – in the rise of 
“purified” Afrikaner nationalism. 
The mid- to late-1930s marked the peak of segregation in South Africa‟s pre-
apartheid history. In 1936, with the old SAP now behind him, Hertzog finally had 
enough support in parliament to change the constitution and close the common 
voters‟ roll to Africans in the Cape. In fact, he had overwhelming support: when 
the Native Representation Bill was laid before a joint session of the upper and 
lower houses, 94 percent of the senators and MPs voted in favour of it. According 
to the new act (the Natives Representation Act), the disenfranchised Cape 
Africans could now only elect three white people to represent them in the house of 
assembly, while black people in all four provinces could indirectly elect a total of 
four white senators. The act introduced communal representation in the form of a 
consultative (i.e., powerless) Natives Representative Council and was 
supplemented by the Native Trust and Land Act (also of 1936), which enlarged 
the reserves from the existing 10.4 million to 17.6 million morgen
41
 – purportedly 
to compensate blacks for the loss of the common-roll franchise. In truth, the latter 
act reinforced the principle of territorial segregation and imposed further 
restrictions on Africans outside the reserves (which now made up thirteen percent 
of land in South Africa). 
Eleven lone liberals voted against the proposed legislation, foremost among them 
the Afrikaner, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr (nephew of the Afrikanerbond leader), who 
had replaced Malan in 1934 as minister of the interior, education and public 
health. African reaction, as Johnson sums it up, “was one of outrage and despair – 
for it was now brutally obvious that the government, far from evolving towards 
more progressive policies, was heading steadily backwards” (2004:123). To 
                                                 
41 One morgen equals 0.856 hectares. The term is Dutch for “morning” and originally referred 
to the amount of land that could be ploughed before midday. 
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Malan and his party the new policies represented a step in the right direction, but 
not nearly a big enough step. Unlike Hertzog, who believed that, “if we want to do 
justice to the Coloured person, we should have to include him among the Whites 
industrially, economically, and politically [read: though not socially]” (quoted in 
Tatz 1962:262), the GNP wanted to see the Cape‟s coloured voters 
disenfranchised too. This would eventually happen (in 1956), but not before the 
Nationalists had seized power and had fabricated for themselves the two-thirds 
majority required to change the constitution (cf. Van der Westhuizen 2007:44–
50). 
In its 1938 election manifesto, the GNP declared that it would put a stop to any 
form of black/coloured representation in parliament, to the transfer of more state-
purchased land to the reserves, and to “the uncontrolled influx of redundant blacks 
into urban areas” (Brits 1994:100). In short, the Nationalists vowed to reverse the 
“undesirable” practices of racial integration that were taking place in South 
Africa, despite the country‟s segregationist laws. Theirs was a policy of complete 
segregation between black and white in all spheres of life. It was not the policy of 
apartheid yet, but in the studies of volkekundiges (apartheid‟s anthropologists – cf. 
section 2.2) and other Afrikaner academics that policy was beginning to take 
shape. 
1.4 South Africa at war and Afrikanerdom divided 
On 4 September 1939, a day after Britain had declared war on Germany, Hertzog 
was marginally defeated by Smuts (80 votes to 67) in a parliamentary vote on 
South Africa‟s participation on the Allied side. Smuts believed the future of 
humanity was at stake. Hertzog, who proposed neutrality, could not see why 
South Africa should pay in blood and money
42
 to defend Britain and her empire. 
                                                 
42 In the end, South Africa‟s participation in the war contributed to a long boom in the 
country‟s economy, which lasted from the mid-1930s through to the 1960s. Yet South 
Africa did pay in blood. For all operations outside the Union the government relied on 
volunteers only. Some 200,000 uniformed South Africans took part in the war, half of 
whom were Afrikaners. Among the latter was “Sailor” Malan, who flew for the Royal Air 
43 
 
As was the case in respect of the flag debate of the previous decade, the house of 
assembly was divided along linguistic lines: most English-speaking MPs voted 
along with Smuts, and most Afrikaner MPs along with Hertzog. When the 
governor-general refused the latter‟s request to dissolve parliament and call a 
general election, Hertzog resigned and Smuts became prime minister for the 
second time. On 6 September 1939, South Africa, too, was at war with Germany. 
In her diary, a seventeen-year-old Afrikaner nationalist, Elsa Joubert,
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 interpreted 
the developments as follows: 
Monday 5 September 1939  
Wrote [a] history [examination]. Badly. Who can study history when we are making 
history ourselves? A terrible excitement reigns. Hertzog made a speech as last in 
1914. Of national destination [volksbestemming] and of loyalty. Tears were shed 
over it. But when Parliament had to vote, the National Party plus Hertzog people got 
only 68 votes and the Smuts people 81. Therefore, Smuts‟s plan went through – S.A. 
declared war on Germany! Hertzog resigned as prime minister. But it does not 
matter, our volk is together again! (Joubert 2005:212). 
6 September 1939  
Still, huge excitement [...] Hertzog is off to the Free State, Smuts is prime minister 
with a majority of 13, and forms his new cabinet. [N.C.] Havenga and [Oswald] 
Pirow [cf. below] are on Hertzog‟s side, great joy about that but terrible war news, 
Poland is being invaded on all sides, Germany is bombing the area, England is 
calling up troops. Dr Malan says: Gen Hertzog proposed neutrality, I follow him 
again as my leader, it is terribly noble of him [Dr Malan], I [the diarist] really 
admire him. Huge farewell for Malan and Hertzog at the station in Cape Town, the 
crowd weeps [...], singing: Now encouraged we venture out again, trusting 
unwaveringly in thy word [Nou treën wij weer bemoedigd voort, in vast vertrouwen 
op U woord]
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 (Joubert 2005:213). 
                                                                                                                                     
Force in the Battle of Britain. Nearly 9,000 South Africans were killed in action. (Cf. 
Davenport and Saunders 2000:346; Giliomee 2003:441.) 
43 Four decades later, Elsabé Antoinette Murray Joubert would achieve international acclaim 
for her novel The long journey of Poppie Nongena which tells the story of a black woman‟s 
suffering under apartheid. Originally published in Afrikaans as Die swerfjare van Poppie 
Nongena (1978), it was translated by Joubert herself for publication in English in 1980. 
Translations into twelve other languages followed. 
44 Note that the language of this hymn is Dutch and not yet Afrikaans. 
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7 September 1939  
On Saturday there will be a grand reunification festival at the [yet to be completed] 
Voortrekker Monument, there is talk of a rebellion. And of a republic (Joubert 
2005:213). 
12 September 1939  
Most of the countries for example The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Russia, Italy 
etc. are staying neutral. Father says he cannot see how England can win. He says he 
hopes she gets her arse thoroughly kicked [...] Everywhere UPs are deciding whether 
to follow Hertzog‟s or Smuts‟s policy. The majority are following Hertzog. 
Saturday‟s festival at Monument Hill was wonderful – 10 000 cars and not a single 
accident. 400 000 people. Hertzog says the UP is done with, he and Malan stand 
united (Joubert 2005:214).  
In the event, thirty-seven parliamentary representatives of the UP followed 
Hertzog into a new party, the Volksparty [Volk‟s Party], which merged with 
Malan‟s GNP in January 1940 to become the Herenigde [Reunited] National 
Party (HNP). For a brief moment, it seemed as if the NP was reunited under its 
founding father. But Afrikaner nationalism had outgrown Hertzog. He had 
abandoned republicanism more than decade earlier and continued to insist that 
white English speakers were “also entitled to a place in the South African sun” 
(Wilkins and Strydom 1978:61). Among the Malanites, by contrast, there were by 
now quite a few extremists – including Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, editor of the 
Transvaler
45
 – who advocated the establishment of a Christian-national Afrikaner 
republic in which Afrikaans would be the sole official language. And the more 
moderate Malanites were advocating separate single-medium Afrikaans and 
English schools – a cause which Hertzog, who believed in Afrikaans-English 
bilingual schools for all white children, had always condemned. Within a year of 
the NP‟s “reunification”, in November 1940, Hertzog stormed out of a provincial 
party congress and retired from politics. A few of his loyal followers formed the 
Afrikaner Party (AP), but the majority of MPs who had left the UP with him 
                                                 
45 Established in 1937 and published by Voortrekkerpers [Voortrekker Press], the paper was 
the GNP‟s mouthpiece in the Transvaal. When the British royal family visited South Africa 
in 1947, Verwoerd‟s coverage of the event was confined to a single sentence: “The 
presence of certain visitors [in Johannesburg] today will cause some dislocation to the 
traffic” (Hopkins 2006:40). 
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remained in the HNP, now led again by Malan. Aged 76, an embittered Hertzog 
died in 1942.  
In general, Afrikaners opposed South Africa‟s entrance into the Second World 
War (even though it would soon provide numerous of them with job 
opportunities).
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 True to his materialist approach to history, O‟Meara (1983:121) 
ascribes this to the fact that “the economic interests of neither farmers nor white 
workers nor Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie dictated support for the war”. He stresses, 
however, that anti-British sentiments played an equally important role. At this 
point, again, it is worth considering a diary entry by the young Elsa Joubert. On 5 
September 1939, after learning that opponents of Hertzog had put out the flame 
which had been kept burning since the Ossewagedenktrek [Oxwagon Memorial 
Trek] of the previous year (in which she had participated – cf. section 5.1.3), 
Joubert wrote: 
The Voortrekker torch is quenched. Tied to it is a Union Jack with the words: „To 
Hell with Hertzog and neutrality‟.  
 I begin to cry. Mother says: „Come now, Elsa,‟ but I cannot help myself, our 
torch, our flame that had to burn until we were free, why did they have to do it, it 
was low and mean, I hate the man who did it, I hate all the English, they could not 
have thought up anything meaner, there will now be a deep wound, together with the 
joy about the reunification of our volk (Joubert 2005:213).
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South Africa‟s wartime cabinet was the first to contain a majority of English 
speakers. It was headed by two Afrikaners, but in the eyes of the Nationalists 
Smuts was “the handyman of the Empire”, while his deputy and heir apparent, Jan 
Hofmeyr, personified that dangerous ideology called liberalism. Smuts, who had 
led successful military campaigns in German South-West Africa and in East 
Africa during the First World War, now became a field marshal in the British 
army. Once again, he served in the British war cabinet. Jan Smuts was the only 
                                                 
46 According to Grundlingh, most Afrikaners who volunteered to serve in the war did so not 
out of idealism, but out of “rather more prosaic pecuniary considerations” (1999:360). 
47 Phrases in italics are in English in the original text. Note also the entry of 7 September 
1939: “Read in the paper at lunch time: there is another flame, the extra one was not put 
out. It still burns and is now guarded day and night. The holy flame still burns” (Joubert 
2005:213). 
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person to have signed the peace treaties that concluded both the First and the 
Second World War, and the only person to have signed the charters of both the 
League of Nations and the United Nations – two organisations, which he helped to 
create. When South Africa went to the polls in 1943, the prime minister‟s status as 
an international statesman and the fact that the tide was turning in favour of the 
Allied forces augured well for the UP. Yet, while the governing coalition of the 
United, Labour and Dominion parties still controlled almost half of Union‟s rural 
constituencies and virtually all the urban ones after the election (O‟Meara 
1983:133), the UP‟s share of the Afrikaner vote was down from 40 percent to 32 
percent (Davenport and Saunders 2000:353).  
Anti-imperial (and pro-German) sentiments among Afrikaner nationalists 
translated not only into votes for the HNP but also into support for a range of pro-
Nazi, proto-fascist movements. With their hopes pinned on a victory for the Axis, 
these movements sought to transform South Africa into a national-socialist 
Afrikaner republic, “severed from the British Crown and founded on the principle 
of „state authority‟ and national discipline” (O‟Meara 1983:125). They shared a 
contempt for the parliamentary system and rejected democratic elections (even 
those that catered for whites only) in favour of rule by the will of a Führer (or, in 
the Afrikaner case, the will of a general and field-cornets – Malan 1959:189).  
Most formidable among these movements was the gender-inclusive Ossewa-
Brandwag [Oxwagon Sentinel – OB], which in 1941 claimed a membership of 
between 300,000 and 400,000 (Malan 1959:188; Van der Westhuizen 2007:34).
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Established in February 1939 to preserve the “oxwagon spirit” of the centenary 
celebration of the Great Trek (cf. section 5.1.3), the OB reinvented itself late in 
1940 as a paramilitary political organisation. Under the leadership of J.F.J. (Hans) 
van Rensburg, who had resigned as administrator (or governor) of the Free State 
to take up the position, the organisation‟s Stormjaers [Storm Troopers] embarked 
on a sabotage campaign aimed at disrupting the war effort. The government 
                                                 
48 Giliomee (2007:301) puts the estimate much lower at 100,000. Yet even if his information 
is closest to the truth, it means that roughly one out of every ten Afrikaners had joined the 
OB by 1941. 
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responded by interning many senior OB members, including the young lawyer 
Balthazar Johannes Vorster, who would become prime minister of South Africa in 
1966. 
Smaller Nazi-inspired organisations that sprang up in South Africa before and 
during World War II included the anti-Semitic South African Christian National 
Socialist Movement or Greyshirts of Louis Weichardt (which never had more than 
2,000 members – Giliomee 2007:300) as well as the Nuwe Orde Studiekring [New 
Order Study Circle – NO]. The latter was established in September 1940 by 
Oswald Pirow, who had met with Hitler the year before while travelling Europe as 
Hertzog‟s defence minister. Several of the HNP‟s parliamentary representatives 
joined the NO, but they were ostracised by the party leadership, not least because 
virtually all of them were ex-UP members. After a short period of cooperation 
with the OB, the HNP set out to neutralise that organisation too. Malan, as Sparks 
explains, “could live with many of Pirow‟s and Van Rensburg‟s ideas, but not 
with the political rivalry they represented” (1990:172).49 What Malan and other 
senior members of his party could not live with was the idea of a dictatorship. 
When election time came in 1943, the schism between the HNP and the national 
socialist splinter groups had deepened to the extent that the party “concentrated its 
main fire not on the governing coalition under Smuts, but against what its 
manifesto termed „the wreckers of Afrikanerdom‟” (O‟Meara 1983:132). Had the 
opposition not been fragmented in 1943, and had thousands of OB and NO 
supporters not abstained from voting (in accordance with their view of elections 
as obsolescent), the election results would have looked differently and the UP 
might have approached the next election – that fateful one of 1948 – with less 
complacency. 
                                                 
49 The question arises as to just how many ideas the NO/OB and the HNP did share at the 
time. In his 1990 book, The mind of South Africa, Sparks argues that “the extent to which 
Afrikaner nationalism was influenced by the ideas and political ethos of Nazi Germany 
during these formative years of the apartheid ideology is something that has been heavily 
downplayed since the collapse and exposure of the Third Reich” (1990:160; cf. also 
Furlong 1991). However, subsequent studies (inter alia Brits 1994) have shown – in my 
view, convincingly – that authors such as Sparks overrate the impact of national socialism 
and fascism on Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. Following Van der Westhuizen 
(2007:36), one may conclude that the relationship did not progress beyond flirtation, but 
that the flirtation was “more than skin-deep”.  
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1.5 “South Africa belongs to us!” 
By the end of the war, national socialism had lost its appeal and Malan had 
convinced the northern extremists in his party that it would be “the epitome of 
political idiocy to ignore the facts and to act as if those 45 percent English 
speakers in our country [i.e., 45 percent of South Africa‟s white population] do 
not exist” (Malan 1964:50). The desired republic, he asserted, could only be a 
“democratically” elected, bilingual, bi-ethnic one. This did not mean that the party 
leader was lukewarm towards republicanism. In the run up to the 1943 election, he 
had told the national congress of the HNP emphatically: “The British connection 
must go; in its place we must have a republic” (Malan 1964:47):  
There, before us, lies the object of our aspiration. There lies the promised land of our 
freedom. There lies the hope of those who had fallen on the Path of South Africa 
since the days of Piet Retief and Andries Pretorius and Hendrik Potgieter.
50
 There 
lies the free, independent, contented republic for which the blood-stained plains, 
strewn with dead man‟s bones, are yearning. There lies our God-ordained 
destination (Malan 1964:43). 
But one does not share with the electorate everything one shares with party 
congresses. As the 1948 election drew closer, the Nationalists stripped their policy 
of controversial attributes. White English-speaking South Africans were assured 
that an HNP government would neither demote their language nor force a republic 
upon them. The aim was not so much to attract the English vote as it was to 
appease moderate Afrikaners who otherwise might have voted for the UP. The 
Rand Daily Mail, for one, remained unconvinced. Supporting the UP, the 
newspaper announced on the morning of 26 May 1948: 
Today is polling day. The main issue before the electorate is whether the present 
Government, represented by the United Party under the leadership of General Smuts, 
will continue to administer the State, or whether the Nationalist Party, led by Dr 
Malan, shall be placed in power to establish a republic.  
 The United Party has 139 candidates in the field and the Labour Party, which is 
collaborating with the United Party, has eight candidates. The Nationalist Party has 
                                                 
50 Voortrekker heroes – cf. chapter 5. 
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nominated only 93 candidates, the Afrikaner Party 11, the Central Group 
(Cadmanites) 11, the South African (Dominion) Party 11 and the Communist Party 
three. There are also 28 Independent candidates.  
 With about 63 members of the Afrikaner Broederbond standing as Nationalist 
Party candidates, it is apparent that the Broederbond is using this election as its 
springboard to obtain full representation in Parliament, as a prelude to the 
achievement of its main objective – the establishment of an Afrikaner republic 
(quoted in Cameron-Dow 2007:54). 
As far as the Nationalists (and the members of the Broederbond) were concerned, 
the issue before the electorate was not their republican ideals, but their policy of 
apartheid. The latter, they believed, was their ticket to power in a country where 
the Second World War had accelerated industrialisation and black urbanisation, 
and where black opposition to racial discrimination was taking on an assertive 
character.
51
 Exploiting white fears of “miscegenation” and black domination, the 
HNP – which contested the election in collaboration with N.C. (Klaas) Havenga‟s 
AP
52
 – told voters that South Africa‟s existing policy of segregation had failed to 
neutralise the swart gevaar and to prevent the oorstroming [swamping] of the 
cities by Africans. Only their unique model of segregation, the Nationalists 
claimed, could save “white civilisation” and Afrikanerdom. In the Free State, the 
election-day edition of Die Volksblad [The Volk‟s newspaper] put it as follows: 
“Break the SAP government or it will break white South Africa” (quoted in Brits 
1994:113). Die Transvaler, still under the editorship of H.F. Verwoerd, called on 
its readers to vote early and to vote against Hofmeyr: “VOTE, THEREFORE, 
FOR THE HNP, THE AP AND INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES THAT 
STAND FOR THE APARTHEID POLICY” (quoted in Brits 1994:114). For Die 
Transvaler and Die Volksblad – as for Die Burger in the Cape Province – election 
day marked the end of a very busy time, during which they collectively emerged 
as the mass ventilator of the apartheid ideology (Rhoodie 1968:53) and as a 
resourceful propaganda machine (Brits 1994:126). 
                                                 
51 August 1946 saw a strike by close on 70,000 African mineworkers. 
52 This electoral pact between the Malanites and the Hertzogites (which was opposed by 
radical northerners such as Verwoerd and Strijdom) would eventually culminate in the 
amalgamation of the HNP and the AP in 1951. 
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The HNP-AP campaign against Hofmeyr was a campaign against liberalism, 
which, in the minds of the Nationalists, was often indistinguishable from 
communism. To them, the danger of these ideologies lay therein that both 
preached gelykstelling [racial levelling]. The truth, as J.P. Brits (1994:131) points 
out, is that liberalism had no hope of making a political breakthrough in South 
Africa in 1948. No party that spoke the language of liberalism stood a chance at 
the polls. In its election campaign, the UP kept asserting that neither the ruling 
party nor its deputy leader (Hofmeyr) supported gelykstelling. Yet while it 
remained a white supremacist party, the UP was less rigid in its approach to “the 
native question” and not as racist in its rhetoric as the Nationalists with their 
master plan to keep the towns and cities of South Africa white. At least some UP 
MPs quietly believed that black and white were potentially equal. This relatively 
liberal stance, according to a widely held view, was what cost Smuts the election. 
To white farmers annoyed by the flow of black labour from the countryside, and 
to white workers frustrated by black competition for jobs, the choice between a 
party that had relaxed influx control and one that promised to tighten it up was 
obvious (O‟Meara 1983:242–247; Marks and Trapido 1987:20).53 
Revisionist studies suggest, however, that the importance of apartheid as a vote-
catching factor in the 1948 election has been overestimated (cf., inter alia, Stultz 
1974; Moodie 1975; Brits 1994). If one views votes against the HNP-AP as votes 
against apartheid, it can be concluded that the policy failed to inspire the 
enthusiasm of more than half of those South Africans who had voted in 1948.
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The trickier question is whether all the crosses next to the names of HNP and AP 
candidates – the vast majority of which were put there by Afrikaners – were 
primarily votes for apartheid. The evidence points to a more complex picture. 
To be sure, Afrikaners voted for the HNP and the AP because they perceived 
Africans as a threat and because they stood to benefit materially from apartheid. 
                                                 
53 Afrikaner commercial and financial interests, in turn, were to benefit indirectly from an 
agriculture-friendly government. 
54 The position of those who did not turn up at the polls – some 58 percent of all potential 
voters (Van der Westhuizen 2007:37) – will, of course, never be known. 
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But politics, and then especially nationalist politics, is about interests and identity. 
Afrikaners also supported the two Afrikaner parties simply because they were 
Afrikaners (or, more accurately, because the nationalist movement had made 
Afrikaners of them by then– a project that I detail elsewhere in this study). An 
anonymous respondent in a survey conducted by Brits explained the reason why 
she voted for the HNP as follows: 
Those days we so to say assumed that an Afrikaner should be a [N]ationalist and that 
was often the case. Look how many of the rural constituencies were undisputed. 
Here among us, one could count the Afrikaners who were [United Party supporters] 
on one hand. You know, [...] many Afrikaners had never trusted General Smuts, 
because there was still Jopie Fourie [the martyr of the 1914 Rebellion] etc. and now 
again he had dragged us through a war and with General Hertzog out of the picture 
those people [Hertzog‟s followers] had come back to the National Party (Brits 
1994:126). 
According to Brits (1994:119–120), sentiments such as these played a more 
decisive role in the election of 1948 than support for apartheid. His argument is 
twofold: If the swart gevaar and swart oorstroming [black swamping of the cities] 
had been foremost in the mind of Afrikaners, (a) these themes would have 
featured far more prominently than they did in letters to the Afrikaans press 
during the run-up to the election, and (b) more urban voters would have deserted 
the UP.  
The belief that it was not primarily enthusiasm for apartheid that brought the 
Nationalists to power is shared by Hermann Giliomee. Implicit in his 
interpretation of the election‟s dynamics is the view that apartheid and Afrikaner 
nationalism were two discrete role-players. “The disastrous aspect of the 1948 
election”, as Giliomee sees it, “was that everybody thought afterwards that it was 
apartheid, and not Afrikaner nationalism or anti-war sentiments,
55
 that had 
clinched the NP‟s victory” (2003:14). The same nationalism/apartheid dichotomy 
underlies his thinking when he claims in an autobiographical essay: “As staunch 
                                                 
55 At this stage, the anti-war vote was largely a vote against the government‟s response to the 
social and economic problems of the post-war years (such as housing and food shortages). 
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[H]NP supporters my parents were Afrikaner nationalists rather than zealous 
supporters of apartheid” (2003:14–15). Afrikaner nationalists, unlike apartheid 
enthusiasts, were committed to what Giliomee portrays as noble projects: 
 a republican project, which longed to see Afrikaners as a community playing 
their role with self-confidence in a country that was as independent from 
Britain as possible; 
 a populist project, which was against the big English corporations, especially 
the Anglo American Corporation, that towered over the economy. [...] The 
nationalists insisted that the state as well as the Afrikaner community as a 
whole should take responsibility for poorer Afrikaners. (My mother played 
an active role in the Afrikaanse Christelike Vrouevereniging [Afrikaans 
Christian Women‟s Association], a women‟s organisation which was 
committed to the upliftment of poor Afrikaners); and 
 a cultural project, which valued mother-tongue education and active 
involvement in the Afrikaans language and cultural movement (2003:14; free 
translation).
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That the Nationalists owed their 1948 victory in no small measure to anti-
imperialist, anti-big-capital and anti-English sentiments (in short: anti-Smuts 
sentiments) has been firmly established in the literature. What Giliomee seems to 
suggest, however, is that the bearers of these sentiments – those Afrikaners who 
longed to be as free, as affluent and culturally as sophisticated as the local Anglos 
or the British – were Afrikaner nationalists, while the defenders of apartheid were 
driven by a different, less righteous cause. I would argue, instead, that republican, 
populist and cultural sentiments were one side of the coin. The flip side was a 
racist belief in white supremacy. The latter might not have been what inspired 
Afrikaners to vote for the HNP-AP, but it was part and parcel of the Afrikaner 
nationalist movement, which, like all nationalist movements, sought to maximise 
its political power. And in a country where Afrikaners formed barely twelve 
percent of the population, power was unattainable without a policy that restricted 
                                                 
56 Giliomee (2004:33) does not deny that control of the state was the ultimate goal of 
Afrikanerdom‟s pre-apartheid economic and cultural movements. Here, however, he 
appears to claim that “the Afrikaner nationalist elite was somehow different to elites the 
world over – that the promotion of their self-interest was tempered by a race and culture-
specific altruism” (Van der Westhuizen 2007:3). 
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the franchise outside the reserves – or, in apartheid‟s terms, the black 
“homelands” – to whites. 
Of those Afrikaner voters who were passionate about apartheid, Giliomee claims, 
many were not racists, but “idealists” who believed that the policy was something 
positive aimed at the upliftment of “black and brown communities” through the 
provision of better social services (2005:14). He draws a similar distinction with 
respect to apartheid‟s ideologues (or what he calls theorists): there were those who 
wanted “to keep down all those who were not white and those who wanted to 
rehabilitate them and recognize their human dignity” – inter alia through the 
large-scale development of the reserves (2003:482). What needs to be pointed out, 
however, is that even these moderate adherents of apartheid – ideologues and 
voters alike – were guilty (at the very least) of racial paternalism. 
Whether the NP had racists or nationalists to thank, the state of the parties in the 
tenth Union parliament (as announced on Friday 28 May 1948) was:  
National Party 70 seats (mainly rural) 
United Party 65 seats (mainly urban) 
Afrikaner Party 9 seats 
Labour Party 6 seats 
Smuts was defeated in his own constituency of Standerton. Ironically, as 
Thompson notes, “the United Party would have won the election if the rural 
electoral divisions had not contained fewer voters than the urban divisions, as laid 
down in the [1909] constitution for which Smuts had been primarily responsible” 
(2000:181). The HNP received only 41.5 percent of the votes cast. It was because 
of South Africa‟s election system and the way in which constituencies had been 
delimited that the party and its AP ally were able to secure 8 seats more than the 
UP-Labour coalition. Had seats been allocated in proportion to votes received, 
UP-Labour would have had 80 seats, the HNP-AP pact 60, and other parties 10 
(Brits 1994:116). Or: had “ninety-one people out of more than a million, 
strategically placed, [...] voted differently, then the United Party would have won 
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four more seats and hung the Parliament – and might have been able to govern 
with the help of the three white representatives of the Africans” (Ross 2008:122). 
To conclude: Two issues dominated white politics in South Africa between 1910 
and 1948: the country‟s relationship with Britain, and the relationship between 
local English speakers and Afrikaners. Occasionally, economic and labour issues 
were also high on the agenda. The “native question” (or what Malan called the 
“colour question”) only rose to prominence in the elections of 1929 and 1938 
when Hertzog‟s NP and Malan‟s GNP ran campaigns based on racist metaphors, 
and then especially the swart gevaar. Recognising the potential of such slogans as 
vote catchers, the Nationalists set out to turn the 1948 election into an election 
about apartheid (Brits 1994:118). In many respects, though, the apartheid election 
was still an election about South Africa‟s status vis-à-vis Britain and about intra-
white relations. While the Rand Daily Mail (quoted above) was mistaken in its 
assumption that an HNP victory would immediately lead to the establishment of 
an Afrikaner republic, fears among English speakers that it would lead to 
Afrikaner domination was well founded. We need only consider one of Malan‟s 
first speeches as prime minister. On 1 June 1948, after a victorious train journey 
from Cape Town to Pretoria, he hailed the outcome of the election as a miracle for 
“us Afrikaners”: 
No one expected this to happen. It exceeded our most optimistic expectations. 
Afrikanerdom has lived under a dark cloud and the future has been black for many 
years. We feared for the future of our children. But the cloud has disappeared and 
the sun is shining once more.  
 In the past, we felt like strangers in our own country, but today South Africa 
belongs to us once more. For the first time since Union, South Africa is our own. 
May God grant that it always remains our own.
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Such was the source of the new prime minister‟s gratitude to God: political power 
was now exclusively in our – that is, in Afrikaner – hands. A horrified Hertzog 
would have said that he was right back in 1935 when he claimed that  
                                                 
57 Source: http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/specialprojects/Luli/Place-in-the-
city/Unit4/unit4.htm (accessed April 2010). 
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when Dr Malan denies that he was influenced, and is still influenced, in his refusal 
to co-operate with the United Party and national unity by [intra-white] racial 
animosity and the desire to dominate over the English section of our population, he 
makes an inaccurate statement (quoted in Wilkins and Strydom 1978:64). 
But Malan soon toned down the rhetoric of an Afrikaner victory. In a radio 
address broadcast on 4 June 1948 (three days after the station speech in which he 
had triumphantly proclaimed that “South Africa belongs to us [Afrikaners]”), he 
sounded almost like Hertzog. There was no mention of a republic. The prime 
minister merely stated that cooperation with Britain would be subject to it not 
affecting the Union‟s status as an independent sovereign state. All local English 
speakers who “prioritised the interests of South Africa above those of any other 
country in the world” (Malan 1964:241) were welcomed into the fold. The 
definition of “National” in “National Party”, Malan explained, was inclusive 
rather than exclusive and encompassed “all sections [read: both white sections] of 
the South African population whose prosperity and happiness we, in all sincerity, 
would like to promote along with mutual friendship and cooperation” (Malan 
1964:241). In a further attempt to allay English fears, he told white South Africa 
that the government‟s policy of equal language rights – “the only basis upon 
which our national unity can be built” – would eventually lead to “the total 
elimination of the so-called [intra-white] race question from the political life of 
South Africa” (Malan 1964:242). As the prime minister saw it, the process of 
“racial” conciliation and nation building could only benefit from the fact that 
“today, for the first time since the formation of the Union, a government exists of 
which the members are all fully bilingual and therefore able to serve both 
population groups each in its own language” (Malan 1964:243). 
English-speaking members of the Opposition would not have described the new 
Government as “bilingual”. To them – and in reality – it was a government of 
Afrikaners, just as its predecessor was a government of English speakers headed 
by an Afrikaner who spoke English most of the time. It must have been this lack 
of language loyalty on the part of Smuts that had prompted Malan to make the 
following remark in the house of assembly on 10 March 1944: 
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There, on the opposite side, next to each other, sit the prime minister [Smuts] and 
the minister of finance [Hofmeyr] – both brilliant students who know Afrikaans and 
English well; I think their level of bilingualism is exceptional. But the prime 
minister will excuse me if I say that, despite his English education, he seems unable 
to part ways with his Swartland ascent. All of us have two hands but only one right 
hand. That, quite obviously, is also true about language. As for the minister of 
finance who comes from an equally privileged background […]: if he switches from 
Afrikaans to English, he reminds one of a fish thrown back into the water. 
Regardless of how bilingual or trilingual one may be, only one language is really 
one‟s own – your mother tongue (Malan 1964:248; free translation). 
Despite its reputation, then, South Africa‟s tenth general election was not only 
about white domination. The question before the electorate was rather: what form 
should white domination take? Or: which one of the two white communities 
should dominate? (Cf. Giliomee 2003:487.) To say this is not to suggest that the 
white electorate was neatly divided along linguistic lines in 1948: the UP still 
managed to garner a fifth of the Afrikaner vote and the apartheid policy attracted 
some English-speaking support for the Nationalists. However, after the election 
no more than a single predominantly Afrikaans-speaking constituency was still in 
UP hands (Brits 1994:117).
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 This was the scenario Malan had in mind when he 
told the crowd who came to meet him at the Pretoria railway station on 1 June 
1948, “South Africa belongs to us”. 
Three days later, when he addressed South Africans over the airwaves, the 74-
year-old prime minister realised that the occasion called for a watered-down 
version of Afrikaner nationalism. Afrikanerdom‟s freshly acquired grasp on 
power was precarious, and the language of ethnic-linguistic exclusivism, like the 
language of republicanism, could only harm what would be his government‟s 
primary project: the implementation of apartheid. Curiously, for a man who had 
claimed in 1942 that “there are many questions in this country, but the most 
serious one [...] is the colour question” (Malan 1964:61), Malan had very little to 
                                                 
58 It was Jeppe, a working-class suburb of Johannesburg, which was represented by Bertha 
Solomon from 1938 to her retirement in 1958. The daughter of Russian Jewish immigrants, 
Solomon was one of South Africa‟s first women‟s rights activists and played a key role in 
the local woman suffrage movement. 
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say about apartheid in his radio address. And yet his preoccupation with the intra-
white “race question”, rather than the “colour question”, did not mark a shift in his 
thinking. If he advocated Afrikaans-English integration, it was because he saw it 
as part of his party‟s plan to curb the trend toward integration across the black-
white divide; if he promoted the idea of an inclusive (white) South African nation 
whose interests took precedence over those of Britain and the Commonwealth, it 
was because Afrikaner nationalists believed, as Giliomee explains, that “white 
unity, as the bedrock of white supremacy, could only be built through the 
development of a single [...] loyalty to South Africa” (2003:494).  
On Monday 7 June 1948, Time magazine published these prophetic words: 
Jan Christian Smuts, the wise, venerable, oak-solid Prime Minister [of the Union of 
South Africa] was out of office. South Africa, which had been considered safe in the 
fold of the British Commonwealth [...] had suddenly embarked on a perverse, 
isolationist, acutely race-conscious road that might lead to secession from the 
Commonwealth and to maltreatment and oppression of the country‟s 9,000,000 non-
Europeans.
59
 
The Nationalist response to such condemnations of apartheid was that the policy 
was misunderstood: it would not entail the oppression of one race by another, but 
the separate, independent development of the different “races”. For non-whites, as 
Malan put it in his radio address of 4 June 1948, apartheid would bring a greater 
measure of self-reliance and self-respect, while at the same time creating more 
opportunities for “free development in accordance with their own nature and 
ability” (Malan 1964:243). Black and white would be “separate but equal”.60  
Statements such as these have led some commentators to conclude that the 
apartheid ideologues were insane. In an academic article in 1991, the literary 
scholar (and later Nobel Prize for Literature laureate) J.M. Coetzee diagnoses 
apartheid as “a form of hubris or madness” (1991:1). Based on an analysis of the 
                                                 
59 Source: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,854382,00.html (accessed April 
2010).  
60 In the mid-1950s apartheid was reinvented by its ideologues as afsonderlike ontwikkeling 
[separate development]. 
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writings of one such an ideologue (to be discussed in the next chapter), Coetzee 
argues that “for at least the phase 1945–48, Geoffrey Cronjé, or the „Geoffrey 
Cronjé‟ that matters, was crazy [and] the electorate which bought the package 
offered by Cronjé and his friends, besides being deceived or self-deceived, was 
also for a time crazy, or at least crazed” (1991:30). A more widely held opinion is 
that apartheid “had grown out of a deep underlying racism” (Johnson 2004:141) 
which compelled its ideologues to develop a whole language to justify the policy 
in an era when the United Nations was about to adopt the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. However, to denounce the apartheid ideologues as insane or their 
labours as a simple case of rationalising racism would be an oversimplification. In 
the next chapter, I trace the development of the apartheid ideology, arguing that it 
was rooted not only in racism but also in the logic of ethnic nationalism.  
For almost forty years, the National Party – which formally dropped Herenigde 
from its name in 1951 when it incorporated the AP – defended apartheid, as did 
the Calvinist church that became known as “the National Party at prayer”. Only in 
the late 1980s would these two key institutions of Afrikaner nationalism begin to 
admit that South Africa took a retrogressive step in 1948. The stance adopted by 
the Dutch Reformed Church in 1986 was that “apartheid as a political and social 
system that wronged people and wrongfully favoured one group above another 
[can no longer] be accepted on Christian-ethical grounds” (quoted in Van der 
Westhuizen 2007:142). A decade later, the last white president of South Africa, 
F.W. de Klerk, made the following apology before the country‟s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission: 
Apartheid was wrong. I apologize in my capacity as leader of the National Party to 
the millions of South Africans who suffered the wrenching disruption of forced 
removals in respect of their homes, business and land. Who over the years suffered 
the shame of being arrested for pass law offences. Who over the decades and indeed 
centuries suffered the indignities and humiliation of racial discrimination. Who for a 
long time were prevented from exercising their full democratic rights in the land of 
their birth. Who were unable to achieve their full potential because of job 
reservation. And who in any the way suffered as a result of discriminatory 
legislation and policies. This [...] apology is offered in spirit of true repentance, in 
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full knowledge of the tremendous harm that apartheid has done to millions of South 
Africans.
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Could this unspeakable human suffering have been avoided, had the Nationalists 
lost the 1948 election? Would a UP victory have been a progressive step? Albert 
Luthuli, who was president of the ANC from 1952 until his death in 1967, did not 
think so: 
For most of us Africans, bandied about on the field while the game was in progress 
and then kicked to one side when the game was won, the election seemed largely 
irrelevant. We had endured Botha, Hertzog and Smuts. It did not seem of much 
importance whether the whites gave us more Smuts or switched to Malan. Our lot 
has grown steadily harder (Luthuli 1962:97). 
On the eve of the election, it was far from clear what “more Smuts” would mean 
for black, coloured and Indian South Africans. If the UP could have had its way, 
the election would not have been fought on the “native question”, not least 
because the ruling party‟s “native policy” was vague, contradictory and confusing 
(Brits 1994:118). In August 1946, Smuts had appointed a commission under the 
relatively liberal Judge H.A. Fagan to investigate, inter alia, the impact of the 
pass laws and the system of migrant labour on the lives of urban Africans. The 
commission found that black urbanisation was inevitable, as was black-white 
integration, at least in the economy. It recommended the “stabilisation of labour, 
which implied acceptance of the movement of black families from rural areas to 
live with their breadwinners” (Wilson 2009:83). Yet, whether a UP government 
would have implemented Fagan‟s proposals – which were vehemently opposed by 
the Nationalists when his report was released in February 1948 – will remain a 
point of speculation.  
What can be said with certainty is that the UP as an opposition party was feeble in 
its challenge of apartheid. During the final years of their reign, Smuts conceded, 
                                                 
61 Source: http://ccmlab.uwaterloo.ca/pad/gov.html#apartheid (accessed April 2010). The 
TRC‟s response was that De Klerk did not go far enough. What the committee also wanted 
to hear, as Giliomee explains, was that “the State Security Council, of which De Klerk had 
been a member, had authorized or condoned the murder and torture of state enemies” 
(2003:651). 
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“segregation [had] fallen on evil days” (Lewsen, quoted in Thompson 2000:176), 
while Hofmeyr would go further, advocating “the ultimate removal of the colour 
bar from [the Union] constitution” (Lipton 1986:21). This was not to be the UP‟s 
stance on the issue after Hofmeyr‟s unexpected death (at age 54) in December 
1948, followed two years later by Smuts‟s death (at age 80). Until its disbandment 
in 1977,
62
 the party‟s “central contradiction was its refusal to abandon white 
supremacy while opposing a government committed to upholding white 
supremacy in an extreme form” (Saunders and Southey 1998:183). 
When, in 1959, the UP adopted a position to the right of the NP and opposed 
government plans of transferring more land to Africans (as part of the “homeland” 
development programme), eleven liberal-minded MPs (out of a total of 53) broke 
with the opposition party and established the Progressive Party (PP).
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 For thirteen 
years (1961–1974), the only PP member to win an election was Helen Suzman 
(1917–2009) – a former lecturer in economic history who represented the 
Johannesburg constituency of Houghton, the richest in South Africa. In 
international terms, as Ross (2008:144) points out, Suzman was hardly a leftist: 
the PP was funded substantially by Harry Oppenheimer, a founder member of the 
party who had succeeded his father Ernest as head of the Anglo American 
Corporation and De Beers Consolidated Mines in 1957. At the time, the 
Oppenheimers controlled, inter alia, 80 percent of the world‟s diamonds and 40 
percent of South Africa‟s gold (Thompson 2000:201). What cannot be denied, 
though, is that “[t]here is basis for believing that as the sole voice of the voteless, 
[Helen Suzman] actually [represented] more South Africans than all the other 
members of Parliament combined”. By 1966, when this commentary appeared in 
the New York Times (quoted in Berger 2009:130), coloured voters had been 
                                                 
62 The UP continued to outpoll the NP in the elections of 1953, 1958 and 1961, but its support 
was dwindling. 
63 Another party born out of frustration with the UP was the Liberal Party (est. 1953). The 
latter was quicker than the PP to adopt a policy of universal suffrage. When the apartheid 
government outlawed multiracial political parties in 1968, the PP survived by ditching its 
few black members. The Liberal Party, by contrast, decided to dissolve itself as a matter of 
principle.  
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disenfranchised (1956) and African representation in parliament (provided by a 
few elected whites) had been abolished (1959). 
After the election of 1974, Suzman was joined in parliament by six more PP 
candidates, including the charismatic Afrikaner Frederik van Zyl Slabbert (1942–
2010). Previously a professor of sociology at Stellenbosch University (whose 
chancellor he would become in 2008), Slabbert played a key role in converting the 
party‟s qualified franchise policy into one of universal suffrage. Following 
amalgamations with smaller groups, the PP was renamed the Progressive Federal 
Party in 1975 and became the official parliamentary opposition in 1977, only to be 
replaced a decade later by the ultra-right Afrikaner nationalist Conservative Party 
(which had split from the NP in 1982.) But never was the NP to be defeated at the 
polls. In the end, the once mighty party negotiated itself out of power, lost some 
support to the (Afrikaner) nationalist right and a lot to the liberal left and, aged 80, 
collapsed into the African National Congress – a saga that forms part of next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE LAND WHICH THEY ONCE OWNED AND LOST AGAIN: 
1948–1994 
„This is after all the fatherland, the inherited land, the birth land [...]: 
the land which they once owned and lost again. They took owning it 
for granted, without ever reflecting upon the value or meaning 
thereof, and the loss never forced them to their senses‟ 
(Schoeman 2007:74–75). 
„All that interests you is the house in which your grandparents spent 
their life, your mother, your people, when they still owned and ruled 
the whole world, the earth and all the stars‟ 
(Schoeman 2007:175).
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2.1 Apartheid: the new face of Afrikaner nationalism 
In 1947 – the year before the Nationalist accession to power – a liberal historian 
from the University of the Witwatersrand (who later became professor of history 
at Queens University in Canada) published a notable political satire cum Wellsian 
prophecy entitled When Smuts goes. A history of South Africa from 1952 to 2010. 
First published in 2015. In a vivid, detailed narrative the author, Arthur Keppel-
Jones, predicted a Nationalist triumph at the polls in 1952, an NP split to the right 
on the issue of a republic in 1959 (which was accompanied by a split in the Dutch 
                                                 
64 This novel by Karel Schoeman, entitled Na die geliefde land [To the beloved country] 
(translated into English as Promised Land), is today widely regarded as an eerily prophetic 
masterpiece. First published in 1972, it tells the story of a young man who returns to South 
Africa (from Switzerland where he lives) to visit the farm he had inherited from his mother. 
Details about the political dispensation in the country are sparse, but what is clearly 
suggested is that the Afrikaner characters in the book live under black majority rule. The 
following comment came from Alan Paton, founding member of the Liberal Party and 
renowned author of Cry the beloved Country (first published in 1948): “[Na die geliefde 
land] is written in Afrikaans, but it speaks to me about my own country more powerfully 
than any other book has done. It is – whatever the oversensitive critics say – the story of the 
death of Afrikanerdom. In Schoeman‟s story, the language still lives on, but it is now the 
language of grief and desolation. Will that be the fate of Afrikaans, of the language in 
which the aspirations of the Afrikaner were sung and spoken? May it be preserved from 
such an end” (1987:65). 
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Reformed Church), and an election victory for the right-wingers – the Christian 
National Party – in 1962.  
Once in power, Keppel-Jones‟s prophecy continues, the Christian National Party 
declared Afrikaans the sole official language of South Africa and restricted 
citizenship to all white people, excluding Jews,
65
 who were born in the country. 
This meant that the vast majority of South Africans were denied all civil rights. In 
the long run, such domination could be assured “only by silencing criticism and 
destroying the political system which made criticism possible” (Keppel-Jones 
1947:84). Thus censorship act after censorship act was passed to stifle those 
“whose writings could be regarded as offensive to the feelings of the Volk, in that 
the feelings of the Volk was Christian National Republican” (Keppel-Jones 
1947:62–63). Initially, organised black resistance against white oppression was 
timid, but political consciousness among Africans grew steadily – owing to a 
small, educated class – and in 1964, it culminated in a major uprising that was put 
down forcefully: 
Thousands of Natives were roughly handled by the police and many arbitrary arrests 
made. The events produced the premature rising of February, 1964, which took the 
form of attacks on the police at many places in the eastern Free State and ugly 
demonstrations by Indians in Durban and by Coloured people in Capetown [sic]. 
There were also riots in many town locations. Troops were mobilised in the Free 
State and the main urban centres; special constables were enrolled [...] Many natives 
were shot and order quickly restored (Keppel-Jones 1947:103). 
                                                 
65 In reality, apartheid did not discriminate against Jews, at least not officially. Yet Afrikaner 
nationalism was not free of anti-Semitism. In the 1920s, it came to the fore in the 
Hoggenheimer cartoons, which D.C. Boonzaier created for Die Burger. With his silk hat, 
the bloated Hoggenheimer figure was a caricature of mining magnate Ernest Oppenheimer, 
who came from a family of prosperous German Jews. A naturalised Briton and Anglican 
convert, Oppenheimer immigrated to South Africa 1902 where he founded the Anglo 
American Corporation and gained control of the De Beers diamond company. To 
Boonzaier, Hoggenheimer represented “the cosmopolitan capitalist without attachment to 
the country except as a place where he could grow rich [...] at the expense of the honest 
patriot” (Le May 1995:148). In the 1930s, prominent Afrikaner nationalists, including 
Hendrik Verwoerd, opposed the immigration of German Jewish refugees to South Africa, 
arguing that their presence would pose a threat to Afrikaners in the professional and 
business world (Giliomee 2007:314). 
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According to the chronology of events in When Smuts goes, the primary aspiration 
of the Christian National Party government was realised in 1966 when the long-
yearned-for Afrikaner republic was inaugurated. Within a decade, however, the 
republican government was overthrown by Anglo-American forces and black 
majority rule was instituted. Ironically, Keppel-Jones concludes his satire of 
Afrikaner nationalism‟s anti-black racism with a scene that is blatantly Afro-
pessimistic: South Africa “returns to barbarism”, and the country‟s fate is finally 
sealed by the outbreak of a devastating plague in 2010.
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In crucial ways, of course, Keppel-Jones got it wrong. Yet, at the same time, it is 
remarkable how many passages in his forward-looking history read like the actual 
history of apartheid South Africa. In 1947, the future had all of these in store for 
the country: the Nationalists‟ assumption of power; the realisation of the 
republican ideal; the interpenetration of party and church (and of political 
ideology and religion); the bitter split of the party and the church despite a 
desperate quest for volkseenheid [unity of the volk]; a parliament in which both 
the ruling party and the official opposition represented Afrikaner nationalists; the 
ruthless and brutal suppression of a liberation movement; and, finally, the demise 
of quasi-totalitarian white minority rule. 
In reality, the Afrikaner nationalist dream of a republic became true sooner than 
Keppel-Jones had expected it would, while both Nationalist solidarity and 
Nationalist rule lasted longer than he had predicted. 1951 saw the Malanites of the 
HNP and the Hertzogites of the AP reunited in one National Party (NP), and for 
almost two decades there would be no more (noteworthy) “births, rebirths and 
splits” in the party (Johnson 2004:140). The first splintering worth mentioning 
occurred in 1969 when the Herstigte [Re-established] National Party was founded 
under the leadership of Albert Hertzog (1899–1982), son of the General. In the 
actual saga, as in Keppel-Jones‟s fantastic one, the NP split to the right. At issue, 
                                                 
66 In the 1940s, Keppel-Jones was not the only white liberal to whom a Nationalist victory 
spelled doom for South Africa. Jan Hofmeyr‟s reaction to the 1948 election results was, 
“There is no hope for this country [...] unless they fight among themselves [and] they 
always do, don‟t they?” (quoted in Giliomee 2003:482). 
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however, was the maintenance of apartheid, and not republicanism. It took the Re-
established National Party until 1985 to win a seat in a general election. By then, 
however, another far more popular ultra-right wing party had broken with the NP. 
Formed in 1982 by Andries Petrus Treurnicht (1921–1993) and 22 other MPs who 
could not stomach the political reforms that were introduced by the second-last 
head of the apartheid state at the time (P.W. Botha), the Conservative Party (CP) 
replaced the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) as South Africa‟s official 
parliamentary opposition in 1987. Two years later, on 6 September 1989, the CP 
won almost a third of the vote in the country‟s last all-white general election. 
However, I am getting ahead of myself. The first head of the apartheid state 
retired in 1954. Aged 80, D.F. Malan told the Cape congress of the NP in a 
farewell address that the time was not ripe for a republic. Having seen the 
Promised Land from afar, Malan had made his peace with the fact that he would 
not enter it.
67
 Nor would his successor, the harder-line Transvaler [inhabitant of 
the Transvaal], J.G. (Hans) Strijdom (1893–1958). But Strijdom began to pave the 
way: under his premiership both the Union Jack and “God save the Queen” lost 
their status as the co-official national flag and anthem of South Africa.
68
 On 
Strijdom‟s death in 1958, his closest associate, H.F. (Hendrik) Verwoerd, became 
premier. It was the latter who, on Union Day (31 May) in 1961, declared South 
Africa a republic, following a referendum on the issue. Barely more than half (52 
percent) of the whites who participated in the referendum voted for a republic, but 
a simple majority was all Verwoerd needed. 
                                                 
67 In Malan‟s opinion, the republic had to wait until the NP had established itself securely in 
power. For, “if each election is about the republic,” he argued, 
  then our opponents – as you very well know – will seize their opportunity. Many 
who voted with us in the last election [in 1953] are against a republic, but they agree 
with us on the colour question. Now, if you combine these two issues in an election 
the Opposition will tell them, „However you feel about the colour question, do not 
vote for the Nationalists because to them it is about the republic‟ [If] every election 
is about the republic, then we jeopardise the republic and we jeopardise apartheid 
along with it (Malan 1964:101).  
68 Dual citizenship of Britain and the Union of South Africa was outlawed in 1949. 
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The founding of the republic meant the end of South Africa‟s membership of the 
Commonwealth, as the local Anglos had feared it would.
69
 Otherwise, little 
changed in the transition from Union to Republic: a decimal currency system (one 
rand equalling 100 cents) replaced the British currency, and a ceremonial state 
president took over the role of the British monarch (represented locally by the 
governor-general) as the head of state.
70
 However, the constitution of the Union 
remained virtually intact. The Nationalists did not seek to change the political 
system. What they hoped would happen in a republic, as Giliomee (2003:494) 
explains, was that the white English speaking citizens of South Africa would 
come to regard the country as their only fatherland.  
By 1961, however, tensions between South Africa and Britain and between 
Afrikaners and local English speakers – those themes that took centre stage in 
white politics before 1948 – had become sideshows. Certainly, the Anglo-
Afrikaner rivalry for status and symbolic power, to borrow Giliomee‟s phrase 
(2003:xv), was far from over. Nor did apartheid end Afrikaners‟ relative 
educational and economic backwardness; at least not soon.
71
 But after 1948, intra-
white economic inequality was of secondary importance in Afrikaner nationalist 
politics. The struggle for symbolic or cultural power, too, took a back seat. What 
happened, as Giliomee (2007:311) interprets it, was that the apartheid aspect of 
the NP‟s policy gradually sidelined that aspect of the policy that appreciated 
                                                 
69 The referendum was held on 5 October 1960, and during March of the following year, 
Verwoerd attended a meeting of Commonwealth premiers in London. When it appeared 
that South Africa‟s application to remain a member of the organisation might be rejected 
because of apartheid, he withdrew it. 
70 Under South Africa‟s 1983 constitution, both this position and the position of prime 
minister were abolished and replaced by an executive presidency. 
71 As South Africa entered the 1970s in the midst of an economic boom, the proportion of 
white English-speaking persons who had completed school was twice as high as that of 
Afrikaners, while there were two English-speaking university graduates for every Afrikaner 
with a degree. Afrikaners, who constituted 60 percent of the white population, earned only 
45 percent of the total white income and a mere four percent of them – compared to thirteen 
percent of the Anglos – were in the highest income stratum (Giliomee 2003:544, based on 
Adam 1971). While Afrikaners‟ aggregate share of the South African economy (excluding 
agriculture, which had always been dominated by them), had doubled in the first three 
decades after 1948, 80 percent of the economy remained in English hands. By 1975, 
Afrikaners controlled only 25 percent of the finance sector, eighteen percent of the mining 
sector, sixteen percent of the trade and commerce sector and fifteen percent of the 
manufacturing and construction sector (Giliomee 2003:543, based on Adam and Giliomee 
1979). 
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Afrikaner culture and took pride in what had been achieved. This was hardly 
surprising: the cultural movement might have helped to bring the Nationalists into 
power (as described in chapter 5), but it could not keep them in power in an era of 
rising (Pan-)African nationalism. Only apartheid could. Faced with a new, far 
more threatening enemy, Afrikaner nationalism thus redefined local Anglos as 
potential allies. This explains why Malan who, in the early 1940s, had declared 
that the National Party was organised Afrikanerdom itself – a Christian National 
Republican party open to Afrikaners who wished to serve their volk (Malan 
1964:57, 58) – would tell that very same party a decade later that 
our nationalism is not for speakers of Afrikaans only. Nationalism should not be 
built on the basis of anti-English or anti-England. We are not a racial party [...] Our 
motivation in our political life should not be hatred against whoever. The only real 
motivation should be love. And therefore our door should always be open. Open to 
English speakers, and there are many who agree with us on the important issues. 
Open to English speakers to enter into our midst, and there are some of them – they 
are increasing in numbers – who will heartily cooperate with us and belong to our 
Party (Malan 1964:108).  
It is here where Keppel-Jones‟s prophecy lost the plot: while white English 
speakers had every reason to fear that a Nationalist government would compel all 
children in its schools and all employees of its civil service to learn the (generally) 
deeply unloved Taal [Language],
72
 anxieties about the status and rights of English 
and its speakers would not materialise. By the end of World War II, as noted in 
the previous chapter, the NP (then the HNP) had come to realise that it had to 
relinquish the nationalist luxury of an officially monolingual state if it wanted to 
have any state at all. In time, this Anglo-tolerant stance would pay off politically. 
Despite the fact that virtually no white English-speaking South Africans favoured 
a republic in the referendum of 1961, almost a fifth of Natal‟s voters supported the 
NP in the general election of the same year. The Nationalists doubled their share 
of the vote in that predominantly English province in the 1966 election – the first 
                                                 
72 There were, of course, exceptions. Alan Paton once wrote, “Although Afrikaner 
nationalism outlawed the Liberal Party and inflicted grave punishments on many of my 
friends, I have never felt any animus against the Afrikaans language. It still remains for me 
one of the most vigorous and expressive languages in the world” (Paton 1987:65). 
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one since 1948 in which they won a clear majority (Van der Westhuizen 2007:39, 
based on Giliomee 1994). By the end of the 1970s, a significant number of 
English speakers countrywide were voting for the NP or, more specifically, for the 
party‟s policy of apartheid. In my final high school year (1988), a mere two years 
before F.W. de Klerk released Nelson Mandela from prison, the English teacher 
let us copy the following texts from the blackboard as “Model letters to the press”. 
She was a mother-tongue speaker of English: 
(a) Sir  
 
HORRIFIED BY ONCE RESPECTABLE AREA  
 
I am horrified at what has happened to the flat area [of Hillbrow] to which I 
have returned after an absence of some years. Protected by influx control and 
group areas [The Group Areas Act – cf. below], it resisted the Third World 
pressures of the station and bus termini for Black [sic] taxis. The repeal of 
influx control and the defiance of group areas have changed it into a slum. 
Now the streets reek with litter, washing hangs from the balconies, buildings 
are neglected, muggings and worse occur. Those Whites [sic] who can, are 
moving out.  
 [The only solution to the problem is] properly defined grey areas in which 
those who want to live as the Third World do, can do so without 
compromising those who don‟t [sic]. 
(b) Sir  
 
CONSUMERS PAY INCREASES  
 
I notice that Pick and Pay [a major supermarket chain] has agreed to increase 
the salaries of Black [sic] workers by R100 a month forthwith and that May 
Day and 16 June [the commemoration of the Soweto uprising] are to be to 
paid holidays. These costs will, of course, be passed on to the customer. The 
effect is that every time the unions hold a pistol to the heads of the 
employers, the customers have to pay up.  
 If the increases are justified and are not a result of highjacking, why 
didn‟t [sic] Hood and Ackerman [the supermarket bosses] pay them when 
they legitimately became due?  
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 Perhaps next year‟s highjack will bring us a further rash of holidays like 
Nelson [Mandela] Day [and Archbishop Desmond] Tutu Day. 
Of course, apartheid did not unite white South Africa. Among whites most, 
though by no means all, of the policy‟s fiercest critics were English speakers.73 
Local English-language newspapers as well as predominantly English 
organisations such as the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and 
the Black Sash gained international acclaim for their anti-apartheid campaigns. To 
Afrikaner nationalists, these activists continued to represent the Engelse gevaar 
[English peril]. The nature of the peril, however, had changed: it no longer lay in 
the Anglos‟ loyalty (real or perceived) to Britain and their contempt (real or 
perceived) for Afrikaners and their culture, but in their “susceptibility” to either 
liberalism or communism, which made them enemies of apartheid. Apartheid had 
become, and would remain for four decades – in election after white election – the 
issue before South African voters. 
The birth, life, death and legacy of apartheid constitute the topic of this chapter. It 
has been documented in texts too numerous to cite, and this is no place for another 
comprehensive account of South African politics after 1948. As in the previous 
chapter, I shall concentrate on those events in history that are relevant to my 
analysis of the interface between politics and culture in the development of 
Afrikaner nationalism. However, a focus confined to events alone would be too 
narrow. Any overview of the political developments in apartheid and post-
apartheid South Africa has to begin with an overview of the ideology of apartheid.  
                                                 
73 The list of Afrikaner anti-apartheid activists includes, most famously, Abraham Louis 
(Bram) Fischer (1908–1975) and Christiaan Frederich Beyers Naudé (1915–2004). The 
grandson of the last president of the Republic of the Orange Free State, Fischer defended 
Nelson Mandela and his co-accused during the 1964 Rivonia Trial (cf. below). Afterwards 
he went underground to help to rebuild the banned South African Communist Party. Within 
a year, however, he was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment to be released only 
when he was dying of cancer. Beyers Naudé started out as a “Broederbond golden boy” 
(Giliomee 2003:528) and a minister in the DRC, but broke with the Bond and the Church 
after the Sharpeville massacre (cf. below). He was banned in 1977 and spent the following 
seven years in house arrest. 
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2.2 The ideology of apartheid 
2.2.1 The point of departure 
Apartheid was Afrikanerdom‟s answer to the problem which always faces ethnic 
exclusivist nationalists – those who believe that the political and the national 
(read: ethnic-linguistic) unit should be congruent. Early on in his seminal work, 
Nations and nationalism, Ernest Gellner explains the nature of this problem as 
follows: 
[V]ery many of the potential nations of this world live, or until recently have lived, 
not in compact territorial units but intermixed with each other in complex patterns. It 
follows that a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogenous, in 
such cases, if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals (2006:2). 
The founding father of the Afrikaners‟ National Party, as has been pointed out in 
the previous chapter, opposed the anglicisation of Afrikaans speakers, but did not 
regard white English-speaking South Africans as non-nationals. It went without 
saying that Africans were non-nationals and that assimilating them into the 
Afrikaner volk was out of the question, but before the Second World War, it was 
still possible for white supremacists to deal with black non-nationals in the way 
Hertzog did by expelling them to “native reserves”. 
To many of the “purified” Nationalists, who broke away from the NP after its 
coalition and fusion with the SAP in 1933 and 1934, respectively, Hertzog‟s idea 
of a bilingual, bi-ethnic white nation was anything but appealing. However, as we 
have seen, they eventually had to concede that an ethnically homogenous 
Afrikaner state was unachievable. About one thing, though, Afrikaner nationalism 
was adamant, and would remain adamant for decades to come: South Africa had 
to be a racially homogenous state – a white state. The political and the racial unit 
should at least be congruous. The problem, from the perspective of the “purified” 
and later the “reunited” Nationalists, was that they found themselves in a country 
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where Africans outnumbered whites by a ratio of roughly 3.5:1,
74
 and in an era 
where tolerance with black exclusion from politics was wearing thin. Therefore, 
they came up with what they portrayed as a just alternative to segregation, called 
it apartheid, and presented it to the white electorate in 1948.  
In the watershed election of that year, the NP‟s manifesto was based on the report 
of its “colour question commission”. Appointed in 1947 (partly in response to the 
Fagan commission – cf. section 1.5) and led by Malan‟s closest confidant, Paul 
Sauer, the commission proposed and defended a policy which can be regarded as 
the consolidation of the various contributions to apartheid that I shall consider 
below. In direct contrast to the Fagan report, which called for better management 
of black urbanisation, inter alia through proper urban planning, the Sauer report 
notoriously stated:  
The cities are the white man‟s creation and the black man may enter them so long as 
he ministers to the needs of the white man, but must depart therefrom when he 
ceases so to minister (quoted in Wilson 2009:83).  
In this respect, apartheid ideology represented a continuation of segregationism: it 
strove to keep urban South Africa white.
75
 What distinguished apartheid from old-
style segregation, besides the fact that it entailed “radical and total” segregation 
(Coertze et al. 1943:5), was an emphasis on linguistic differences among Africans 
(which were assumed to be ethnic differences). According to the apartheid 
ideologues of the 1930s and 1940s, speakers of the various African languages 
constituted volke and the reserves had to be transformed into “fatherlands” (later 
called “homelands”)76 for them. Here, under the guardianship of whites 
(preferably Afrikaners), each volk could develop – culturally and politically – in 
accordance with its own (divinely determined) character. For every volk in the 
world, so the ideologues believed, “has an inherent right to live and to develop 
                                                 
74 In 1946, according to census figures, the Union South Africa was home to 2,376,000 white 
and 8,618,000 black people (Giliomee 2003:595). 
75 During its first decade in power, the apartheid government was relatively successful in this 
regard. By 1960, only 17 percent of blacks were urbanised, compared to 65 percent of 
whites (Thompson 2000:290). 
76 Henceforth without inverted commas. 
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[just like every individual, and] the personal and national ideals of every 
individual and of every ethnic group can best be developed within its own national 
community” (M.D.C. de Wet Nel, quoted in Moodie 1975:265; Moodie‟s 
translation). Detribalised Africans thus had to be retribalised, and future 
detribalisation had to be prevented by rooting the education of a tribe‟s (or a 
volk‟s) children in their ancestral culture (cf. Brits 1994:81–86). As Werner 
Eiselen (1899–1977) – arguably the pioneering architect of apartheid – put it, the 
duty of black leaders was “not to become black Europeans [read: black 
Englishmen] but to raise their people to a higher Black culture [read: higher black 
cultures]” (quoted in Sparks 1990:194). Such was the paternalistic logic of the 
ideology of apartheid, the origins of which can be traced to Stellenbosch 
University in the south and the Afrikaner Broederbond to the north of the Union 
of South Africa. 
2.2.2 Contributions from the south 
While the term apartheid only entered the lexicon of Malan and Die Burger 
around 1943, the birth of the concept of apartheid roughly coincided with the birth 
of the “purified” NP. The party, however, was not primarily responsible for the 
formulation and dissemination of the apartheid ideology between 1934 and 1948. 
That task was taken on by newspaper editors – notably Albert Geyer of Die 
Burger and Hendrik Verwoerd of Die Transvaler – and by Afrikaner academics in 
a range of fields, including history, sociology, politics, “native administration”, 
“Bantu languages” and, last at but not the least, volkekunde [study of volke]. The 
latter discipline was established in South Africa in 1926 when Werner Eiselen 
founded the department of Bantoekunde [Bantology] at Stellenbosch University. 
Taught at Afrikaans-medium universities and “ethnic” universities (cf. section 
2.3.1) until late in the twentieth century, Bantoekunde and later volkekunde was a 
version of anthropology that studied African culture from an essentialist 
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perspective.
77
 Of apartheid‟s early ideologues many were volkekundiges 
(practitioners of volkekunde), and Eiselen lead the way. 
The son of a Berlin missionary, Eiselen spent his childhood and adolescence 
among the Pedi (speakers of Northern Sotho) and went on to study phonetics and 
anthropology at the universities of Berlin and Hamburg. He left Stellenbosch 
University (where he had met Verwoerd) in 1936 to become chief inspector of 
“native” education in the Transvaal, but returned to the academia a decade later 
for a brief stint as professor of volkekunde at the University of Pretoria. When 
Malan succumbed to northern pressure and appointed Verwoerd as minister of 
native affairs in 1950, Eiselen became his secretary – a position that he held until 
his retirement in 1960 (which, according to Moodie (1975:273), might have 
stemmed from his disillusionment with apartheid). As chairperson of the Bantu 
Education Commission appointed in 1949, Werner Eiselen was the principal 
draughtsman of one the most oppressive pieces of apartheid legislation: the Bantu 
Education Act of 1953.  
Eiselen‟s early input into (what had yet to be called) apartheid dates back to his 
Stellenbosch days and entailed a plea for what modern sociolinguists (and present-
day Afrikaans language activists) would call the maintenance of linguistic 
diversity: 
It will be clear to everyone that the factors which favor the continued existence of 
the Bantu languages (Holy Writ, schools, literature) do not weigh up against those 
against it (white opposition to [a] third official language, multiplicity of Bantu 
languages). But there is one factor, and that the most important, which I have not yet 
                                                 
77 Anthropologists at South Africa‟s English-language universities held a more sophisticated 
constructivist view of society and regarded volkekundiges as “apartheid‟s anthropologists” 
(Gordon 1988). Like most other social scientists, anthropologists were organised in separate 
Afrikaans and English associations during the apartheid era. Anthropology was one of the 
last of the social sciences to overcome its language-/ideology-based organisational schism 
when the South African Society for Cultural Anthropology (previously the Association for 
Afrikaans Volkekundiges) and the (predominantly English) Association for Anthropology in 
Southern Africa merged in 2001 to form Anthropology Southern Africa. (Cf. Van der Waal 
and Ward 2006:17.) South African historians still have to overcome their schism: the 
Historical Association of South Africa (and its journal Historia) and the Southern African 
Historical Society (and its journal South African Historical Journal) continue to co-exist, 
albeit no longer in isolation from each other. 
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mentioned. That is the will of a People to stand on guard [handhaaf], to remain 
immortal as a People. If such a will exists, then it can operate only through the 
medium of a unique ethnic language. From the history of the Boer People we learn 
how a People can retain its identity despite insuperable difficulties and enormous 
economic disadvantages.  
 The future will teach as whether the Bantu have a sufficient ethnically conscious 
stratum to persist and win for their languages a firm and abiding place in South 
Africa. From our side we can do much to encourage these Peoples in their struggle 
for cultural existence if we try to understand and respect their language and culture 
(Eiselen, quoted in Moodie 1975:272–273; Moodie‟s translation). 
It was in 1934, in an article entitled “What will become of the Bantu languages in 
South Africa?,”78 that Eiselen expressed these sentiments. The length of the quote 
is justified by its relevance to a key contention of this study, namely that certain 
contemporary efforts by white Afrikaans-speaking language activists to promote 
the African languages of South Africa have its roots in the racial paternalism of 
apartheid. As demonstrated in section 5.2.3, the argument still seems to be, “From 
the history of the Boer People we learn [and black South Africans can learn] how 
a People can retain its identity [and language]”. The paternalism of Eiselen, as 
Moodie interprets his writings, was fostered not by racism but by anthropological 
interests. Eiselen‟s commitment to what he perceived to be the welfare of 
Africans, claims Moodie, was genuine (1975:273). Brits, too, remarks that Eiselen 
promoted apartheid because he believed that it would benefit South Africa‟s 
“Bantu volke” by protecting them from the eroding effects of “Westernisation” 
(1994:86; cf. also Sparks 1990:193–194). Later on in his career, Eiselen would 
advocate politically (relatively) independent black homelands as a means of 
preserving and strengthening the ethnic and linguistic identities of Africans (Brits 
1994:82). 
What Eiselen came to envisage, in Gellnerian terms, was the satisfaction of the 
nationalisms of all the linguistically defined “potential nations” of South Africa. 
Since its inception, however, African nationalism in the country – of which the 
                                                 
78 The short answer to this question is: they would become official languages of the country in 
1994. 
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leading exponents have been the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan 
Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM) – was “a struggle of natives to be recognised as a transethnic identity, as a 
race, as „Africans‟” (Mamdani 2009:127). It was a form of nationalism that dealt 
with linguistic differences in its midst by ignoring them. English was adopted as a 
lingua franca and preferred to the mother tongue as the language of education – a 
stance that apartheid reinforced rather than changed. Eiselen‟s opposition to such 
anglicisation might have been based on a sincere belief that it was not in the 
interests of Africans. But to speculate on the true motives of politicians is 
pointless. What cannot be denied is that apartheid ideologues knew all too well 
that it was in their own interest to try to replace “negative racial nationalism” in 
the black community with “positive cultural nationalism” (Moodie 1975:265). 
Those in the liberation movement – not all of whom were, of course, African or 
Black nationalists
79
 – saw through this divide-and-rule strategy. 
When Eiselen left Stellenbosch in 1936, he had done enough to convert many a 
student to the notion of a “multinational” South Africa. Among them were two 
men who would become leading volkekundiges, P.J. (Piet) Schoeman
80
 and P.J. 
(Pieter) Coertze. In 1943, the latter co-produced what Giliomee (2003:467) 
regards as the first book that promoted a policy called apartheid in the language of 
the social sciences. In the publication, boldly entitled, Die oplossing van die 
Naturellevraagstuk in Suid-Africa [The solution of the native question in South 
Africa], Coertze and two of his colleagues at Stellenbosch University, F.J. 
Language (!) and B.I.C. van Eeden, argued for the unscrambling of both the racial 
and the “black ethnic” egg in the country. The authors went as far as to propagate 
the withdrawal of black labour from white South Africa, claiming (naively) that 
“[a] progressive policy with respect to the reserves would gradually bring about a 
                                                 
79 Other important agents of liberation included the trade union movement and, after 1983, the 
multiracial United Democratic Front. The contribution of religious bodies should also not 
be underestimated. 
80 Schoeman retired as professor of “Bantology” in 1947 to become a full-time writer. His 
novels are situated, virtually without exception, in the South African countryside and were 
popular among apartheid‟s prescribers of schoolbooks. 
76 
 
whole range of national self-supporting economic units” (quoted in Giliomee 
2003:467; Giliomee‟s translation; emphasis added).  
2.2.3 The lay of the land to the north 
Stellenbosch University was not the only hub of apartheid-related ideological 
activity during the early 1940s. In the inland provinces of South Africa that 
function was fulfilled by the Broederbond, where the term apartheid had been in 
use since 1935 (when it was coined by a front organisation of the Bond, the Suid-
Afrikaanse Bond vir Rassestudie [South African League for Racial Studies] (est. 
1935)).
81
 The apartheid debates in the Broederbond – which formed part of the 
organisation‟s “ideological counter-offensive to fusion” (Bloomberg 1989:131) – 
brought a secular dimension to Bond thinking, which had long been characterised 
by Kuyperian Calvinism (after the Dutch theologian/politician Abraham 
Kuyper).
82
 To be sure, the Broeders did not become any less “Christian” in their 
approach to nationalism, but in the post-fusion years, they turned to “academic 
disciplines” other than theology for ideas that could justify the course Afrikaner 
nationalism was taking. 
The heartland of Kuyperianism was Potchefstroom University in the north-
western Transvaal, and by the late 1920s, academics from this institution had 
taken control of the Bond. L.J. du Plessis, a professor in political science, became 
deputy chairman in 1928, and chairman in 1930, to be succeeded by the 
theologian, J.C. van Rooy, in 1932. According to the version of Calvinism to 
which these men and their followers subscribed, nations – just like individuals – 
                                                 
81 In 1933, the thousand-member strong Broederbond had 28 branches in the Transvaal, 
nineteen in the Orange Free State, four in the Cape Province and two in Natal. The Bond 
was indeed a predominantly northern organisation, as Giliomee (2003:421) describes it. 
Over the following two decades, however, the picture changed. The number of branches in 
the Cape doubled from 21 to 42 between 1938 and 1943, and totalled 54 in 1948 (compared 
to 58 in the Free State and 73 in the Transvaal). In 1953, the Cape branches outnumbered 
the Free State ones by 22. Throughout its existence, though, Transvaal was home to the 
majority of the Broederbond‟s branches (Stals 1998:763). 
82 Though prevalent in the Broederbond in the 1920s and 1930s, Kuyperianism was associated 
with the smallest (and most conservative) of Afrikanerdom‟s three churches, namely the 
Gereformeerde Kerk [Reformed Church]. The largest church, the Dutch Reformed Church, 
adhered to a different stream of Calvinism, which emphasised the organic relationship 
between a volk and its church. (Cf. O‟Meara 1983:67–71.) 
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had a God-ordained character and destiny. Certain nations even had a godly 
calling and the Afrikaner volk, so the Potchefstroom scholars claimed, was one of 
them. To the political philosopher and leading Kuyperian H.G. Stoker, the proof 
lay in Afrikaner history: 
God willed the diversity of Peoples. Thus far he has preserved the identity of our 
People. Such preservation was not for naught, for God allows nothing to happen for 
naught. He might have allowed our People to be bastardized with the native tribes as 
happened with other Europeans. He did not allow it. He might have allowed us to be 
anglicized, like for example, the Dutch in America... He did not allow that either. He 
maintained the identity of our People. He has a future task for us, a calling laid 
away. On this I base my fullest conviction that our People will again win back their 
freedom as a People. The lesson of our history must always be kept before our eyes 
(Stoker, quoted in Moodie 1975:67; Moodie‟s translation). 
One could be forgiven for mistaking German Romanticism as the inspiration 
behind Stoker‟s brand of nationalism and republicanism (“our volk will again win 
back their freedom as a volk”). Should his “diversitarian view of the world” – the 
belief that national diversity is patently the design of God (Kedourie 1985:56–57) 
– not be traced back to Johann Gottfried Herder? Is Stoker‟s view of the Afrikaner 
volk as a natural division of the human race with its own character, which must be 
preserved purely (Kedourie 1985:58) not also Herderian in origin? Did Stoker not 
get the idea that each volk had a special role in God‟s master plan from Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, who once wrote that “it is God who directly assigns to each 
nationality its definite task on earth” (Kedourie 1985:58)?  
Stoker and his ilk, however, were inspired not by German Romanticism but by the 
Kuyperian doctrine of soewereiniteit in eie kring [sovereignty in own sphere]. To 
them, volke represented independent spheres in which the sovereignty of God was 
absolute (O‟Meara 1983:67–70). It was a new generation of ideologues who 
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introduced the Broederbond to German Romanticism, or what Moodie (1975) has 
termed, neo-Fichteanism.
83
 Most influential among them were: 
(a) Hendrik Verwoerd (1901–1966), who turned down an Abe Bailey 
scholarship to Oxford University after receiving a doctorate in philosophy 
from Stellenbosch University. Instead, he opted for post-doctoral study in 
psychology at the universities of Hamburg, Berlin and Leipzig. After a year 
or two in Germany, Verwoerd visited universities in the United States in 
1927 before returning to Stellenbosch in 1928 as professor of applied 
psychology. By the time he left Stellenbosch University to become editor of 
Die Transvaler (1937), he also held a professorship in sociology and social 
work. (Future career: senator 1948; minister of native affairs 1950; prime 
minister 1958–1966.) 
(b) Nicolaas (Nic) Diederichs (1903–1978), who studied at graduate level in 
Munich, Cologne and Berlin before obtaining a doctorate in philosophy 
from the University of Leiden in 1929. On his return to South Africa, the 
University of the Orange Free State appointed him as professor of 
philosophy and political science. (Future career: MP 1953; several 
economic ministerial portfolios; state president 1975–1978.) 
(c) Piet Meyer (1909–1984), whose nationalism, like that of Verwoerd, stood 
between him and an Oxford degree. In the early 1930s he declined a Rhodes 
scholarship and went to the Free University of Amsterdam instead where he 
completed a doctorate in philosophy and education. Meyer also spent time 
in Germany, attending the Berlin anti-Comintern school (Bloomberg 
1989:137). (Future career: head of the state-controlled South African 
Broadcasting Corporation 1959–1976; Broederbond chair 1960–1972.) 
(d) Geoffrey (Geoff) Cronjé (1907–1992), who earned a doctorate in sociology 
and criminology from the University of Amsterdam. In 1933, he became a 
                                                 
83 Moodie (1975:154, 299) uses this term to refer to nationalism as Elie Kedourie (1960) 
interpreted the concept – that is, as ethnic exclusivist nationalism of which the prime source 
has been Johann Gottlieb Fichte‟s “Address to the German nation”.  
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lecturer and in 1936 a professor in the department of sociology at the 
University of Pretoria – a position he held until his retirement.  
These men, as Moodie (1975:x) summarises it, arrived home with a neo-Fichtean 
social-philosophical framework, rose rapidly in the ranks of the Broederbond and 
steered the organisation into political, economic and cultural activity.
84
 They also 
charted a new ideological course for the Bond. Meyer became the full-time 
secretary of the Broederbond‟s front organisation, the Federasie van Afrikaanse 
Kultuurvereniginge [Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations] (FAK, est. 
1929), in 1937, while Diederichs replaced Van Rooy as chairman of the Bond in 
1938 after having served in the executive council since 1934. Verwoerd, in turn, 
joined the Bond‟s executive council in 1942 (Stals 1998:759).  
Two years into his chairmanship, Diederichs was appointed to the FAK‟s 
Commission for Racial Relations which Cronjé convened (Serfontein 1979:52–
53; Pelzer 1979:162). In 1944, this commission organised an FAK volkskongres 
[volk congress] on the Afrikaners‟ “colour policy” with the aim to neutralise 
“malevolent misrepresentations and distortions” of the policy. A two-day meeting 
of “specialists in the field” preceded the congress, which was open to all and 
attended by representatives of about 200 church and cultural bodies (Swart and 
Geyser 1979:28, 31). The “experts” (all of them Broeders) presented papers, and 
in the end the congress agreed with them  
that gelykstelling [racial levelling] of whites and non-whites would be fatal to 
whites; that blood-mixing was detrimental to both black and white (according to 
„scientific evidence‟) and should thus be avoided; that the Bible made it clear that 
God had made provision for different nations since the creation and that racial 
separation in South Africa was therefore justified (Brits 1994:80). 
In their report, the congress organisers supported the apartheid idea without 
developing it into a comprehensive and detailed ideology. That challenge was 
taken on by Cronjé in his book, ‟n Tuiste vir die nageslag: die blywende oplossing 
                                                 
84 The Bond‟s activist initiatives of the post-fusion era (1934–1948) are revisited in chapter 5 
of this study. Of concern here is the organisation‟s contribution to the ideology of apartheid.  
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van Suid-Afrika se rassevraagstukke [A home for posterity: the lasting solution of 
South Africa‟s racial problems]. Published in 1945, it became the Broederbond‟s 
political bible and was soon supplemented by three related books – all by Cronjé: 
Afrika sonder die Asiaat: die blywende oplossing van Suid-Afrika se 
Asiatevraagstuk [Africa without the Asian: the lasting solution to South Africa‟s 
Asian problem] (1946); Regverdige rasse-apartheid [Just race apartheid] (1947); 
and Voogdyskap en apartheid [Guardianship and apartheid] (1948). Through 
articles in newspapers and magazines Cronjé popularised his teachings, most of 
which concurred with those of the volkekundiges at Stellenbosch University. Like 
Coertze, Language and Van Eeden, he believed that white dependency on African 
labour could be eliminated or, as he later conceded, at least reduced, and that the 
reserves could become economically viable, self-governing black states (under 
white trusteeship).
85
 The coloured population of South Africa, too, should 
constitute themselves as a nation,
86
 while Indians should be repatriated to India. 
Only along this route, Cronjé warned, could the dangers be overcome that was 
posed to the white race by “miscegenation” (which implied “biological 
degeneration”), liberalism (with its emphasis on racial equality) and communism 
(with the appeal it held for a detribalised black proletariat). (Cf. Marks and 
Trapido 1987:19–20.)  
Not all of the abovementioned neo-Fichteans shared Cronjé‟s preoccupation with 
“South Africa‟s racial problems”. In their work (most of which did not make for 
easily digestible reading), Diederichs and Meyer were primarily concerned with 
the development of their own volk.
87
 Nor was neo-Fichteanism the only thought 
current, as Charles Bloomberg (1989:137) once put it, in which the post-fusion 
generation of Broederbond ideologues fished for justificatory ideas. The social 
                                                 
85 If it proved impossible to replace black workers with white immigrants or with machinery, 
it was argued, the various black volke were to live separately in the locations. 
86 This was still the stance of apartheid‟s defenders in the early 1980s. Cf. Coertze 
(1983:138).  
87 As Broederbond ideologue, Diederichs is best known for his booklet Nasionalisme as 
lewensbeskouing en sy verhouding tot internasionalisme [Nationalism as Weltanschauung 
and its relation to internationalism], which was published by Nasionale Pers in 1935. For a 
discussion of the work and the debate it provoked among the Afrikaner nationalist elite, cf. 
Moodie (1975:156–165). 
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science that came out of the United States – and particularly the American 
doctrine of “separate but equal” – impressed Verwoerd more than anything he had 
discovered in Germany (cf. Miller 1993). Diederichs and Meyer, on the other 
hand, were influenced by the ideology of national socialism (as were the 
Kuyperians, L.J. du Plessis and H.J. Stoker), at least to a significant degree.
88
 It 
has been argued, notably by Moodie (1975:274–275) and Sparks (1990:176–181), 
that Cronjé, too, drew on German Rassenkunde [racial studies] in his influential 
work, ‟n Tuiste vir die nageslag. Not only was the book published by the Nazi-
imitating Ossewa-Brandwag (cf. section 1.4), but it emphasised racial differences 
and “the superior position of the whites” (quoted in Moodie 1975:275). In this 
respect, Cronjé departed from ideologues such as Eiselen who couched their 
defence of apartheid in the less overtly racist discourse of ethnic pluralism. 
2.2.4 The nationalist principle qualified and compromised 
In summary, it can be said that apartheid was the brainchild of “purist” Afrikaner 
nationalists who – unlike Hertzog – adopted the Fichtean formula that “wherever 
a separate language is found there a separate [divinely created] nation exists 
which has the right to take independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself” 
(Williams 1994:5). In the Afrikaner case, however, the formula was more 
complex: speakers of the same language constituted members of the same nation, 
if they belonged to the same “race”. In fact, as a principle of inclusion/exclusion, 
race took precedence over language. For potential candidates with the right 
language but the wrong skin colour (i.e., for the majority of South Africa‟s 
coloured population) there was no hope of becoming Afrikaners. Immigrants from 
Europe, on the other hand, who were prepared to learn Afrikaans could become 
“thoroughbred” Afrikaners.89 
                                                 
88 Meyer called his son Izan, which is “Nazi” spelled backwards, only to claim that it was a 
coincidence after the war (Sparks 1990:162). 
89 Hendrik Verwoerd was born in The Netherlands and came to South Africa with his parents 
as a two-year-old boy. D.F. Malan and his wife adopted a German girl who was orphaned 
during the Second World War and no doubt came to regard her as an Afrikaner child. James 
Thomas (Jimmy) Kruger, who was South Africa‟s minister of justice and the police from 
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In another respect, too, Afrikaner nationalism was not entirely consistent in its 
Fichtean approach to the relationship between language, nation and state: it 
tolerated white English speakers in the national territory. However, in the space 
that really mattered – there where modern nations are moulded and where their 
existence is preserved (as Fichte put it in his “Addresses to the German nation” – 
Kedourie 1985:83), where “the will of the young [is bent] to the will of the 
nation” (Kedourie 1985:84) – the Anglos would not be tolerated: inside the walls 
of classrooms. Afrikanerdom‟s mother-tongue education/“own schools” project, 
which insisted on separate educational institutions for Afrikaners and white 
English-speaking South Africans, was originally a Broederbond initiative and, by 
the Broeders‟ own admission (through chairman Piet Meyer in 1968), among their 
most important ones: 
The Christian national education of our Afrikaner youth in and by own mother-
tongue institutions from kindergarten and primary school to university and other 
institutions of tertiary education, was one of the primary objectives of our 
Brotherhood from the beginning [...] Our participation [...] in the establishment of 
mother-tongue schools and the Afrikanerisation of our universities
90
 is the golden 
thread that runs through all our activities (quoted in Wilkins and Strydom 1978:253; 
their translation). 
In his history of South Africa, Thompson explains the mother-tongue education 
policy that was introduced by the NP shortly after 1948 as follows:  
Although [the government] treated whites as a single entity in politics, in defence of 
Afrikaans culture it insisted on separation between Afrikaners and other whites in 
                                                                                                                                     
1974 to 1979 (and who notoriously claimed that Steve Biko‟s death in 1977 left him cold) 
was born in Wales and adopted by Afrikaner parents. 
90 At the end of apartheid, five of South Africa‟s ten white universities were exclusively 
Afrikaans: the University of the Orange Free State (est. 1904), the University of Pretoria 
(est. 1908), Stellenbosch University (est. 1918), Potchefstroom University for Christian 
Higher Education (est. 1919) and the Rand Afrikaans University (est. 1967). The latter was 
a creation of the Broederbond, as was the bilingual University of Port Elizabeth (est. 1964). 
Of (the post-apartheid successors of) these universities, only Stellenbosch is ranked among 
the top 400 in the world, whereas three of the four historically white English universities 
have made the list (namely the University of Cape Town, the University of the 
Witwatersrand and the University of KwaZulu-Natal). Source: 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2012-13/world-
ranking/region/africa (accessed March 2013). 
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the public [read: state] schools. Building on the policy that JBM Hertzog had 
initiated in the Orange Free State, the government maintained parallel sets of white 
public schools throughout the country and made it compulsory for a white child to 
attend a public school that used the language of the child‟s home – Afrikaans or 
English (2000:190). 
The one glaring error in this otherwise accurate portrayal of apartheid‟s approach 
to white education is the claim that its origins can be traced back to Hertzog. The 
latter, as has been mentioned, was an ardent opponent of separate single-medium 
Afrikaans and English schools. From the moment that the Broederbond started to 
promote single-medium schools, Hertzog rejected the idea, not because 
nationalism was absent from his agenda, but because his was a different brand of 
nationalism. Like Jan Smuts (and J.H. Hofmeyr during his stint as minister of 
education in the fusion government), Hertzog advocated Afrikaans-English 
bilingual schools where, he believed, “the white children who worked and played 
together and spoke each other‟s language [...] would grow up with the conviction 
of being brothers and sisters within the same nation” (Hancock 1962:256).91 
Thompson can also be faulted for interpreting apartheid‟s language-in-education 
policy as an initiative in defence of Afrikaans culture. It was not as innocuous as it 
seemed. “Purist” Afrikaner nationalists insisted that white Afrikaans-speaking 
children and white English-speaking children in South Africa should attend 
separate schools so that Afrikaners could receive a Christian National [read: 
nationalist] Education in their “own schools”. Before 1948, the Broederbond-led 
movement for mother-tongue-based Christian National Education for Afrikaners 
was yet another example of nationalists looking to education to provide them with 
the key to the power of which they were in search (Kedourie 1985:82):
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Clearly, the idea was that a system of separate Afrikaans schools would provide the 
purveyors of Afrikaner Nationalism with a system which would more conveniently 
lend itself to the cultivation of the spirit of exclusivity. Once the children were 
                                                 
91 This was no minor political issue. The provincial election of October 1943 became known 
as the dual-medium-education election. Cf. Broodryk (1994). 
92 This, as Kedourie sums it up, is what Fichte did in the first of his “Addresses to the German 
Nation” (1985:82–84). 
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herded into their separate schoolrooms, the Afrikaner children could be nurtured on 
the philosophy of republicanism, based mainly on glorious memories of the past. In 
the course of time, they would become the ruling political force in South Africa 
(Wilkins and Strydom 1978:258). 
Once Afrikaner nationalists had become the ruling political force, mother-tongue-
based Christian National Education for the children of the volk became a means – 
a crucial means – of safeguarding their power. 
To conclude: I introduced this section (2.2) suggesting that apartheid‟s ideologues 
proceeded from the nationalist principle that “the political and the national unit 
should be congruent”. However, as I hope to have demonstrated, this principle 
was compromised twice: if the political and the national unit could not be 
congruous, the post-fusion Afrikaner nationalists argued, (a) the political unit had 
to be congruous with the racial unit; and (b) the national unit had to be congruous 
with the educational unit. White educational institutions, in others words, had to 
be monolingual Afrikaans or English. To apply this rule to civil service 
institutions was not an option, but through a rigorous policy of bilingualism, the 
NP government would largely Afrikanerise these institutions. While English 
speakers continued to dominate the higher echelons of the civil service for the first 
decade of NP rule, new entrants were overwhelmingly speakers of Afrikaans. By 
1970, the number of Afrikaners in the service was twice as high as in 1948 
(Giliomee 2003:493). But English-speaking civil servants were hardly the real 
victims of apartheid. In the next section, I shall turn to the far more devastating 
impact of the system on the lives of black South Africans. 
2.3 From ideology to policy 
2.3.1 Laying the legal foundation of apartheid: from the Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act to the Terrorism Act 
For all the emphasis that apartheid‟s architects lay on regverdige rasse-apartheid 
[just race apartheid] – to borrow one of Geoff Cronjé‟s titles – for all the 
assurances that the policy would entail neither domination nor discrimination but 
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mere differentiation, the first apartheid laws were characterised by their 
“undisguised racial malevolence” (Butler 2009:17). Enacted during the NP‟s first 
term in office (1948–1953), these laws heralded the so-called petty apartheid93 of 
the 1950s (which, to its victims, was anything but petty) and laid the foundation 
for the “grand” apartheid – the homeland project – of the 1960s. They included, 
inter alia and in chronological order: 
1949 The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, which extended the existing ban 
on white-black marriages to future marriages between whites and members 
of all other “races”, including coloureds and Indians. (Repealed in 1985.)94 
1950 The Immorality Amendment Act, which made it an offence for a white 
person to have (or attempt to have) any sort of sexual relations with a black, 
coloured or Indian person. This entailed an extension of Hertzog‟s 
Immorality Act of 1927, which outlawed white-black sexual liaisons. By 
1985, when the act was finally repealed, about 11,500 people had been 
convicted of this form of “immorality” (Giliomee 2003:505). The maximum 
sentence was seven years‟ imprisonment. 
1950 The Population Registration Act, which formed the basis of all apartheid 
legislation. In a more rigid way than earlier race classification laws, the act 
distinguished between “Whites”, “Bantus/Natives/Africans/Blacks” and 
“Coloureds”. Initially, the latter category included “Indian” and “Chinese” 
(along with the subcategories of “Cape Coloured”, “Cape Malay” and 
“Griqua”), but in 1959 “Asian” was added as a separate category. The 
Population Registration Act required that every individual should be 
                                                 
93 The term was coined in 1959 by Piet Cillié, who was editor of Die Burger from 1954 until 
1977 and who opposed Verwoerd on issues such as the disenfranchisement of the Cape 
coloureds. Petty apartheid in the form of “Whites/Europeans Only” and “Non-whites/Non-
Europeans” signage, Cillié argued, “irritated without achieving anything” and endangered 
the grand apartheid plan of homeland-creation (Giliomee 2007:313, 316). 
94 In 1975, a decade before it was repealed, the Mixed Marriages Act was still defended along 
the following lines: “The Nationalist Government‟s policy is separate development. Now is 
a white man marries a black Transkeian woman, the man will be voting for the white 
parliament, the [woman] for the Transkei parliament and the children for the Coloured 
Persons‟ Representative Council. I do not think this makes for a happy family life” (F.W. 
de Klerk, quoted in Wilson 2009:94). 
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identified and registered at birth as belonging to one of these “racial 
groups”. It was an incredible venture in what Johnson describes as “an 
already Creolised society”. He adds, “This bizarre and often cruel process 
had to proceed without researching family trees for many Afrikaners might 
themselves have fallen foul of [the test for whiteness]” (2004:141). In 
disputed cases, the majority of which involved persons who were classified 
as coloureds, the final decision lay with a Race Classification Board. 
(Repealed in 1991.)
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1950 The Group Areas Act, which empowered the government to declare any 
urban living space as white/black/coloured/Indian territory, and to evict 
those who happened to live outside “their group‟s areas”. In the end, 25 
percent of South Africa‟s coloured population and seventeen percent of the 
country‟s Indian population (as against only 0.15 percent of whites) were 
“relocated” under the Group Areas Act. Most controversially, more than 
60,000 coloured people were bulldozed out of their homes in District Six in 
central Cape Town (Giliomee 2003:505). The act affected the coloured and 
Indian communities, rather than urban Africans who were already confined 
to black locations in terms of the Urban Areas Act of 1923. In the 
government‟s opinion, however, some of these settlements were too close to 
white suburbs and after the Natives Resettlement Act had been passed in 
1954, urban black communities (most notably the residents of Sophiatown 
in north-west Johannesburg) fell victim to forced removals as well.  
 Among the estimated three million people (“surplus” people as they were 
regarded) who were “resettled” during the apartheid era were also black 
South Africans who lived in rural areas on land which they had purchased 
before 1913. Movement to town was not an option and families were 
                                                 
95 The story of Sandra Laing, on which director Anthony Fabian based his award-winning 
film Skin (2008), is but one story about the cruelty of apartheid‟s racial classification 
system: Born to white parents unaware of their black ancestry, Laing was judged too dark 
to attend a white school. She was reclassified as coloured and later again as white 
(following a court decision that the “race” of the parents should have been the decisive 
factor). In the end, she left her family, became part of a black community, and applied to be 
reclassified as black. 
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dumped (in the literal sense of the word) in the overpopulated homelands 
where there was no work. In short, apartheid‟s forced removals “damaged, if 
not destroyed, the asset base of people who did not have much to start with” 
(Wilson 2009:86). (Progressively amended and finally repealed in 1991.) 
1950 The Suppression of Communism Amendment Act, which outlawed the 
Communist Party of South Africa and the propagation of communism in the 
country. Communism, as Johnson notes, was defined so broadly that “the 
Act could be – and was – applied to anybody who made a political nuisance 
of themselves”, including liberals (2004:144). (Progressively amended and 
finally repealed in 1991.)  
1952 The Native Laws Amendment Act, which narrowed the category of 
Africans who had the right of permanent residence in any particular black 
location to those who were born there or had lived there continuously for 
not less than fifteen years. Africans who had worked for the same employer 
for at least ten years were also allowed to stay. All others, however, had to 
make their permanent homes in the overcrowded, under-resourced 
homelands.  
1952 The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act, 
which, despite its ironic name, constituted the notorious pass laws that 
underpinned the apartheid government‟s (attempt at) control over black 
urbanisation (influx control). The act forced all Africans over the age of 
sixteen – men and now also women – to carry identification in the form of 
an internal passport with them at all times. Dubbed a dompas [dumb pass], 
this “reference book”, as it was formally renamed, contained everything 
from the bearer‟s “ethnic affiliation” to her/his criminal record (the latter 
including “crimes” prohibited by laws which were, in themselves, criminal). 
Most importantly, it stipulated whether permission was requested to be in a 
certain area at a certain time, and whether it was granted or denied. The act 
also reduced the time that black work-seekers were allowed in an urban area 
from two weeks to 72 hours. In 1964, the Bantu Labour Act went further 
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and prohibited the employment of black labourers, who were not channelled 
through the state labour bureau.  
 Through the pass laws, as Wilson succinctly puts it, apartheid “did more 
than divide black from white; it also divided the black man in half: labour 
unit in town, husband and father in the rural area [read: homeland]” 
(2009:85). During the early 1970s, up to half of South Africa‟s black 
labourers were living, as migrants, in single-sex accommodation (Wilson 
2009:84). By then, pass law prosecutions had reached half a million per year 
with “more than one person charged every minute, day and night” (Wilson 
2009:102). 
 Despite the harsh enforcement of the pass laws, the tide of black 
urbanisation was unstemmable – as Fagan‟s 1948 report had predicted it 
would be – and in 1986 influx control was finally abandoned (Saunders and 
Southey 1998:130–131). Apartheid, to quote Wilson again, was stripped of 
its moral fig leaf: “For if people were to live permanently in town, what 
value was separate citizenship in some rural „Homeland‟?” (2009:102). 
1953 The Bantu Education Act, which was to be supplemented six years later by 
the Extension of University Education Act (1959). The latter segregated 
tertiary education and prohibited black students from attending the liberal 
English-language universities of Cape Town and the Witwatersrand without 
a permit. It also paved the way for the establishment in the 1960s and 1970s 
of the University of the Western Cape (for coloureds), the University of 
Durban-Westville (for Indians) as well as a range of “ethnic” universities in 
the homelands, including the University of the North, the University of 
Zululand, the University of Transkei, the University of Bophuthatswana and 
the University of Venda.
96
 These so-called bush colleges have been 
described as “pathetic mockeries of universities, usually staffed by third-rate 
Broederbonders” (Johnson 2004:143). Yet far from producing pro-apartheid 
                                                 
96 The University of Fort Hare, which was founded by Scottish missionaries in 1916 as 
Africa‟s first university for blacks, also came under NP control after 1959. 
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ethnic nationalist black leaders as the government had hoped they would, 
these institutions soon became breeding grounds of (transethnic) Black 
Consciousness.  
1953 The Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act/Natives Settlement of 
Disputes Act, which prohibited strike action by black workers. The latter 
were not allowed to join registered trade unions. In 1979, however, the 
government succumbed to pressure from workers and adopted the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, which officially recognised black trade 
unions. The formation of the racially inclusive Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) in December 1985 marked a shift in the balance 
of power in South Africa‟s political economy. 
1953 The Public Safety and Criminal Law Amendment Acts, both of which 
were passed in response to the defiance or civil disobedience campaign of 
1952. The latter act made civil disobedience punishable by a jail sentence of 
up to three years, while the former provided for a state of emergency to be 
declared (which would first happen in 1960). Under a state of emergency, 
authorities could place a ban on meetings and detain anybody whom they 
believed threatened public safety. These acts were supplemented in 1960 
and 1967 by the Unlawful Organisations Act (which banned the ANC and 
the PAC) and the Terrorism Act, respectively. 
1953 The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, which saw 
“Whites/Europeans Only” and “Non-whites/Non-Europeans” signs going up 
in every conceivable public place: above the entrances to toilets and the 
counters of municipal buildings, police stations, post offices and banks, on 
beaches and park benches, on buses and train coaches, in hospitals and 
cemeteries – even on ambulances and hearses. In terms of a court decision, 
the facilities provided for “Whites/Europeans” and “Non-whites/Non-
Europeans” did not need to be of equal standard. 
With the exception of those laws which were enacted before he took office as 
minister of native affairs on 18 October 1950, the majority of the abovementioned 
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acts were the designs of Hendrik Verwoerd – a man whose forte was the 
uncompromising logical consistency with which he converted ideology into 
policy, and policy, in turn, into legislation. Of his early contributions to the body 
of apartheid legislation, the Bantu Education Act acquired particular notoriety 
and merits more detailed attention here.  
Resulting from the work of the Eiselen Commission, the Bantu Education Act 
entrusted Verwoerd‟s department – and not the provincial departments of 
education, which administered white education – with the administration (or 
rather, control) of black education. It also empowered the state to take control of 
the existing church and mission schools (some of which were of the highest 
quality, catering for a privileged few). The syllabi of the latter, Verwoerd 
suggested as he introduced the second reading of the bill in the senate, were 
irreconcilable with the apartheid policy. By turning out Africans with “white-
collar ambitions” who “strut in the plumes of the English civilisation”, these 
schools were bound to cause “widespread frustration” (Verwoerd 1963:62, 71). 
Under apartheid, the native affairs minister reminded the senate, 
there is no place for the Bantu in the white community above the level of certain 
forms of labour [...] It is, therefore, of no use to him to receive an education aimed at 
his incorporation in the white community where he will not and cannot be 
incorporated. Up until now, he has been subjected to a school system which lured 
him away from his own community and practically misled him by showing him the 
green pastures of the whites, yet still would not allow him to graze there. [The 
resultant frustration] disrupts the community life of the Bantu and endangers the 
community life of the whites (Verwoerd 1963:77–78). 
“The Bantu”, Verwoerd argued, had to be furnished with an education “which 
does not concentrate on the interests of the individual but which is geared towards 
the progress of the Bantu community” (Verwoerd 1963:59). Africans had to be 
prepared for serving their own community – either in the homelands where “all 
doors were open to [them]” (Verwoerd 1963:78), or as teachers, nurses and 
policemen in the locations (Giliomee 2003:508). Black ambitions beyond that 
were “ill-directed and volksvreemd [alien to one‟s own volk]” (Verwoerd 
1963:68). 
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Despite calls from black teachers‟ associations for equality between black and 
white in education, the Bantu Education Act envisaged a differential curriculum 
for black schools countrywide – in the reserves, on white farms and in the 
locations. Designed for what Verwoerd regarded as “the needs of the Bantu/native 
community”, such a curriculum would prescribe the teaching of reading, writing, 
arithmetic, Christian principles as well as “hand-work, song and rhythm” during 
the first four years of schooling. The medium of instruction would be the mother 
tongue, yet African children would be expected to learn English and Afrikaans as 
well. In order to prepare them for blue-collar employment in the white-controlled 
economy, the two official languages of the Union would remain compulsory 
subjects in the higher primary phase.
97
 The mother tongue, too, would be an 
obligatory field of study (Verwoerd 1963:70, 72–73). 
It is not difficult to see why Bantu Education, as it became known, was from the 
outset synonymous with “education for inferiority and subservience”.98 It was 
introduced by Afrikaner nationalist politicians who were primarily concerned 
about the political consequences of identical education systems (not to mention a 
single education system) for blacks and whites in South Africa. For political 
reasons, education had to be taken out of the hands of the missions “that were 
producing the despised and dangerous „black Englishmen‟” (Sparks 1990:195). In 
his speech before the senate, however, Verwoerd defended Bantu Education as a 
project of retribalisation
99
 or what he termed volksontwikkeling [national 
development – Verwoerd 1963:71] – that is, development of the (white-defined) 
black volke of South Africa. This was also the position that the Eiselen report 
adopted: “African cultures were dynamic and could provide the context for the 
modernization of entire peoples”. The challenge facing Bantu Education, so the 
                                                 
97 As Verwoerd hoped to withdraw all white teachers from black schools, this meant that 
black teachers would have to teach (in) both these languages. Language subjects – and then 
particularly Afrikaans – Verwoerd said, would thus receive priority in teacher training 
programmes (of which the government now also planned to seize control). 
98 This is how the late liberation struggle veteran and education specialist, Curtis Nkondo, 
once described it. Source: 
http://www.education.gov.za/dynamic/dynamic.aspx?pageid=310andid=9214 (accessed 
May 2010). 
99 “The point of reference in the provision and organisation of education in the Bantu 
community should, where possible, be the tribal organisation” (Verwoerd 1963:77). 
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report claimed, was to inculcate a groepsgevoel [group feeling] and a sense of 
pride in the volkseie [what is unique to the volk] among Africans. Unsurprisingly, 
the report “evinced a strong belief in the superiority of mother-tongue education” 
(Giliomee 2003:508). To apartheid‟s ideologues, it should be borne in mind, 
mother-tongue education meant separate mother-tongue schools (i.e., separate 
tribal/ethnic/volk schools) for the speakers of the various African languages. The 
principle of “congruity between the national and the educational unit” was thus 
applied not only to the own volk but to the whole of South Africa. 
Like Afrikaner nationalists before him and Afrikaner nationalists to come, 
Verwoerd presented the choice for mother-tongue instruction as a choice informed 
primarily by pedagogy. When taught in English, he told the senate in 1953, “the 
Bantu child – unlike our white children [who are taught in their home languages] 
– [cannot] achieve a thorough understanding of the reading material” (Verwoerd 
1963:71). White English liberal commentators rejected this emphasis on the 
mother tongue, arguing that it was an attempt to bar Africans from English – 
South Africa‟s only international language (Johnson 2004:143). Among the urban 
black elite, Verwoerd‟s language-in-education policy, like all his other plans for 
Bantu Education, was met with profound dismay – a reaction that the Nigerian-
born scholar Kole Omotoso has explained as follows: 
In an attempt to ensure that all Africans were united against the imperialists and 
colonisers of Africa, the African political and intellectual elite deliberately rejected 
African ethnicity and tribalism [and, as a result, many] Africans picked up European 
languages to replace their various ethnic and tribal languages. [In South Africa,] the 
Afrikaner rulers of the National Party insisted on dividing the Africans [according 
to] their ethnic and tribal languages, the very opposite [position from that which was 
adopted by] the political and intellectual leaders of the African struggle against 
European colonisation (Citizen, 2006/11/08). 
Not long after the introduction of Bantu education, the apartheid government also 
took control of the education of coloured and Indian children (who were, 
sometimes, slightly better off than their African counterparts). While only an 
apartheid apologist would claim that black education in South Africa improved in 
the decades following 1953, it is true that the proportion of Africans who received 
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some form of education grew considerably.
100
 In 1949, as Ross (2008:130–131) 
points out, no more than a third of black children between the ages of seven and 
sixteen attended school. By 1976, that figure had risen to an estimated 50 percent 
and towards the end of apartheid, it was probably as high as 85 percent. During 
the four decades of apartheid, the number of black students at South African 
universities (i.e., the homeland universities and the non-residential University of 
South Africa) increased ninety-fold. However, these figures can be misleading, as 
was proved by a test conducted in South Africa in 1995. This test, which 
measured functional literacy and numeracy at a level equivalent to seven years of 
schooling, was failed by 80 percent of black adults and 40 percent of whites (Ross 
2008:131). Against the backdrop of apartheid‟s education landscape the surprising 
aspect of these results is the poor performance by whites: 
Education was compulsory for white but not black children. White children had 
excellent school buildings and equipment; black children, distinctly inferior facilities 
[...] In 1978, when there were five times as many African children as white children 
in South Africa, only 12,014 Africans passed the matriculation examination or its 
equivalent (similar to American graduation from high school), whereas three times 
as many whites did so. The government spent ten times as much per capita on white 
students as on African students, and African classes were more than twice as large as 
white ones. Moreover, most teachers in African schools were far less qualified than 
the teachers in white schools; African teachers were paid less than whites even when 
they did have the same qualifications; and they had to teach African schoolchildren 
from textbooks and to prepare for examinations that expressed the government‟s 
racial views (Thompson 2000:191). 
Bantu Education would backfire badly on Afrikaner nationalists. Not only did it 
leave South Africa ill-prepared for the recession in the world economy during the 
early 1970s, but with the introduction of the system the apartheid government 
sowed the seeds of its own destruction. For it was at black township schools, 
when children rebelled against Afrikaans and everything it represented, that the 
                                                 
100 Except in the eastern Cape, the area in South Africa with the longest history of mission 
education (cf. Ross 2008:103–131). 
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tide against apartheid turned. The repercussions of that event – the Soweto student 
uprising of June 1976 – is the story of South Africa‟s liberation from apartheid.  
2.3.2 Resistance against apartheid: from the defiance campaign to the 
Rivonia trial
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There had been earlier uprisings, and like the one in Soweto they started out 
peacefully. Under the premierships of Malan (1948–1956) and Strijdom (1956–
1958), when Verwoerd was minister of native affairs (1950–1958), apartheid did 
not go unchallenged by those at the receiving end of the policy. During April 
1952, shortly after the introduction of the first apartheid legislation, an estimated 
100,000 people country-wide took part in an Indian National Congress-inspired 
and ANC-led campaign to defy these laws openly. On 25 June 1955, more than 
3,000 delegates
102
 assembled in an open space at Kliptown near Johannesburg to 
                                                 
101 The struggle against apartheid is most closely associated with the ANC. Like the Union of 
South Africa and the NP, the organisation had its birth in the Free State capital of 
Bloemfontein – 32 months after the Union and two years, almost to the day, before the NP. 
Established by young overseas-trained lawyers in protest against the Union constitution and 
the pending Natives Land Act, the ANC (named the South African Native National 
Congress (SANNC) until 1923) initially adopted a deferential and non-confrontational 
approach in its fight against racial discrimination. During the early 1940s, however, a new 
generation of young lawyers and other professionals (now locally trained, notably at Fort 
Hare) challenged “the polite gradualism [...,] mild exhortations [and] moderate stance of 
their elders in the ANC” (Berger 2009:112). Prominent among these Young Turks were 
Walter Max Ulyate Sisulu (1912–2003), Anton Muziwakhe Lembede (1914–1947), Oliver 
Reginald Tambo (1917–1993) and Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela (1918–) who, in 1944, 
breathed new life into the moribund organisation through the formation of the ANC Youth 
League. Five years later, in December 1949, the ANC adopted the Youth League‟s 
“Programme of Action” as official policy: the days of deputations and petitions were over; 
the era of mass action, civil disobedience, boycotts and strikes had begun. 
  As I was revising this chapter during January 2012, I found myself in Bloemfontein 
where the ANC was celebrating, on the 8
th
 of the month, its 100
th
 birthday. This followed 
after the military wing of the organisation, Umkhonto we Sizwe [spear of the nation] or MK 
as it is known, commemorated its 50
th
 birthday in December 2011 (on the 16
th
, that sacred 
day in Afrikaner nationalist mythology – cf. chapter 5). Media coverage – not only of the 
jubilee and centenary celebrations of but also of the ANC‟s history – was extensive and 
made me acutely aware of the inadequacies of the discussion of the anti-apartheid struggle 
that follows here. But this is not a thesis on South Africa‟s liberation movement. The latter 
is relevant only in as far as it had shaped the course of Afrikaner nationalism. 
102 They represented all the constituting members of the newly formed ANC-led Congress 
Alliance: the South African Indian Congress (est. 1923), the South African Coloured 
People‟s Organisation (est. 1953), the (small) predominantly white Congress of Democrats 
(est. 1953) and the multiracial South African Congress of Trade Unions (est. 1955).  
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approve a “Freedom Charter for the democratic South Africa of the future”,103 and 
on 9 August 1956, some 20,000 women marched to the Union Buildings in 
Pretoria to petition against the pass laws.  
Time and again, however, non-violent protesters – armed with stones, if anything 
at all – came up against the full force of the apartheid state. Nearly 80,000 people 
were arrested during the defiance or civil disobedience campaign of 1952. The 
Congress of the People, as the Kliptown meeting identified itself, was broken up 
by police and shortly afterwards 156 Charterists (supporters of the Freedom 
Charter) were charged with high treason. They included Z.K. Matthews, the 
driving force behind the Congress of the People and one of the drafters of the 
Freedom Charter; Nelson Mandela, who had been serving on the national 
executive committee of the ANC since December 1949; and Albert Luthuli, the 
president of the ANC, who would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1960. All the 
accused were acquitted, but only after four years.  
Organised opposition to apartheid intensified when Verwoerd succeeded Strijdom 
as prime minister in 1958. During that year, the Africanists (as they called 
themselves), who had misgivings about white involvement in the liberation 
movement, walked out of the Transvaal conference of the ANC. They went on to 
form the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) during April 1959, electing 
Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (1924–1978) as their president.104 A year later, 
Sobukwe issued a call for people to hand in (or burn) their passes en masse at 
local police stations. What happened at the Sharpeville police station prompted 
the (reluctant) move to armed resistance against apartheid. On Monday 21 March 
1960, as Ross recounts the events, 
                                                 
103 This is how Z.K. Matthews phrased it. Source: 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/campaign-congress-people-and-freedom-charter-
origins-and-nature (accessed March 2013). 
104 PAC nationalism was a “racially assertive nationalism”: Africa, the slogan of the 
organisation went, was for the Africans, “and although their definition of Africans could 
include whites, they saw most whites as settlers without valid claim to the land they 
owned” (Saunders and Southey 1998:129). 
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large demonstrations were held throughout the Vaal region. Some 20,000 people 
converged on the police station at Evaton, and another 4,000 on that at 
Vanderbijlpark [to hand in their passes, as part of the PAC-led campaign]. These 
demonstrations were dispersed by baton charges and threatening, low-flying jet 
aircraft. However, such tactics did not have the same effect on the 5,000 people or 
so who had gathered around the Sharpeville police station. Faced with a melee they 
could not control, the inexperienced police constables panicked and fired on the 
crowd […] The gunfire killed sixty-nine people – including eight women and ten 
children – and wounded 180 (2008:139). 
The government responded by banning the ANC and the PAC, forcing them to go 
underground. Both organisations now established military wings, but before long 
the high command of Umkhonto we Sizwe – the ANC‟s armed division under the 
command of Nelson Mandela – was arrested at Lilliesleaf Farm in Rivonia outside 
Johannesburg. Charged with high treason, they faced being hanged, but the judge 
in the case was wary not to turn them into martyrs. He found eight of the accused 
guilty of sabotage and, on 11 June 1964, sentenced them to life imprisonment. 
Mandela and the other black prisoners were taken from the courtroom to Robben 
Island. In a statement from the dock, the man who would become South Africa‟s 
first democratically elected president – and, arguably, the world‟s most beloved 
statesman – spoke these prophetic words: 
the ideal of a democratic and free [South Africa] in which all persons live together in 
harmony and with equal opportunities […] is an ideal which I hope to live for and to 
achieve.
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2.3.3 Of rising phoenixes and falling flagpoles 
It would be another three decades, however, before “the wind of change” that was 
blowing down from Ghana – who gained independence from Britain in 1958 – 
would reach the southernmost tip of the continent of Africa.
106
 In South Africa, 
                                                 
105 Mandela added that it was also an ideal for which he was prepared to die. Fortunately, he 
did not have to. Source: http://www.nelsonmandela.org/content/mini-site/introduction-
from-the-book (accessed March 2013). 
106 The wind reached Anglophone southern Africa during the mid-1960s and Lusophone 
Africa during the mid-1970s, adding to the existing international pressure on the apartheid 
regime. Botswana and Lesotho became independent in 1966, Swaziland in 1968, and 
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black political opposition was crushed under Verwoerd, owing in no small part to 
his minister of justice and the police, Balthazar Johannes Vorster (of Ossewa-
Brandwag fame – cf. section 1.4). Verwoerd‟s misguided response to “the wind of 
change” – as Harold Macmillan described the decolonisation of Africa in an 
address to the South African parliament on 3 February 1960 – was to introduce 
the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959)
107
 – an extension of the 
Bantu Authorities Act (1951) and a forerunner of the Bantu/Black Homelands 
Citizenship Act (1970). This was grand apartheid legislation, the ultimate aim of 
which was to ensure that there would be no black South African citizens. 
As we have seen, the idea that non-whites should be evicted from white South 
Africa was put forward by the Afrikaner nationalist ideologues of the late 1930s 
and early 1940s. They defended the proposed policy, which clearly entailed racial 
cleansing, in the language of German Romanticism. Linguistic frontiers, it was 
argued in Fichtean fashion, were the natural frontiers not only of nations but also 
of states (Alter 1990:60). As a state in which members of different nations were 
living together (increasingly so after the Second War World), South Africa was 
thus “unnatural, oppressive, and finally doomed to decay” as “the different nations 
[ran] the risk of losing their identity” (Kedourie 1985:58–59). The apartheid 
notion of black homelands – one for each black language/ethnic group – was 
consistent with this nationalist view of the world. 
To say this is not to suggest that Fichte would have approved of the map of South 
Africa as it came to look after the introduction in 1970 of the Bantu Homelands 
Citizen Act. National Party ideology notwithstanding, linguistic frontiers in 
apartheid South Africa did not coincide with the frontiers of the homelands or so-
called Bantustans, at least not neatly (cf. Map 2.1): the Zulu, Xhosa, Pedi, 
Tswana, Sotho, Tsonga, Swati, Venda and Ndebele “nations” were hardly united 
                                                                                                                                     
Angola and Mozambique in 1975. When Zimbabwe gained its independence from Britain 
in 1980, the white-ruled buffer zone – as apartheid South Africa saw it – between itself and 
the rest of “dark Africa” was something of the past. The border war, which started in 1966 
when South African forces first clashed with SWAPO in northern Namibia (cf. footnote 29) 
and which saw South Africa invading Angola in 1975, now increased in intensity.  
107 Renamed the Promotion of Black Self-government Act and later the Representation 
between the Republic of South Africa and Self-governing Territories Act, both of 1959. 
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as far as each of these languages was heard.
108
 With the exception of QwaQwa 
(for Sotho speakers), Venda (for Venda speakers) and KwaNdebele (for Ndebele 
speakers), all the homelands were fragmented, mainly because white farmers were 
not prepared to sacrifice their land on the altar of apartheid: KwaZulu (for Zulu 
speakers) consisted of eleven separate pieces of land, Lebowa (for Pedi speakers) 
of five, Bophuthatswana (for Tswana speakers) of seven, Gazankulu (for Tsonga 
speakers) of two and KaNgwane (for Swati speakers) of three. Xhosa speakers 
ended up with not one but two homelands, separated by a stretch of “white” 
territory and the mighty Kei river, hence their respective names: the Transkei in 
the north and the Ciskei in the south. 
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Map 2.1 Apartheid South Africa
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A general lack of territorial (and economic) integrity was not the only reason why 
the nine black homelands – four of which would eventually accept 
“independence” (Transkei in 1976, Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979 and 
Ciskei in 1981) – were doomed to failure. If ever a system of social engineering 
proved Walker Connor‟s point that “[w]hile an ethnic group may [...] be other-
defined, the nation must be self-defined” (– and, one may add, must choose its 
own leaders – 1994:430; emphasis in the original), it was apartheid. Regardless of 
how hard the social engineers tried to coax speakers of South Africa‟s Bantu 
languages into the idea that “wherever a separate language is found there a 
separate nation exists”, black nationalism in the country was not Fichtean in spirit. 
It might have accentuated the black-white divide at times, but from the outset it 
downplayed, if not ignored, intra-black linguistic differences. 
When they formed the ANC Youth League in 1944, Nelson Mandela and his 
comrades aspired to become “the brains-trust and power-station of the spirit of 
                                                 
108 I borrow this phrase from a song by one of Fichte‟s fellows, Ernst Moritz Arndt, in which 
the latter expressed the vision to see the whole of Germany united “[a]s far as the German 
tongue rings out and praises God with songs!” (“Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland?” – 
Arndt, quoted in Düding 1987:30).  
109 Source: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no81/MapHomelands.html (accessed March 
2013). 
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African nationalism; the spirit of African self-determination”.110 Rejecting the 
class analysis of the Communist Party of South Africa, the Youth League 
maintained that “Africans, as a conquered race, were oppressed „by virtue of their 
colour as a race – ... – as a nation!‟ not as a class” (quoted in Berger 2009:112). 
However, despite this initial exclusivist approach, the ANC adopted the Freedom 
Charter in 1956 according to which “South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
black and white”, and in 1969 opened its membership to whites. Through the 
Charter, the ANC committed itself to the principle of a non-racial civic nation – “a 
democratic state, based on the will of all the people [that] can secure to all their 
birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief”.111 The point is: the 
ideals of grand apartheid were irreconcilable with the ideals of ANC nationalism, 
both in its Africanist and in its non-racial manifestations. 
Hendrik Verwoerd did not live to see the flagpole falling down – as if on cue – 
when the Ciskeian flag was about to be raised during the homeland‟s 
“independence celebrations”. Eight years into his premiership, Verwoerd was 
assassinated in parliament by a mentally ill employee
112
 and Vorster
113
 took over 
as prime minister. The Vorster years saw “a hardening of apartheid rule, which 
from then on exhibited its most repressive characteristics” (Ross 2008:144). In his 
book, Pale Native – Memories of a renegade reporter, veteran Afrikaner 
journalist Max du Preez reflects upon the impact of Verwoerd‟s death (on 6 
September 1966) on the Afrikaner psyche: 
It was a time of great fear. I was only fifteen years old, but I sensed that the 
community in which I lived felt lost, rudderless and scared. They had blindly placed 
                                                 
110 ANC youth league manifesto of 1944: 
http://www.africawithin.com/mandela/ancyl_manifesto.htm (accessed July 2011). 
111 The Freedom Charter, as quoted in Segal and Cort (2011:29). It was to remain the ANC‟s 
basic policy statement throughout the struggle against apartheid despite its ideological 
inconsistencies. In addition to (racially inclusive, South African) nationalism, both 
socialism and liberalism somehow found their way into the Charter. Cf. Thompson 
(2000:203) and Dubow (2012:68–74). 
112 In his biography of the assassin (Een mond vol glas (1998), which appeared in English as A 
mouthful of glass (2000)), Henk van Woerden suggests, contrary to popular belief, that 
there might have been a political motive. In 1960, Verwoerd had survived an attack on his 
life. 
113 Vorster‟s middle name Johannes was, ironically, anglicised to John. 
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all their trust and hopes in the hands of their Leader. Suddenly, their Moses was 
gone. That was the mentality of Afrikaners in the time after the Anglo-Boer War: 
find a strong leader and follow him without question [...]  
 All was well with Afrikanerdom under [Verwoerd‟s] rule. He finally „liberated‟ 
them from British imperialism by withdrawing South Africa from the 
Commonwealth and changing the country‟s status to that of a republic in 1961. 
Between 1960 and his death, South Africa experienced extraordinary economic 
growth. His cocksure rationalisations of apartheid on moral and religious grounds 
stayed with many Afrikaners long after his death. 
 They got another strong leader to replace Verwoerd: John Vorster. But where 
Verwoerd earned the reverence he enjoyed through his (rather twisted) intellect, 
Vorster had to get it through pure kragdadigheid [forceful and uncompromising 
tactics] and an aggressive leadership style and body language. It was easier to 
discard him in the end, and even easier in the case of his successor, PW Botha” 
(2004:61). 
By the time Botha replaced Vorster,
114
 the phoenix of South Africa‟s liberation 
movement – inspired by Black Consciousness – was rising from the ashes. This 
became abundantly clear in Soweto on the morning of 16 June 1976 when 
thousands of teenagers converged to march in protest against the government‟s 
decision to introduce Afrikaans as a language of instruction into black secondary 
schools (outside the homelands). These children, who preferred to be taught in 
English, now had to study half of their school subjects through the medium of 
English and half through Afrikaans. Failing to disperse the crowd, police opened 
fire. Among the first victims to be gunned down was a twelve-year-old boy who 
would become the martyr of the Soweto uprising, Hector Pieterson.
115
  
In what has been described as a “[y]ear of fire, year of ash” (Hirson 1979), the 
revolt spread through the townships of South Africa, leaving more than 600 
people dead (according to the official count), most of them schoolchildren. Steve 
                                                 
114 Vorster was forced to resign, soon also as state president, due to his role in the so-called 
information scandal or Muldergate scandal (after Connie Mulder, the minister of 
information who, until then, had been the prime minister‟s heir apparent). The scandal 
involved the secret use of taxpayers‟ money to finance government propaganda efforts, 
inter alia the establishment of a pro-apartheid English-language newspaper, The Citizen. 
115 The photo of Pieterson‟s sister and another youth carrying his dead body made the 
headlines worldwide and remains the symbol of the Soweto uprising. 
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Biko (1946–1977), the founder of South Africa‟s Black Consciousness Movement 
and of the all-black South African Students‟ Organisation, was arrested on 18 
August 1977 and died three weeks later at the hands of police. “The harsh 
measures taken to suppress the uprising”, as Saunders and Southey summarise the 
outcome of the events, “aroused much international condemnation, and created a 
crisis of legitimacy for the apartheid regime that led eventually to the negotiated 
settlement of the1990s” (1998:161). Yet external boycotts and sanctions alone did 
not bring the apartheid government to its knees. In the wake of the Soweto 
uprising, a protest culture took root in South Africa: “Students and workers, 
children and adults, men and women, the educated and the uneducated became 
involved in efforts to liberate the country from apartheid” (Thompson 2000:222). 
Of the “Soweto generation”, many sacrificed their education, left the country to 
receive military training and returned as guerrillas.  
2.4 On the banks of the Rubicon, and after the crossing 
White South Africa had to “adapt or die”. This was what P.W. Botha told his 
electorate shortly after assuming office as prime minister, and eventually he 
would abolish the pass laws, begin tentative talks with the ANC and agree to 
cooperate with a United Nations-monitored independence process in Namibia. But 
Botha will be remembered as the man who did not cross the Rubicon.
116
 The 
furthest he was prepared to go, constitutionally speaking, was to provide for 
limited coloured and Indian participation in central government through a 
tricameral parliament, and to establish so-called black local authorities. Under the 
tricameral constitution (adopted in 1983), the Big Crocodile – as the irascible 
Botha was nicknamed – became the executive state president of South Africa. 
For the right wing of the governing party, Botha‟s reforms were too much. They 
quit the NP, as noted above, to form the Conservative Party (CP). For the vast 
                                                 
116 In August 1985, as Sparks explains, “Botha was supposed to announce a giant step away 
from apartheid – a „Rubicon speech‟, according to the advance publicity hype – which 
turned out to be a damp squib that disillusioned South Africa‟s few remaining friends in the 
world and triggered the start of serious international sanctions” (1995:1). 
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majority of South Africans, however, the reforms were too little, too late. Out of 
their frustration the United Democratic Front (UDF) was born – “a mass-based 
popular front of oppositional bodies and organisations [with close links to the 
ANC-in-exile] that took the country by storm” (Segal and Cort 2011:39). The 
townships became ungovernable, and in June 1986 the first of a series of states of 
emergency was declared. 
After suffering a stroke in January 1989, Botha resigned as NP leader and eight 
months later, under pressure from his cabinet, also as state president. F.W. de 
Klerk took over the reins and led the Nationalists through a difficult election in 
September, solving nothing. South Africa was on the edge of an abyss. But then, 
rather unexpectedly, the world changed. In November, the Berlin Wall came 
down and with it the threat – real or perceived – of communism. At parliament‟s 
opening on 2 February 1990, F.W. de Klerk crossed the Rubicon, announcing 
the end of apartheid, the unbanning of all proscribed organisations, the release of 
Mandela and the remaining ANC prisoners, a welcome back home of all exiles and 
the invitation to the ANC and all other parties to talks on a new democratic 
constitution. By the time [he] had finished speaking, South Africa had changed 
completely and for ever [sic] (Johnson 2004:198). 
Afrikaner nationalism, too, had changed completely and forever. It was about to 
lose – completely and forever – what nationalists value most: control of a state. 
According to Sparks, De Klerk did not foresee this total loss of state power: 
Just as Gorbachev could not have known that his restructuring of the Soviet system 
would lead to the loss of his East European empire, the collapse of communism, and 
the dismemberment of the Soviet Union itself, so, too, De Klerk did not expect his 
reforms to lead to black-majority rule and the end of Afrikaner nationalism before 
the end of the decade (1995:7). 
About one thing Sparks is right: De Klerk, by his own admission (in November 
1993), “would have liked to have seen something closer to the power-sharing in 
the Swiss or Belgian model [and] more clearly defined rights for the regions and 
[religious, political and cultural] minorities” (quoted in Segal and Cort 2011:119, 
160). But – and this is the central contention of my thesis – Sparks is mistaken in 
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suggesting that black-majority rule of South Africa meant the end of Afrikaner 
nationalism. He would not dispute that Afrikaner nationalism lives on in 
organisations such as the Afrikaner-Weerstandsbeweging [Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement] (AWB, est. 1973) and the Boeremag [Boer Force/Power] (est. 1994), 
which entertain dreams of overthrowing the ANC government and restoring the 
old Boer republics. Nor would he dispute that it lives on in the all-white rural 
village enclave of Orania – the only place in South Africa where statues of 
Hendrik Verwoerd are still publicly on display. I go further, however, and argue 
that Afrikaner nationalism also lives on in the far more rational, numerically much 
stronger minority rights/civic republican/radical democracy movement in 
contemporary Afrikaner circles, which adopts (rather opportunistically) the 
rhetoric of European multiculturalist discourses.  
Without suggesting that the “lunatic fringe” of post-apartheid Afrikaner 
nationalism is not worth studying, my study limits its focus to the “respectable 
core”. Unlike the fringe, the core does not aspire to be a nation state again, yet the 
difference between the projects is one of degree rather than kind. This argument is 
developed in the next chapter. First, however, it is necessary to conclude the 
narrative of South Africa‟s transition from apartheid to democracy. Owing to 
constraints of space, I shall concentrate on two sub-narratives that are directly 
relevant to the argument: the fate of the NP, and the politics of language in the 
constitution-making process. 
Nelson Mandela was released from prison on 11 February 1990, but it took almost 
two more years for negotiations to get underway, mainly because a wave of 
violence had engulfed the townships of South Africa. From the outset, the CP 
boycotted all talks and soon the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) followed suit, 
demanding that the province of Natal be declared an independent, sovereign Zulu 
state. Predictably, the key role players – first in the Convention for a Democratic 
South Africa (Codesa) and finally in the Multi-party Negotiating Forum – were 
the NP and the ANC, with Roelf Meyer (deputy minister of constitutional 
development) and Cyril Ramaphosa (lawyer and former president of the National 
Union of Mineworkers) soon emerging as the leading negotiators. 
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A two-stage transition process was agreed upon. First, an interim constitution 
containing a set of constitutional principles would be negotiated. Then, following 
a general election, South Africa‟s new parliament would be responsible for 
writing the final constitution in keeping with the constitutional principles. Crisis 
after violent crisis threatened to derail the first stage – the Boipatong massacre, 
the Bisho massacre, the assassination of Chris Hani (former MK commander and 
general-secretary of the SACP) and, last but not least, the armed invasion of the 
World Trade Centre (where negations took place) by the AWB. But talks 
continued as “both the ANC and NP leaders wanted a negotiated settlement” 
(Johnson 2004:202). Finally, in November 1993, the Multi-party Negotiating 
Forum adopted a new interim constitution for South Africa.  
The election date was set for 27 April 1994. Only at the last minute were the IFP 
and the Afrikaner right persuaded to participate. By now, the latter was led by the 
charismatic General Constand Viljoen, the former head of the South African 
Defence Force. With “his options shrunk to a stark choice between leading the 
right-wingers into a civil war or joining the election,” Viljoen eventually 
registered a party, the Freedom Front (FF), into which several leading members of 
the CP followed him (Sparks 1995:170). The leader of the IFP, Chief Mangosotho 
Gatsha Buthelezi, too, registered his party for the election after reaching a 
compromise with the ANC on the position of the Zulu king and the relative power 
of South Africa‟s future provinces. 
In the event, the FF received 2.2 percent of all the votes, half a percentage point 
more than the white liberal Democratic Party (DP), which was launched in April 
1989 following the merger of the PFP, the National Democratic Movement and 
the Independent Party.
117
 The NP managed to get one fifth of the vote (20.4 
percent) and the ANC almost two thirds (62.6 percent). After four decades of NP 
endeavours to nurture “national consciousness” in South Africa‟s black 
community, only the Zulus voted along ethnic lines, though not en bloc: 10.5 
                                                 
117 All the election statistics in the remainder of this chapter are from 
http://electionresources.org/za/ (accessed March 2013). 
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percent of the vote went to the IFP, which won control of the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal.
118
 Within the new system of proportional representation, the 
ANC had 525 seats in parliament, the NP 82, the IFP 43, the FF nine, the DP 
seven, the PAC five and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) two. The 
ANC, NP and IFP formed a Government of National Unity and on 10 May 1994, 
Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as president of a South Africa with nine newly 
demarcated provinces and no more native reserves, Bantustans or apartheid 
homelands (cf. Map 2.2).  
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Map 2.2 South Africa today
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Two years later, on 8 May 1996, South Africans could face the world “with the 
finest legal framework to protect human rights then in existence” (Wilson 
2009:109). The irony did not escape commentators such as Johnson: the new 
South African constitution (Act 108 of 1996) was “a liberal document written by 
parties which were both passionate opponents of liberalism” (2004:206).120 I 
would suggest, however, that certain ostensibly liberal clauses in the constitution 
were included on the insistence of Afrikaner nationalists who styled themselves as 
liberal language activists.  
                                                 
118 Since 1994, the Zulu vote has shifted towards the ANC. Compare the following election 
results: 
  1994 IFP 48.6% ANC 31.6% 
  1999 IFP 40.5% ANC 39.8% 
  2004 IFP 34.9% ANC 47.5% 
  2009 IFP 20.5% ANC 64% 
119 Source: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no81/mapprov.bounderies.html (accessed 
March 2013). 
120 It might have been ironic, but it was hardly surprising that the Nationalists were by now 
staunch advocates of the liberal principles of property rights and a free market economy. As 
regards the ANC, it has been argued that the party‟s negotiators failed the bottom 50 
percent of the South African population, who had played such a key role in the liberation 
struggle. From the point of view of these people – the poor, powerless masses – the timing 
of the negotiations for a democratic South Africa was unfortunate: in the wake of the end of 
the Cold War, the West was triumphantly uncritical of neoliberal capitalism and the ANC 
elite was persuaded to abandon any socialist agendas and to “play the economic game 
according to the neoliberal rules as dictated by the USA and the Washington Consensus and 
by corporatism – local as well as global” (Terreblanche, Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2006/03/17:8, 
9). 
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Allow me to explain. Towards the end of 1993, when the official status of 
Afrikaans was at stake at the Multi-party Negotiating Forum, threats like the 
following were nothing unusual and did not necessarily come from the far right: 
should anyone tamper with Afrikaans, it was warned, they can expect a Bosnian 
situation on the terrain of language (spokesperson for Die Stigting vir Afrikaans 
[The Foundation for Afrikaans] quoted in Die Volksblad, 1993/11/03); the 
reaction of Afrikaners will make the struggle of the IRA, the Basques and the 
ANC look like crèche cowboy games (Ton Vosloo, managing director of 
Nasionale Pers [National Press], quoted in Beeld, 1991/05/04), and the feud 
between the Flemings and the Walloons like a Sunday school picnic (Henno 
Cronjé, chief executive officer of the FAK, in a letter to Beeld, 1993/08/21).  
The decision to grant all major South African languages official status at national 
level was widely seen as a compromise to satisfy the Afrikaans lobby.
121
 Novelist 
Chris Barnard explained it as follows in a letter to Die Burger: 
One wonders what else they could have decided. One official language, English? 
Then all hell would have broken loose. Two official languages, Afrikaans and 
English? A worse-case scenario of hell breaking loose. Afrikaans, English and 
Xhosa? Then eight million Zulus would have broken loose. And so down the line to 
eleven languages (Die Burger, 1993/11/20). 
The cause of the Afrikaans language activists found further support in the South 
African Bill of Rights (Act 108 of 1996, chapter 2), and then particularly in 
sections such as the following: 
Section 9(3)  
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including [...] language. 
                                                 
121 In terms of section 6 of the final constitution, eleven languages have official status at 
national level, and the state is required to “elevate the status and advance the use” of the 
historically marginalised nine African languages. The language clause also prescribes 
mechanisms, notably the Pan South African Language Board (PanSALB), for the 
development of these languages and for the promotion of multilingualism in general. 
Language-related rights such as the right to a fair trial are also protected. 
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Section 30  
Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of 
their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Section 31 
(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be 
denied the right, with other members of the community –  
 (a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language; and 
 (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and 
other organs of civil society.  
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with 
any provision of the Bill of Rights.  
The most controversial language-related clause in the South African Bill of 
Rights, which continues to be a source of conflict, is section 29(2). To the NP, 
“own education” – that old Broederbond principle of “education of our Afrikaner 
youth in and by own mother-tongue institutions from kindergarten and primary 
school to university” (Wilkins and Strydom 1978:253) – remained non-negotiable 
up until the very end of the constitution-making process. The night of 18 April 
1996, Segal and Cort report, did not start well: 
At a meeting between the ANC and the NP on the education clause, the two parties 
could not reach agreement. The NP was still arguing for the protection of single-
medium institutions, while the ANC insisted, as they did many times before, that 
this would perpetuate inequalities in education. The conversation between the 
representatives of the two parties revealed their utter frustration and despair:  
Cyril Ramaphosa:  
 „What are we going to do, Piet?‟  
Piet Marais: 
 „I don‟t know. That‟s why we are sitting so many people around the table now, 
to try to resolve the matter. I believe we must admit that we are more or less 
deadlocked.‟ 
Cyril Ramphosa:  
 „We have to adopt the constitution on the 8th [of May] and how do you go to the 
8
th
 and deadlock on a simple issue like this?‟  
Piet Marais:  
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 „I‟m just the messenger.‟  
(2011:169). 
By 4 May 1996, the parties were still deadlocked, to the irritation of Blade 
Nzimande (currently South Africa‟s minister of higher education), who knew very 
well that the right to mother-tongue education was not the real issue: 
The principle in negotiations, which I learnt pretty quickly, is that in order to 
negotiate in good faith, you have to respect the other side. But to be quite honest, on 
the education issue, I couldn‟t help but feel that I despised the Nats because they 
were trying in all sorts of ways to really entrench apartheid. In that way, I preferred 
the Freedom Front, because they were very straight and honest with us (quoted in 
Segal and Cort 2011:181). 
In the end, the following formulation, suggested by Nzimande, was acceptable to 
both parties: 
Section 29(2)  
Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of 
their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably 
practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this 
right, the state must consider all reasonable educational alternatives, including 
single-medium institutions, taking into account –  
(a) equity; 
(b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and practices. 
Since 1996, numerous underutilised Afrikaans state schools
122
 have been forced to 
introduce English as an additional medium of instruction in order to accommodate 
black pupils from overfull, under-resourced township schools. These children, the 
government would argue, have the right in terms of section 29(2) “to receive 
education in the official language […] of their choice [i.e., English] in public 
educational institutions”. Evoking the very same constitutional right, quite a few 
                                                 
122 As Ponelis explains, “enrolment at Afrikaans secondary schools is tapering off on account 
of both population dynamics and the fresh impetus that the practice for Afrikaans children 
to attend English schools has gained” (2004:131). Afrikaans language activists are trying to 
reverse this trend. 
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Afrikaans schools have taken the government to court in an effort to maintain 
their single-medium status.
123
 Parallel-medium education, the governing bodies of 
these schools would argue, is fiscally unsustainable and leads to anglicisation, 
thus violating the language rights of Afrikaans pupils.  
The first language-related case to be heard by South Africa‟s Constitutional Court 
(late in 2009) was brought by a high school (Hoërskool Ermelo) which sought to 
remain exclusively Afrikaans. In my view, this aspect of the post-apartheid 
campaign against the demise of Afrikaans as a public language reveals most about 
the nature of the campaign. What is really at stake? Afrikaans speakers‟ 
constitutional right to mother-tongue education? Or the modus vivendi of single-
medium Afrikaans schools, their way of doing things? If it turns out to be the 
latter, we have to entertain the possibility that we are witnessing a final 
compromise to the Afrikaner version of the nationalist principle: if a government 
of co-nationals is no longer an option, Afrikaners at least have to go to school 
with and be educated by co-nationals. More than anything else, the resilience of 
Afrikanerdom‟s mother-tongue education/“own schools” project suggests that 
Afrikaner nationalism has not run its course. 
Claims to the contrary, namely that Afrikaner nationalism has become extinct, are 
often based on the collapse of the NP. In 1996, the party withdrew from the 
Government of National Unity and reinvented itself under De Klerk‟s successor, 
the young Marthinus van Schalkwyk, as the New National Party (NNP). But it 
was not new enough: in the election of 1999, the NNP‟s share of the vote was 
down from 20.4 to 6.9 percent. The FF also lost ground. The DP, however, fared 
much better than in the previous election and replaced the NNP as the official 
opposition. According to Giliomee (2003:660), more than half of the Afrikaner 
vote in the 1999 election went to the DP, which was then led by Tony Leon, an 
English-speaking South African Jew. 
                                                 
123 These court cases included: Governing Body of Mikro School and others v Western Cape 
Minister of Education and others (2005); Governing Bodies of three Northern Cape 
Schools and others v Northern Cape MEC for Education and others (2005); Ermelo High 
School v Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education (2007). The list is 
not exhaustive. 
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Following its poor performance at the polls, the NNP merged with the DP in 2000 
to form the Democratic Alliance (DA), only to withdraw from the alliance within 
a year. A mere 1.7 percent of South African voters supported the NNP in the 
election of 2004, and in 2005 the party dissolved itself and merged with the ANC. 
Support for the FF – which became the FF+ in 2003 following right-wing mergers 
– has remained low but constant. Under Helen Zille, a white English-speaking 
woman who is also fluent in Afrikaans and, to a lesser degree, in Xhosa,
124
 the 
DA has kept growing. The party drew 16.7 percent of the vote during the last 
election (2009) and took control of the Western Cape Province, where coloured 
people constitute the largest group and just under half of the population speak 
Afrikaans as a first language (Statistics South Africa 2012:21, 25). But election 
statistics, as will emerge towards the end of this study, tell only half of the story of 
post-apartheid Afrikaner identity politics. 
                                                 
124 The daughter of parents who fled Germany in the 1930s (her maternal grandfather and 
paternal grandmother were Jewish), she also speaks German. 
111 
 
CHAPTER 3  
LANGUAGE, THE NEW LAND: THE CONTEMPORARY 
AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE MOVEMENT IN THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Activists for Afrikaans, but no longer Afrikaner nationalists (or 
so they say): a question of definition 
The Afrikaner campaign of the early 1990s for the continued official status of 
Afrikaans in a democratic South Africa was followed after 1994 by a language 
preservation campaign which has, since then, continued to increase in intensity. 
What distinguishes this Afrikaans language movement from its predecessors is the 
fact that it is not an exclusively white endeavour. From the rise of Afrikaner 
nationalism until the end of apartheid, Afrikaans language activists were, virtually 
without exception, Afrikaners (or, more accurately, Afrikaner nationalists). For its 
black or coloured speakers (i.e., more than half of its speakers), Afrikaans was, as 
Jakes Gerwel
125
 once put it, “a completely sober thing” (1988:16) – “simply a 
medium in which they live[d] naturally” (1987:26). They would have died in the 
language, but not for the language (Gerwel 1985:193).  
After the end of apartheid the situation seems to have changed as coloured 
speakers of Afrikaans were taking up prominent positions in existing and new 
Afrikaanse taal- en kultuurorganisasies [Afrikaans language and culture 
organisations]. To some, this involvement of non-Afrikaners in the language 
campaign rules out the possibility that any form of activist behaviour in defence of 
Afrikaans could nowadays be regarded as Afrikaner nationalist behaviour. These 
                                                 
125 Gert Johannes Gerwel (1946–2012) was a coloured anti-apartheid activist who, during the 
1980s, turned the University of the Western Cape into the intellectual home of the Left 
(first as professor and head of the Afrikaans department, then as dean of the arts faculty and 
finally as vice-chancellor). In 1994, Nelson Mandela appointed him as director-general in 
the office of the presidency. Gerwel held a doctorate in literature from the University of 
Brussels which was published in 1983 as Literatuur en apartheid: konsepsies van 
“gekleurdes” in die Afrikaanse roman tot 1948 [Literature and apartheid: conceptions of 
“coloureds” in the Afrikaans novel until 1948]. 
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commentators would concede that the language movement is neither integrated 
nor united. They tend to argue that coloured language activists – or “brown” 
activists as they identify themselves – stress the role of Afrikaans in socio-
economic development, while white activists generally invoke language rights.  
However, debates that took place in the media from 2005 onwards suggested that 
the “brown”-white schism in the primary Afrikaans speech community ran much 
deeper. Towards the end of the decade, Christo van der Rheede, arguably the most 
prominent “brown” activist on the language front in the South Africa, described 
the “white Taalstryd [Language Struggle]” as reactionary, parochial and 
“embroiled in controversy and hidden agendas”. With reference to efforts to 
maintain Afrikaans as a language of tuition at certain universities, Van der Rheede 
remarked that “the Taalstryders [Language Strugglers] failed to grasp the 
complexity of the language problem by focusing only on Afrikaans and 
regard[ing] transformation as an assault on Afrikaner heritage and identity” (Cape 
Times, 2009/07/29). Did he mean to suggest that the white language activists were 
acting as Afrikaner nationalists? Maybe not, but this is the hypothesis of my 
thesis: that the white branch of the movement for the maintenance of Afrikaans as 
a public language in the post-apartheid South Africa constitutes, for the most part, 
a continuation of the Afrikaner nationalist project. The aim of the present chapter 
is to develop a theoretical framework within which this hypothesis can be tested. 
The major question that presents itself is whether a non-state-oriented ethnic-
based language struggle qualifies as a nationalist struggle. In order to answer this 
question, it is imperative that the definition of nationalism be revisited. 
“Nation, nationality, nationalism”, as Benedict Anderson phrases it in the 
introduction to Imagined Communities, “all have proved notoriously difficult to 
define, let alone to analyse” (1991:3). The meaning of these terms is neither 
obvious nor uncontested. To say that there are as many definitions of nationalism 
as there are theorists of the subject would be an exaggeration, yet there can be no 
denying that definition is a contentious issue and that the existing body of 
literature is characterised by (sometimes sharp) divergences. So is public 
discourse, and post-1994 public discourse in South Africa is an interesting case in 
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point. In the debate within and surrounding the Afrikaans language movement 
questions such as “Is this/that nationalism?” and “Are we/they nationalists?” are 
emotionally charged. This is hardly surprising in the light of the association of 
apartheid with what nobody seems to deny was Afrikaner nationalism. What is 
often denied – directly or indirectly – is that latter-day language activism in the 
white Afrikaans-speaking community is an expression of Afrikaner nationalism. 
In the pages that follow, I provide examples of arguments to this effect that were 
raised between 2000 and 2006 by Afrikaner scholars in various fields. The result 
is a rather lengthy introduction, but the purpose is to give the reader some sense of 
the peculiarity of the definition problem in this particular case.  
In an article that appeared in Die Burger on 8 October 2003, Hein Willemse – a 
coloured Afrikaans-speaker who was, at the time, head of the department of 
Afrikaans at the University of Pretoria – expressed the view that language 
activism has been central to Afrikaners‟ “cultural achievement, their sense of 
uniqueness, their political control, their loss of political control, the earlier 
triumph and the present setback of their nationalism” (quoted in Giliomee 
2004:53; Giliomee‟s translation). Yet the white Afrikaans language activists of the 
post-apartheid era generally do not identify themselves as Afrikaner nationalists. 
Quite often, the label is explicitly discarded. For instance, when linguistics 
professor Ernst Kotzé, observes (with unmistakable approval) that the issue of 
language discrimination has become a standing item in the letter columns of 
Afrikaans-language newspapers, he adds that “the authors are no longer 
necessarily language nationalists, as was previously mostly the case, but also 
„ordinary‟ mother-tongue speakers of Afrikaans” (2004:118). Even if these letter-
writers protest because they believe, as Hermann Giliomee does, that the survival 
of Afrikaans is the minimum requirement for the survival of an Afrikaner 
identity,
126
 that does not make them nationalists.  
                                                 
126 Giliomee (2001:20) ascribes (the alleged) post-apartheid defeatism among Afrikaners to the 
fact that they were always made to believe that control of the state was a precondition for 
their survival. Many Afrikaners, he says, now feel that they have finally lost the battle. He 
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Giliomee‟s take on the matter is that the Afrikaners of the post-apartheid era have 
“to come to terms with [their] history, to nourish and replenish [their] love for 
language and land and to accept the responsibility to hand over their cultural 
heritage to the next generation” (Giliomee 2003:666). What needs to be passed 
on, however, is more than a love of language and culture. According to the author 
of the Afrikaner biography, the crucial question is: “Can this generation ensure 
that Afrikaans as a public language is transmitted to the next generation and is it 
possible in this struggle to form alliances with other languages?” (Giliomee 
2001:24; emphasis added). For at least some theorists, though apparently not for 
Giliomee, an approach such as this would qualify as nationalist in nature: it values 
the continued existence of a language-based ethnic identity and lays on others a 
duty to preserve that identity, inter alia by preserving the language. 
What Giliomee does present as nationalism, is – as he describes it – the ANC 
government‟s “nation-building creed of one history, one public language, and one 
„patriotic‟ party” (2003:666). To this project, he claims, Afrikaners are not 
attracted, and time and again participants in the language debate have proven him 
right. Consider, for example, the degree of hostility towards “the Mbeki 
government” in an article by law professor Koos Malan: 
What South Africa describes as affirmative action is a self-deceiving code for 
something else.  
 A decoding soon reveals that „affirmative action‟ is one of the key instruments of 
the Mbeki government‟s sectional nationalist project, which is entrenching black 
domination in all spheres of society.  
 An additional side effect is the establishment of English monolingualism in the 
public service, in civil society and in education. Since black domination is the 
principal aim and English monolingualism its inevitable spin-off, Anglo-Afro 
nationalism is an apposite label for this project.  
 Anglo-Afro nationalism puts the congenial liberal and human rights codes of the 
affirmative action concept at its service. Draped in human rights camouflage, this 
nationalism acquires a mobility that would otherwise be lacking. 
                                                                                                                                     
suggests a different take on the matter: the prerequisite for the continued existence of an 
Afrikaner identity is the continued existence of Afrikaans as a public language. 
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Malan‟s piece appeared in the now defunct English-language newspaper Thisday 
(2003/11/11) under the heading “Anglo-African Gevaar” – a title which contains 
an unambiguous negative comment on his stance. But while the author of the 
article clearly reminded the sub-editor who chose the title of the Afrikaner 
nationalists of yore and their swart gevaar rhetoric, Malan seems to believe that 
modern-day Afrikaner opposition to “black domination” as well as “English 
monolingualism in the public service” is not an expression of minority 
nationalism: the black majority are the nationalists; theirs is a sectional nationalist 
project, “[d]raped in human rights camouflage”. 
During January 2005, the concept of “Afro-nationalism” was also employed by 
the philosopher and political commentator Johann Rossouw in a review essay in 
Die Vrye Afrikaan [The Free African].
127
 In more explicit terms than Malan, 
though, Rossouw insists that the Afrikaner reaction (or at least the reaction of 
what he calls the new Afrikaners) to “Afro-nationalism” is not a form of 
nationalism. Rossouw does not deny that it is a political reaction: the “New 
Afrikaans Movement” (as he has labelled it – 2003:81) envisages the Afrikaner 
community as a “smaller political community” as opposed to “larger power blocs 
(the nation, the colonial motherland, the imperium, the market)”.  
According to Rossouw, there are two types of post-apartheid Afrikaners: those 
who seek “political salvation” within the South African nation, and those who 
believe that their only salvation lies within the Afrikaner community. The former 
group, he claims, favour the discontinuation (opheffing) of their identity as 
Afrikaners (henceforth “self-destructors”, in lieu of a better translation for 
selfopheffers). Within the latter group he identifies two sub-types: old backward-
looking Afrikaners – whom he calls “the nationalists” – and new forward-looking 
ones. Rossouw asserts that, unlike the more traditional Afrikaners, the new 
                                                 
127 During its three-and-a-half-year existence (September 2004–February 2008) as the 
mouthpiece of the post-apartheid FAK, Rossouw was the editor of Die Vrye Afrikaan. All 
quotations in the next few paragraphs are from the following source:“„O moenie huil nie, o 
moenie treur nie, die jollie bobbejaan kom weer‟: oor Marlene van Niekerk se Agaat” 
[“„Oh do not cry, oh do not grieve, the jolly baboon comes again‟: on Marlene van 
Niekerk‟s Agaat”] – Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2005/01/21, www.vryeafrikaan.co.za (accessed 
March 2005). 
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Afrikaners – among whom he includes himself – are not nationalists: they favour 
“a different or new Afrikaner identity”.128 
Rossouw continues to argue that a distinguishing feature of the post-1990 
Afrikaans world has been a mass production of symbols – by the self-destructors, 
the nationalists and new Afrikaners alike. Of these three “political positions”, the 
pro-new South Africa orientation of the self-destructors has attracted, in his 
opinion, the largest proportion of media attention by far. This he ascribes to the 
fact (?) that they cooperate with governmental and corporate South Africa. 
Compared to their symbolic production process, the respective projects of the 
nationalists and the new Afrikaners have received poor publicity, mainly because 
they stand in tension with governmental and corporate South Africa. Yet in 
Rossouw‟s assessment, both the nationalist and new movement “probably enjoy 
considerable support in the broader community”. He adds: 
Their one advantage over the self-destructors – and this is particularly true of the 
new Afrikaners – is their intellectual depth. Nevertheless, due to the limited scope of 
media at their disposal, the new Afrikaners can at present not compete with the self-
destructors on an equal basis, and they are constantly subjected not only to attempts 
by the self-destructors to cast suspicion on them, but also to flagrant efforts to lump 
them with the nationalists: today, if one mentions the idea of a new Afrikaner, you 
are accused by the self-destructors that you want to return to the old Afrikaner of the 
nationalists. 
It is not difficult to anticipate the kind of questions that some scholars of 
nationalism may raise, especially in response to the last part of this argument. Not 
nationalists? A group of people who regard themselves as intellectuals and who 
aspire to reconstruct an ethnic identity, lamenting their lack of access to the forms 
of mass media without which they cannot facilitate the process through which a 
new community is imagined? 
                                                 
128 It is interesting, though, that the “new Afrikaners” do not seem to be uneasy in the company 
of the “nationalists”. Rossouw apparently had no qualms joining the FAK (during 2004) or 
organising a conference in Orania (during 2007). 
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Following the publication of his review, Rossouw was indeed accused of being a 
“closet nationalist”, and his position criticised as one that could far too easily be 
interpreted as an apology for a new, more sophisticated version of apartheid. This 
particular reaction came from philosophy professor Anton van Niekerk, who 
identifies himself as a South African, “unashamedly Afrikaans and proud of it”, 
but not an Afrikaner.
129
 What is worth noting is that Van Niekerk rejects 
Rossouw‟s position out of loyalty to his mother tongue: 
I think it is extremely unwise, and I particularly think that, in our efforts to protect 
Afrikaans, also its higher functions in South Africa, such a position will endlessly 
complicate cooperation between us and our brown [sic] and black co-speakers of 
Afrikaans, who in most cases do not want to hear anything more about the concept 
Afrikaner.
130
 
Van Niekerk‟s response would have annoyed not only Rossouw but also 
Giliomee. The latter, too, takes a critical view of white Afrikaans speakers who 
dissociate themselves from the ethnonym Afrikaner. “Is it not ironic,” asks 
Giliomee, “that people who have served cosily in the Broederbond until recently 
now regard the term „Afrikaner‟ as stuffy?” (Beeld, 2005/07/19).131 What seems to 
concern him is the fact (?) that these no-longer-Afrikaners occupy important 
strategic positions in society: “it is they who will eventually determine the future 
of Afrikaans”. According to Giliomee, they are driven by guilt and constitute one 
of three categories of post-apartheid Afrikaners. Just like Rossouw, Giliomee 
distinguishes two further types, and their typologies are remarkably compatible, as 
                                                 
129 This echoes Kotzé‟s belief: it is entirely possible to be loyal to Afrikaans, not as an 
Afrikaner nationalist, not even as an Afrikaner, but as an “ordinary” mother-tongue speaker 
of the language. However, the concern voiced by Van Niekerk (and, almost on a daily 
basis, by “ordinary” Afrikaans speakers in letters to the press) about the weakening 
institutionalised position of Afrikaans – “its higher functions in South Africa” and by 
implication the power of its speakers – suggests that it is not disinterested loyalty. 
130 This quote and the one in the preceding paragraph are from Van Niekerk‟s letters: 
 (a) “Oor die wegbly van die jollie bobbejaan: wie is dit wat regtig treur?”  
[“About the jolly baboon not coming: who really grieves?”]  
– www.litnet.co.za/seminaar/agaat_avniekerk.asp (accessed March 2005); and 
 (b) “Gemeenskap, identiteit en verantwoordelikheid: hoe ek en Johann Rossouw verskil”  
[“Community, identity and responsibility: how Johann Rossouw and I disagree”] 
– www.litnet.co.za/seminaar/avn2.asp (accessed March 2005).  
131 Clearly, this is not meant to imply that everybody who rejects the term in this spirit was a 
member of the Broederbond  
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are their respective individual positions. Rossouw‟s portrayal of self-destructors 
matches the way in which Giliomee depicts guilt-driven Afrikaners: they 
supported the Truth and Reconciliation Commission all too enthusiastically, and 
would have subsequently sacrificed almost anything to be assimilated into the 
new South African nation, including “any protection of Afrikaans, the term 
„Afrikaner‟, historical roots of a university as well as academic and professional 
integrity”.  
In direct opposition to the guilt-driven Afrikaners, in terms of Giliomee‟s 
classification, stand the grievance-driven ones. Like those Afrikaners whom 
Rossouw classifies as nationalists, they will never accept a predominantly black 
government. Giliomee labels his third category principle-driven Afrikaners, and 
this is clearly where his sympathy lies. What is striking about this group, he 
argues, is the way in which they defend the South African Constitution: they pay 
their taxes, lodge complaints with the Pan South African Language Board about 
the neglect of Afrikaans and defend the right to mother-tongue education (i.e., 
single-medium Afrikaans schools) in court – exactly what Rossouw‟s new 
Afrikaners would do. They are not nationalists but good democrats.  
Consider, in conclusion, the following statement that was made by one of 
Rossouw‟s fellow “new Afrikaners”, the philosopher Pieter Duvenage, in a 
contribution to Die Vrye Afrikaan (2006/03/17:11): 
Unfortunately one is confronted time and again with the stubborn criticism that you 
are relapsing to a type of nationalism or pre-94-mentatlity. The group of people to 
which I belong are trying to make a clear distinction: [ours] is not a nationalist 
agenda, but rather a pluralist project to be a post-national Afrikaner. 
The list of examples can go on, but I think the problem is clear: participants in the 
Afrikaans/Afrikaner debate of the post-apartheid era neither spell out nor defend 
the respective definitions of nationalism to which they subscribe. The viewpoint 
expressed in each of the cases quoted above seems to be a conclusion reached 
through deductive argumentation (this is not nationalism, that is nationalism) with 
the different general starting premises (nationalism is...) – the reason for the 
119 
 
different conclusions – only implied and for the most part unclear. About one 
thing there is consensus: whatever nationalism is, it is bad, or at least a bad label 
to bear. To be called a nationalist is an accusation; nationalism is always the 
unfashionable hidden agenda of some or other out-group. 
There would be ample reason to question the merit of this study if it were to set 
out and “expose closet nationalists” in the spirit of the ongoing public debate. 
That is not my intention. Yet I do think that the tendency among white Afrikaans 
language activists, as demonstrated above, to reserve the (clearly stigmatised) 
label “nationalist” for ideological opponents (both within and outside the 
Afrikaner community) – without defining the general concept nationalism, let 
alone explaining defining preferences – may have inhibited scholarly attempts to 
understand what has happened over the past decade or two to the once powerful 
force which everyone can agree was Afrikaner nationalism. The general 
consensus appears to be that “Afrikaner nationalism is alive approximately 100 
years since its birth” but that it is “most certainly ailing”. This is how local 
sociologist Janis Grobbelaar puts it in her contribution to Abebe Zegeye‟s volume 
Social identities in the new South Africa (2001:301–315). Grobbelaar, like many 
other commentators, equates nationalism with its extreme manifestations: she 
regards as nationalists only those Afrikaners who are “concerned with the relative 
or federal political autonomy option and, „if all else fails‟ with that of radical 
militarised secession” (2001:313).  
I wish to propose a definition of nationalism that is wider in scope, not as an 
attempt to confine ever more Afrikaners (who do not want to be there) to the 
nationalist camp, but because I believe it will bring us closer to explaining the 
contemporary Afrikaans language movement. In terms of a broader definition, as 
will become clear, it is possible to argue that Afrikaner nationalism is alive and 
well, co-existing with South African nationalism (a term that I would prefer to 
“Afro-nationalism”). It is to the development of such a definition that I now turn. 
3.2 The philosophical, social and psychological dimensions of 
nationalism 
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A cursory glance of scholarly definitions of nationalism reveals there to be a fair 
degree of consensus at the most general level. At least when it comes to the broad 
conceptual categories to which the phenomenon of nationalism belongs, theorists 
seem to agree that nationalism is one or more of the following: 
(a) an ideology;  
(b) a movement; and/or 
(c) “a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment” (Snyder 1968:247). 
Not everybody includes all three categories in their definitions, but many authors 
do and it seems safe to conclude, then, that nationalism has: 
(a) a philosophical dimension (nationalism being an ideology);  
(b) a social dimension (nationalism being a movement); and 
(c) a psychological dimension (nationalism being “a condition of mind, feeling, 
or sentiment”). 
Nationalism is not only defined but also explained in terms of these categories 
with theories varying according to the emphasis they lay on the philosophical, the 
social or the psychological causes of the phenomenon. The concept “social” is 
used here to include political, cultural and economic aspects of nationalism – sub-
categories that become important when explanatory theories are considered. 
While most scholars agree that cultural, political and economic factors played a 
role in the origin and spread of nationalism, some single out one set of factors – 
cultural or political or economic – as the decisive determinant. 
One way to establish the extent to which “the struggle for Afrikaans” is a 
nationalist struggle is to consider the philosophical, social and psychological 
features of the language struggle, asking whether its ideology and programme of 
action are nationalist in nature. Are language sentiments – love for and loyalty 
towards Afrikaans – nationalist sentiments? These questions can, of course, only 
be addressed once the specific content of the ideology of nationalism, the nature 
and goals of nationalist movements and the object(s) of nationalist sentiment have 
been defined. For the purpose of this analysis I suggest (a) that the term 
“activism” be employed alongside “movement” given the similarity of their 
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respective dictionary definitions,
132
 and (b) that the defining category “condition 
of mind/feeling/sentiment” be substituted with a lesser-used but perhaps more 
accurate and more helpful category: “attitude”.  
The reason for the latter choice is simply that the meaning of all the general-level 
categories in terms of which the psychological aspect of nationalism is defined – 
condition/state of mind, consciousness, outlook, sense, feeling and, perhaps the 
most widely used one, sentiment – are included in the meaning of “attitude” as the 
term is used in social psychology, more specifically in the widely accepted ABC 
model which distinguishes between (A) affect, (B) behaviour and (C) cognition as 
the constituent components of attitudes. According to the model, the cognitive 
aspect of attitudes refers to thought in whichever form: assumptions, beliefs, 
ideas, motives, outlooks, principles, values, and the like. It also includes the 
cognitive processes of interpretation and evaluation. Any attitude has, in the 
second place, an affective or emotive component: those somatic or physiological 
reactions that the object of the attitude evokes. Finally, attitudes comprise 
behavioural dispositions or “readiness for action” – the conative component (cf., 
inter alia, Baron and Byrne 1987:116). The value of the concept “attitude” – both 
in a definition of nationalism and in an analysis of the interrelationship between 
language and nationalism – lies in its structured inclusiveness. 
At least one example is called for here to illustrate the interplay between feelings, 
actions and thought (Affect, Behaviour and Cognition) in attitudes. Let us 
consider a letter to the editor of a Sunday newspaper that appeared three days 
before South Africa‟s 1994 elections. It was written (as were countless similar 
letters) in reaction to a decision by the national carrier, the South African Airways 
(SAA), to use English only – and no longer English and Afrikaans – for in-flight 
                                                 
132 movement: 
  “a campaign undertaken by a group of people working together to advance their 
shared political, social, or artistic ideas” 
 activism: 
  “action of using vigorous campaigning to bring about political or social change” 
 Source: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english (accessed March 2013). 
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announcements. “If the SAA wants to become English”, the author of the letter 
advised his fellow Afrikaans speakers,  
fly with another domestic airline that still uses Afrikaans and with any other airline 
when travelling aboard. The latter may not address you in your own language, but at 
least you will not have to sit there boiling with rage about the betrayal by your own 
people (Rapport, 1994/04/24). 
The crucial point here is that Cognition (which may be rational or irrational, 
conscious or unconscious) rather than Affect is in the driver‟s seat. What triggered 
both the rage (the “gut-level” feeling) and the resolution to boycott the SAA 
(“readiness for action”) was the assumption that the step taken by the airline 
constituted betrayal of Afrikaans speakers/Afrikaners by Afrikaans 
speakers/Afrikaners. People, in the words of Epictetus, “are not upset [or pleased] 
by the things that happen, but by their opinions about what has happened” (quoted 
in Muller, Claassen and Van Tonder 1986:108). Explained in terms of another 
ABC theory (which is not to be confused with the ABC/three-component attitude 
model), 
[i]t is rarely the stimulus, A [SAA‟s decision to drop Afrikaans], which gives rise to 
a human emotional reaction, C [rage]. Rather, it is almost always B – the 
individual‟s beliefs regarding […] or interpretation of A – which actually lead to his 
reaction C (Ellis, quoted in Swanepoel 1992:129). 
All this suggests that any attempt to explain nationalist (language) attitudes should 
start with an attempt to lay bare the cognitive content of such attitudes. 
3.3 Nationalism and the nation 
Underpinning all definitions of nationalism is the assumption that any 
manifestation of the phenomenon involves a particular social unit, usually referred 
to as a nation. But what constitutes a nation? While nationalists seldom have any 
difficulty in defining their own nation, this question is the source of ongoing 
debate among theorists of nationalism. Anthony Smith identifies three issues on 
which conflicting views have developed over the years: 
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the „essence‟ of the nation as opposed to its constructed quality; the antiquity of the 
nation versus its purely modern appearance; and the cultural basis of [the nation] 
contrasted with its political aspirations and goals (1998:170).  
There has been a fourth, less contentious area of disagreement in the literature 
with regard to the definition of the concept nation. Scholars such as Elie Kedourie 
and Walker Connor have interpreted nationalism to imply ethnic nationalism only. 
Stating explicitly that “[n]ationalism does not refer to loyalty to one‟s country” 
(1994:196; emphasis in the original), Connor, like Kedourie (1985:73–74), 
employs the term “patriotism” for devotion of this kind. Eric Hobsbawm (1996) 
reminds us, however, that the notion of ethnicity was absent from what he calls 
the revolutionary-democratic or liberal definition of the nation which emerged 
from the French and American Revolutions. These nations were defined (as the 
United States and many other nations are still defined) in terms of citizenship and 
mass participation or choice (Hobsbawm 1992:18). It was only during the late 
nineteenth century that ethnicity became, as Hobsbawm puts it, “one way of 
filling the empty containers of nationalism”. In contemporary Europe133 it is a 
popular way: 
If there is any standard criterion today of what constitutes a nation with a claim to 
self-determination, that is, to setting up an independent territorial nation-state, it is 
ethnic-linguistic [...] Every separatist movement in Europe that I can think of bases 
itself on ethnicity, linguistic or not (Hobsbawm 1996:256–258). 
However, what makes each of these nations a nation is not the fact that its 
members share a tangible attribute such as a language. Nor is it a “sense of shared 
blood” (Connor 1994:197). For Hobsbawm they qualify as nations on the basis of 
their specific political programme. Following Hobsbawm (1992:14), one may 
therefore argue that the basic characteristic of the modern nation is not only its 
modernity, but more specifically its embeddedness in modern politics. This may 
take the form, to borrow Michael Billig‟s (1995) terms, of “banal” nationalist 
politics in the case of state-owning nations, or “hot” nationalist politics in the case 
                                                 
133 The article in which Hobsbawm made these observations was first published in 1992 when 
the problem of separatist nationalism in Europe was more acute than today. 
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of stateless nations with a claim to self-determination (or state-owning nations 
aroused at a time of crisis). It may also involve, I would argue, the defence and 
expansion of an ethnic-specific institutional base in a “host” state.  
Here I depart from Hobsbawm who classifies groups as nations only if they claim 
the right to “form territorial states of the kind that have become standard since the 
French Revolution” (1996:256). Nations may (have to) settle for less. As long as 
they are “more or less institutionally complete”, Will Kymlicka (1995:11) is 
prepared to call them nations. One may set the bar even lower: a nation must have 
some modern institutions of its own: trade unions, schools, newspapers and 
magazines, television and radio channels, language academies and other cultural 
organisations, museums and heritage societies, cultural festivals (or arts festivals 
as the Afrikaners call them), and so forth. It has in fact been claimed – notably by 
Manuel Castells – that contemporary nationalism is “more oriented toward the 
defense of an already institutionalised culture than toward the construction or 
defense of a state” (1997:30). Whether this makes the nationalism, as Castells 
suggests, “more cultural than political” is debateable. Politics, in the words of 
John Breuilly, is about power, and “[p]ower, in the modern world, is principally 
about control of the state” (1993:1). To me, however, this indisputable fact does 
not disqualify ethnic struggles for lower-order forms of power – legal power, 
economic power and cultural power
134
 – as nationalist politics. 
Nations, then, are groups that assume a either a civic character or an ethnic 
character. In the latter case, (potential) state-ownership is not a prerequisite for 
nationhood. Yet ethnic nationhood is not to be equated with ethnicity. A nation, as 
Michael Mann puts it, “is a community affirming a distinct ethnic identity, history 
and destiny” (1995:44; emphasis added).135 Nationalism, in other words, entails 
the mobilisation or politicisation of ethnicity. Attempts to define nations of the 
                                                 
134 It was Michael Mann (1993), of course, who distinguished between these four sources of 
social power: political, military, economic and cultural/ideological. Max Weber has drawn 
a similar distinction between political power, class and status as three broad categories of 
power (Turner 1988:65–67). 
135 To this Mann adds: “and claiming its own state”. According to my interpretation of the 
nature of a nation, its political project need not be state-oriented.  
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ethnic type most often take the form of checklists. According to the list proposed 
by Miroslav Hroch, for example, members of an ethnic nation should, at the very 
least, share 
(1) a “memory” of some common past, treated as a “destiny” of the group – or at 
least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a 
higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a 
conception of the equality of all members of the group organised as a civil society” 
(1996:79). 
However, the compilation of these kinds of lists is perhaps best left to nationalists 
themselves. Unlike Hroch, Hobsbawm is reluctant to distinguish criteria for ethnic 
nationhood. Where available, he says, language is likely to become the primary 
symbol and expression of ethnicity. But language is not always readily available: 
the Croats and the Serbs, like the Hutus and the Tutsis, share a language. In at 
least one of his contributions (1996:255–266), this has led Hobsbawm to insert 
phrases such as “whatever it is” or “whatever its basis” after using the term 
“ethnicity”. Breuilly, in similar vein, leaves nation undefined except to identify 
the claim that “a nation with an explicit and peculiar character” exists as one of 
three basis assertions upon which a nationalist argument is built (1993:2).
136
  
To conclude, echoing John Hall: nations depend on political projects for the 
reason that “[t]here is no firm sociological mooring whatever to the nation, not in 
language, not in religion, and not in ethnicity, and Gellner is quite right to insist in 
consequence that the nation is far harder to define than is nationalism” (1995:11). 
In the next part of this chapter I return to the definition of nationalism. The aim is 
to identify the distinguishing features of nationalist ideologies, nationalist 
movements and nationalist attitudes and to explore the (potential) role of language 
in each of these dimensions of nationalism: the philosophical, the social and the 
psychological. Which of those language ideologies identified by sociolinguists are 
nationalist ideologies? When does a language movement become a nationalist 
movement? What about language attitudes make them nationalist attitudes? Only 
                                                 
136 This allows him to include supra-ethnic groups such as Arabs and Africans as nations in his 
typology of nationalism (1993:9).  
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once these questions have been answered can one begin to draw defensible 
conclusions about the interrelationship between Afrikaans and Afrikaner 
nationalism in the post-apartheid South Africa. 
3.4 Nationalist ideologies and language 
3.4.1 Nationalism as ideology 
Within the modernist paradigm (which, as should be clear by now, is also the 
paradigm adopted here), two classic studies on nationalism are introduced in a 
rather assertive manner with the claim that nationalism is, above all, a political 
ideology. I am thinking, of course, of Elie Kedourie‟s Nationalism (first published 
in 1960) and Ernest Gellner‟s Nations and nationalism (first published in 1983). 
Kedourie begins by stating that “[n]ationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at 
the beginning of the 19th century” and adds that “the doctrine holds that humanity 
is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics 
which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is 
national selfgovernment” (1985:9). Gellner is even briefer: “Nationalism is 
primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit 
should be congruent” (2006:1). At a superficial level, as far as the basic content of 
nationalist ideology is concerned, Gellner thus concurs with Kedourie, as do the 
majority of scholars. It is when explanations for the genesis and spread of the 
ideology are provided that differences of opinion become clear. 
Kedourie traces the origins of the nationalist doctrine/principle/ideology back not 
only to German Romantic thought and Herder‟s “diversitarian view of the world” 
as is common practice in the literature, but further down the history of ideas to 
Immanuel Kant‟s concept of self-determination. In the hands of people like 
Fichte, Kedourie claims, “full self-determination for the individual came to 
require national self-determination” (1994:137). The validity of the causal link 
between Kant and nationalism has been questioned by Kedourie‟s critics, 
including Gellner (1983:130–134). Breuilly, too, has reservations about the 
suggested mode of invention if it implies that Kant, Herder and Fichte together 
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produced the ideology of nationalism (1999:188). He does not dispute that the 
work of Herder – and then particularly his historicist concept of community – had 
been a major intellectual source of nationalist ideology, but emphasises that 
Herder was neither the first nor the only writer to defend diversity from a 
historicist and organicist position. Herder did not invent an ideology; his thoughts 
– which might have been “disinterested attempts to understand the world” – were 
“translated” into nationalist ideologies (1993:54–56). The use here of the plural 
form suggests that there cannot be talk of one coherent, monolithic ideology of 
nationalism, and elsewhere Breuilly indeed makes the point that variations upon 
the basic theme are possible: nationalist intellectuals can appropriate and adapt the 
core ideas to suit their own circumstances and objectives (1993:62). Their 
endeavours can be viewed, according to Breuilly‟s theory, as an intellectual 
response to a crisis of political modernisation (1999:222). I think one may go 
further and argue, as Hroch does (with specific reference to post-1989 central and 
eastern Europe), that the “basic precondition of all national movements – 
yesterday and today – is a deep crisis of the old [political] order” (1996:96).137 
To have any appeal, the intellectual response clearly needs to be appropriate to the 
specific crisis situation; it has to outline credible options and set realistic goals. If 
the classic ambition of nationalism – a state of one‟s own – is unachievable for 
whatever reason, one has to compromise. A key question in this chapter is under 
what conditions such a compromised response may still be regarded as a 
nationalist ideology. Hobsbawm (1996:258) feels strongly that “ethnic politics, 
however embittered, are not nationalist [if] the programme of setting up separate 
territorial, ethnic-linguistic states is both irrelevant and impractical”. As argued 
above, I do not agree with him in this respect, at least not as far as contemporary 
Afrikaner (language) politics is concerned. In this case, more than one ideologue 
has suggested that language should act as a substitute for the lost, never-to-be-
found-again state. Language can become the new land. In 2001 alone, both 
Hermann Giliomee (in an academic article) and Johann Rossouw (in a public 
                                                 
137 Consider also Alter (1990:80–81): “in almost every historical instance [...] nationalisms [...] 
were occasioned by real or perceived crises”.  
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lecture presented at the very popular Klein Karoo National Arts Festival) tried to 
persuade their fellow-Afrikaners that they do not need a state to survive (as 
Afrikaners). After 1994, Rossouw concedes, it is at any rate not a viable option 
“for us”: 
The pressure put today on the state by the globalisation process [...] makes the 
establishment of an Afrikaner state at this stage also an almost impossible idea. As it 
is, Afrikaners are citizens of South Africa and it would make much more sense to 
find our place within this state rather than to establish our own elsewhere (Rossouw 
2001:8). 
Rossouw adds, nevertheless, that some form or other of an Afrikaner state is not 
forever after out of the question. In his talk, entitled “„This place is no longer a 
place‟: a new beginning for democracy among Afrikaners?”, he puts it to his 
audience that the transfer of political power in South Africa had left Afrikaners 
without a “place”. After eliminating material capital and religion as potential new 
metaphorical homes for the Afrikaner, he concludes that only language can 
provide a place where Afrikaners can feel at home again. Like Giliomee (2001), 
Rossouw insists though that it is not enough for Afrikaans to be spoken; it must 
remain a language of public domains: schools, universities, courts of law, business 
chambers, markets and churches (Rossouw 2001:12). Afrikaans must, in a word, 
retain its institutionalised status. 
More recently, the idea that language should replace the lost state was also 
suggested to Afrikaners by the veteran author, poet and playwright, Hennie 
Aucamp. The latter, however, has a more pessimistic take on the situation than 
Giliomee and Rossouw as is evident from the following ideas he raised in an 
interview with Beeld (2007/12/08): 
In a sense, the Afrikaner is also stateless. Camus said: „I have a fatherland – the 
French language.‟ But I do not know with how much conviction we will be able to 
say for much longer: „Yes, we have a fatherland, the Afrikaans language.‟ Because 
the attempts to undermine this language [as a pure, literary and institutionalised 
language...] 
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In my view, these responses by the Afrikaner intellectual elite to the post-
apartheid crisis contain what Breuilly (1999:221) considers to be essential 
ingredients of political ideologies: a principle of inclusion/exclusion (who “we” 
are – notice the use of the first person plural pronoun by both Rossouw and 
Aucamp) as well as a principle of political order (how “we” should be governed). 
While the latter principle no longer requires that Afrikaners should have a state, it 
still requires that they should be, in other ways, “collectively and freely 
institutionally expressed”. This phrase, which I borrow from Brendan O‟Leary 
(1998:40), captures the essence of nationalism. As a definition of nationalist 
ideology it is broad enough in scope to encompass both state-centric and non-
state-centric approaches. 
In terms of this less conventional definition, activist initiatives by an ethnic group 
without state power aimed at the formation or defence of its own institutions 
amount to nationalist activism. Following Schöpflin (2000:8), one may go further 
and argue that “symbolic expression” will suffice if “institutional expression” is 
only partially realisable. The nationalist quest for symbolic expression may be 
more than a means to a political end. For those nations which have to abandon the 
ideal of political self-determination and the prospect of securing any significant 
degree of lower-level institutional power, “symbolic articulation and presence” 
(Schöpflin 2000:8) may be an end in itself – a form of compensation.  
Such cases, where ethnic conspicuousness or ethnic survival/revival has been 
(portrayed as) the major or even the sole aspiration of a social movement have 
been described as cultural nationalism (Hutchinson 1987; 2013). Its agents are not 
politicians but intellectuals and artists (of all kinds and abilities, one would 
assume). Instead of political parties they form academic and cultural societies. 
Cultural nationalism, as Hutchinson interprets the concept, is a force which recurs 
in times of (perceived) national decay, seeking “the moral regeneration of the 
national community rather than the achievement of an autonomous state” 
(1987:9). Cultural nationalism, in other words, is more concerned with the 
nation‟s symbolic power or prestige than with its political power. But power, as 
will become clear towards the end of this study, remains at the heart of all 
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nationalist ideologies. In the following section, I trace the historical role of 
language in these ideologies. 
3.4.2 The role of language in nationalist ideologies 
Given that an investigation into the role of language in nationalism can include 
everything from a phonological analysis of the intonation patterns in Hitler‟s 
speech to a rhetorical analysis of his speeches, it is necessary to specify the ways 
in which language concerns us here. Language clearly is, in the first place, an 
instrument of communication. It is also an instrument of thought. While no one 
will claim that communication cannot take place without language, it is 
considered by many to be a prerequisite for thought. Psycholinguists would phrase 
it more cautiously, saying that language facilitates conceptualisation. In some 
anthropological studies, however, language has been equated with thought and 
thought, in turn, with culture (read: tribal/ethnic culture). The latter half of this 
equation is not as illogical as it may seem: if culture is a way of life, it is also a 
way of thinking about life; any given cultural group (which is always socially 
constructed and never natural) is identified not only by its artefacts and practices, 
but also by the Weltanschauung of its individual members – their outlooks, beliefs 
and values (which some members of the group may reject). At the same time, a 
language is one of the tangible attributes of a cultural group and as such a basis of 
differentiation and both a source and a marker of social identity. All these things it 
has been since pre-modern times: an instrument of communication and thought, 
an aspect of culture, a prerequisite for certain forms of group membership and an 
important cue for inter-group categorisation. In the era of nationalism, however, 
language came to assume another function: that of a political symbol. For this 
Herder set the tone, even if it was not his intention. 
Herder believed that “the greatness of a people was its uniqueness and that its 
uniqueness depended originally and primarily on its language” (Fishman 
1994:89). Defending his “diversitarian view of the world” (partly against the 
universalism of the Enlightenment), he proceeded from the premises that language 
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is (a) thought; (b) learnt in a community; and (c) unique. Breuilly summarises the 
subsequent line of argumentation as follows: 
If language is thought, and can be learnt only in a community, it follows that each 
community has its own mode of thought. Furthermore, to go on to argue that 
languages are unique could lead to the conclusion that each language is not simply a 
particular way of expressing universal values. Rather it is the manifestation of 
unique values and ideas (1993:57). 
The claim, in short, is that cultures are unique because languages are unique. In 
the twentieth century, the American anthropologist Edward Sapir and his student 
Benjamin Lee Whorf would set out to prove this experimentally. While the strong 
version of their hypothesis – that the grammatical structure of the language one 
speaks determines one‟s culture or Weltanschauung (linguistic determinism) – has 
thus far eluded scientific validation, many linguists are prepared to accept the 
hypothesis in its weaker version, arguing that linguistic structure does not 
determine culture but can certainly influence Weltanschauung (linguistic 
relativity). Also widely held is a view that inverts the direction of causality: a 
language, it is said, is an index or a reflection of “its” culture, partly because 
domains of experience which are important to that culture get grammaticalised 
into the language (Romaine 1994:29). Culture, according to this view, determines 
language; languages are unique because cultures (and the physical and social 
environments in which they emerge) are unique, not vice versa (cf. Fishman 
1991:20–24; Fishman 1994:84–88; Wardhaugh 1986.) 
Since the mid-1980s, the dominant position in linguistics has shifted back towards 
that of Sapir and Whorf. Language, critical linguists now believe, is a “reality-
creating social practice” (Fowler 1985:62). According to this view, a systematic 
and consistent discourse not merely reflects but may reinforce cultural change. At 
issue here, however, is not whether Herder, Sapir and Whorf were right or wrong 
about the nature, strength and causal direction of the relationship between 
language and thought/culture. What is important, as Fishman (1994:89) puts it, is 
that “there are still many who believe in relative linguistic determinism, both in 
the scholarly world and in the world at large, and this view provides strong 
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support for the views of those who believe that it is not possible to be Xmen [sic] 
without Xish” (i.e., for example, Afrikaners without Afrikaans).138 In other words: 
if nationalist ideologues wish to claim – as they have done since Herder in those 
cases where it served their political programmes – that their language is the 
(expression of the) soul of their nation, there is a whole intellectual tradition to 
which they can resort.
139
 It is in claims such as these that both language and nation 
become symbols: they represent each other. Given the centrality of language to 
human existence, it is potentially a very powerful symbol as Fishman explains:  
Language can become the ultimate symbol of ethnicity, since in expressing, 
referring to, and evoking something else in addition to itself, it becomes valued in 
itself (quoted in Giles and Johnson 1981:205). 
Thus far, the focus has fallen on the role of language in the first part of the 
Herderian-inspired nationalist doctrine which, to quote Kedourie again, “holds 
that humanity is naturally defined into nations [and] that nations are known by 
certain characteristics which can be ascertained”. Of these characteristics, the 
German Romanticists believed, language was the decisive one: it was the criterion 
of differentiation between one nation and the next and, in the light of its “obvious” 
naturalness, national boundaries were assumed to be natural too. These 
convictions, however, did not have the status of political ideology. They were 
“translated” into ideology when the claim was added that linguistic frontiers were 
also the natural frontiers of states (Alter 1990:60). And so the “fateful link 
between language and politics” (Kedourie 1985:61) was established: language 
                                                 
138 Though it may have an impact on the definition of that identity, language shift does not 
imply loss of a cultural identity. In reality, it is entirely possible to be a Xman [sic] without 
Xish: one can be Jewish with neither Hebrew nor Yiddish, Irish without the Irish language, 
Scottish without Gaelic and Suba without Olusuba (cf. Kembo-Sure 2004), to name but a 
few examples. Conversely, as in the case of coloured speakers of Afrikaans, having Xish as 
a mother tongue does not necessarily makes one a Xman.  
139 With reference to the German case, Breuilly (1999:220) makes the point that changes in 
political practice have, to some extent, determined the idiom of the nationalist argument. It 
always tended to juxtapose “the „natural‟ to the „artificial‟, the „organic‟ to the 
„mechanical‟, the „pure‟ to the „polluted‟”, but the idiom shifted from language to history to 
ethnicity to race, and the major intellectual source accordingly from linguistics to historical 
studies to anthropology to biology. It is possible, I think, to argue that the ideology of 
Afrikaner nationalism followed a similar route, returning a century after its inception to 
language/linguistics.  
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became central not only to the nationalist principle of inclusion/exclusion, but also 
to the principle of political order.  
In earlier nationalist ideologies language did not assumed this role. It was not 
linked to the principle of self-determination in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(cf. Özkirimli 2000:19), nor did it feature, as mentioned above, in the original 
revolutionary definition of the French or the American nation. In France, though, 
it was not long before the idea started to appeal to revolutionaries such as Henri 
Grégoire and Bertrand Barére that “the language of a free people should be one 
and the same for all!” (Grillo 1989:27). For the Jacobins, French became “a 
revolutionary device for bringing the truths of liberty, science and progress to all, 
ensuring the permanence of citizen equality and preventing the revival of ancien 
régime hierarchy” (Hobsbawm 1992:103). The nation might have been defined 
not as a linguistic community but as “an act of association”, yet the actualisation 
of the practices of association came to require linguistic homogeneity (Grillo 
1989:23). Whereas the German nationalist writer Ernst Moritz Arndt wanted to 
see all the lands where German was the dominant language united (Alter 
1990:60), Grégoire propagated the Frenchification of those citizens of France with 
mother tongues such as German, Breton, Basque and Catalan (who, in the wake of 
the Revolution, made up more than half of the population of the state), and the 
“improvement” of those who spoke “bad” French (an additional twelve to thirteen 
percent of the population; cf. Hobsbawm 1992:60–61). 
In contemporary language policy studies, the French model still represents one of 
two divergent approaches that multilingual states may adopt. Alan Patten and Will 
Kymlicka (2003:1–51) identify it as the nation-building approach which sees the 
desired outcome of a national language policy as convergence on a common 
language. Implementation of such a policy would entail, as it did in post-
revolutionary France, “[t]he eventual elimination, by education or decree, of all 
but one language, which is to remain as the national language” (Stewart 
1968:532). The (nowadays far more fashionable) diversity-preserving approach, 
by contrast, defends the value of multilingualism and favours policies that offer 
protection for minority languages. The former type of policy usually aims at 
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eliminating not only linguistic but also cultural diversity, whereas the latter is 
generally part of a broader policy of recognising cultural pluralism.
140
 Underlying 
these policies, to use the terms sociolinguists do, are the respective ideologies of 
linguistic assimilation and linguistic pluralism (Cobarrubias 1983:63). 
On the basis of its nation-building programme and its objective of national unity 
and cohesion, the ideology of assimilation has to be regarded as a nationalist 
ideology. It does not proceed from the Herderian assumption that language-group 
and nation are congruent, but it insists, like the French revolutionaries did, that 
state, nation and language-group should be made congruent. The ideology of 
linguistic pluralism is nationalist in a different sense: it is in the name of this 
ideology that minority language communities such as South Africa‟s white 
Afrikaans speakers pursue their goal of finding “collective and free institutional 
expression”, thus resisting assimilation.  
Among sociolinguists, one would be hard-pressed to find a single scholar who 
does not adhere to the ideology of linguistic pluralism (cf. Green 1987:653). Quite 
often, they base their defence of linguistic diversity – i.e., their defence of 
“threatened” languages – on the claims (a) that languages are intrinsically 
valuable, and (b) that “linguistic diversity contributes to our quality of life, in the 
same way as bio-diversity does” (Grin 2004:147). To François Grin, an economist 
by training, there is an “analytical resemblance” between languages and 
“environmental assets” such as animal or vegetal species (2002:91–92). Other 
authors – notably Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) and Luisa Maffi (2000) – go 
much further and argue that the relationship between linguistic and cultural 
diversity on the one hand and biodiversity on the other hand is not only 
correlational (where linguistic and cultural diversity is high, biodiversity is too, 
and vice versa – Skutnabb-Kangas 2000:83), but also causal (“linguistic and 
cultural diversity may be decisive mediating variables in sustaining biodiversity 
itself, and vice versa, as long as humans are on the earth” – Skutnabb-Kangas 
2000:91; emphasis in the original). If one accepts these assumptions, the 
                                                 
140 Politics of recognition, as Charles Taylor (1994) has called it. 
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protection of linguistic diversity – and, by implication, the “survival struggle” of 
any individual language – becomes as justifiable a cause as the protection of 
biodiversity. 
Unsurprisingly, Afrikaans language activists have found in sociolinguistic 
literature an ally which is, on the face of it, very reputable. In their writings, too, 
statements such as the following recur:  
[Afrikaans is] considered as valuable in its own right (Giliomee 2004:53).  
[T]he loss of any language is an impoverishment of the experience potential of the 
people. It is similar to a loss of biodiversity (Breyten Breytenbach, quoted in Beeld, 
1993/12/14). 
The effect of [globalisation] on the plurality of languages and cultures is comparable 
to the extinction of species in the biological order. Languages disappear like species 
(Fragmente editorial 2000(2):4–5). 
In truth, however, sociolinguistics is not the most reputable of intellectual allies. 
Both the intrinsic value approach to languages and the bio-ecological or “green” 
approach to linguistic diversity have been discredited. If we believe that languages 
are valuable in themselves, as Patten and Kymlicka point out, 
then we should acknowledge that speakers of vulnerable languages have not just 
rights to maintain their language but also duties to do so. They should be 
encouraged, and perhaps even compelled, to maintain their language, even if some 
of them are not interested in doing so (2003:47). 
To Daniel M. Weinstock, this implication of the intrinsic value approach makes it 
an illiberal approach: 
The problem with the intrinsic value strategy for the defence of minority languages 
is [...] that if the argument upon which it is based goes through, it is not individual 
speakers of a language who have a right against others that they be allowed to use 
their language. Rather, minority languages themselves have rights against all others, 
including their own speakers, to have their intrinsic value affirmed (Weinstock 
2003:255; emphasis in the original). 
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Languages are not inherently valuable, and in view of their “historical, social and 
political constructedness” (May 2001:4; emphasis in the original) they are not 
comparable to species in the natural world (cf. Hamel 1997). Yet perhaps Walker 
Conner is right: “what ultimately matters [in social analysis] is not what is but 
what people believe is” (1978:76; emphasis in the original). And language 
activists – both inside and outside of academia – who regard minority languages 
in any given context as threatened species that deserve protection remain 
undeterred by their critics. 
A final note on nationalism as ideology and the role of language in nationalist 
ideologies is necessary here. The preceding discussion on these topics took as its 
point of departure two definitions of nationalism which are, at a first glance, 
remarkably similar: those of Kedourie and Gellner. Yet the explanations offered 
by these scholars for the rise of nationalism could not be more removed from each 
another. Gellner opposes Kedourie‟s view of nationalism as something accidental 
and rejects the allusion that we might well have been (and would have been far 
better off) without nationalism (Gellner 1964:151). Gellner, who belongs to the 
group of modernists who explain the emergence and spread of nationalism as “the 
necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions” (Gellner 
1997:11), emphasises the role of industrialisation. The major point of criticism 
against theories of this nature is that “one can establish no general „social 
condition‟ which can be correlated with the emergence of a powerful nationalism” 
(Breuilly 1999:191).
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What is convincing about Gellner‟s theory, though, and of direct relevance to this 
study, is his explanation for the rise of shared “high” codes and cultures. In the 
agrarian age, Gellner reminds us, the language of landowners was “a matter of 
considerable indifference” to peasants: 
Life is a difficult and serious business. The protection from starvation and insecurity 
is not easily achieved. In the achievement of it, effective government is an important 
                                                 
141 John Breuilly mentioned to me that he has always thought that what Gellner explains best is 
the definition of modern cultural and political identity as national, rather than the politics of 
nationalism. 
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factor. Could one think of a sillier, more frivolous consideration than the question 
concerning the native vernacular of the governors? (Gellner 1964:152–153; 
emphasis in the original). 
When and how did it happen, then, that the language of the governors – the 
language of government – became a matter of concern for the subjects? Why do 
modern day subjects have to share not only a language, but, if they want to 
maximise their social mobility, a certain variety of that language? According to 
Gellner‟s theory, the answer lies in the nature of modern industrial societies, 
specifically in the nature of work within such societies. 
In contrast to technologically stable agrarian societies, industrial societies (and, 
one may add, industrialising and post-industrial societies) are characterised by 
scientific and economic growth (Gellner 1997:25). This development has had a 
profound impact on, amongst other things, the nature of work. Work in the 
industrial age has become what Gellner terms “semantic”: “[i]t consists not of the 
modification of things, but in the manipulation of meanings and people” 
(1998:27). The very process of communication now makes up the working lives 
of people (1997:29). Most work presupposes not only a capacity for 
communication, but, what is more, a capacity for context-free communication. 
Gellner explains: 
In the stable, intimate, restricted communication of agrarian sub-communities, 
context – status of the participants, their tone, expression, body-posture – was 
probably the most important constituent in the determination of meaning. Context 
was, so to speak, the principal phoneme. Only a small number of specialists – 
lawyers, theologians, bureaucrats – were able, willing or allowed to take part in 
context-free communication (1997:29). 
The reverse is true of the modern age: “precision of articulation, such as enables a 
message to transmit meaning by its own internal resources, without making use of 
context [...] is now a precondition of employability and social participation and 
acceptability” (1997:29). 
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When work is semantic, when it involves the constant encoding and decoding of 
messages (quite often technically complex ones) without making use of context, 
the need for a standardised, modernised, technicalised code – a high code – arises: 
The standardization of idiom is [...] imposed on this kind of society by the nature of 
the work within it, which ceases to be physical and becomes predominantly 
semantic: work is now the passing and reception of messages, largely between 
anonymous individuals in a mass society (1994:105).
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Gellner‟s interpretation of the term “high code” as a script-linked, educationally 
transmitted code corresponds roughly with the definition of a “high variety” 
supplied by Charles A. Ferguson in his classic work on diglossia: “a highly 
codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety [...] which is 
learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal 
spoken purposes” (quoted in Schiffman 1997:206). In sociolinguistics, since the 
work of Ferguson and Joshua Fishman, the distinction between “high” and “low” 
is not an unfamiliar one: high varieties/languages perform high (formal, public) 
functions in high (secondary) domains of life, and low varieties/languages 
perform low (informal, private) functions in low (primary) domains. (Cf. Fasold 
1984:52.) Certainly, the labelling of certain varieties/languages as “low” is not 
meant to imply that other varieties/languages are intrinsically “better” (“higher”). 
The descriptions of high and low merely indicate functional differences between 
languages, and, contrary to popular belief, any low language can become a high 
language.
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Translated into sociolinguistic terms, Gellner‟s high code is a high function 
language – a formally standardised language that is used as an instrument of work, 
be it in the field of technology, commerce, publishing and broadcast, government, 
                                                 
142 What Gellner has to say about the nature of work in industrial societies is probably more 
true of middle-class work than of working-class work. Yet, as he rightly remarks, “what 
passes for manual work [in the industrial age] presupposes a level of literacy and 
sophistication which must often be well above that of the professional scholar of the 
agrarian age” (1997:28). 
143 It is no mean feat, however. If Giliomee‟s (2003:xvii) information is correct, only four 
languages – Afrikaans, Hebrew, Hindi and Indonesian – could achieve this in the course of 
the twentieth century, and not without massive state support. 
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judicature or education (the co-called higher or secondary domains of modern 
society). The concept “high culture” is defined by Gellner (1997:75) as a codified, 
literate culture that an industrial society uses as its main tool of work. This 
suggests that any particular high code – or, in sociolinguistic terms, any particular 
high function language – is the essence of its associated high culture. The code 
does not merely reflect or symbolise the culture: a high code is the most important 
constituent part of a high culture.  
To summarise Gellner‟s explanation for the emergence of shared high codes and 
cultures: Work in the industrial age is based on communication; work is 
communication. Communication requires a shared code, and modern 
communication-based work requires a high code that is shared on a large scale; it 
requires a widely spread high culture. Put differently: modern communication-
based work necessitates a certain degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity, at 
least in the public sphere, in the domain of work. To Gellner, then, the nationalist 
principle which holds that the political and the national (or cultural) unit should be 
congruent is not “the [bitter] fruit of idle pens and gullible readers” (Gellner 
1997:10–11); it is a matter of necessity. Towards the end of chapter 4, I 
demonstrate the applicability of Gellner‟s theory to the (near-simultaneous) birth 
of South Africa‟s mineral revolution, Afrikaner nationalism and the high code 
Afrikaans. Then, in the final chapter of this study, I go further, arguing that 
Gellner may also provide us with an explanation for the emphasis on the public 
(or high) functions of Afrikaans in the post-apartheid language campaign.  
3.5 Nationalist movements and language 
3.5.1 Nationalism as cultural, political and economic activism 
As products of social crises, political ideologies typically form part of social 
movements which “come into being and act as levers of change” (Giddens 
1989:278). The kind of change sought by a nationalist movement, as dictated by 
the conventional ideology of nationalism, is increased unity and independence for 
the nation or, when the nationalism is assimilationist in orientation, increased 
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homogeneity within an existing state. This may involve military action or less 
violent forms of separatist, reformist or unification politics (cf. Breuilly 1993:9). 
More often than not it also involves activism in the sphere of culture. Some 
authors, notably Joep Leerssen, have gone so far as to claim that nationalism 
always begins as the “cultivation of culture”. 
In an article that focuses on the meaning and role of culture in nationalism, 
Leerssen (2006:560–562) evaluates existing approaches and rejects both 
modernist and anti-modernist explanations for the cultural expressions of 
nationalism as inadequate. Rather than explaining the cultural aspect of any 
particular nationalism as some derivative of a corresponding political movement 
or as “the ongoing manifestation of a pre-existing fact” (Leerssen 2006:561), 
Leerssen proposes that we conceive of cultural nationalism as a universal 
intellectual movement analogous to – and directly related to – Romanticism.144  
In with the same way as Miroslav Hroch, Leerssen traces the origins of nationalist 
movements – their phase A – to the studies of authors, poets, folk song and tale 
collectors, grammarians, lexicographers, schoolmasters and (pre-professional) 
historians who devoted their time to “scholarly inquiry into and dissemination of 
an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social and sometimes historical attributes” 
of the nation (Hroch 1996:81). These cultural nationalists, as Leerssen describes 
them, typically formed the “unwitting avantgarde” for their political counterparts 
– the phase B nationalists (Leerssen 2006:562). Like Hroch, who depicts the latter 
group as “a new range of activists” (Hroch 1996:81), Leerssen regards the 
political activists in any particular movement as a set of nationalists 
chronologically distinguishable from the cultural activists of phase A. He argues 
more strongly than Hroch, though, that the earliest phases of Europe‟s nationalist 
movements in that long nineteenth century did not involve political action. 
Whereas Hroch would say, for example, that phase A activists on the whole 
seldom made political demands on behalf of their nation (Hroch 1996:81) or that 
                                                 
144 In the discussion that follows, I think I overstate my criticism of Leerssen‟s emphasis on 
culture at the expense of politics, overlooking the value of this insight: that nationalism is 
produced not “nationally” but “trans-nationally”. 
141 
 
they usually did not attempt to mount a patriotic agitation (Hroch 1985:23), 
Leerssen believes that nationalism is always born as a purely cultural movement 
(Leerssen 2006:562). 
The history of Afrikaner nationalism does not support this claim. Early 
preoccupations with the Afrikaans language, as we shall see in the final chapter, 
were born out of political (or material) frustration; the cultural projects of the last 
quarter of the 19
th
 century and the first half of the 20
th
 century were, for the most 
part, not endeavours in their own right but a means to a political (or an economic) 
end. Phase A Afrikaner activists may have styled themselves as language activists, 
but quite a few did so while earning their livelihood as politicians. Regardless of 
their respective contributions to the promotion of the Afrikaans language and 
Afrikaner culture, people such as S.J. du Toit, C.J. Langenhoven, J.B.M. Hertzog 
and D.F. Malan, do not qualify as phase A cultural nationalists in the exclusive 
sense that Leerssen defines the term, nor can the vast majority of their fellow 
activists in the First and Second Afrikaans Language Movements be classified as 
such. Of course, not every one of these individuals aspired to become a 
parliamentarian, but virtually all of them cherished political hopes for their nation. 
To be fair, Leerssen does not claim validity for his generalisations outside modern 
Europe yet here, too, history has produced counter-examples. French nationalism, 
for one, began as political nationalism and in many of the later, smaller national 
movements where cultural activists did take the lead, political motives cannot be 
ruled out. Hroch, for his part, developed the periodisation model as a comparative 
framework only for the latter category; that is, for those smaller nationalisms that 
embarked on the nation-to-state route at various points in the 1800s and with 
varying degrees of success. In these cases, as in the case of German and Italian 
nationalism (Hobsbawm 1992:102–103), language and/or culture was the criterion 
of potential nationhood – the principle of inclusion/exclusion. Unsurprisingly, 
nationalism found its first expression in the sphere of language and culture. Yet to 
insist that all nationalism is, first and foremost, cultural nationalism is to forget 
about those national movements in history – also in European history – that were 
originally based on territory and citizenship. That it is common for nationalism to 
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rear its head as a linguistic and cultural beast is beyond dispute: the first agents of 
many nationalist movements – including the Afrikaner one – were not political 
parties but “cultivators” of language and culture. What is unsound is the claim that 
this is always the case, and the suggestion that the nationalist beast has, in its 
infancy, no political bone in its body. 
Leerssen continues to argue that a nationalist movement, once it is born, never 
ceases to be a cultural movement because cultural concerns are not restricted to 
the embryonic phase of nationalism – an idea that is far less contentious than the 
claim that nationalism always begins as a “cultivation of culture”. In this regard, it 
has been argued that a purely political or civic conception of the nation is hard to 
sustain, hence the tendency for such conceptions to turn into cultural ones, at least 
in part (Spencer and Wollman 2005:13).  
In the case of Afrikaner nationalism, political change – the kind of change 
classically sought by a nationalist movement – was eventually brought about “by 
a conscious, planned, organised and politically directed attempt to provide for key 
economic, social and cultural interests neglected by those forces favouring the 
incorporation of [the Afrikaner] within a broader South Africanism”. This is how 
Dan O‟Meara (1996:447) interprets the role of culture and economics in the post-
fusion (post-1934) Afrikaner nationalist project, and in Volkskapitalisme (1983) 
he demonstrates persuasively how the Broederbond-led (i.e., petit bourgeoisie-
led) economic movement of the 1940s resulted not only in the growth of 
Afrikaner capital but also in cross-class national unity that was sufficient to bring 
the National Party to power.  
The economic movement was complemented by a language and cultural 
movement which constitutes part of the subject of the final chapter of this thesis. 
What needs to be pointed out here is that O‟Meara may overstate his critique of 
discourse analysis as a theoretical framework when he asserts that the Afrikaner 
nationalist movement achieved success “not by proclaiming the „truth‟ of [an 
Afrikaner] subjectivity either in intellectual journals or from the rooftops” but by 
addressing the material and other interests of its target group (1996:447; emphasis 
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in the original). To accuse O‟Meara of economic reductionism and determinism 
would be unfair: he concedes that “ideology and systems of legitimation have real, 
determinate effects in society” (1996:447). Still, he remains convinced that 
ideological/discursive practices – even in the form of “symbolic rituals and 
routines” – are not the salient shapers of national identities: 
Discourse does not explain identity, even less those key episodes in South African 
history when large numbers of people began to act in terms of identities different 
from those apparently underlying their previous socio-political actions (1996:447). 
But national identity formation cannot be explained solely in terms of interests 
either. To be sure, when confronted with a choice between two competing 
national identities
145
 – represented by two sets of nationalist elites – one‟s material 
interests may determine one‟s decision. Yet nationalist elites would not be 
nationalists if their programmes focused on interests exclusively. Their first task is 
to establish the criteria for membership of their nation – i.e., the principle(s) of 
inclusion/exclusion – and then, indeed, to proclaim the “truth” from the rooftops. 
Potential members must be told that they belong to the nation. Consider as an 
example the following question that was put to Afrikaner mothers in an article that 
appeared in a widely read Afrikaans magazine (De Huisgenoot) in 1919: 
Does the child know that he is an Afrikaans child and because he is Afrikaans that 
he must speak his own language, know the history of his volk, be familiar with his 
Bible [...] By the seventh year the child must know what the word Afrikaner is 
(quoted in Hofmeyr 1987:113; her translation). 
The important point here – and in this respect O‟Meara is right – is that 
propaganda alone would not have turned white Afrikaans speakers into 
Afrikaners. To work effectively at a popular level, as Breuilly explains, nationalist 
ideology needs simplification, concreteness and repetition: 
Simplification involves above all the construction of stereotypes. There are 
stereotypes of the nation in terms of history or racial characteristics or cultural 
practices as well as stereotypes of enemies. Repetition through speeches, newspaper 
                                                 
145 South African (à la Smuts) or Afrikaner (à la Malan), for example. 
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articles, rallies, songs, etc., is an essential part of the work of a nationalist party [or 
movement]. The turning of these simplified and repeated themes into concrete form 
is achieved primarily through symbolism and ceremonial (1993:64). 
To summarise: However crucial the role of economic and other interests, 
successful nationalist mobilisation also requires the discursive construction of a 
national identity. The latter process entails the popularisation of the nationalist 
ideology inter alia through the creation of myths, stereotypes, symbols and 
ceremonies. It is upon this process of simplification and concretisation that I shall 
focus in my analysis of the rise of the Afrikaner nationalist movement as a 
politically directed language and cultural movement (section 5.1). For the 
purposes of the analysis, I shall rely on a model developed by Leerssen in the 
same article which claims that all nationalism begins as and remains cultural 
nationalism. While this sweeping formulation overstates the case, Leerssen‟s point 
that the role of culture in nationalism warrants more structured attention is a valid 
one, and the model that he puts together in an attempt to systematise what are 
commonly considered to be nationalism‟s cultural endeavours is not without 
merit. In fact, if the Afrikaner case is anything to go by, it is a valuable analytical 
tool – also beyond European shores – provided that the reservations expressed 
here about Leerssen‟s points of departure are borne in mind.  
Leerssen‟s model, reproduced here as Table 3.1, can be regarded as a taxonomy of 
cultural activism.
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 Calling it a “typology of [...] cultural nationalism” (Leerssen 
2006:560) is perhaps misleading because culture-related nationalist activism is 
more often than not political nationalism at heart, and is oriented in the final 
analysis not toward cultural aims but toward control of the state or lower-level 
public institutions.  
                                                 
146 What we have here is an attempt to systematise neither nationalist ideology nor nationalist 
sentiment but nationalist activism as it relates to culture. Virtually every concept that 
appears in the table is a noun derived from a verb: description, maintenance, activism, 
planning, editions, translations, writing, criticism, education, commemorations, protection, 
investment, studies, revival. It is an inventory of things that nationalists do, not what they 
believe or feel. 
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 Types of cultivation 
 Salvage Productivity Propagation 
Cultural fields    
Language Language description 
 
1 
Language 
maintenance 
2 
Language activism, 
language planning 
3 
Discourse Text editions 
 
 
4 
Translations, 
literature, history-
writing, criticism 
5 
Education, festivals, 
commemorations 
 
6 
Material culture Archeography 
 
 
7 
Monument protection, 
musealisation, 
architecture 
8 
Dedicatory investment 
of public space 
 
9 
Practices performed Folklore studies 
 
 
10 
Folklore revival, 
national music, rustic 
literature 
11 
Folk pageantry 
 
 
12 
Table 3.1 A taxonomy of culture-related nationalist activism 
(Or: “„Culture‟ and its „cultivation‟ arrayed in a matrix” – Leerssen 2006:571) 
 
The argument has been made that the applicability of Leerssen‟s model is limited 
to those nationalisms that emerged as movements of “cultural cultivation”. In the 
history of Europe these were movements of opposition, born under circumstances 
that Hroch explains as follows:  
[A]n „exogenous‟ ruling class dominated ethnic groups which [...] lacked „their own‟ 
nobility, political unit or continuous literary tradition. [At some point,] selected 
groups within the non-dominant ethnic community started to discuss their own 
ethnicity and to conceive of it as a potential nation-to-be. Sooner or later, they 
observed certain deficits, [attributes that] the future nation still lacked, and began 
efforts to overcome one or more of them, seeking to persuade their compatriots of 
the importance of consciously belonging to the nation (Hroch 1996:80).  
What Leerssen does is to identify four fields in which activism of this kind, aimed 
at the transformation of a nation-to-be, typically took place:   
(a) language;   
(b) “the discursive realm of literature and learning” or discourse;  
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(c) material culture; and  
(d) performance culture.
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As a second step, these “cultural fields” are juxtaposed with three types of 
cultural activism:  
(a) salvage, retrieval and inventory;  
(b) fresh productivity; and  
(c) propagation/proclamation in the public sphere.  
In the field of discourse (literature and history production), for example, salvage 
might have involved the edition of existing texts by phase A nationalists. This 
would have been followed by “fresh productivity” in the areas of literature and 
history-writing and finally, in the propagation phase, by the introduction of 
literary awards and the commemoration of historical events. In the field of 
material culture, cultivation could have entailed the salvation of an ancient 
building, its restoration (productivity) and its dedicatory (re-)naming 
(propagation).  
A quick glance at Table 3.1 – which Leerssen describes as a matrix coordinating 
culture and its cultivation – will lead sociolinguists to identify certain problems. 
To begin with, I would suggest that the terms “language maintenance” (under 
“productivity” – block 2) as well as “language activism” and “language planning” 
(under “propagation” – block 3) should be avoided, as the scope of these 
endeavours is much broader than their respective locations on the matrix may 
seem to imply. Language maintenance, language activism and language planning 
all form part of what Leerssen calls the salvation, production and propagation of a 
language. However, if we were to list all three terms in all three columns (blocks 
1, 2 and 3), this would still leave us in the dark as to what is entailed by 
maintenance, activism and planning at the various stages of a linguistic cultivation 
process. Instead, such processes should be understood in terms of language 
planning alone. More specifically, they should be explained with reference to the 
                                                 
147 Leerssen uses the term “performative culture”, but I prefer “performance culture” given the 
well-established status of the related term “performance art”. 
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sociolinguistic distinction between corpus planning and status planning. Corpus 
planning, as Nancy Hornberger (2003:452) defines the concept, refers to “those 
efforts [or activism] related to the adequacy of the form or structure of 
languages”. Following Ferguson (1968), she identifies the goals of corpus 
planning as: 
(a) standardisation (the selection of a standard linguistic norm which overrides 
 regional and social dialects);  
(b) graphisation/codification (the development of an orthography);  
(c) modernisation; and   
(d) renovation (including “purification”). 
The cover term that Leerssen uses for these processes – “from grammar-writing to 
purism” (Leerssen 2006:569) – is “language description”. It would be possible, 
therefore, to employ the term “corpus planning” as a substitute for “language 
description” in block 1 of the matrix. But corpus planning as a type of cultural 
activism does not seem to belong solely in that block. It also fits into the blocks 
where “language” and “productivity” and “language” and “propagation” intersect 
(blocks 2 and 3): the “salvation” of a language is normally followed by the 
“production” of grammars and dictionaries, and once the language has been 
“propagated” in the public sphere, it is subject to constant modernisation and 
renovation. The spread of a language in the public sphere implies the 
dissemination of whatever was the result of the initial corpus planning process. 
However, it also implies status planning – “those efforts [or activism] directed 
toward the allocation of functions of languages” (Hornberger 2003:452). If the 
status planners are nationalists, a more accurate definition of their project would 
be “activism directed toward the conquering of public domains for a language”. 
Given that we are dealing with newly established and hence largely unknown 
linguistic norms, it is not surprising that the domains of education and the media 
have generally been targeted first.  
Table 3.2 represents my attempt, motivated in the preceding paragraphs, to refine 
Leerssen‟s categories of cultural activism in the field of language. As regards the 
fields of discourse, material culture and performance culture, the model remains 
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essentially a reproduction of Leerssen‟s.148 In the Afrikaner case, as will become 
clear in chapter 5, nationalist productivity in the field of discourse often entailed 
national myth-making rather than national-history writing, while “the invention of 
tradition”149 is a more apt description than “folklore revival” for the developments 
that occurred over the course of time in the fields of material and performance 
culture. 
 Types of cultural activism 
 Salvage, retrieval, 
inventory 
Fresh cultural 
production 
Propagation/ 
Proclamation in the 
public sphere 
Cultural fields    
Language Corpus planning: 
standardisation, 
codification, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
grammars, 
dictionaries, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
modernisation, 
renovation, etc. 
Dissemination of 
linguistic norms 
Status planning: 
spread across 
public domains 
 
Discourse Editions of older 
literary and 
historical texts 
Translations/ 
adaptations 
(Bible, classics) 
National/historical 
poetry, drama, 
novels 
National history-
writing 
 
Literature and history 
in education 
Literary awards and 
prizes 
Commemorations 
Material culture Archeography Restoration 
Musealisation 
Historicist 
architecture 
 
Dedicatory investment 
of public space: 
monuments, etc. 
Performance culture Folklore studies: 
oral literature, 
folk music and 
dances, manners 
and customs 
Folklore revival Folk pageantry: 
festivals and 
similar events 
Table 3.2 Leerssen refined: a taxonomy of culture-related nationalist activism 
                                                 
148 Cf. the elaboration of his Table 1 (2006:571) in his Table 2 (2006:572). 
149 This is, of course, the title of a major book by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger (first 
published in 1983). 
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To account for what he calls the social and institutional framework of cultural 
nationalism, Leerssen expands his model with two further categories. Under the 
heading “social ambience”, as can be seen in Table 3.3, he lists inter alia 
associations, academies, reading societies, book clubs, conferences, newspapers 
and periodicals. In the history of nationalist movements, says Leerssen, these were 
the products of “bottom-up” organisation by the professional and middle classes. 
Their work, if they were lucky, was complemented in the more advanced stages of 
the movement by that of government agencies, which, in a “top-down” fashion, 
created an “institutional infrastructure” through the establishment, funding and 
management of universities, libraries, archives, museums, galleries and so forth. 
These are inventorised in the bottom row of Table 3.3.  
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 Types of cultivation/Cultural activism 
 Salvage Productivity Propagation 
Cultural fields    
Language Corpus planning: 
standardisation, 
codification, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
grammars, 
dictionaries, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
modernisation, 
renovation, etc. 
Dissemination of 
linguistic norms 
Status planning: 
spread across 
public domains 
 
Discourse Editions of older 
literary and 
historical texts 
Translations/ 
adaptations 
(Bible, classics) 
National/historical 
poetry, drama, 
novels 
National history-
writing 
 
Literature and history 
in education 
Literary awards and 
prizes 
Commemorations 
Material culture Archeography Restoration 
Musealisation 
Historicist 
architecture 
 
Dedicatory investment 
of public space: 
monuments, etc. 
Performance culture Folklore studies: 
oral literature, 
folk music and 
dances, manners 
and customs 
 
Folklore revival Folk pageantry: 
festivals and 
similar events 
Social ambience Associations, congresses, academies, publishing ventures, reading 
societies, book clubs, periodicals 
 
Institutional 
infrastructure 
Universities/chairs, libraries, archives, state museums, state academies, 
government agencies 
Table 3.3 Culture-related nationalist activism contextualised 
(Or: “A matrix coordinating aspects of the cultivation of culture in nationalism” – Leerssen 
2006:572) 
 
By adding the dimensions of “social ambience” and “institutional infrastructure” 
to the matrix that coordinates the fields and the types of cultural activism, 
Leerssen attempts to contextualise culture-related nationalist activism. This part of 
his model, too, raises certain questions. We can agree that associations, 
academies, reading societies and book clubs are the kind of cultural organisations 
that nationalists have traditionally formed. But do conferences, newspapers and 
periodicals not belong under discourse as propagation? Universities are listed 
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under “institutional infrastructure”, but do state schools not belong there as well, 
along with libraries, archives, museums and galleries that are (completely or 
partially) state-sponsored? Apart from these apparent misplacements in the model, 
Leerssen‟s categories of “social ambience” and “institutional infrastructure” seem 
to conflate three categories in an illogical way:  
(a) the agents of cultural activism;  
(b) their modes of organisation; and  
(c) the institutionalisation of culture.  
I would suggest that efforts aimed at the institutionalisation of a national culture 
constitute a type of cultural activism. In truth, the institutionalisation or official 
recognition of a language and its culture appears to be the long-term objective – 
expressed or unexpressed – of the entire range of activities that Leerssen lists as 
examples of cultural salvage, cultural productivity and cultural propagation. 
According to Hroch, the goals of ethnic-linguistic national(ist) movements include 
three broad demands that correspond to felt deficits of national existence: 
(1) the development of a national culture based on the local language, and its normal 
use in education, administration and economic life;  
(2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the 
form of autonomy and ultimately [...] of independence;  
(3) the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group, including 
educated elites, an officialdom and an entrepreneurial class, but also – where 
necessary – free peasants and organized workers (Hroch 1996:81).  
Only when all three demands have been met, says Hroch, can a movement be 
regarded as successful. Success, in other words, implies not only political 
sovereignty and class-transcending national unity but also institutionalisation of 
the national culture, especially the national language. Fully fledged nationhood 
requires more than one‟s own language and culture; it requires that the national 
culture should be embodied in a state in which all the structures operate in the 
national language. Phrased in Gellnerian terms, fully fledged nationhood requires 
the transformation of the national language and culture into a high code and 
culture. Given that the movements under consideration here are opposition 
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movements, language and culture become sites of political conflict as soon as 
their institutionalisation is demanded. For what is demanded, in effect, is that the 
language and culture of the current rulers are substituted with (or at least 
complemented by) the language and culture of the aspiring ones.  
Finally, a case can be made that Leerssen‟s model should be expanded to include 
initiatives to maintain/preserve the national culture as a fifth type of cultural 
activism. This would reflect his (valid) point that culture remains a concern in 
nationalist politics after the achievement of self-government. As it stands – that is, 
with Leerssen‟s category of “institutional infrastructure” scrapped – the model is 
representative only of nationalist movements on the rise. Salvage, productivity 
and propagation are identified as types of cultural cultivation but they also 
represent the early stages of the cultivation process. From this perspective, 
cultural activism aimed at institutionalisation would follow after activism aimed at 
propagation, while post-institutionalisation activism would entail the 
maintenance/preservation of the national culture.  
All of this suggests that cultural nationalism – contrary to Leerssen‟s claim – does 
not develop separately from political nationalism according to “a chronology and 
dynamics of its own”, pursuing “concerns of its own” (2006:573). The concerns 
of cultural nationalism are political concerns because they involve the 
authoritative (re)allocation of resources. Not only are culture and politics in 
constant interaction in nationalist movements, but – as indicated in Table 3.4 – the 
five types/stages of culture-related nationalist activism that have been identified 
earlier correspond roughly with either oppositional or state nationalism (that is, 
with a certain phase of a political movement).  
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 Types of cultural activism 
 Associated with oppositional nationalism Associated with state nationalism 
 Salvage, retrieval, 
inventory 
Fresh cultural 
production 
Propagation/ 
Proclamation in the 
public sphere 
Institutionalisation/ 
official recognition 
Maintenance/ 
Preservation 
Fields of cultural 
activism 
     
Language Corpus planning: 
standardisation, 
codification, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
grammars, 
dictionaries, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
modernisation, 
renovation, etc. 
Dissemination of 
linguistic norms 
Status planning: 
spread across public 
domains 
 
  
Discourse Editions of older 
literary and 
historical texts 
Translations/ 
adaptations 
(Bible, classics) 
National/historical 
poetry, drama, 
novels 
National history-writing 
 
Literature and history in 
education 
Literary awards and 
prizes 
Commemorations 
  
Material culture Archeography Restoration 
Musealisation 
Historicist architecture 
 
Dedicatory investment 
of public space: 
monuments, etc. 
  
Performance culture Folklore studies: 
oral literature, 
folk music and 
dances, manners and 
customs 
Folklore revival Folk pageantry: 
festivals and similar 
events 
  
Table 3.4 The interaction between culture and politics in nationalism: skeleton of a model 
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The term state nationalism, as it is used in Table 3.4, refers to a nationalist 
movement in control of a state. According to this definition, Afrikaner 
nationalism was transformed from oppositional nationalism into state nationalism 
in 1948. The four decades that followed produced numerous nationalist 
endeavours that fit onto our model as examples of activism aimed at the 
maintenance/preservation of Afrikaner culture and, ultimately, at the 
maintenance/preservation of Afrikaner power. On the basis of these examples it 
would possible to complete the final two columns of Table 3.4, at least 
provisionally.
150
 That is part of the aim of the final chapter of this study where I 
shall apply the Leerssen model to the rise, rule and post-apartheid life of 
Afrikaner nationalism by mapping the intentions and/or actual achievements of 
Afrikanerdom‟s most significant taal- en kultuurorganisasies [language and 
culture organisations] onto the matrix.
151
 In this way, I believe, new light will be 
shed on the way in which Afrikaner nationalism has expressed itself over the 
years in the four fields of culture, especially language. This is not exactly the kind 
of research project for which the model was designed. Leerssen had cross-national 
comparisons in mind:  
What happened in Iceland in 1820, what in Slovenia in 1850? Which came first? Is 
it possible to see certain pursuits more heavily represented in established nation-
states like Denmark, others in marginal minority cultures such as Estonia? (Leerssen 
2006:572)  
My question, by contrast, concerns trends in a single case of nationalism over 
time. Still, the mere application of a model based on European data to an example 
from colonial Africa does imply a cross-national comparison. It makes it possible 
to determine, amongst other things, whether Afrikaner culture was cultivated in a 
manner similar to European national cultures. Was the route one of salvation, 
                                                 
150 Provisionally, because this contribution to the model will be based on the Afrikaner case 
alone. Yet it will be a first attempt to specify what the institutionalisation/official 
recognition of a culture and its maintenance/preservation imply in the fields of language, 
discourse, material culture and performance culture. 
151 Nevertheless, it should be stressed that cultural and academic societies, as Hutchinson 
(1987:9–15) describes them, are not the only agents of culture-related nationalist activism. 
The role of individuals should be considered as well, along with the role played by 
nationalist political parties while in opposition or in government. 
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productivity, propagation, institutionalisation and, after 1948, maintenance? And, 
crucially for this study, what has happened since 1994? To accommodate post-
apartheid Afrikaner activism aimed at the “defense of an already institutionalised 
culture [and language]” (to quote Castells (1997:30) again) Leerssen‟s model 
requires one more column as indicated in Table 4.5. 
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 Types of cultural activism 
 Associated with oppositional nationalism Associated with state nationalism Associated with post-
power oppositional 
nationalism 
 Salvage, retrieval, 
inventory 
Fresh cultural 
production 
Propagation/ 
Proclamation in the 
public sphere 
Institutionalisation/ 
official recognition 
Maintenance/ 
Preservation 
Defence of acquired 
status 
Fields of cultural 
activism 
      
Language Corpus planning: 
standardisation, 
codification, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
grammars, 
dictionaries, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
modernisation, 
renovation, etc. 
Dissemination of 
linguistic norms 
Status planning: 
spread across 
public domains 
 
   
Discourse Editions of older 
literary and 
historical texts 
Translations/ 
adaptations 
(Bible, classics) 
National/historical 
poetry, drama, 
novels 
National history-
writing 
 
Literature and history 
in education 
Literary awards and 
prizes 
Commemorations 
   
Material culture Archeography Restoration 
Musealisation 
Historicist architecture 
 
Dedicatory investment 
of public space: 
monuments, etc. 
   
Performance culture Folklore studies: 
oral literature, 
folk music and 
dances, manners 
and customs 
Folklore revival Folk pageantry: 
festivals and similar 
events 
   
Table 3.5 The interaction between culture and politics in nationalism: skeleton of a model for the Afrikaner case 
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3.5.2 Language activism and its explanations 
In the previous section of this chapter, I considered the relation between 
nationalist ideologies and nationalist movements, and then particularly those 
movements which originated as language activism and as activism in the spheres 
of discourse (literature and history production), material culture and performance 
culture. These forms of activism, as will emerge in chapter 5, provided Afrikaner 
nationalists with the means to simplify and concretise their ideology, thus 
facilitating the spread of national consciousness on a mass basis.
152
 Through the 
print media (newspapers, magazines, novels and poetry collections), nationalist 
history was popularised and individuals came to imagine themselves (to borrow 
Benedict Anderson‟s famous phrase) as Afrikaners. A nation, as Isabel Hofmeyr 
once explained it (in a title she chose – cf. Hofmeyr 1987), was built from words. 
Yet that is only half the truth: it was also built, so to speak, from monuments and 
festivals. Put differently, in terms of the Leerssen model: ideology and history 
also found expression in material or visual culture (artefacts, the linguistic 
landscape)
153
 and performance culture (practices) – before and after 1948. 
The end of apartheid did not mean the end of Afrikaner activism in the fields of 
discourse, material culture and performance culture. We need only consider the 
centenary commemoration, through literature and journalism, of the Anglo-Boer 
War; the renovation and preservation of existing Afrikaner monuments, museums 
and other heritage sites, and the creation of new ones; and the resistance against 
certain name changes. If one accepts that nationalism need not be directed at 
gaining and maintaining state power, a case can fairly easily be made – as is done 
in the final chapter of this thesis – that the lion‟s share of these initiatives are 
examples of nationalist activism. What is more difficult to argue is that Afrikaner 
                                                 
152 In terms of Hroch‟s periodisation model, this achievement constituted Phase C of the 
nationalist movement: the period of mass mobilisation. As the theory goes, the latter period 
was typically preceded by “the period of patriotic [read: political] agitation” (Phase B) 
which, in turn, followed after “the period of scholarly interest” (Phase A – cf. Hroch 
1985:22–23). 
153 In sociolinguistics, the term “linguistic landscape” refers to “the visibility and salience of 
languages on public and commercial signs in a given territory or region” (Landry and 
Bourhis 1997:23). 
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activism in the field of language constitutes nationalist activism. The question is: 
does the occurrence of language activism in South Africa continue to be what it so 
often has been – here and elsewhere: an indicator of ethnic nationalism? In a 
scholarly contribution to the existing body of literature on language rights, 
Theodorus du Plessis (2006:71) claims the exact opposite.
154
 According to him, 
the occurrence/absence of language (rights) activism could serve as a barometer of 
the general social condition of the civically defined South African nation (Du 
Plessis 2006:89): the more widespread the activism, the healthier the nation.
155
  
Du Plessis (2006:71) maintains that the contemporary Afrikaans language 
movement – like any other language movement – should be studied in terms of its 
relationship to the international language rights movement. In addition to more 
obvious examples, he defines activism in the field of place names as language 
rights activism, presumably on the grounds that the non-visibility of a language in 
the public sphere may, under certain circumstances, constitute the non-recognition 
of a language right. While Du Plessis‟s contribution reports on an empirical 
investigation into the status quo of language activism in South Africa, it is written 
from a normative perspective. Citizens should, as a matter of duty, defend their 
language rights. Following Angéline Martel (1999), Du Plessis insists that 
                                                 
154 This contribution was the pilot study in the ongoing South African Language Rights 
Monitor (SALRM) project. Published in the format of an annual report, each Monitor aims 
to provide a comprehensive overview of the developments on the language front in South 
Africa, as reflected in the country‟s mainstream newspapers. Although the major focus is 
on language rights, the Monitors cover other language-related problems as well, including 
the contentious issue of name changes in contemporary South Africa. Newspaper coverage 
of aspects of language promotion and language research also receive attention, and a whole 
chapter is devoted each year to a discussion of instances of language activism that had 
made the headlines. Together, these chapters constitute perhaps the most comprehensive 
record of language activism in the post-apartheid South Africa. It is a scene dominated by 
Afrikaans. Year after year, language (rights) activism in relation to the African languages of 
South Africa receives scant attention in the media. Even in 2007, when the SARLM survey 
included the KwaZulu-Natal-based Zulu-language papers, Ilanga and Isolezwe, the ratio of 
newspaper clippings that dealt with the maintenance of Afrikaans to those that dealt with 
the maintenance of other South African languages were 10:1.  
  Despite my own involvement in the SALRM project (between April 2008 and 
December 2009 as editor of both the monthly Bulletin and the Monitors of 2006 and 2007), 
this thesis takes a critical view of the Monitor‟s approach to language activism, arguing that 
an analysis of language activism in terms of its manifestations remains at the level of 
description and is of little value in explaining language activist initiatives. 
155 By implication he is criticising not only “inactive” Afrikaans speakers, but also the lack of 
activism in relation to the African languages of South Africa. 
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language rights activism is “essential, and even inevitable, in a process aimed at 
democratizing a multilingual society” (2006:71). To strengthen his point, he 
highlights Tollefson‟s (1991:211) remark that “a commitment to democracy 
requires a commitment to struggle for language rights” (2006:71; emphasis 
added). The willingness to participate in language struggles is by implication a 
civic virtue.  
Drawing on newspaper coverage during 2002 and 2003 as his primary source, Du 
Plessis analyses language activism in South Africa in terms of seven instruments, 
the first six of which were originally identified as such by Martel (1999:47): 
litigation, the formation of pressure groups (lobbying), research, community 
mobilisation, media coverage, violence and (Du Plessis‟s addition) the lodging of 
complaints. As sub-instruments of community mobilisation, Du Plessis further 
distinguishes between petitioning, boycotting, threats of litigation, pressurising 
the masses and demonstrations. In the model that serves as a framework for his 
discussion – reproduced here as Table 3.6 – these instruments are located on a 
scale ranging from moderate to confrontational. 
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 Instruments of language activism 
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Lobbying 
 
 
  
Mobilisation 
 
 
   
Petitioning 
 
 
   
Boycotting 
 
 
   
Threat of litigation 
 
 
   
Pressurising the masses 
 
 
   
Demonstrations 
 
 
  
Litigation 
 
 
 
 
 
Violence 
 
 
Table 3.6 Hierarchy of instruments of language rights activism (cf. Du Plessis 2006:73 – Table 1) 
 
Du Plessis‟s model provides us with a tool to describe what the defence of an 
already institutionalised language has entailed over the past two decades in the 
case of Afrikaans. As such, it can be incorporated into Table 3.5 in the block 
where “language” and “defence of acquired status” interact. Beyond that, his 
hierarchy of instruments of language rights activism is of limited analytical value: 
it does little more than listing and organising the instruments that activists – all 
kinds and creeds of activists in the modern world – have at their disposal.  
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Even more problematic is Du Plessis‟s normative approach to the study of 
language campaigns, and then particularly the post-apartheid campaign for the 
preservation of Afrikaans and Afrikaans place names. His suggestion that the 
latter is a disinterested and virtuous endeavour is challenged in this thesis. 
Language activism may be “a phenomenon that is increasingly prevalent in 
contemporary democracies” (Coulombe, quoted in Du Plessis 2006:71), but it 
may be because minority nationalism is increasingly prevalent in the world. For 
language conflicts, as Alan Patten and Will Kymlicka (2003:6) remind us, have 
virtually always been linked to nationalist conflicts. White Afrikaans language 
activists may claim to be inspired by a commitment to democracy or to the South 
African constitution, but it may be because apartheid has given ethnic loyalty a 
bad name. That brings me, in the final part of this chapter, to the psychology of 
language activism and nationalism. 
3.6 Nationalist attitudes and language 
3.6.1 Nationalism as attitudes 
Thus far in this chapter, the focus has been on nationalist ideologies and 
nationalist activism. Nationalism also refers, in the third and final place, to 
popular sentiment: it exists in the minds of individuals as feelings of belonging 
and loyalty and pride; time and again it erupts, as Anthony Giddens puts it, from 
feelings of threat and insecurity. According to Giddens, nationalism is first and 
foremost a psychological phenomenon (Billig 2005:191). Whilst explanatory 
theories of nationalism that stress the role of the human need to belong to a group 
are generally rejected (the rise of nationalism certainly cannot be explained as the 
solution to a psychological problem, cf. Breuilly 1993:414–418), those theories 
that do not seem to account for the feelings that nationalism engenders – its 
emotional power, its spell – have also been criticised. Özkirimli (2000:141) cites 
the example of Anthony Smith who put the question to Gellner as to why people 
should ardently identify with (that is, nothing less than love) an invented high 
linguistic culture. 
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Responding to his critics, Gellner asserted that passion was not absent from his 
theory. Individuals, he explained, tend to find themselves in stressful situations if 
the nationalist requirement of congruence between their culture and their 
environment is not satisfied (cf. Özkirimli 2000:141). To Gellner, environment 
meant state; part of the argument in this chapter has been that the requirement of 
congruence can be satisfied at lower institutional levels. But his point remains 
valid either way: in the modern world, incongruence between an ethnic culture 
and its institutional environment – the inability to participate in a job market that 
functions in an unfamiliar high code, for example – is bound to cause stress and 
insecurity, which may or may not lead to nationalist resentment. Reactions of this 
nature are probably best understood not as feelings or sentiments but, within the 
framework of the ABC model, as attitudes comprising affective and behavioural 
and cognitive aspects. Put differently: these attitudes involve emotion, (readiness 
for) action and thought. And, as has been suggested earlier in this chapter, the 
stimuli for both emotion and action are to be found on a cognitive level – the level 
of thought.  
Cognitive determinants of nationalist attitudes have material and immaterial 
dimensions. Concerns about access to resources may draw individuals into 
responding to a nationalist ideology, embracing the beliefs, norms and values that 
it embodies. Once internalised, these beliefs, norms and values shape nationalist 
emotion, which may lead to nationalist action (or activism). Such, it seems, is the 
nature of the relationship between ideology, activism and attitudes in the minds 
and lives of nationalists: nationalist sentiment (the affective component of 
nationalist attitudes) and readiness for nationalist activism (the behavioural 
component of nationalist attitudes) presuppose the endorsement of a nationalist 
ideology, and this act of endorsement constitutes (part of) the cognitive 
component of nationalist attitudes. 
3.6.2 Language attitudes and their explanations 
It may be an exceptional case – it certainly is when it comes to language 
monuments – but the history of Afrikaner nationalism contradicts Smith‟s 
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suggestion that people are unlikely to identify with an invented high linguistic 
culture.
156
 Following the official recognition of Afrikaans in 1925, Afrikaners – or 
at least the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie – celebrated their language as a young 
human-made institutionalised high code, singing:
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Nobody breaks it, lawyer pleads it, cleric preaches it: Afrikaans!  
Schools teach it, politician honours it: Afrikaans!   
(FAK 1937, song 9). 
The focus of the song, it should be added, was not limited to the public domains 
that the newly standardised language had conquered. The “un-artificial”, 
“unprocessed”, “organic” characteristics of Afrikaans, and its role in the private 
lives of its speakers, were acknowledged too: 
Father speaks it, Mother nourishes it, baby warbles it,  
everybody caresses it: Afrikaans for me!   
(FAK 1937, song 9). 
Titled “Afrikaans vir my” [Afrikaans for me], this song was written and 
composed by the composer of the apartheid national anthem, M.L. de Villiers. In 
1937, it was included in the first edition of the FAK-sangbundel [FAK Anthology 
of song] – Afrikaners‟ “authorised” collection of folksong.158 Together with 46 
other songs of known authorship, “Afrikaans vir my” form part of the opening 
section of the FAK Anthology which deals with “Volk en vaderland” [Volk and 
fatherland].
159
 It is not the only song in this section that portrays Afrikaans as a 
language of both the private and the public sphere – a language that is 
simultaneously old and young, traditional and modern, natural and constructed. 
Consider as further examples the lyrics of song 20 (“Ek ken ‟n land” [I know a 
                                                 
156 If ever a high code was rapidly invented, it was Afrikaans: it took a low-function 
vernacular, literally a kitchen language, a mere two to three decades – from the beginning 
of the twentieth century to the early 1930s – to be “firing on all cylinders” (Ponelis 
2004:122). 
157 If truth be told, I would be surprised if this “folksong” was ever sung. The lyrics as 
translated here sound as awkward in the original Afrikaans. 
158 Henceforth, FAK Anthology. 
159 Some of these more “serious” songs (though not “Afrikaans for me”) have become as 
popular as the more typical light-hearted and anonymous folksongs in the rest of the FAK 
Anthology. 
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country]) and song 36 (“Uit die chaos van die eeue” [Out of the chaos of the 
centuries]): 
I know a language oh so dear,  
my own language, my heritage  
almost lost  
but now reborn,  
so young and fresh!  
(FAK 1937, song 20). 
Hear it rustling purely over our fields – sweetest tongue of young and old:  
First sounds in our ears, and last when death is near.  
It is the language of our forebears, of their national assemblies;  
on our pulpits, in our law courts, rises the sound of Afrikaans.  
We shall preserve you, we shall build you up, we shall carry your flag high;  
in our Love for our Language we shall be strong, South Africa  
(FAK 1937, song 36). 
There are more examples to be found in the “Volk and fatherland” section of the 
FAK Anthology (and elsewhere in the Afrikaans literature), but I think the point is 
clear. It is possible for a nation to love its language as a Blut-und-Boden mother 
tongue – a language born from “an intensely passionate embrace between a robust 
people and an unforgiving soil” (Kruger, quoted in Kok (ed.)1974:35), a language 
that “sits in our marrow and blood” (FAK 1937, song 41), a language learned at 
mother‟s knee from her “pious mouth” (FAK 1937, song 42) – and to love the 
language as a high code equipped for modernity and urbanity. In fact, in the dual 
nature of the national language may lie the dual explanation for “the love of a 
language”, which so often complements “the love of a volk and a fatherland”. 
What has to be borne in mind here is the distinction between the communicative 
function of a language on the one hand (including thought), and its symbolic 
function on the other hand. Human languages, sociolinguistic textbooks tell us, 
are both instruments of social (and intrapersonal) interaction and symbols of 
identity. Following Gellner, one may go further and argue that the nature of 
language – both as a tool of communication and as a marker of identity – has been 
redefined by industrialisation, modernisation and nationalism. In the course of 
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history, languages that survived the transition from an agrarian to an industrial 
society and/or the transition from the world of empires to the world of nation 
states acquired communicative and symbolic functions that they had previously 
not performed. Industrialisation, to simplify one effect of the process, turned 
language into the tool of virtually all trades, while nationalism turned languages 
into national symbols.  
To understand the symbolic role of language in nationalism we need only consider 
songs 20 and 36 from the FAK Anthology again, now in their entirety. In the life 
of a nation, as in these folksongs, nation, country and language are substitutable 
in the sense that they symbolise – or, as Joshua Fishman (1994:87) explains it, 
stand for or represent – one another: 
I know a country of oxwagon […]  
I know a volk so great and free […]  
I know a language oh so dear  
(FAK 1937, song 20; emphasis added). 
[I]n our Love for our Volk we shall be strong, South Africa […]  
[I]n our Love for our Language we shall be strong, South Africa […]  
[I]n our Love for our Country we shall be strong, South Africa  
(FAK 1937, song 36; emphasis added; unconventional use of uppercase in the 
original). 
Song 40 may serve as another example of the threefold nature of the object of 
national love: 
I cherish my country with all my heart, fatherland South Africa [...]  
I cherish my country with all my heart, my beloved South Africa. 
I cherish my volk with all my heart, Afrikaans [sic] volk so free […]  
I cherish my volk with all my heart, my beloved volk so free. 
I cherish my language with all my heart, mother tongue so soft, so sweet.  
Wherever I may wander, never will a foreign language rob me of my love.  
Language of pious predecessors, my beloved language oh so sweet.  
I cherish my language with all my heart, mother tongue so soft, so sweet  
(FAK 1937, song 40; emphasis added). 
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Like a flag, it is often said, a language may symbolise a nation and a state. There 
are, however, obvious differences between languages and flags: the latter have no 
value beyond the symbolic; the former are potential sources of material power. 
This goes some way to explaining why people would (claim to) love an artificially 
constructed high linguistic culture and defend it as such: only when the national 
language functions as a high code, when it is more than the tongue of the mother 
and the language of the home – more than the soul of the nation – can it facilitate 
upward socioeconomic mobility in the modern world. During South Africa‟s 
transition to democracy, when the future status of Afrikaans was still uncertain, at 
least some commentators acknowledged this fact. “Let us admit it,” an Afrikaans 
speaker wrote to Die Burger during November 1993, 
[i]t is not Afrikaans that is under threat. It is us who feel threatened because we fear 
that our positions – those positions that have to do with Afrikaans – will be become 
redundant in a new dispensation (Die Burger, 1993/11/17; emphasis in the original). 
To summarise: In the vocabulary of the ABC model of attitudes, love for a 
language is determined, on a cognitive level, by a positive evaluation of the nation 
that the particular language symbolises, and/or by a calculation of the 
opportunities that the language creates (or in future may create) as a high code. 
The question that arises is: is that always the case? Can language love always be 
explained as opportunistic love of a volk and a fatherland? Are sentiments about 
language necessarily nationalist sentiments? Can one deduce from the following 
declaration of love that the Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging [Afrikaans 
Language and Cultural Association] (ATKV, est. 1930) continues to be an 
Afrikaner nationalist organisation? 
At the ATKV we are unequivocally, decidedly and without hesitation in love with 
Afrikaans and for those who share our love there are more than enough projects 
[which provide you with the opportunity] to breathe in the language of your heart 
[and] declare your love to Afrikaans (Taalgenoot, 2013, Summer, p. 59). 
This little advertisement appeared during 2013 in the summer edition of the 
ATKV‟s glossy magazine Taalgenoot [Language Companion]. It suggests that the 
love affair between Afrikaans and Afrikaans speakers – as linguist Piet Swanepoel 
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described it in the title he chose for his professorial inauguration lecture in 1991 – 
is all but over. Yet it has not been an exclusively nationalist love affair, not least 
because prominent coloured speakers of Afrikaans such as Franklin Sonn would 
describe their language – or rather their dialect – as “the Afrikaans that we call 
our mother tongue and the Afrikaans that we love” (1988, quoted in Swanepoel 
1992:123; emphasis in the original). Quite a few white opponents of Afrikaner 
nationalism, too, remained loyal to Afrikaans over the years. Beyers Naudé (cf. 
footnote 73), for example, said in 1991: 
Afrikaans is my mother tongue. It is a language that I love and that I would like to 
see promoted (quoted in Swanepoel 1992:123). 
A decade after his release from prison, where he spent seven years for high 
treason against the apartheid state, the Afrikaner poet, playwright, author and 
visual artist Breyten Breytenbach wrote (in Afrikaans): 
Every time one has been away, and you get back, you realise how you have missed 
it: the texture of everyday life. The sounds, the colours, the language, the humour. I 
know a few languages, and I can adapt, I can play my role if necessary. As 
European, perhaps even as Frenchman. But one never gets deeper than a certain 
level. You can never relax instinctively; you are never intuitively fully part of where 
you are. Afrikaans is possibly more important to me than to many other people. 
Overseas it has been a coat against the cold. One holds on to such an old coat, even 
though it is worn to shreds, even though it has holes in it, even though the original 
label is long gone–like a child clinging to a blanket because it smells of the mom 
and the dad (Beeld, 1993/12/14). 
Similar language attitudes have been articulated by non-nationalist fictional 
characters. Obi Okonkwo in Chinua Achebe‟s No Longer at Ease is not an Ibo 
nationalist, yet: 
[f]our years in England had filled [him] with a longing to be back in Umuofia. This 
feeling was sometimes so strong that he found himself feeling ashamed of studying 
English for his degree. He spoke Ibo whenever he had the least opportunity of doing 
so. Nothing gave him greater pleasure than to find another Ibo-speaking student in a 
London bus (1988:214; emphasis added). 
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Consider also the following excerpts from Peter Høeg‟s novel Miss Smilla‟s 
feeling for snow. The first-person narrator, Smilla Qaaviqaaq Jaspersen, is the 
daughter of a female Inuit hunter and a Danish physician who spent her early 
childhood with her mother in Greenland. “When we moved from the village 
school to Qaanaaq,” she recalls, 
we had teachers who didn‟t know one word of Greenlandic, nor did they have any 
plans to learn it. They told us that, for those who excelled, there would be an 
admission ticket to Denmark and a degree and a way out of the Arctic misery. This 
golden ascent would take place in Danish. Then you arrive in Denmark and six 
months pass and it feels as if you will never forget your mother tongue. It‟s the 
language you think in, the way you remember your past (1996:105).
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Joshua Fishman would have phrased it slightly differently: the mother tongue is 
the language in which you remember your culture of origin.
161
 If these are fond 
memories, chances are that you will become conscious of and even defensive 
about your ancestral language when a (threatening) new language arrives on the 
block. The reason, according to Fishman, has to do with the fact that a language is 
                                                 
160 Eventually, however, the high code Danish supplants Miss Smilla‟s Greenlandic, leaving 
her melancholic: “It is freezing, an extraordinary –18°C, and it‟s snowing, and in the 
language which is no longer mine, the snow is qanik – big, almost weightless crystals 
falling in stacks and covering the ground with a layer of pulverised white frost” (1996:3). 
161 It should be stressed, however, that the notions of a mother tongue and a single culture of 
origin have become alien to the modern world, also to modern Africa. In fact, according to 
Neville Alexander, “one of the most pernicious elements of the colonial legacy is the 
Eurocentric interpretation of the relationship between language and culture and, 
specifically, the assumption that the language group and the cultural group are identical” 
(The Sunday Independent, 1996/06/23). Consider the experience of the narrator in J.M. 
Coetzee‟s autobiographic novel Youth – a young man whose mother tongue (in the literal 
sense of the word) is English: 
  He leaves a message at the Earls Court address. Some days later there is a call: not 
from Ilse but from the friend, the companion, speaking English clumsily, getting is 
and are wrong […] Her name is Marianne […] For a while they speak English, then 
he relents and switches to the language of [his father‟s] family, to Afrikaans. 
Though it is years since he spoke Afrikaans, he can feel himself relax at once as 
though sliding into a warm bath (2002:127).  
 But then the character takes the Afrikaans-speaking girl for a walk along the Thames 
Embankment: 
  In her hiking boots, with her no-nonsense haircut, Marianne from Ficksburg is out of 
place among the fashionable London girls, but she does not seem to care. Nor does 
she care if people hear her speaking Afrikaans. As for him, he would prefer it if she 
lowered her voice. Speaking Afrikaans in this country, he wants to tell her, is like 
speaking Nazi, if there were such a language (2002:127).  
 The language(s) in which you remember your culture(s) of origin, it seems, does/do not 
always evoke feelings of belonging and pride. 
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related to “its” culture in part-whole fashion: “Language is (part of) culture 
because much of culture” – songs, rhymes, stories, idioms, religious scripts and 
the like – are “inherently and inescapably linguistic” (Fishman 1994:86). When 
translated, these texts seem to lose their emotional appeal; somehow they no 
longer evoke the same “associations and memories” (Fishman 1991:24).162  
Like “a coat against the cold” and “a blanket [that] smells of the mom and the 
dad”, to use Breytenbach‟s metaphors, languages are loved for the memories they 
bring of home and youth. Such sentiments hardly qualify as nationalism. The 
problem is that they are exploitable and ever so often have been exploited by 
activist-ideologues who believe that “wherever a separate language is found there 
a separate nation exists which has the right to take independent charge of its 
affairs and to govern itself [in as far as possible]” (Fichte paraphrased by Williams 
1994:5). If “history is the raw material for nationalist […] ideologies, as poppies 
are the raw material for heroin addiction” (Hobsbawm 1997:5), then harmless 
language love is the raw material for potentially harmful nationalist language 
attitudes. 
When the status of a language as a high code comes under threat, ostensibly 
harmless love for that language is particularly at risk to be exploited by a 
nationalist movement. Consider the following language attitudes – all of which 
were expressed by leading figures on the Afrikaans literary scene during 1991: 
Chris Barnard (not to be confused with the heart surgeon):  
One speaks and protects and promotes your mother tongue because it is your only 
true home (quoted in Swanepoel 1992:137).
163
 
Hans du Plessis:  
Mother tongue is […] the only language in which you can spontaneously perform 
                                                 
162 Except when first learnt in translated form: “There were some songs, such as the British 
national anthem, which he could only sing in Yoruba; books such as Booker T. 
Washington‟s Up from slavery and John Bunyan‟s Pilgrim‟s progress that he remembers 
only in their Yoruba translation” (Omotoso 1994:101). 
163 Since its publication in 1980, Jaap Steyn‟s (well-researched but nationalist) history of 
Afrikaans, titled Tuiste in eie taal [At home in one‟s own language], has become the bible 
of Afrikaner language activists, some of whom seem to regard Steyn‟s metaphor of “mother 
tongue = home” as an adequate justification for linguistic human rights claims. 
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intellectually. It is identity. Rob a speaker of his [sic] mother tongue and you rob 
him of his basic human rights, namely to be himself spontaneously (quoted in 
Swanepoel 1992:131). 
Lina Spies:  
Mother tongue is a precious human possession. In the mother tongue one thinks, 
lives, is. In any other language – which one normally acquires second-hand and 
artificially – one comes across smaller. Exceptions to this rule are rare” (quoted in 
Swanepoel 1992:130). 
I do not wish to suggest, on the basis of these quotes alone, that Barnard, Du 
Plessis and Spies were, at the time, Afrikaner nationalists. Yet in South Africa in 
1991, holders of beliefs such as those cited here must have been attracted to a 
movement which vowed to protect the institutionalised status of Afrikaans. Such a 
movement was on the rise, and some of its leading members also undertook to 
ensure that white speakers of Afrikaans would remain collectively and freely 
expressed, both institutionally and symbolically, in a future dispensation. 
3.7 Concluding the conceptual analysis 
In a classic book dating back to 1970, Albert Hirschman distinguishes between 
“exit, voice and loyalty” as potential minority responses to a majority regime. The 
ideal solution to Koos Malan‟s problem with “black domination” and “English 
monolingualism in the public service” is the “exit” option which is also, in terms 
of conventional definitions, the nationalist solution: an independent Afrikaner 
state. However, in South Africa today exit is impractical, if not unthinkable, and 
Malan chooses the “voice” option, not least because exit loses its attraction when 
it is possible to have voice (i.e., to be published, to lodge complaints with the Pan 
South African Language Board, to defend language rights in court, etc.; cf. Hall 
1995:18). Is the “voice” option any less nationalist than the “exit” option? The 
argument in this study is that it is not. Nor is the “loyalty” option if it entails, 
however banal, a belief in the primacy of the South African nation and a 
corresponding sense of a civic (as opposed to an ethnic) obligation.  
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The variety of nationalist ideologies, nationalist movements and nationalist 
sentiments does not rule out an overarching definition of nationalism: nationalism, 
as it is defined here, is an ideology which holds that the nation should be 
collectively and freely expressed, both through symbols and institutions (which 
may or may not include the state). The term is also used to refer to a programme 
of action of which the objectives are to preserve the identity of the nation and to 
protect its interests. In the third and final place nationalism concerns identification 
with and loyalty towards a nation – be it civically or ethnically defined.  
Language can play and has played a central role in nationalist ideologies, 
nationalist movements and nationalist attitudes. In nationalist ideologies, it has 
come to be the principle of inclusion/exclusion par excellence and as such also the 
principle upon which political order is based. By defending a language, nationalist 
movements can revive national identities and secure sectional interests. The object 
of language attitudes is often not a language, but the nation that it symbolises.  
Not only the fact that a language, like a nation, can be the object of love, loyalty 
and pride but the intensity of these emotions, the fervour of language movements, 
the fierce way in which speakers normally react to negative comment of whatever 
nature on their language, the whole idea that people have often tried to purify their 
language from (certain) foreign elements – all this suggests that concerns about 
language are not really about language. And yet they are not necessarily 
nationalist concerns. 
In bringing this chapter to a close, I would like to propose a preliminary test that 
might help us to determine whether non-state-oriented language activism and 
language attitudes are nationalist in nature or not. It revolves around three 
concepts: duty, border and threat. Once these concepts enter the discourse – once 
a language is represented as a clearly demarcated territory that must be protected – 
it becomes a nationalist discourse. In such discourses, it seems, the borders of 
languages are perceived to be threatened at (at least) three levels. When language 
activists represent emigration and lower birth rates as threats to Afrikaans (e.g., 
Steyn 1980:20), they are defending the demographic border of the language. 
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When they lay on young Afrikaners the duty to “ensure that Afrikaans as a public 
language is transmitted to the next generation” (Giliomee 2001:24), they are 
defending the functional border of the language – the domains within which it 
operates as a high code. When they oppose the impure use of any particular 
language and by implication Afrikaans-English code-mixing (e.g., Goosen 2002; 
Scholtz in Die Burger, 2003/08/29), they are defending the linguistic or structural 
border of the language. 
Language nationalism, then, involves efforts to increase, or at least stabilise, the 
number of speakers as well as the range of public functions of a language. It also 
involves purism: the elimination of lexical insurgents or the naturalisation of 
lexical immigrants – all in an attempt to guard not only the linguistic but also the 
national frontier. When all efforts have failed to make the linguistic unit and the 
political unit congruent, when the geopolitical boundaries of the nation have 
become blurred beyond recognition, nationalist concerns about the demographic, 
functional and structural boundaries of the national language seem to become all 
the more acute. 
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CHAPTER 4  
“A LANGUAGE WHICH MAKES EVERY MODEST WOMAN 
BLUSH”: THE CONTEMPORARY AFRIKAANS LANGUAGE 
MOVEMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, I  
[The English tongue] is of small reach, it stretcheth no 
further than this Iland of ours, naie not there ouer all [...] 
But our state in no Empire (Richard Mulcaster, 1582). 
4.1 A longitudinal approach to understanding Afrikaans language 
activism 
Judged against the criteria that I proposed and defended in the previous chapter, a 
non-state-oriented ethnic-based language movement – such as the Afrikaner 
branch of the movement for the preservation of (the institutionalised status of) 
Afrikaans in contemporary South Africa – may qualify as a nationalist movement. 
However, my argument in favour of a general definition of nationalism that allows 
for the classification of (certain) present-day Afrikaans language activists as 
Afrikaner nationalists can rightly be dismissed as the imposition of a model on the 
evidence. What also needs to be established is the degree to which the post-1990 
language movement – or a segment thereof – is an extension of pre-1990 
Afrikaner nationalism.
164
 That is the aim of the remainder of my thesis: to 
substantiate the claim that Afrikaner nationalism has outlived apartheid by 
juxtaposing movements old and new.  
Set against the political background sketched in chapters 1 and 2, the focal point 
of this diachronical comparison will be activism, and then particularly activism in 
the extra-parliamentary arena. To compare political activism – in the narrow sense 
                                                 
164 It was at the beginning of this year, as mentioned in the previous chapter, that F.W. de 
Klerk opened his first parliamentary session as South Africa‟s president with the 
announcement that his government intended to enter into a process of negotiation with the 
liberation movement. At this point, rather than four years later when the ANC came into 
power, did Afrikaner nationalism begin to reinvent itself as an opposition movement. 
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of the word – by Afrikaners before and after 1994 would be pointless, given the 
way in which the rules of South Africa‟s party-political game had changed in the 
election of that year. In the vocabulary of the Leerssen-based model that I 
developed in chapter 3, the primary concern of chapters 4 and 5 will be cultural 
activism, and then particularly language activism. The rationale behind past and 
present Afrikaner language movements – the ideology underpinning the activism 
and the expressed and unexpressed ambitions of the activists – will form part and 
parcel of the comparison. What will not be compared, simply because it would 
require a sophisticated attitude study among modern-day Afrikaners that falls 
beyond the scope of this thesis, is the impact or mass appeal of pre-apartheid and 
apartheid Afrikaans language movements on the one hand, and the post-apartheid 
movement on the other hand. 
It needs to be stressed, though, that while cultural rather than political activism 
has the central attention in the final two chapters of this thesis, I also revisit the 
relationship between cultural and political nationalism – both as concepts and as 
actual movements – and question the notion of a dichotomy. To study Afrikaner 
nationalism‟s successive cultural movements in isolation from contemporaneous 
political and, one should add, economic movements would be pointless. For the 
Afrikaner nationalist project, to misquote O‟Meara slightly, started out and 
remained for at least a century a “politically directed attempt to provide for 
[Afrikaners‟] key economic, social and cultural interests” (O‟Meara 1996:447; 
emphasis added). Only when the interplay between culture, politics and 
economics in any particular phase of the nationalist movement has been explored 
synchronically can an attempt be made to identify diachronic trends in the history 
of Afrikaner nationalism, including (what I claim to be) its post-apartheid history.  
The question posed here thus concerns the role of cultural activism in the 
development of Afrikaner nationalism vis-á-vis that of political activism and 
economic activism. It is a question that corresponds closely to what Kellas regards 
as the problem that studies of nationalism classically seek to address, namely: 
what was “the particular relationship between politics (power, authority), 
economics (wealth, occupation, class) and culture (identity, status, language) 
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which in any particular case brought about the transition from ethnicity to 
nationalism”? (1991:35).  
With the Afrikaner case in mind, I would modify Kellas‟s question in several 
ways. First, I would not explain politics as “power”, given that economics and 
culture, as has been suggested, can also be sources of power. Second, I would be 
more specific with regard to agency. Political and/or economic and/or cultural 
activists, rather than politics, economics and culture, are the leading actors on the 
nationalist stage. In the third place I would rephrase Kellas‟s question to reflect 
the fact that the work of activists is not done when “the transition from ethnicity 
to nationalism” has been established. As Leerssen explains it, cultural activists – 
and, one may add, economic activists – do not leave the stage once the politicians 
have made their entrance: 
Culture [and economics remain] on the agenda even when national movements have 
obtained a full-fledged social and political activist presence [...] Even after the 
achievement of a nationalist objective in the establishment of sovereign statehood, 
one can see undiminished concern for the cultivation of the national culture [and the 
development of the national economy] in the set-up of the new state (2006:563). 
Finally, I would argue that the role of language in the birth and life of a 
nationalist movement merits more focused attention than it receives in Kellas‟s 
question. As should be clear even at this juncture of my thesis, Leerssen‟s answer 
to the general question, “what is culture?”, is acutely true of Afrikaner nationalist 
culture: 
Foremost among these four [types of cultural fields] is clearly that of language. 
From Herder to the generation of the Humboldts, Schlegels and Grimms, language 
comes to be seen as the essential soul of the nation‟s identity and position in the 
world. An extraordinary number of cultural-nationalist initiatives are concerned with 
language: from grammar-writing to purism, from language revivalism to language 
planning (2006:569). 
I would go further: the other cultural fields identified by Leerssen – discourse, 
material culture and performance culture – have also been intimately concerned 
with language, at least in the case at hand. From the outset, even before the 
176 
 
language was standardised, Afrikaner nationalist literature and history were 
written in Afrikaans. Di geskiedenis fan ons land in di taal fan ons volk [The 
history of our country in the language of our volk] was published in 1877, four 
decades before the official Afrikaanse Woordelys en Spelreëls [Afrikaans Word 
List and Spelling Rules]. The linguistic landscape of Afrikaner monuments has 
always been an Afrikaans landscape. It is inconceivable, for example, that the 
inscription Ons vir jou, Suid-Afrika [We for thee, South Africa] on the cenotaph in 
the Voortrekker Monument could have been in any language but Afrikaans. And 
only Afrikaans could have been the language of speech and song during the lavish 
spectacle that was the Oxwagon Memorial Trek of 1938, and during all the Day of 
the Vow celebrations that were to follow (cf. chapter 5).
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One can go even further and make the claim that the issue of language are central 
not only to cultural nationalist initiatives but also to nationalist activism in the 
domains of politics and economics. Yet whilst the role of language in cultural 
nationalist activism is fairly easy to explain (as I tried to do in the preceding 
paragraph), the relationship between language and political and/or economic 
activism is more obscure and may only be uncovered through a thorough analysis 
                                                 
165 This is not the whole truth. The monument that Afrikaners regard as their first language 
monument (cf. section 5.1.1) was in reality a monument for Dutch with an inscription in 
Dutch: Vrijheid voor de Hollandsche Taal [Freedom for the Dutch language]. What needs 
to be borne in mind, though, is that the term “Dutch” was used to include Afrikaans at the 
time of the monument‟s unveiling in 1893. Up until the early 1900s, Afrikaans was also 
known as Afrikaans-Hollands [Afrikaans-Dutch] and Dutch as Hooghollands [High Dutch] 
(Ponelis 1998:47). The point is that the inscription could not have been in English. We need 
only consider the outrage with which the following event was met in Die Patriot and De 
Zuid-Afrikaan. The reason why these newspapers denounced it as an error of judgment, a 
scandal and a farce is abundantly clear from Siegfried Huigen‟s (2008:153) account of the 
occasion:  
  A few days before the unveiling of the language monument an „Amateur 
Entertainment, in aid of the Taal Festival Fund‟ was held on the initiative of the 
leading activist, Uncle Daantjie. Children received English book prizes and staged 
performances of all kinds in English. The only Dutch item on the programme was a 
reading of Nicolaas Beets‟s „Het Noord-Brabantsche Meisjen‟ [The Girls from 
North Barbant]. After the anthem of the Afrikanerbond was sung, the evening was 
concluded with „God save the King‟ (freely translated summary).  
 The following anecdote, as told by Giliomee (2003:433), is also worth considering here:  
  Hertzog did not participate in the ceremony to lay the Voortrekker Monument‟s 
cornerstone in Pretoria [in 1938]; he was invited but made his acceptance 
conditional on the organizers inviting the governor general since the state would 
contribute most of the funding for the monument. The implication was that „God 
save the King‟[...] had to be sung, which caused and outcry.  
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of the relevant historical evidence in any given case. Such an analysis constitutes 
part of the final chapter of this study. Relying on both primary and secondary 
sources, chapter 5 dissects the nature of the relationship between (a) language 
(activism) and cultural activism; and (b) language (activism) and political and 
economic activism in the history of Afrikaner nationalism, concluding that 
language activism in contemporary Afrikaner circles is not only related to but is, 
at heart, what it always has been: cultural, political and economic activism aimed 
at the maximisation of Afrikaners‟ symbolic, political and economic power. It is, 
in a word, still Afrikaner nationalism. 
One provisional remark: What makes the role of language in nationalism more 
complex than that of discourse, material culture and performance culture is its 
dual nature. Like artefacts such as history books and monuments, and practices 
such as festivals, any particular standardised language is the product of cultural 
labour. Yet languages are also instruments of communication in an era where 
communication forms the basis of economic and political activity. As such, the 
language of a nation is directly linked to the economic and political empowerment 
of the (potential) members of that nation. A cultivated language is of little value to 
its (potential) speakers if it does not provide access to educational and economic 
opportunities and political participation. To rephrase it in Gellnerian terms: in the 
industrial age – and even more so in the information age (or the age of 
informatisation á la Hardt and Negri 2000:280), in the network society (á la 
Manuel Castells 1996) and in modern knowledge economies (á la Peter Drucker 
and Fritz Machlup) – where work is semantic, a cultivated language is of little 
value to its (potential) speakers if it does not function as a high code. Unlike 
history books, monuments and festivals, language is 
always entangled – at some level 
with power relations 
 that ultimately are a matter of who may or may not do what, 
  where and when, 
  under what conditions of control (if any), 
with power relations 
 that en-gender and class-ify 
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 that otherwise simultaneously open up and restrict 
  the times and spaces of human action, 
   of human engagement in the world (Pred 2002:172).  
Adjusted for the purposes of this study, the Kellas question reads as follows: 
1. What was the particular relationship between political, economic and 
cultural forces and counter-forces which 
(a) in 1875, resulted in what may be called Afrikaner nationalism‟s false 
start; 
(b) in the first half of twentieth century, contributed to the successful 
formation and politicisation of an Afrikaner national identity; 
(c) in 1948, eventually brought the nationalist movement to power; 
(d) between 1948 and the 1994, help to enable the National Party to stay 
in control of the South African state?  
2. What was the role of language in these developments? 
What remains to be done, once these questions have been addressed, is to test the 
central hypothesis of this thesis, which can now be rephrased as follows: 
Certain patterns of continuity in Afrikaner activism outside the party-
political arena indicate that post-apartheid activism constitutes an extension 
of the Afrikaner nationalist project. 
To summarise: the final chapters of this thesis comprise a longitudinal comparison 
between the contemporary Afrikaner cultural movement – which manifests 
primarily as an Afrikaans language movement – and its apartheid and pre-
apartheid antecedents. Such a comparative approach challenges the normative, 
often a-historical interpretation of language activism prevalent in the South 
African sociolinguistic literature. This literature, as I illustrated in section 3.5.2 
with reference to Du Plessis (2006), tends to sanction and sanctify language 
activism without any attempt to explain the phenomenon. In search of an 
explanation for the ongoing Afrikaans language campaign it would be a mistake 
to consider the campaign solely from a cross-national comparative perspective as 
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Du Plessis proposes and to ignore its roots in the development of Afrikaner 
nationalism. However, it would also be a mistake to interpret all present-day 
expressions of Afrikaans language activism as expressions of Afrikaner 
nationalism. To tell the nationalists from the non-nationalists, as will become 
clear towards the end of chapter 5, Afrikaans language activism in the post-
apartheid South Africa has to be studied in conjunction with activist behaviour by 
Afrikaans speakers in other spheres of life – culture, the economy, and, last but 
not least, politics. And never should one lose sight of the fact that activism implies 
the endorsement of a set of beliefs, norms and values (an ideology). Only an 
analysis of language activism which takes into account other forms of cultural 
activism, as well as economic and political activism, and which takes into account 
the ideological origin of the activism, will bring us closer to an understanding of 
the latest Afrikaans language movement. 
4.2 Afrikaans, Afrikaners, and “the Great Debate on nationalism” 
The obvious starting point for a reconstruction of the history of Afrikaans 
language activism is the history of the Afrikaans language. Afrikaans is a product 
of the colonial era. Whilst the significance of various other influences on its 
vocabulary and structure cannot be denied, the language essentially stems from 
seventeenth century Dutch that was brought to southern African shores by settlers 
from Holland three and a half centuries ago. If dialects are mutually intelligible 
forms of the same language, as the lay definition goes, modern Afrikaans has to 
be regarded a dialect of modern Dutch in the same way that South African English 
is a variety of English. Afrikaans is related to Dutch to such an extent that 
speakers of each language can make themselves understood by speakers of the 
other, albeit with some effort. Yet linguists will be quick to point out that mutual 
intelligibility is not a reliable criterion to distinguish between different languages 
on the one hand, and varieties of the same language on the other hand (or between 
autonomous and heteronomous linguistic varieties). According to such a 
definition, standard Danish and Norwegian qualify as dialects while Cantonese 
and Mandarin have to be separate languages – neither of which inferences is a 
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reflection of reality. When the boundaries of languages are drawn, politics, rather 
than linguistics, can play the decisive role.
166
 Afrikaans and Dutch is a telling case 
in point: it was Afrikaner nationalist politics that turned the former into a language 
autonomous from the latter. Languages are said to be dialects with armies and 
navies. The example of Afrikaans calls for a slightly different definition: a 
language is a dialect that was hijacked by nationalists.
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It was, however, only during the last quarter of the nineteenth century that 
Afrikaans became entangled with nationalist politics. By then, the language had 
had a long existence as a vernacular – the sociolinguistic term for a linguistic 
variety without a written standard (Ponelis 1998:47). Afrikaans‟s life before the 
nationalist hijack – its life as a vernacular – forms the narrative around which this 
chapter revolves. It is a saga that dates back to 1652. 
In most English-language histories of South Africa, 1652 is simply described as 
the year during which the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie [Dutch East India 
Company] (henceforth, VOC or the Company) established a small, armed 
settlement at the Cape of Good Hope (Johnson and Jacobs 2011:326). In the 
northern spring/southern autumn of that year, as more poetic authors have 
interpreted the event, Europe returned to Sub-Saharan Africa: 
More than 50 000 years were to pass before human beings, who had first walked out 
of Africa to inhabit the rest of the world, came back to the southern tip of Africa, 
where long-established hunters and gatherers (San) as well as pastoral people with 
cattle and sheep (Khoe)
168
 were living. Desire for gold and spices were two of the 
                                                 
166 So can religion: Hindi and Urdu are closely related Indo-European languages, but Hindi 
speakers are predominantly Hindus and Urdu speakers predominantly Muslims. 
167 Such a nationalist highjack, as we have seen in the previous chapter, initially entails 
ostensibly innocuous activist initiatives aimed at language standardisation. Yet metaphors 
of terror and war (languages being hijacked; languages possessing armies and navies) are 
perhaps not entirely inappropriate in this context. For the standardisation of one linguistic 
variety usually implies the stigmatisation, marginalisation and exclusion of other varieties 
and their speakers. It implies language conflict. To mention but one example: When first 
entering school, speakers of non-standard varieties are at a double disadvantage: not only 
are they unfamiliar with the language of education, but they also have to endure 
condescending attitudes towards the only language they know. 
168 Also Khoi or Khoikhoi. The latter term, a self-identification meaning “men of men” or 
“real people”, is preferred henceforth. 
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main factors that drove the bold seafarers of the Mediterranean to venture far from 
home during the 15
th
 century. After rounding the Cape, the Portuguese
169
 established 
themselves in India and south-east Asia at the beginning of the 16
th
 century, but in 
Southern Africa it was not for another century and a half that a European maritime 
power would decide to establish a permanent presence. In 1652 Jan van Riebeeck 
was sent by the Dutch to set up a refreshment station halfway on the arduous sea 
journey to the East Indies. And so began the long, turbulent process of 
colonisation... (Wilson 2009:43).
 
 
For the Afrikaner nationalist historians of the twentieth century (and then 
particularly those who authored school text books), 1652 marked another, far 
more significant beginning: the birth of the Afrikaner nation. It was not before 
1707 that a Cape settler of European descent would identify himself as an 
Afrikaander. The incident (the first recorded case of such self-identification) 
occurred on the evening of 6 March in Stellenbosch – a town founded by Cape 
Commander Simon van der Stel in 1679 (his first year as Commander). The story 
goes that a small group of raucous drunken young men were celebrating the 
dismissal of Van der Stel‟s son and successor, Willem Adriaan, as Commander.170 
Among them was the sixteen-year old Hendrik Bibault. When the magistrate 
confronted them, Bibault (born at the Cape) challenged the authority of the VOC 
official (not born at the Cape) with the words: 
[I]k wil niet loopen, ik ben een Afrikaander, al slaat die landrost mijn dood, of al 
setten hij mijn in den tronk, ik sal, nog wil niet swygen. [I shall not leave, I am an 
                                                 
169 The first European “to gaze upon Africa‟s southernmost point” (Johnson 2004:30), in 1488, 
was Bartolomeu Dias – a knight of the Portuguese royal court. Dias named the area the 
Cape of Storms (Cabo das Tormentas). Later, however, when it proved to be a sea route to 
the east, it was renamed by King John II of Portugal the Cape of Good Hope (Cabo da Boa 
Esperança). 
170 By then, Willem Adriaan van der Stel had been in control of Cape for eight years. After 
succeeding his father in 1699, Van der Stel Jr. entered into private farming (on what is 
today the esteemed wine estate Vergelegen) on a scale that enraged the farming elite. 
Accusing the VOC official of inappropriate conduct – though perhaps more concerned 
about their own economic interests than about Company regulations – a group of men led 
by Adam Tas and Henning Hüsing staged a revolt and in 1707 managed to force Van der 
Stel from office. 
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Afrikaander, even if the magistrate beats me to death or puts me in jail, I shall not, 
nor will be silent.]
171
 
Unsurprisingly, this defiant declaration of identity found its way into that part of 
the Afrikaner nationalist myth which depicts VOC rule at the Cape as less than 
sympathetic, and solidarity among non-VOC officials as the root from which the 
Afrikaner nation‟s love of freedom sprung. Yet whatever Bibault was trying to 
assert on that evening of his arrest in 1707, it could not have been an ethnic 
identity, at least not according to Christoph Marx and other so-called modernists 
or constructionists who argue (as I do in this study) that the notion Afrikaner 
“became infused with ethnicity only from about 1870” (2008:91). 
But three and a half centuries of Afrikaner history sounds better than 150 years of 
Afrikaner history,
172
 and whilst the Afrikaner activists of the twenty-first century 
may no longer believe that “the Afrikaner nation, with its own characteristics and 
destiny, was placed in [South Africa] by God the Three-in-One”,173 they continue 
to believe that “over 350 years, through religion, politics, art, science, technique 
and thought, we [Afrikaners] have created an indigenous symbolic tradition [read: 
nation]” (Rossouw, Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2005/09/16:7).  
The claim, then, is that the Afrikaner nation-building project – whether God- or 
human-inspired – commenced on 6 April 1652 when the Drommedaris, the Goede 
Hoop and the Reijger docked at Table Bay. These were the first three ships of a 
                                                 
171 Giliomee‟s translation. For a more detailed account of this confrontation and the 
consequences for Bibault, see Giliomee (2003:22). Note that he gives preference to the 
spelling Biebouw. 
172 Consider the following observation by Hobsbawm: 
  For history is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, 
as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction. The past is an essential element, 
perhaps the essential element, in these ideologies. If there is no suitable past, it can 
always be invented [...] The past legitimizes [...] I recall seeing somewhere a study 
of the ancient civilization of the cities of the Indus valley with the title Five 
Thousand Years of Pakistan. Pakistan was not even thought of before 1932–3, when 
the name was invented by some student militants. It did not become a serious 
political demand until 1940. As a state it has existed only since 1947 [...] But 5,000 
years of Pakistan somehow sounds better than forty-six years of Pakistan (1997:5).  
173 The induction formulary of the Afrikaner Broederbond, quoted in Wilkins and Strydom 
(1978:379). 
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fleet of five
174
 to arrive at the Cape after having set sail three months earlier from 
the port of Texel. Ashore walked some eight dozen Europeans under the 
command of Jan Anthoniszoon van Riebeeck. Van Riebeeck‟s orders from the 
VOC were to establish not a colony but a mere fortified base: a halfway resupply 
camp for ships en route to the East. He was to hoist the Dutch flag, build a fort 
and a hospital, trade for cattle, grow crops and, last but not least, produce 
vegetables and fruit to curb the high mortality rate among Company sailors due 
mostly to scurvy.  
Jan van Riebeeck was not the VOC‟s first choice for the Cape expedition, not 
least because his employment record with the Company was tainted by allegations 
of corruption: in 1648 he had been recalled from his position in Tongking (Tonkin 
in present-day Vietnam) after defying a ban on private trading. At the Cape he did 
not particularly want to stay. After the fort (which became known as the Castle) 
was built at the foot of Table Mountain and fresh produce was in sufficient supply 
to cater for passing ships, he bid the settlement farewell in 1662. 
Such were the facts. Jan van Riebeeck was “a pragmatic Dutch East India 
Company servant who set out to establish an outpost of a trading empire in 
workmanlike fashion” (Dubow 2004).175 And yet, when the rand replaced the 
pound as the currency of newly found Republic of South Africa in 1961, 
banknotes bore his portrait and would continue to do so for the following three 
decades. By then, the Afrikaner myth had somehow managed to turn the 33 year-
old founding father of the city of Cape Town into the founding father of an entire 
nation: a “volk-planter” and a hero. 
Unlike the “volk-planter”, who packed his trunks after a decade, the rest of the 
Dutch settlers had come to stay. They were joined, initially on a small scale, by 
more immigrants, also from elsewhere in Europe. Of those who arrived before 
1680 the majority were sailors and soldiers from The Netherlands. In 1657 the 
                                                 
174 The Walvis [Whale] and the Oliphant [Elephant] arrived a month later. 
175 Source: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=9510 – a review of Witz (2003) by 
Saul Dubow (accessed March 2013). 
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first of these VOC employees were released from Company service and given 
land to farm as so-called free burghers
176
 – an early sign that the Cape of Good 
Hope was, after all, turning into a colony of European settlement. In the course of 
the next four decades, wine and wheat settler farmers would steadily fill up the 
fifty miles radius around the Cape settlement, and by the end of the century so-
called trekboere [white nomadic or frontier farmers] would begin to cross the first 
coastal mountain range, leaving behind the Mediterranean climate and the markets 
of the Cape and turning to subsistence stock farming.  
The party of two hundred Huguenots who arrived, as families, between 1688 and 
1692 (following the revoking of the Edict of Nantes in1685) did much to stabilise 
the burgher community and – with their experience in grape growing – to 
establish the Cape‟s wine industry. The French settlers were assimilated into the 
Dutch-speaking population within two or three generations and hold a place of 
honour in the Afrikaner myth of origin. It is a reputation well earned: their 
descendants, as Giliomee points out, “were to establish positions of leadership in 
Afrikaner society out of all proportion to the numbers of the original 
immigrants”177 (2003:11). Yet even if history took a different course, the myth 
would have attached significance to these religious refugees: for a nationalism 
rooted in Calvinism they made good ancestors. 
In sum: according to their creation story, Afrikaners were Calvinists of western 
European origin who became a nation in its own right during the first Dutch 
occupation of the Cape (1652–1795). It was, so the myth goes, “the harsh rule of 
the Dutch East India Company at the Cape and the hard life on the frontier [that] 
fostered a spirit of unity and independence within the pioneer settlement” (Moodie 
1975:2). This retrospective projection of something resembling national self-
consciousness and patriotic unity is not entirely absent from scholarly accounts of 
                                                 
176 According to Saunders and Southey (1998:75), the term “free burghers” was originally used 
to refer to ex-officials of the VOC, but later came to be used for all whites who were not 
Company officials. Free burghers, as Giliomee explains, “were released from their contract 
with the Company, but continued to be subject to the Company‟s regulations for the Cape 
settlement and the decisions of the Cape authorities” (2003:6). 
177 After their arrival, the Huguenots represented almost a quarter of the burgher population of 
856 (De Villiers 2012a:45). 
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settler/pioneer mentality. Giliomee, for example, is convinced that few of these 
immigrants “ever went back or looked back”: 
They were among the first colonial peoples to cut most of their family and 
community ties with Europe and to develop a distinct sense of self-consciousness; 
they made the new land genuinely their own (2003:xiv). 
Even the work of the liberal historian Cornelius de Kiewiet portrays the formation 
of the “Boer race” in “the long quietude of the eighteenth century” as the 
emergence of a unique “national character” in response to a uniquely hostile 
environment. In contrast to Afrikaner nationalist mythology, though, De Kiewiet 
highlights the (alleged) negative consequences of this particular encounter 
between humans and nature: 
Their life gave them a tenacity of purpose, a power of silent endurance, and the 
keenest self-respect. But this isolation sank into their character, causing their 
imagination to lie fallow and their intellects to become inert. Their tenacity could 
degenerate into obstinacy, their power of endurance into resistance to innovation, 
and their self-respect into suspicion of the foreigner and contempt for inferiors 
(quoted in Giliomee 2003:35). 
In the eyes of outsiders, the appeal of this interpretation could only have been 
enhanced by the way in which the story of Afrikaner nationalism unfolded in the 
decades following the publication of De Kiewiet‟s A history of South Africa in 
1941. Yet national psychoanalysis is a risky business and belongs, perhaps, only 
in nationalist myths. What can be said with certainty is that the eighteenth century 
saw the development of a degree of cultural homogeneity among the 
heterogeneous European settlers at the Cape (Davenport and Saunders 2000:22; 
Johnson 2004:35). Afrikaners they were not. And rather than “the hard life on the 
frontier” it was a politico-economic institution that directed the process of 
homogenisation through assimilationist religious and language policies even if 
that institution, obsessed as it was with profits, was “largely devoid of idealistic 
motives” (Giliomee 2003:19).  
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Once settled at the Cape, the VOC founded a Dutch Reformed congregation
178
 
and for more than a century it did not permit any other churches, not even a 
Lutheran one for German immigrants. When the French Huguenots tried to form a 
congregation of their own, the initiative was rejected as brazen: soon, Commander 
Simon van der Stel warned, the French would be demanding “their own 
„magistrate, Commander and Prince‟” (Giliomee 2003:11–12; 41). At stake in 
both instances was not only religious uniformity but also linguistic uniformity. 
The Huguenots, historians agree, might have remained a distinct community, but 
in a calculated way Van der Stel settled them among Dutch farmers along the 
Berg River. Instructions from the Lord XVII (the board of directors of the VOC 
which met in Amsterdam) were unambiguous: the Cape Commander was to 
“ensure that the French language [would] gradually become extinct and 
disappear” (Giliomee 2003:11). In the case of German-speaking settlers, who 
during the eighteenth century outnumbered immigrants arriving from Holland, the 
dynamics of demography was on the side of the VOC: they were mostly single 
men who went on to marry Dutch-speaking women, including daughters and 
granddaughters of Huguenots and, occasionally, non-European women. The 
resultant intergenerational language shift was away from German. As Van der Stel 
summarised VOC policy, all newcomers to the Cape – that is, all European 
newcomers – had to “learn our language and morals, and be integrated with the 
Dutch nation” (Giliomee 2003:11). 
The implementation of this policy was only partially successful. French- and 
German-speaking settlers did learn Dutch, but it was not the Dutch of the 
educated classes of the Low Countries, and it is hard to tell if they or their 
descendants ever saw themselves as belonging to the Dutch nation. If they did, 
they did not articulate it in writing, at least not on a significant scale, for the 
majority of them were semi- or illiterate. Whether these settlers self-identified as 
members of an Afrikaner collectivity instead is equally hard to tell. Giliomee 
(2003:51) seems convinced that a sense of being Afrikaners 
(Africanes/Africaanders) rather than being Dutch or French or German had 
                                                 
178 Until the first church was inaugurated in 1704, the congregation met in the Castle. 
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crystallised among white African-born Dutch speakers towards the end of the 
1700s. He bases his claim inter alia on observations of visitors to the Cape, and 
then particularly R.B. Fisher and W.J. Burchell. In 1816, Fisher reported meeting 
a white community in the colony who “speak a very bad sort of Dutch language... 
and style themselves as an original nation, Africanes”. Six years later, in his 
Travels in the interior of South Africa (London: Batchworth, 1822) Burchell 
claimed that “all those born in the Cape Colony who were [...] of German, Dutch 
or French descent, and who spoke Dutch called themselves „Africaanders‟” (both 
quoted in Giliomee 2003:52). 
But how reliable are the accounts of these travellers of yore? By the turn of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as Fritz Ponelis reminds us, the best part of 
the burgher population was sparsely distributed over a vast territory. Space and 
mobility (and lack of enthusiasm on the part of the VOC) prevented the 
development of social structures and institutions that could facilitate the formation 
of a collective identity: 
The [Dutch-speaking] nomadic stock farmers were ardent individualists and by no 
means docile citizens of an orderly and disciplined society. They trekked until they 
could no longer see smoke coming from a neighbouring chimney (1998:19). 
There was, of course, the Dutch Reformed Church, and burghers (whether based 
in the colonial hub of Cape Town and Stellenbosch, on the frontier, or somewhere 
in between) almost certainly identified themselves as Christians, as colonists 
elsewhere were doing at the time, thus signalling their European or “civilised” 
descent which entitled them to preside over “heathens” and “barbarians”. The 
trekboere, however, were not the most devoted church-goers, at least not until the 
1790s when “something of a religious awakening swept over the colony, and the 
proportion of confirmed members of the church in the burgher population rose 
steadily” (Giliomee 2003:41–42). 
The question that arises here is the very question at the heart of “the Great Debate 
on nationalism” (Schöpflin 2000:2–3): are nations ancient cultural entities, 
modern political constructs or something in between? Applied to the case at hand, 
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the question is: which came first – Afrikaners or Afrikaner nationalism? Was an 
Afrikaner community – constituted around origin, language and religion – already 
in existence when nationalist associations and newspapers were first established in 
1875? Was this community, as Giliomee claims, a clearly recognisable group by 
then, who self-identified as Afrikaners? (2012:220). Or was the notion Afrikaner, 
as authors such Christoph Marx and Fritz Ponelis assert, a product of Afrikaner 
nationalist thinking? According to the latter view, an Afrikaner ethnicity was 
projected onto a group of people (Ponelis 1998:19). Ethnicity, says Marx, “is not 
self-evident, but a construct that can become a politically significant factor by 
means of mobilisation techniques” (2008:89). It is, as Saul Dubow phrases it, “a 
form of social identity which acquires content and meaning through a process of 
conscious assertion and imagining” (quoted in Cherry 1993:15). Ponelis 
understands this process of ethnic construction as follows: the bigger the group, 
the more difficult it is to define its ethnicity. Only through “ideology, in the form 
of nationalism”, can one arrive at such a definition (1998:18–19): 
The group that was ideologically brought into being, namely the Afrikaner volk, was 
projected by that ideology as ‟n oergegewe [a primeval given],179 that is, as an entity 
which had already existed before the ideological mythologisation [of Afrikaner 
history] in Jan van Riebeeck‟s time and even earlier (1998:20). 
The evidence presented in the remainder of this study supports Christoph Marx 
and Fritz Ponelis rather than Hermann Giliomee:
180
 Afrikaner nationalism, to 
                                                 
179 Or, as he describes it elsewhere, a “primordial godly phenomenon” (Ponelis 1998:52). 
180 Giliomee, it should be stressed, is not an uncritical nationalist historian. He has no qualms, 
for instance, debunking the myth of Slagtersnek.  
 The Slagtersnek Rebellion, Afrikaner children were taught during apartheid, began early 
in 1813 when a Khoikhoi labourer, named Booy, laid a complaint of assault and wage 
withholding against his master, one Frederick Bezuidenhout. When the latter refused to 
appear before the magistrate, the Cape Regiment, comprised of non-white troops under 
white officers, was sent to arrest him. A brief shoot-out ensued at Bezuidenhout‟s house 
and he was fatally wounded.  
  So far so good. But then the history textbooks of yore went on to report (and I quote 
from a textbook titled Pionierspore [Pioneer Trails] that was published in 1981 – my fifth 
school year): At Bezuidenhout‟s funeral, “his brothers and friends swore that they would 
not let the killing of a [white] man by Khoi troops go unavenged” (Graves 1981:97). 
Bezuidenhout merely gave Booy a pak slae [spanking]. The rebellion that followed was put 
down and five of the leaders were hanged for treason.  
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borrow Ernest Gellner‟s phrase (1964:169), invented a nation where it did not 
exist. The question that I seek to address is how it was done. In this respect 
Ponelis is vague. How did Afrikaner nationalist ideology “produce” Afrikaners? 
How was the Afrikaner volk “ideologically brought into being”? What did the 
“ideological mythologisation” of Afrikaner history and the “projection” of an 
Afrikaner ethnicity onto potential Afrikaners entail? What triggered these 
processes, and how did they unfold? 
Dan O‟Meara, for one, would challenge the weight attached by Ponelis to 
ideology. O‟Meara‟s take on the matter, as outlined in section 3.5.1 above, is that 
the Afrikaner nationalist movement succeeded in making Afrikaners out of white 
Afrikaans speakers (“Frenchmen out of peasants” á la Max Weber) by promoting 
their material and other interests and not by projecting an Afrikaner identity onto 
them (to use Ponelis‟s metaphor or, as O‟Meara himself puts it, “not by 
proclaiming the „truth‟ of [an Afrikaner] subjectivity either in intellectual journals 
or from the rooftops” – 1996:447; emphasis in the original). It was, however, not 
an either-or scenario: the formation and politicisation of an Afrikaner national 
identity in the first half of the twentieth century required both the promotion of 
Afrikaner interests and the dissemination of the ideology of Afrikaner 
nationalism. But before any attempt can be made to analyse these dynamics, it is 
necessary to tell the now widely accepted demythologised version of Afrikaans‟s 
early life story.
181
 
                                                                                                                                     
  What school children were not told, was that Bezuidenhout was “a notorious frontier 
ruffian who lived with a [mixed-race] woman and whose [mixed-race] son called him 
„baas‟ (the term non-whites used for a white master)” (Giliomee 2003:85). The real story of 
Slagtersnek, as Giliomee points out, hardly supported the Afrikaner nationalist myth: 
  The rebels were depicted as brave martyrs paying the ultimate penalty for standing 
up against British autocracy [...] What was ignored was the way Slagtersnek-as-
nationalist-myth clashed with the nationalist myth of racial purity [...] Twentieth-
century [Afrikaner] nationalists also ignored the fact that the more settled farmers 
wanted nothing to do with the rebellion (2003:86). 
181 This story, as will become clear, hardly fits into Afrikaner nationalist mythology. A suitable 
history, which overemphasised the Germanic and Dutch roots of the language, had to be 
invented. All through primary school and high school, from 1977 to 1988, I was taught this 
mythologised version of the history of Afrikaans. It was Christo van Rensburg and Vic 
Webb who, in Afrikaans linguistics courses at the University of Pretoria, introduced me to 
the truer, more interesting story. During the late 1980s, these white Afrikaans-speaking 
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4.3 Afrikaans’s life as vernacular under VOC rule 
4.3.1 The origins of Afrikaans 
The late 1700s saw the emergence of the first texts that are classified – on the 
basis of linguistic features, and obviously with hindsight – as more Afrikaans than 
Dutch (Ponelis 1993:73). By then, contrary to the impression that might have been 
created in the discussion thus far, Afrikaans was anything but a “white man‟s 
language”. 
On their arrival at the Cape, the Dutch settlers came into contact with the 
Khoikhoi (whom they condescendingly referred to as “Hottentots”, mimicking 
their “click” language) and the San (whom they called “Bushmen”). 182 In recent 
decades, the Khoikhoi and the San have generally been studied as one group, the 
Khoisan, not least because both sub-groups spoke varieties of the Khoisan 
language. The Khoisan are believed to be the first inhabitants of southern Africa 
with an archaeological history dating back to 25,000 B.C. On the eve of their 
encounter with European colonists, however, the Khoikhoi and the San were 
readily distinguishable communities even if the border between them was 
permeable. The Khoikhoi were livestock farmers who lived in villages, while the 
San were primarily migratory hunter-gatherers. 
What started out as cattle trading between the Khoikhoi and the settlers ended in 
two wars over grazing land and water (fought in 1659–1660 and 1673–1677 
respectively). Yet despite a hedge of wild almond trees planted by Van Riebeeck 
after the first Dutch-Khoikhoi war in an attempt to demarcate the boundary of the 
settlement and to prevent cattle theft, sexual liaisons between Europeans and 
Khoikhoi women prevailed. Of relevance for the present discussion is the fact that 
                                                                                                                                     
scholars – along with others such as Theodorus du Plessis and the late Fritz Ponelis – 
played a key role in the demythologisation Afrikaans‟s past. Equally, if not more significant 
was the contribution of black Afrikaans speakers (some of whom might also have identified 
themselves, at the time, as brown or coloured.) They included the late Neville Alexander, 
Achmat Davids, the late Jakes Gerwel, Alwyn van Gensen and Hein Willemse. 
182 Regarded today as a less derogatory term than “Bushmen”, San (also: Sana, Sonqua, 
Obiqau), which literally translates as thieves of murderers, is the name that the Khoikhoi 
gave to the “Bushmen”. 
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speakers of different native tongues – be they traders or lovers – had to 
communicate with one another.
183
 From 1658 onwards, VOC officials and slave 
owners
184
 also needed to communicate with the slaves who were brought to the 
Cape from various parts of Africa and the East,
185
 and slaves required a lingua 
franca among themselves and to communicate with the Khoikhoi – many of 
whom came to work and live alongside them, sometimes having children by them 
(Johnson 2004:38; Sparks 1990:77).
186
 There was no question what this lingua 
franca was going to be. What Frenchmen and Germans were coaxed into, locals 
and slaves were forced to do: 
When the first slaves were imported, [the VOC] issued firm instructions that only 
Dutch was to be spoken to them. Slaves could not be manumitted without being able 
to speak and write Dutch. When an official drew up a glossary of Khoikhoi words, 
the Company undertook to publish it, but added that it was more important that the 
Khoikhoi learn the Dutch language than the other way round (Giliomee 2003:19).
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This basic rule of “Dutch only” was enforceable, yet to prescribe the kind of 
Dutch that was to be spoken was beyond the Company‟s powers. The VOC could 
not have prevented the dynamic process of creolisation – or, more accurately, 
creoloidisation – that followed. 
                                                 
183 Initially, four Khoikhoi speakers who had learned Dutch acted as interpreters. They were 
Autshumao (alias Herrie/Harry de Strandloper [the beachcomber]), his niece Krotoa (alias 
Eva); Doman (alias Anthonie) and Claas Das (De Villiers 2012a:42).  
184 Shell (2012:64) distinguishes between four groups of slave-owners: the VOC, VOC 
officials, burghers and so-called free blacks. (The number of slaves in the service of the 
latter was negligible.) 
185 Between 1658 and 1808, when the slave trade was abolished, approximately 63,000 slaves 
were brought to the Cape: an estimated 26.4 percent from Africa, 25.1 percent from 
Madagascar, 25.9 percent from India and 22.7 percent from Indonesia (Shell 2012:63). In 
addition to other languages, they spoke the lingua franca of the trade routes, creoloidised 
Portuguese. By 1710, there were almost as many slaves as burghers in the Cape Colony. In 
the end, the number of indigenous slaves (people born into slavery) nearly equalled the 
number of slaves who were originally imported (Shell 2012:69). 
186 The Khoikhoi were “legally free, but in practice their position was not much different from 
that of the Cape slaves” (Saunders and Southey 1998:99). Detribalised and dispossessed of 
their land, many had no choice but to offer their labour to white farmers. 
187 To this end, a Dutch teacher for the Khoikhoi was appointed in 1661 (De Villiers 
2012a:48). De Villiers (2012a:51) also notes that privately owned slaves were only allowed 
to wear a hat once they could speak Dutch. 
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Some general notes on pidgin, creole and creoloid languages are necessary here
188
 
as the creoloid characteristics of Afrikaans are among the things that set the 
language apart from Dutch. For the purposes of this discussion, pidgins and 
creoles can be defined as products of a colonial world in which speakers of 
different languages (called source languages) were somehow compelled to learn 
the colonial language (or target language) in the way that the Cape‟s indigenous 
population and the slaves who were brought to its shores had to learn Dutch. 
According to sociolinguistic theory, the transition from pidgin to creole was 
marked by the use of the colonial language as a first language (and no longer 
merely as a lingua franca) by its “new” speakers.  
A creole language is not to be equated with the colonial language on which it is 
based. Nor is it some kind of cross breed between the source language and the 
target language. Pidginisation and creolisation entailed the simplification – or, as 
linguists would depict it, the resourceful recreation – of the colonial language by 
speakers who tried to master the language without any formal tuition. Young 
children can pick up languages as if by osmoses, but in adults the result of 
informal additional language acquisition is normally approximate acquisition of 
the target language (Ponelis 1993:27). The language that was born in the mouths 
of first generation Cape slaves, for example, deviated significantly from Dutch. 
What is remarkable, as written text-based research would later demonstrate, is that 
this deviation was systematic to the extent that it corresponded with deviation in 
other Dutch-based creoles of the time such as the so-called Negerhollands that 
was spoken in the Virgin Islands – an area completely isolated from the Cape. In 
fact, all pidgins and creoles – or at least all those based on European languages – 
display striking similarities in grammatical structure.  
It would be inaccurate to call modern-day standard Afrikaans is a creole language. 
To describe languages such as Afrikaans, Peter Trudgill (1983:102) coined the 
term creoloid. Like creolisation, creoloidisation is “is the result of the influence of 
                                                 
188 Authoritarian sociolinguistic texts on pidgins, creoles and creoloids include Romaine 
(1988) and Trudgill (1983; 2002). 
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imperfect learning by relatively large numbers of non-native adult speakers” 
(Trudgill 2002:71). Unlike creoles, however, creoloids have no pidgin history in 
the sense that they always had mother-tongue speakers.  
The creoloid features of Afrikaans – lack of nominal gender and case, lack of 
subject/object distinctions in pronouns, etc. (cf. Markey 1982; Gilbert and 
Makhudu 1984) – had survived the standardisation process and even the re-
Dutchification of Afrikaans
189
 in the early twentieth century. As Giliomee 
(2003:53) interprets the process, slaves and Khoikhoi servants were responsible 
for the initial creolisation (read: creoloidisation) of Dutch in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century while both burghers and their servants, in interaction with 
each other, took the process further in the eighteenth century. Equally, if not more 
significant must have been other forms of interaction, more intimate than between 
master and servant.  
The creoloidisation of Dutch cannot be understood separately from what some 
authors describe as the “creolisation” or miscegenation190 of the Cape settlement 
during the first 75 years of its existence. By 1690, as Giliomee (2003:37) points 
out, the ratio of male to female burghers was 2.6:1. Unsurprisingly, exogamous 
unions between European men and non-European women (mostly manumitted 
slaves) were commonplace. Under the VOC, about a 1,000 of these unions were 
formalised in Western marriage (Shell 2012:69). The most famous cases include 
the 1658 wedding of Jan Zacharias to the slave Maria from Bengal, and the 1664 
wedding of the surgeon Pieter van Meerhoff to Krotoa (renamed Eva) – a 
Khoikhoi woman whom Van Riebeeck and his wife took into their household in 
1653.
191
  
Marriages of Europeans to so-called heelslag [full-caste] slave women (of “pure” 
Asian or African origin) were prohibited in 1685, but not to marriages to halfslag 
                                                 
189 This process involved reconstructing the vernacular by, among other things, “eliminating 
those elements reflecting poverty and lower-class origins” (Marks and Trapido 1987:12). 
190 In the South African case, unlike in the Latin American case, the term “creole” does not 
denote a person of European descent born in the colony. 
191 There are only two recorded cases of marriages between liberated male slaves and 
European woman. Slave men caught with white women were burnt alive. 
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[half-caste] slave women (i.e., slave women with a European father). For at least 
another four decades, children born from such marriages stood a fair chance to be 
absorbed into the burgher community, as did children born out of wedlock to a 
white father and a slave mother. Of the latter category of children many were born 
in the Slave Lodge –“a huge building without windows [...] at the upper end of the 
main street, next to the Company‟s vegetable garden of nine acres and opposite 
the big Company hospital”. Virtually all slaves in the service of the VOC lived in 
the Lodge, which was seldom visited by Europeans “except for one hour each 
night when it became a brothel for the local garrison [and others]” (Shell 
2012:64).  
Racial fluidity, it should be stressed, did not imply racial equality. On the 
contrary: the early Cape was stratified according to racial categories constructed 
by the European settlers. From the outset, everybody else had been “relegated to, 
or confirmed in, a position of legal and political inferiority” (Davenport and 
Saunders 2000:33). The paradox, as Johnson (2004:41) points out, is that the 
racially mixed settlement was at the same time a racially divided one. Divisions 
grew steadily more rigid, and from the 1730s onwards the “white” community 
became progressively endogamous – a development that Giliomee attributes not 
only to the increasing availability of marriageable white women but also to the 
power they held within the family.
192
 Yet white endogamy did not mean the end 
of communication across racial divisions. Accordingly, it did not mean the end of 
the creoloidisation of Afrikaans. In fact, that process had just begun. 
To conclude the story of the birth of the Afrikaans language: at the Cape, as is 
always the case, language was “entangled [...] with power relations” (Pred 
2002:172), and the powers that be spoke Dutch. The resultant communicative 
arrangements had repercussions on various levels. On a micro-linguistic level 
(that is, the level of language structure), one of the outcomes was the emergence 
                                                 
192 Once the ratio of male to female burghers stood at 1.5:1 (in 1730), “European women could 
now use their relative position of power to employ sanctions against mixed marriages and 
against legitimizing the racially mixed offspring of their husband and sons” (Giliomee 
2003:37). 
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of a “simplified” form of Dutch – a typical creoloid. On a macro-linguistic or 
sociolinguistic level, the long-term consequences involved large-scale language 
shift: for descendants of the Khoikhoi, the San and the slaves Afrikaans became a 
first language.
193
 As time went by, some – to use a crude colloquialism – “passed 
for white”, but the majority eventually ended up – to put it equally crudely – in 
apartheid‟s category of “coloureds”. Let me rephrase, following Johnson and 
Jacobs (2011:263): many coloured – and, one should add, white194 – South 
Africans can trace their roots to the Khoisan and the Cape slaves. 
Despite a significant shift towards English in the coloured community under 
apartheid, some 75.8 percent of these South Africans still identify Afrikaans as 
their home language (compared to 60.8 percent of white South Africans – 
Statistics South Africa 2012:27). According to the latest (2011) census statistics, 
Afrikaans has 731,703 more coloured speakers than white ones (Statistics South 
Africa 2012:26). It is, then, simply preposterous to claim, as Afrikaners had done 
for decades, that Afrikaans is the language they had made from Dutch: 
Afrikaans is Dutch that was recreated in the mouths of whites [blankes]. It is a white 
man‟s language, and had developed alongside the Afrikaanse volk. [It] is our self-
acquired own possession, and was not borrowed back from skew speakers (emphasis 
in the original). 
This statement, as quoted by Ponelis (1998:20), was made by the linguist G.S. 
Nienaber in 1949, 35 years after one of Afrikaans‟s most zealous activists, C.J. 
Langenhoven, had (by now infamously) asserted: 
Afrikaans is the one and only white man‟s language which was made in South 
Africa and which had not come ready made from oversees (quoted in Giliomee 
2003:369; emphasis added). 
                                                 
193 The Khoisan languages have become virtually extinct.  
194 Consider the following tale as told by Shell: “The slave Armosyn Claasz gave birth to the 
children of four different fathers in the Company‟s Slave Lodge, some described as halfslag 
[half-caste], which means that the father was white. Many of these children and their 
descendants were absorbed into what became prominent Afrikaner families” (2012:68). 
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This accurately depicts the creation process, but certainly not the creators. It is, 
further, indeed ironic that a “wonderfully expressive and cosmopolitan new 
language”, to echo Alistair Sparks, “which the slaves invented out of their 
necessity for communication and then passed on from black nanny to white child 
while the sophistication of High Dutch wilted on the dry and distant veld, should 
have become the talisman of a narrow racist nationalism dedicated to the 
oppression of its real creators” (1990:77). Two qualifications are called for here. 
First, as has been suggested, there were variations to the “black nanny to white 
child” scenario: black wet nurse to white child,195 black mother to white child, 
black child to white child in play. Second, while “proper” Dutch did disappear 
from this kind of interaction in the home and on “the dry and distant veld”, it 
remained the (official) language of the Company and the church. In 
sociolinguistics terms, the language situation was one of simple diglossia: 
Afrikaans speakers (who could read) could read Dutch but few of them could 
write the language “properly”, and even fewer could speak it “properly” (Ponelis 
1998:47).
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By implication, Sparks admits that the slaves, like the Khoisan, were forced (or at 
least had no choice but) to learn Dutch and in this sense his description of the 
Cape creoloid as “a language invented out of necessity” is, in my view, closer to 
the truth than Giliomee‟s portrayal of Afrikaans as “one of the genuinely multi-
racial achievements” of South Africa (2003:xiv). The latter claim – first 
articulated in 1975 by white, leftist Afrikaans author Jan Rabie and in recent years 
often quoted in the South African language debate – should be seen as a corrective 
to the now debunked myth of Afrikaans‟s lily-white history and ownership. And 
yet one has to ask: is imposition rather than accomplishment not a more honest 
interpretation of what happened at the Cape, at least initially?  
                                                 
195 Cf. Giliomee (2003:49–50); Shell (2012:65–66). 
196 During the nineteenth century, a situation of complex diglossia would develop “with 
Afrikaans as the vernacular and both standard Dutch (in the church, in private education 
and in the media) and English as languages of culture” (Ponelis 1993:50). 
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For all the emphasis it continues to lay on the injustice of anglicisation, Afrikaner 
nationalist mythology has always turned a blind eye to Dutch‟s/Afrikaans‟s own 
acts of linguicide (as sociolinguist and language activist Tove Skutnabb Kangas 
controversially interprets the process of language shift or death.) To this day, the 
myth represents the English as the inventors of linguistic imperialism. 
Commenting on anglicisation policies of the nineteenth century – to which I shall 
soon turn – even non-nationalist Afrikaner scholars would remark, for example, 
that British imperialism in South Africa “was myopically and chauvinistically 
loyal to English” (Ponelis 1993:59). But was Dutch imperialism any less short-
sighted and arrogant? And did Afrikaner nationalism not come to epitomise 
(dramatically so in Soweto in 1976) what it means to be myopically and 
chauvinistically loyal to a language?  
What can be said with certainty is that English jingoism shaped the language 
consciousness of white Afrikaans speakers in a way that Dutch linguistic 
chauvinism did not shape the language consciousness of the Khoisan and the Cape 
slaves. In the 1870s, Afrikaans language consciousness – or more accurately, 
awareness among white Afrikaans speakers of the inferior status of their language, 
literature and heritage vis-á-vis the English language, English literature and 
British/English heritage – found expression in language activism. Nationalism got 
in the way of anglicisation. Dutch assimilationism, by contrast, achieved its goal 
of wholesale language shift and culminated in the emergence of the western 
dialects of Afrikaans. 
4.3.2 The dialects of Afrikaans 
The creoloid language that was born in the shade of Table Mountain would in 
time spread far beyond that shade. Today, in main-stream dialectology, a 
distinction is made between three overarching dialects of Afrikaans (each with its 
own sub-dialects): the south-western, north-western and eastern variety. The 
differences between these varieties are not very substantial, and they are on the 
decrease. This is because Afrikaans entered the era of modernisation and 
industrialisation – which was also, in this case as in many others, the era of 
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language standardisation – relativity soon after its birth. Before the three dialects 
could deviate drastically from one another, the process of dialect levelling was set 
in motion by formal mass schooling – a domain of the standard language.  
The geographical distribution of Afrikaans‟s dialects – like the distribution of 
North American English dialects – tells tales of migrations, both voluntarily and 
forced. Represented on a map (4.1), the dialects of Afrikaans mirrors a centrifugal 
dynamic, to borrow Johnson‟s phrase, “in which all problems, ambitions and 
conflicts could be overcome by outward movement” (2004:44). 
Image removed for copyright reasons 
 
Map 4.1 The spread of Afrikaans in the eighteenth century
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Up until the end of the second Dutch-Khoikhoi war in 1677, as has been 
mentioned, settler farming at the Cape was limited to the peninsular plains. The 
following century, however, saw enormous colonial expansion as white trekboere 
pushed the boundaries of the VOC-governed territory deep into the interior – 
northwards towards the Gariep River,
198
 and eastwards towards the Great Fish 
River. Khoikhoi and, to a lesser extent, San resistance to land occupation should 
not be underestimated, but it was the Xhosa (a Bantu-speaking people) who, in 
1778, finally brought the white advance to a halt at the Great Fish River some six 
hundred miles east of Cape Town.  
Afrikaans was eventually standardised on the basis of the language that the 
trekboere took with them all the way to the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony.
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Here, west of the Great Fish River, some of the farmers continued to regard 
themselves first as Dutch and later as British colonial subjects, while others 
sought to escape British rule in the so-called Great Trek of the 1830s. It is through 
                                                 
197 Source: http://www.argief.litnet.co.za/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cmd=print_articleandnews_id=93785andcause_id=1270 (accessed March 
2013). 
198 In 1779, the Gariep River was renamed the Orange River, in honour of the Dutch royal 
house. After the end of apartheid, the river‟s original Khoisan name was reinstated. 
199 It was the most turbulent frontier: within the span of two decades no less than three wars 
were fought (in 1779, 1793 and 1799), and more would follow. 
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the direct descendants of the latter group – the Voortrekkers – that eastern frontier 
Afrikaans (as the eastern variety is also known) reached the northern parts of 
present-day South Africa where the Pretoria-Johannesburg area is now the hub of 
the dialect.  
The two remaining dialects of Afrikaans – the south-western variety and the 
north-western variety – are historically associated with non-native speakers of the 
language: south-western Afrikaans with the slaves and their descendants, and 
north-western Afrikaans with the Khoikhoi, groups of whom (notably the Korana 
and the Griqua)
200
 settled north of the colonial border in the vicinity of the Gariep 
river during the late eighteenth century. By then, after wars and waves of 
smallpox epidemics
201
 had taken their toll, there were only about 20,000 Khoikhoi 
left in the colony – a detribalised, landless proletariat impoverished by 
colonialism. Some of them were bilingual but many were no longer fluent in their 
original language and spoke Afrikaans. The Khoikhoi who left the Cape were the 
first Afrikaans speakers in the north-western parts of southern Africa (Ponelis 
1998:14). 
At present, according to Johnson and Jacobs (2011:263), the Khoikhoi population 
of South Africa and Namibia totals no more than 55,000. Even fewer San people 
have survived. Their pre-colonial way of life as hunter-gatherers brought them 
into conflict not only with colonist farmers, but also with Khoikhoi pastoralists 
and Bantu-speaking migrant groups. The best grazing land, as De Villiers 
(2012a:49) explains the source of the conflict, was also the best hunting ground.
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Agile and armed with bows and poisonous arrows, the San did their best to protect 
their territory against the invasion of livestock farmers, but to little avail. Bands of 
San who were not massacred or dislocated (by white and black forces) were 
fragmented, with individuals becoming part of exogenous economies. 
                                                 
200 The Griqua – as the group formally named itself in 1813 – was hardly a “pure” Khoikhoi 
clan. Initially led by the manumitted slave Adam Kok (circa 1710 – circa 1795), members 
also included other former slaves, runaway slaves, mixed-race people and even a few white 
people. In language and lifestyle, the Griqua resembled the white frontier farmers. 
201 These epidemics are believed to have been linked to infected laundry that was brought 
ashore from visiting ships. 
202 Cf. also Visagie (2012a:99–100). 
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The distinguishing feature of north-western Afrikaans – also called Orange River 
Afrikaans – is influence by the Khoisan language. South-western Afrikaans, on 
the other hand, is characterised by Malay, Portuguese and Arabic influences. 
These are detectable not only in the vocabulary of the dialect (better known as 
Cape Afrikaans or Kaaps), but also in its phonetic features (cf. Ponelis 1993:65–
67). While a considerable number of Malay loanwords found their way into 
standard Afrikaans,
203
 there has been a much higher degree of borrowing from 
Malay in south-western Afrikaans, particularly in the sub-variety of this dialect 
that is associated with Cape Town‟s Muslim community.  
Islam was introduced to the Cape in the seventeenth century via convicts and 
political exiles as well as slaves from Bengal, India and Indonesia. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, the religion was wide-spread among the Cape slaves (who 
enjoyed a fair degree of religious freedom). The first Muslim school or madrasah 
was founded in 1793, and the first mosque a few years later. In the madrasahs, 
children were taught to read and write in the Arabic script through the medium of 
Malay. Within two generations, however, the Afrikaans creoloid had replaced 
Malay as the language of the Cape Muslim community. By the mid-1800s – 
according to an observer quoted by Giliomee (2003:101) – “all the Malays [sic] in 
Cape Town” spoke Dutch (read: the Afrikaans creoloid) while only the upper 
classes understood and wrote Arabic and Malay. Afrikaans also became the 
language of instruction in the madrasahs, leading to the establishment of what has 
become known as the Arabic-Afrikaans writing tradition. 
Though this fact has long been ignored in Afrikaner nationalist historiography, it 
was the Cape Muslims who first devised an orthography for the Afrikaans they 
spoke so that it could be used in written form. It was they, too, who produced 
what has to be regarded as the first Afrikaans books (printed circa 1856).
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203 Most famous among them is the word for many/much, namely baie. Others examples 
include piering [sauser] and piesang [banana]. 
204 The first Afrikaans book in the Latin alphabet was published in 1861. Authored by L.H. 
Meurant, the magistrate of the town of Cradock, it formed part of a minor movement that 
propagated the segregation of the eastern from the western Cape. This movement was 
hardly, as Du Plessis (1986) has characterised it, a nationalist movement. 
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Arabic script was employed, and one can hardly ask for a better record of how the 
south-western variety of Afrikaans must have sounded at the time. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, about a dozen Arabic-Afrikaans works had been 
published, and the writing tradition would survive another century.
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But non-nationalist language activist initiatives such as the invention of the 
Arabic-Afrikaans writing tradition, as well as literary production in Kaaps and 
Orange River Afrikaans, fall beyond the scope of this study which is concerned 
with the development of the Afrikaans language and Afrikaans literature only to 
the extent that it is relevant to the development of Afrikaner nationalism. In the 
remainder of my thesis, the focus is thus confined to the history of nationalism-
inspired Afrikaans language activism. 
4.4 The catalyst and the context for Afrikaner nationalism’s “false 
start”: anglicisation and modernisation206 
In 1795, VOC control of the Cape was terminated – a development that has to be 
set against the background of the tumultuous aftermath of the American and 
French Revolutions. Inspired by the revolutionaries (and by the Dutch Patriot 
Movement of the time), a group of Cape Town dwellers and farmers from the 
surrounding area staged a revolt against VOC “despotism”. The Cape Patriots, as 
the rebels called themselves, were no doubt influenced by Enlightenment 
thinking: some literature did reach the Cape and delegations to The Netherlands 
met with anti-Orangists. However, for all their pro-revolution sentiments (as 
                                                 
205 Cf. Davids (1992) and Davids, Willemse and Dangor (2012). 
206 In scope – both thematically and chronologically speaking – this section overlaps with a 
key text from the body of pre-apartheid Afrikaner nationalist literature. Titled Die Afrikaner 
en sy taal, 1806–1875 [The Afrikaner and his language, 1806–1875] and authored by the 
leading Afrikaans linguist and language activist, J. du P. Scholtz, the book first appeared in 
1939 and was dedicated it to “the memory of all those who devoted themselves to the 
preservation of the Dutch-Afrikaans language and culture at the Cape during the years 
1806–1875”. To reflect a truer picture, however, the book should have been titled The 
Afrikaans-speaker and the Dutch language, 1806–1875, and the dedication should have 
read: “to the memory of all those who devoted themselves to the preservation of Dutch as a 
public language at the Cape during the years 1806–1875”. To think in terms of Afrikaners 
as Afrikaans language activists before 1875, I argue, is premature. His primordialist 
orientation notwithstanding, Scholtz‟s research provides a valuable overview of newspaper 
coverage of the language-related issues at the Cape during the period under review. 
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opposed to local Company officials who were Orangists and anti-revolutionary – 
Giliomee 2003:56), the burghers essentially stood for the opposite of popular 
sovereignty and universal rights. They insisted, amongst other things, that 
white men should not be arrested by „caffers‟ (slaves who served as auxiliary 
police), that burghers should be allowed to punish their own slaves [...], that 
Englishmen and Frenchmen should be denied residential rights, and that Chinese, 
Javanese and convicts should not be allowed to live among the burghers and run 
businesses in competition with theirs (Davenport and Saunders 2000:38).
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Blind to the inconsistencies in their version of the ideology, the Cape Patriots 
happily used the new language of liberalism to legitimise their grievances. In a 
series of petitions to the Lord XVII, they demanded more political and economic 
rights and freedoms for their “fellow citizens of the Cape of Good Hope”. (Cf. 
Davenport and Saunders 2000: 27–29, 36–40; Giliomee 2003:54–57.)  
In at least one of these petitions the Cape Patriots identified themselves as 
Africaners – something that future Afrikaner nationalists would not leave 
unexploited. At the time, however, the term was still not an ethnonym, and 
certainly not one that was confined to white Afrikaans-speaking burghers. It could 
refer to anybody “who identified with, and was usually born in, South Africa 
rather than Europe” (Saunders and Southey 1998:8), including, for example, the 
Khoikhoi and mixed-race followers of the notorious Jager Afrikaner (circa 1750–
1823) – a man of Khoikhoi and slave descent – and his son Jonker Afrikaner 
(1790–1860). Only in the twentieth century did the name Afrikaners acquire its 
current meaning as an ethnonym. Those whites who came to be known as 
Afrikaners were also called Cape Dutch in the Cape Colony and Boers in the Boer 
republics. 
The nationalist ideal of Cape Dutch and Boers united in an independent Afrikaner 
state only surfaced in the 1870s – a century after the Patriot movement. To be 
sure, the earlier campaign displayed elements of nationalist politics. The burghers 
were self-declared patriots. Nationalist revolutions, however opportunistically 
                                                 
207 In the end, none of these demands were met.  
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interpreted, were their sources of inspiration. They were promoting the interests – 
both material and existential – of the citizens of the Cape of Good Hope – a 
collectivity which, they believed, was politically and economically not as 
independent as it could have been. To Giliomee, the noteworthy aspect is that the 
burghers‟ petitions addressed “the issue of their survival in a way that transcended 
the immediate self-interest of the authors” (2003:55). Yet the Cape Patriots were 
hardly Afrikaner nationalists. For the time being, despite their situation being 
comparable to that of the frontier population in Britain‟s American colonies, they 
aspired only to the status of “free citizens of a colony of the free United 
Netherlands, sharing the same rights and privileges” (Giliomee 2003:6; cf. also 
Davenport and Saunders 2000:29). 
But then another colonial power, alien in ways that the Dutch authorities had not 
been, appeared on the scene. On 11 June 1795, a British fleet sailed into False Bay 
– the eastern bay of the Cape Peninsula. The Netherlands had been under French 
occupation since January of that year, and to prevent the same fate from befalling 
the Cape, Prince William V of Orange – the Dutch Stadtholder on exile in 
England – had asked his host to seize the colony. Unconvinced of Britain‟s good 
intentions, local authorities resisted occupation and mustered forces to defend 
Cape Town, but to no avail. In terms of a conciliatory treaty of surrender, signed 
on 16 September 1795, the Cape became a British possession.  
Before long, however, die Kaap was weer Hollands [the Cape was Dutch 
again].
208
 The Peace Treaty of Amiens (25 March 1802) required Britain to 
relinquish the Cape Colony to The Netherlands, and on 21 February 1803 the flag 
of the Batavian Republic was hoisted on the Castle in Cape Town. Under 
commissioner-general J.A. de Mist and general Jan Willem Janssens colonial 
administration improved remarkably. But their time in office was short-lived. 
Early in January 1806, British battleships were approaching the Cape Peninsula 
once again – now from the western side via Table Bay. This time they had not 
come on behalf of the Prince of Orange. The sea battle of Trafalgar, fought less 
                                                 
208 An Afrikaans idiom meaning “everything is all right again”. 
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than three months earlier, had confirmed Britannia as ruler of the waves. After 
defeating the Cape garrison in the Battle of Blaauwberg [Blue Mountain] on 8 
January 1806, she came to rule the waves of the Cape – the Gibraltar of the Indian 
Ocean – too.  
In Afrikaner nationalist mythology, the Battle of Blaauwberg marked the 
beginning of Eene eeuw van onrecht [A century of wrong] as an old Dutch-
language book on intra-white (Dutch/Afrikaans-English) relations in nineteenth 
century South Africa is titled. Its actual authorship is unclear,
209
 but Eene eeuw 
van onrecht was published on the eve of the Anglo-Boer War (in 1899) by Francis 
William Reitz (1844–1934) in his capacity of state secretary of the Boer republic 
of Transvaal. The book, like the Afrikaner myth, assumed that Afrikaners had 
already constituted a volk when the century of wrong began. Contrary to this 
assumption, as I shall demonstrate below, Afrikaners – or rather, Afrikaner 
nationalist activist-ideologues – only managed to construct an Afrikaner volk once 
the “century of wrong” had passed. In the course of that century, however, British 
rule in South Africa – uninterrupted in the colonial south but interrupted in the 
republican north (cf. section 1.1) – provided the catalyst and created the context 
for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism.  
The question that presents itself is, once again, a “how” question: How was that 
achieved? How did British control of South African territories fertilise the ground 
for the seed of Afrikaner nationalism? Following the convention, I argue that it 
happened in two non-consecutive phases: in the Cape Colony from the 1820s 
onwards, and in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies in the aftermath of the 
Anglo-Boer War. The first phase is covered in the remainder of this chapter and 
the second phase in the last chapter of this study.  
British control of the Cape Colony – and later the Transvaal and Orange River 
Colonies – provided the catalyst for the rise of Afrikaner nationalism through 
formal policies of anglicisation. On this historians generally agree, and it is not 
                                                 
209 It is believed to include contributions by Jan Smuts. 
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disputed in this study. What is challenged, is the lay and scholarly belief that 
white Afrikaans speakers, in the face of anglicisation, collectively and 
simultaneously began “to feel a sense of unity and pride in their own identity” 
(Watermeyer 1996:102). Following Miroslav Hroch, I argue quite the opposite: 
shame and embarrassment – and, of course, a fair amount of resentment and 
ambition – on the part of a few, rather than widespread pride, triggered the 
language activism that constituted the earliest expressions of Afrikaner 
nationalism. 
Despite all the contextual differences, there are ways in which Afrikaner 
nationalism is comparable to those European nationalisms that Hroch included in 
his periodisation model. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Afrikaners were 
a group under exogenous rule – in the Colonies of the Cape and Natal from 1806 
and in the Transvaal and Orange River Colonies from 1902 onwards. The 
language they spoke lacked not only a continuous literary tradition but any written 
tradition at all.
210
 If the English press in the Cape was to be believed, there could 
be no literature with such a language (Cape Argus, 1857/12/19, quoted in Ponelis 
1993:59). It was when a new class of educated but marginalised men observed 
these deficits, “[attributes that] the future nation still lacked, and began efforts to 
overcome one or more of them” that Afrikaner nationalism was born. Like the 
intelligentsia in Hroch‟s examples, they started to talk about their ethnic identity, 
conceived of it as a national identity, and set out to “persuade their compatriots of 
the importance of consciously belonging to the nation” (Hroch 1996:80).  
More than national prestige was at stake. As will emerge, the cultivation of 
Afrikaans was part and parcel of attempts to empower white speakers of 
Afrikaans economically and politically. Cultivation, the language-cum-nationalist 
activists knew, would pave the way for institutionalisation, and the 
institutionalisation of Afrikaans would facilitate Afrikaners‟ access to economic 
and political resources. The vernacular had to be adapted for the modern 
institutions of print-capitalism (á la Anderson), schools, churches, courts of law 
                                                 
210 Or, to be more accurate, it lacked a written tradition in the Roman alphabet.  
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and, last but not least, parliament and other structures of government. Explained in 
Charles Ferguson‟s terms, Afrikaans had to be converted into a high variety that 
performed formal functions in the public domains of life. Explained in Ernest 
Gellner‟s terms, the language had to become a high code with a high culture.  
When English first arrived on the scene, Dutch was the cultivated (high) language 
of the Cape Colony and, as such, the primary target of anglicisation. The ultimate 
target, however, was the Cape Dutch way of life: the Cape as a colony had to be 
anglicised. In intention, as Davenport and Saunders sums it up, “British policy 
was to adjust the cultural life of Colonial society to the legal realities of British 
rule” (2000:45). Giliomee agrees, but his bias is clear to see – the inverted 
commas alone an indication of where his empathy lies: 
[After gaining control of the Cape Colony,] Britain had resolved to develop it, 
extend it, and „civilize‟ it. The first big step was a new language policy (2003:197). 
Less sophisticated nationalist interpretations of the “stranglehold of anglicisation” 
at the Cape are less subtle in their bias. Apartheid-era school text books, for 
example, would assert that  
[t]he conqueror intended to turn the Cape [...] into a British colony in the true sense 
of the word. This should have happened by means of anglicisation of everything and 
everyone, and language, that after all determines nationhood, was the first to suffer 
(Meiring 1949:6). 
The problem with this idea – that Britain sought to destroy a long-existing 
Afrikaner nation by destroying the Afrikaans language – is (at least) two-fold: 
First, as has been established above, there could be no talk of Afrikaners as a 
nation with a language prior to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Second, 
the language that “suffered” as a result of anglicisation programmes was not 
Afrikaans, the national language-to-be, but Dutch, the language of public 
institutions.  
The statement that Dutch was the language of the Cape‟s public institutions must 
be qualified: Dutch was the language of those public institutions that existed in 
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the colony before 1806. These included government, legal and religious 
structures,
211
 but virtually excluded schools (not to mention universities) and 
periodical publications. It was during the “century of wrong”, and particularly 
between 1811 and 1813, on the initiative of governor John Cradock, that state-
sponsored formal education began to replace the (very basic) church-based 
education of the Dutch era. And it was two British settlers, John Fairbairn and 
Thomas Pringle, who introduced the printing press to a community unfamiliar 
with newspapers and magazines. In 1824, Fairbairn and Pringle established the 
weekly South African Commercial Advertiser – South Africa‟s first newspaper. 
The Dutch magazine, Het Nederduitsch Zuid-Afrikaansch Tijdschrift [The Nether 
German South African Journal] was launched during the same year, and in 1930 
followed the bilingual Dutch-English newspaper De Zuid-Afrikaan. [The South 
African]. Ironically, the Cape‟s first Dutch-language periodicals owed their 
existence to British imperialism. 
Fairbairn and Pringle had arrived in Algoa Bay (modern-day Port Elizabeth) in the 
eastern Cape during the first half of 1820, along with some 4,000 of their 
countrymen from all corners of the British Isles. They had been recruited and 
assisted by the British government as part of a broader undertaking in the early 
nineteenth century to populate the empire with British subjects. By settling them 
on the eastern frontier of the colony, on land seized from the Xhosa, Cape 
authorities were hoping they would serve an additional purpose, namely as a 
buffer against the Xhosa. Some settlers turned out to be successful stock farmers, 
and many who gave up farming came to dominate other sectors of the colony‟s 
economy, not least because they had brought with them “the ideology of free trade 
and progress” (cf. Giliomee 2003:194). The 1820 settlers – or, to be exact, 
Fairbairn, Pringle and George Greig, the printer of The South African Commercial 
Advertiser – were also instrumental in the achievement of press freedom for the 
Cape in 1828. 
                                                 
211 The DRC was the most important institution of the conquered Cape Dutch (Giliomee 
2003:199). 
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According to Saul Dubow, Britain‟s imperial ambition to anglicise the institutions 
of the Cape Colony – old and new – was first articulated by Cradock in 1811. 
Pressures for anglicisation, Dubow adds, “were given further force by senior 
administrators like Henry Ellis, who helped to prepare the way for the 1820 
settlers” (2006:21). Yet the first British official to introduce a formal policy of 
anglicisation in colonial South Africa was Charles Somerset.  
Somerset became governor of the Cape in 1814 after Britain had officially 
acquired the territory in terms of the Anglo-Dutch treaty (also known as the 
Convention of London). In 1822, he issued a proclamation which sought to 
replace Dutch by English as the official administrative language of the colony. 
Two years later, in a report to the governor, one of his trusted advisers, J.A. 
Truter, warned that  
an apprehension is fast spreading among the public, that their children will not be 
allowed to receive any further instruction in Dutch, and that the language is to be 
totally proscribed (quoted in Scholtz 1964:29). 
According to the 1822 proclamation, English was to become the sole legal 
language of the Cape Colony on 1 January 1827. Shortly before the policy was 
enacted, on 6 November 1826, officials of the district court of Stellenbosch voiced 
their concern: 
although we would willingly submit to all laws and orders of Government, [...] it 
cannot possibly be required of us that we shall sign the daily records, sentences, acts 
of judgment upon criminal misdeeds, and other documents if drawn up in a language 
that [we] are unacquainted with (quoted in Ponelis 1998:48). 
Officials of the district court of Graaff-Reinet went a step further and resigned 
(Ponelis 1998:48). Attempts to anglicise school and church were also met with 
protest. Writing to The South African Commercial Advertiser in 1832, a reader 
observed that “the Dutch colonists, tenacious of the customs or their fathers, still 
consider [...] Dutch as the language of the country and are desirous that their 
children shall before all be taught the parental language” (published on 5 May 
1832; quoted in Scholtz 1964:57) Two and a half years later, on 7 November 
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1834, the following question cropped up in the editorial columns of De Zuid-
Afrikaan : “Why would we not be allowed to pray to our God [...] in our own 
language?” (quoted in Scholtz 1964:73). One of the founder members of the 
newspaper (who would become its editor in 1939), Christoffel J. Brand,
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summarised Cape-Dutch discontent as follows: “England has taken from the old 
colonists of the Cape everything that was dear to them: their country, their laws, 
their customs, their slaves, yes even their mother tongue” (quoted in Giliomee 
2003:199).
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But there was a flip side to the coin. Appreciating the instrumental value – and, of 
course, the prestige – of English in a British colony, a considerable proportion of 
the urban educated Cape Dutch elite were not only prepared but eager to have 
their children study (in) English. Gradually, town and city life became 
predominantly an English life,
214
 several upper-class Cape Town families became 
English families,
215
 and quite a few prominent leaders in the Cape Dutch 
community became, as they were called, Anglomanne [Anglomen]. “A colonist of 
Dutch descent”, it seemed, could after all become “an Englishman”, contrary to 
what De Zuid-Afrikaan believed. It was in on 17 October 1853, seven months 
                                                 
212 With a doctorate in law from the University of Leiden (obtained in 1820), Brand was one of 
the first well-educated Cape Dutch colonists. Together with John Fairbairn he agitated for 
representative government and, when it was finally achieved in 1853, became the first 
speaker of the Cape house of assembly – a position he held for two decades. In 1872, on the 
introduction of responsible government, he also became the first speaker of the Cape 
parliament. Christoffel Brand was, perhaps ironically, knighted in 1860. 
213 Brand made this statement in 1837, three years after the British parliament abolished 
slavery (on 1 December 1834). Provision was made for a four-year apprenticeship period, 
but in 1838 the last of the Cape‟s slaves were emancipated. 
214 Only four South African cities had their birth during Dutch period: Cape Town (est. 1652), 
Stellenbosch (est. 1707), Swellendam (est. 1745) and Graaff-Reinet (est. 1786). During the 
British period six more were added to the map: Port Elizabeth (est. 1820, on the arrival of 
the British settlers), Durban (est. 1824), King William‟s Town (est. 1835), East London 
(est. 1845), Kimberley (est. 1871) and, last but not least, the city of gold, Johannesburg (est. 
1886). The capitals of the Boer republics, Bloemfontein (est. 1846) and Pretoria (est. 1855), 
were born as rural towns, as were other cities founded by the Voortrekkers. 
  In an interesting observation, Scholtz (1964:82) points out the English names of towns 
in the Cape Colony of the nineteenth century drew little, if any, protest from their 
Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants. Examples include Beaufort, Caledon, Clanwilliam, 
Colesberg, Cradock, Darling, George, Napier, Prince Albert, Richmond, Somerset, 
Victoria, Wellington and Worcester. 
215 De Villiers (2012b:75) cites the Cloete, Van der Bijl and Mijburgh families as examples. 
210 
 
after Britain had granted representative government to the Cape Colony, that this 
opinion was expressed by the newspaper‟s editorial team: 
[i]t is a mistake that we have frequently opposed to assume that as British subjects 
were are obliged to adopt a British nationality. A colonist of Dutch descent cannot 
become an Englishman, nor should he strive to be a Hollander (quoted in Scholtz 
1964:83).  
According to De Zuid-Afrikaan, the challenge facing “enlightened” colonists of 
Dutch descent was to become Kapenaars [Capetonians] by “learning to combine 
the fundamental features of the English national character with those of the Dutch 
national character in a harmonious way” (quoted in Scholtz 1964:83). But the 
newspaper, like many of its readers, was ambivalent about the matter. It also 
predicted, with approval, that “the Dutch nationality” at the Cape would slowly 
but surely be assimilated into “the English nationality” (De Zuid-Afrikaan, 
1857/05/21, quoted in Scholtz 1964:94).
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By the mid-nineteenth century, however, this debate was no longer relevant to all 
Afrikaners-to-be, simply because roughly one-third of them could no longer be 
called Cape Dutch. During the late 1830s, as has been mentioned, some 14,000 
men, women and children (at the time about a tenth of the Cape Dutch population) 
escaped anglicisation and assimilation into “the English nationality” when they 
left the colony en masse. This series of migrations, which came to be known as 
the Great Trek, would supply the basic raw material (á la Hobsbawm 1997:5) to 
Afrikanerdom‟s myth manufacturers of the early twentieth century.  
To say that the migrants or Voortrekkers escaped anglicisation is not to suggest 
that Somerset‟s language policy per se (or even indirectly) caused the Great Trek. 
The Trek, as Davenport and Saunders (2000:53) warn, was not “a demonstration 
against alien government [just] because it was alien”. The burden of anglicisation, 
to use their metaphor, was lighter than Afrikaner nationalists would like to 
                                                 
216 For the most part, however, De Zuid-Afrikaan “committed itself to resist the eclipse of the 
Dutch heritage; it denounced those who, in a desire to present themselves as „civilized‟, 
abandoned „their ancestors‟ language, morals, outlook, in short, their own nationality and, 
eventually also, their own religion‟”. 
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believe, especially in the remote rural areas of the Cape Colony, including its 
eastern frontier from whence the various journeys that made up the Trek 
commenced. It was for a complex combination of other reasons that the eastern 
frontier farmers and their families decided to load their belongings into oxwagons 
and head off northwards into the unknown.  
Johnson and Jacobs (2011:131) are right in claiming that the white farmers “were 
running out of land for pasture since there was little additional land to conquer”. 
Yet it is doubtful, as the editors of the Encyclopaedia of South Africa also claim, 
that they “feared that their culture and identity were being threatened” (Johnson 
and Jacobs 2011:131). After six frontier wars with the Xhosa, the last of which 
(fought in 1835) cost them £290,000 in losses, the settlers must have felt 
threatened, and the Cape government could not have been popular on the frontier. 
But if the local British authorities were loathed, it was for their failure to provide 
protection, not for their language laws. Frontier settler life in colonial Africa, not 
unlike peasant life in agrarian Europe, was “a difficult and serious business” (to 
stretch the applicability of Gellner‟s idea): 
The protection from [Xhosa warriors] is not easily achieved. In the achievement of 
it, effective government is an important factor. Could one think of a sillier, more 
frivolous consideration than the question concerning the native vernacular of the 
governors? (1964:152–153; emphasis in the original). 
The final chapter of this thesis analyses the mythologisation of the Great Trek 
within the framework of the modified Leerssen model. Suffice it to say here, 
where the focus is on language matters, that the Voortrekkers settled in the 
interior of South Africa and eventually managed to found two republics: the Zuid 
Afrikaansche Republiek [South African Republic] (ZAR) or Transvaal, and the 
Orange Free State (OFS). The independence of the former was recognised by 
Britain in the Sand River Convention of 1852 and the latter became independent 
two years later in terms of the Bloemfontein Convention. By the mid-1860s, white 
Afrikaans speakers constituted 90 percent of the white population of the republics, 
compared to 75 percent in the Cape Colony (Giliomee 2003:201). Unsurprisingly, 
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the official language of the republics – in as far as pastoral republics needed an 
official language – was Dutch.  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the ZAR government terminated state 
grants to schools using English as medium of instruction. Paul Kruger, the last 
president of the ZAR (form 1880 through the Anglo-Boer War), believed that 
“[e]very attempt to expand education in English will help towards the destruction 
of the landstaal [language of the country]” (Giliomee 2003:237). Yet virtually 
nobody spoke Dutch. Even Kruger‟s (as yet unstandardised) Afrikaans was better 
than his Dutch:  
Visiting Rotterdam […] in 1884 as part of a Transvaal delegation, he stopped using 
his broken Dutch for the first time and switched to Afrikaans. A Dutch report noted 
the great difference: in his own language the speech was „lively, glowing and 
spirited‟ (Giliomee 2003:224). 
The language set-up in the Free State was similar. Dutch was the official language 
but the Zuid-Afrikaansche taal [South African language] was the “unofficial 
language that was not written but spoken and understood” (Dutch educationist 
Johannes Brill, quoted in Nienaber 1975:86). The Dutch of Kruger‟s counterpart, 
Marthinus Theunis Steyn (the last president of the OFS, 1896–1902) was equally 
poor. As a student he opted for English when he could not cope in The 
Netherlands and went to London to complete a law degree. He corresponded with 
his English-speaking wife in English and included several English speakers in his 
cabinet. Though as president he, too, 
began to take the issue of language and culture more seriously, as an embodiment of 
nationhood. If the Dutch language languished, he declared, the Free State nation 
would decline. He instructed his officials to switch to Dutch in corresponding with 
the Natal
217
 and Cape governments, and gave Dutch-speakers preference in 
appointments to the civil service. Departments were told that Dutch was the official 
language, and pressure was put on the schools which predominantly used English to 
introduce Dutch as the language medium (Giliomee 2003:245). 
                                                 
217 A British colony since 1843 – cf. section 1.1. 
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As a marginal but important note, Kruger‟s description of Dutch as the language 
of the country along with Steyn‟s portrayal of Dutch as “an embodiment of 
nationhood” – the language of the nation – have to be considered here. It would 
be difficult to deny that these language attitudes – and the language activism to 
which they gave rise (e.g. language-in-education policies) – were nationalist in 
nature. In fact: can there be a more unambiguous expression of nationalism than 
the establishment of a republic? Why, then, is the rise of Boer republicanism not 
interpreted as the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, at least not by Christoph Marx 
and others belonging to the modernist/constructionist school. Marx explains: 
There is a contradiction between Afrikaner nationalism and republicanism, since the 
latter was initially confined to specific areas [of present-day South Africa], while the 
former strove to include all Afrikaans-speaking white people in the country. It is 
ahistorical to regard them as one and the same with hindsight, as many nationalist 
historians who make no distinction between Afrikaner nationalism and for instance 
OFS nationalism (2008:120). 
Quoting Stadler, Marx concludes: “The [Boer] republic was not a precise 
statement of political objectives but [...] served as a model of harmony for a 
society rent by conflict, of certainty in an age of uncertainty (2008:120). 
To conclude: The genesis of Afrikaner nationalism must be cast against the 
backdrop of imperial dreams of an anglicised Cape Colony. In this respect, I share 
the view of both Afrikaner nationalist historians such as Hermann Giliomee 
(2003:194) and non-nationalists such as Leonard Thompson (1985:239–240) and 
Robert Ross (1999:4–6): Afrikaner nationalism was a reaction against British 
Imperialism. Unlike the nationalists, however, I do not defend Afrikaner 
nationalism as a justified response to oppression. Before convicting the local 
British authorities of oppression, as Davenport and Saunders (2000:46) warn, one 
should distinguish their intentions from the manner in which they implemented 
their policy of anglicisation. If Dutch did “suffer” badly, it was only in secondary 
state schools. The Scots clergy imported by the Somerset regime were sent to The 
Netherlands to learn Dutch, and interpreters were provided in courts of law. The 
actual source of Cape Dutch discontent in 1827 was more likely the abolition of 
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their traditional legal structures than Somerset‟s new language policy. Now the 
law and its enforcement were in the hands of “higher, generally alien authorities, 
who legislated in English [even though they] gazetted the law in Dutch as well”. 
What Davenport and Saunders seem to suggest – and this is also the point I am 
trying to make – is that concerns about language per se might not have been what 
prompted the lawyers of Graaff-Reinet, for example, to resign. In the final 
analysis, they probably resigned in frustration borne out of their loss of power to 
legislate and to execute the law.  
By no stretch of the definition can the Graaff-Reinet language activists be 
regarded as Afrikaner nationalists. Nevertheless, the power constellations in the 
Cape Colony in 1827 already resembled those that typically produced the smaller 
nationalisms of Europe on which Hroch based his periodisation model: a potential 
nation X under exogenous rule Y, the language of Y boasting (inter alia) a 
longstanding and proud literary tradition, the language of X lacking (inter alia) a 
written tradition (in the Roman alphabet – the only one known to nation-to-be X). 
At the Cape, an additional ingredient was added to the mix: language Z. The first 
Afrikaner nationalists could claim Dutch – a language, like English, with an age-
old written and literary tradition – as theirs. Lack of widespread fluency in the 
national language-to-be had not deterred nationalists elsewhere.
218
 But there was 
another dimension to the problem: not only was Dutch virtually a foreign 
language in the colony; it was also an unattractive one, as least according to the 
local English-language press. In a leading article that appeared on 19 September 
1857, the Cape Argus minced no words: 
[S]upposing the Dutch of Holland was the vernacular of this country, which it is not, 
why seek to perpetuate it here in an English colony. Dutch has no status among the 
languages of Europe. Nobody ever learns it; and all ranks above the lowest in 
Holland prefer to speak French. The fact is, that Dutch, with some very good points 
about it, is not an attractive language. Very well fitted for pulpit eloquence, no 
doubt, but shockingly unsuited for sentiment and poetry (quoted in Scholtz 1964:91; 
emphasis in the original newspaper article). 
                                                 
218 Eliezer Ben-Yehuda is perhaps the classic example. 
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The real thorn in the side of the author(s) of the article was, however, “the present 
atrocious vernacular of the Cape” – Afrikaans: 
The language of the Cape! As if the miserable, bastard jargon, which is the 
vernacular of this country, is worthy of the name of language at all. [...] The poverty 
of expression in this jargon is such, that we defy any man to express thoughts in it 
above the merest common-place. People can hardly be expected to act up to 
sentiments which the tongue they use fail entirely to express. There can be no 
literature with such a language, for poor as it is, it is hardly a written one (quoted in 
Scholtz 1964:91). 
The article concluded with an appeal to the Cape Dutch: 
preach English from your pulpits, and encourage your children to learn and use, in 
familiar discourse, the language of Shakespeare and Milton [...] Let [..] your 
language and nationality go (quoted in Scholtz 1964:91–92). 
In similar vein, The Cape Monitor of 14 October 1857 told Afrikaans speakers 
that their language  
is doing you and your children incalculable harm. It cramps up your thoughts. It 
impedes you energies. It brings the blush to every modest woman‟s cheeks, and 
makes the educated recoil with disgust too often (quoted in Scholtz 1964:92).  
A case can be made that such attitudes might have contributed more to the 
anglicisation of the Cape than any formal language policy. One need not ban a 
language, as the late Flemish sociolinguist Kas Deprez used to say;
219
 given 
enough prestige, all you need to do is ask: What can you do with that language? 
Who wants to speak that language? The explanation for the shift towards English 
in the towns and cities of the British-ruled Cape Colony lay as much in the 
instrumental value of English as it did in the symbolic value of the language – its 
cultural power or social currency. 
                                                 
219 Personal observation as a student in the European Studies Masters Programme at the 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1995. 
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Thus far, this section overviewed British attempts in the nineteenth century to 
anglicise the Cape Colony. These imperialist endeavours were partially 
successful. Eventually, however, they would provoke a nationalist response form 
an intelligentsia who weighed their culture, found it wanting and set out to rectify 
the problem. But the rise of Afrikaner nationalism can hardly be explained as a 
remedy for an elite inferiority complex. Language and cultural imperialism is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the rise of an oppositional 
language and cultural movement; assimilationism may catalyse a nationalist 
reaction, but not under any and all social circumstances. At the Cape, British rule 
did not only provide the spark for Afrikaner nationalism through anglicisation; it 
also created the climate for Afrikaner nationalism through modernisation.  
By 1806, the Cape Dutch – as Giliomee (and not the Cape Argus!) characterises 
them – “were a rural, isolated, relatively backward people with only a few who 
received more than a rudimentary education”. They “could boast of no great 
economic advances or cultural achievements, apart from the Cape Dutch 
homesteads” (2003:195). But then came the British, and with them print-
capitalism and other forces of modernisation, not least of all mass schooling. After 
Britain took control of the Cape, the number of school-attending children in the 
colony kept growing and quintupled between 1842 and 1860 (from 4,000 to 
20,000 – Giliomee 2003:201). In the minds of these children – to tweak Gellner 
(1964:152–153) once again for the purpose of my argument – “the question 
concerning the native vernacular of the governors” was no longer a silly, frivolous 
consideration. To those who (partially) completed school, work had become 
semantic. The native language of the governors was also the language of 
employment and upward social mobility. De Zuid-Afrikaan might have denounced 
those who, “in a desire to present themselves as „civilized‟”, abandoned their 
native language (Giliomee 2003:203), but in the Cape‟s modernising economy 
English was what Afrikaans was not (and Dutch was only to a limited extent): a 
valuable tool and a source of status.  
The empathy of latter-day commentators – Afrikaner nationalists and non-
nationalists alike – more often than not lies with those Afrikaans-speaking 
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colonists who resisted “the eclipse of [their] Dutch heritage” (Giliomee 
2003:203). They were brave in the face of British arrogance, conceit and 
condescension which motivated – so the line of reasoning goes – the introduction 
of the hegemonic, unfair and unjustifiable policy of anglicisation. Giliomee, for 
one, believes that the Cape Colony of the nineteenth century provides a textbook 
example of “the contempt British imperialists so often showed for what they 
regarded as lesser cultures and breeds of men”(Giliomee 2003:xiv): 
Although more sympathetic to the Afrikaner colonists then the officials, the English-
speaking journalists, like the businessmen, reinforced the image of Afrikaners as 
unprogressive and parochial. The great majority of Afrikaner colonists were farmers, 
for whom the benefits of free enterprise and free trade as a prerequisite of colonial 
progress were far less obvious than they were for the merchants. The British 
merchants deemed unprogressive the demand [...] for tariff protection of colonial 
products from cheap imports. The concern for the survival of the Dutch language 
was seen as similarly unprogressive. [...] Trying to transplant something of the 
British Isles to the harsh African soil, they formed literary societies and discussed 
the latest books they had ordered from „home‟. They went to their own churches [...] 
and they played their own games. They did little to get to know the Afrikaners and 
their ways, preferring to keep their own company or occasionally that of an 
anglicized Afrikaner. In their way they themselves were also parochial (Giliomee 
2003:196). 
However, the debate about the fairness of programmes of linguistic assimilation is 
far from closed. To have claimed, as the Cape Argus did, that nothing “will 
advance the moral and social progress of the colony [more] than the substitution 
of the English language for the present Cape Dutch” (19 September 1857; quoted 
in Scholtz 1964:91) was to overstate the case. Yet it is true, given the semantic 
nature of work, that modern economies function predominantly in “high codes” 
and that fluency – or, in Gellnerian terms, a capacity for context-free 
communication – in the language of the economy  
is essential if all citizens are to have an equal opportunity to work […] and, 
conversely, if businesses are to have at their disposal a labour force possessing the 
linguistic competences necessary for flexibility, trainability, and mobility in the 
modern workplace (Patten and Kymlicka 2003:39). 
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In the modern world, as Patten and Kymlicka (2003:37–38) argue, linguistic 
homogenisation has been as much the result of formal assimilationist policies at it 
has been a by-product of justifiable programmes of modernisation such as the 
massification of education and the improvement of all kinds of infrastructures. 
Positive attitudes towards English among the Cape Dutch were due, in no small 
measure, to “the benefits that the British government‟s invasive social 
reorganisation brought to the whole population” (Ponelis 1998:48). 
But not everybody was enchanted by English. In a poem mockingly titled 
Fooruitgang [Progress] that eventually became part of the Afrikaans literary 
canon, one C.P. Hoogenhout famously complained: 
English! English! All is English! English all you see and hear;  
In our schools and in our churches, Mother Tongue is [foully] murdered.  
Bastard is our People now; in this the clergy do comply;  
Dutch in schools is a deception – nothing more than Dutch in name.  
Those who refuse anglicization are derided and disdained:  
Even in Transvaal and Free State, everywhere the self-same pain.  
„It is progress,‟ cry the loudmouths, „Civilization on the march!‟  
Out-of-date and very stupid are all of those who don‟t agree.  
(Moodie‟s 1975 translation, p. 40). 
Hoogenhout belongs to the first generation of activists who, in August 1875, set 
themselves the task to prove that Afrikaans was worthy of the name of language – 
that it could have a written form and, in time, a Shakespeare and a Milton. The 
rest is history: the history of Afrikaner nationalism. 
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CHAPTER 5  
LOOSE CONTINUITY: THE CONTEMPORARY AFRIKAANS 
LANGUAGE MOVEMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, II 
„Dates of battles all of which were won, names of people all of 
whom were heroes, lofty words and noble gestures, long lists of 
heroic deeds, injustices to remember and never to forget [...] 
They wasted years of our lives with those things, with their 
folksongs and speeches and vows 
(Schoeman 2007:106). 
All in this ridiculous 
little language, virtually without a literature, 
that they claim to cherish, 
hugging it like a teddy bear 
(Rousseau 1995:36). 
5.1 Before apartheid: building a nation from words, monuments and 
festivals 
5.1.1 The first Afrikaans language and cultural activists
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In the third chapter of this thesis, I challenged Joep Leerssen‟s argument that 
“nationalism is always, in its incipience at least, cultural [rather than political] 
nationalism” (2006:562). A crucial piece of evidence in support of my claim to 
the contrary – namely that nationalism may, and Afrikaner nationalism did 
originate as a politically directed cultural movement – is to be found in the public 
lecture that ushered in the First Afrikaans Language Movement (or, in Leerssen‟s 
terms, the first efforts to cultivate Afrikaans and Afrikaner culture). Speaking in 
the Free State capital of Bloemfontein during May 1875, the rector of the 
prestigious Grey College in the city, Johannes Brill, put it to his audience that 
[i]f we yearn for an independent national existence, a language of our own, one day 
even our own South African literature, the responsibility rests on our shoulders to 
support the national movement and to defend it against powerful foreign influences, 
                                                 
220 In this section, I relied primarily on Nienaber (1974; 1975) for factual information. 
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to love and nurture the national consciousness, and to protect and maintain the 
national life with everything at our disposal (GRA 1909:53). 
Brill, an immigrant from the Netherlands, delivered his lecture in Dutch, but 
spoke as an advocate of another language, “the unofficial tongue [of the colonies 
and republics of South Africa] that was not written but spoken and understood 
from Cape Town to deep in the interior without which no stranger – Englishman 
or German – who travelled through the country [sic] could do, the South African 
language” (GRA 1909:53). This unofficial language, Brill predicted, would in 
time replace the official ones – English in the British colonies of the Cape and 
Natal, and Dutch in the Boer republics of the Free State and Transvaal – provided 
that a movement of national unification analogous to the German example 
developed among Afrikaners. Conceding that his observation applied to the 
political and intellectual elite rather the volk at large, Brill claimed that 
the African [read: Afrikaner], whether he belongs to the Colony, to Natal, to the Free 
State or to the Transvaal, thinks of himself as an African and thinks of South Africa 
as his fatherland just like the Prussian, the Saxon, [...] and the Swabian felt in the 
first half of this century that his fatherland was larger and that Germany should be 
one country (GRA 1909:51–52; emphasis in the original). 
Part of the objective of this chapter is to apply my adapted version of Leerssen‟s 
model of nationalism as the “cultivation of culture” (represented in Table 3.5, and 
below again in Table 5.1) to the life of Afrikaner nationalism, including its post-
apartheid life. As will be recalled, I proposed that institutionalisation / official 
recognition and maintenance / preservation should be added to the three TYPES 
OF CULTURAL ACTIVISM identified by Leerssen, namely salvage / retrieval / 
inventory, fresh cultural production and propagation / proclamation in the 
public sphere. The citations above confirm the need for such a modification to the 
original model, especially if one seeks to apply it to the Afrikaner case. To 
Johannes Brill, “a [standardised] language of our own, one day even our own 
South African literature” was not an aim in itself; on the contrary, these goals 
were of secondary importance to the official recognition of Afrikaans. As Brill 
interpreted the causality between (what Leerssen would call) cultural and political 
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nationalism, the former would not lead to the latter. He believed that the political 
and territorial unification of Afrikaners – or at least a nationalist movement 
towards unity and independence – was a prerequisite for the successful cultivation 
of Afrikaans. As this chapter attempts to systematise the intentions and 
achievements of the Afrikanerdom‟s extra-parliamentary agents by mapping the 
specificities of Afrikaner nationalism onto Table 5.1, it will become clear that 
Brill‟s approach represented the rule rather than the exception among Afrikaans 
language activists. From the outset, there was nothing “purely cultural” about the 
cultivation of language and culture. 
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 TYPES OF CULTURAL ACTIVISM 
 Associated with oppositional nationalism Associated with state nationalism Associated with post-
power oppositional 
nationalism 
 Salvage, retrieval, 
inventory 
Fresh cultural 
production 
Propagation/ 
Proclamation in the 
public sphere 
Institutionalisation/ 
official recognition 
Maintenance/ 
Preservation 
Defence of acquired 
status 
FIELDS OF CULTURAL 
ACTIVISM 
      
Language Corpus planning: 
standardisation, 
codification, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
grammars, 
dictionaries, etc. 
Corpus planning: 
modernisation, 
renovation, etc. 
Dissemination of 
linguistic norms 
Status planning: 
spread across 
public domains 
 
   
Discourse Editions of older 
literary and 
historical texts 
Translations/ 
adaptations 
(Bible, classics) 
National/historical 
poetry, drama, 
novels 
National history-
writing 
 
Literature and history 
in education 
Literary awards and 
prizes 
Commemorations 
   
Material culture Archeography Restoration 
Musealisation 
Historicist architecture 
 
Dedicatory investment 
of public space: 
monuments, etc. 
   
Performance culture Folklore studies: 
oral literature, 
folk music and 
dances, manners 
and customs 
Folklore revival Folk pageantry: 
festivals and similar 
events 
   
Table 5.1 The interaction between culture and politics in nationalism: skeleton of a model for the Afrikaner case 
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Outside parliament, the story of Afrikaner nationalism is largely a story of 
political activists establishing taal- en kultuurorganisasies [language and culture 
organisations]. Three months after Johannes Brill had delivered his speech, on 14 
August 1875, it happened for the first time when eight men – six of them younger 
than thirty – met at a private house in Paarl, a town some 35 miles northeast of 
Cape Town. They were invited by Stephanus Jacobus (better known by his initials 
as “S.J.”) du Toit (1847–1911) – a twenty-eight year old minister in the Dutch 
Reformed Church (DRC).  
In July of the previous year, under the pseudonym Ware Afrikaner [True 
Afrikaner], Du Toit contributed a series of three articles on the topic of De 
Afrikaansche taal [The Afrikaans language] to De Zuid-Afrikaan. His concern was 
the anglicisation of his people. Writing in Dutch, he condemned not only the 
language policies and practices of the colonial authorities at the Cape, but also 
Afrikaans-speakers‟ poor evaluation of their own language. Such anti-Afrikaans 
attitudes, Du Toit warned, advanced the cause of anglicisation as it was beyond 
the powers of Dutch to survive the English tide. “Can you not see where we are 
heading?”, he asked the Cape Dutch (whom he regarded as part of the Afrikaner 
nation) and urged them to wake up before it was too late (Nienaber 1975:190–
193). 
What prompted Du Toit to call the meeting, though, was a tentative offer by the 
British and Foreign Bible Society (BFBS) to publish the bible in Afrikaans. For 
three years, one of the invitees, the Dutch-born Casper Peter Hoogenhout (1843–
1922), had been propagating the idea of an Afrikaans bible along with his 
countryman, friend and mentor, Arnoldes Pannevis (1838–1884). Appealing to 
“reasonable Afrikaans Christians who were committed to the expansion of God‟s 
Kingdom”, Pannevis provoked a debate in De Zuid-Afrikaan when he defended an 
Afrikaans translation of the bible on the basis that it would benefit the “coloured 
population” whose “only access to knowledge of God‟s Word was through a half-
strange and poorly understood language” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:116). 
Hoogenhout pointed out that the Dutch bible was equally inaccessible to a 
significant section of the Cape Colony‟s white community. To him, it was a 
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matter not only of Christianisation but also of education, and, ultimately, of 
economic empowerment. In a letter to De Zuid-Afrikaan, he took Pannevis‟s 
argument further: “[i]f there were a bible and other books in the Afrikaans 
language”, Hoogenhout wrote, “a poor Afrikaner would be able to learn more in 
six months than he can now learn in six years” (quoted in Du Plessis 1986:41). 
Suiting the action to the word, Hoogenhout tried his hand at bible translation and 
sent an Afrikaans version of Matthew 28 to the mouthpiece of the DRC, De 
Kerkbode [The Church Herald], where it ended up in the wastepaper basket. 
Pannevis, for his part, decided to go through the official channels and wrote to the 
BFBS in November 1874. While London was not at all keen to “perpetuate 
corrupted languages by printing the bible in them” (Nienaber 1975:115), the 
BFBS‟s secretary in Cape Town, the Reverend Geo Morgan, was more 
sympathetic and approached Du Toit, whom Pannevis had recommended as 
translator. Du Toit indicated that he knew a few men who would be supportive 
and promised to take the matter up with them.  
It was, then, as champions of an Afrikaans bible that A. Ahrbeck, S.J.‟s brother 
D.F. du Toit (nicknamed Uncle Locomotive), another D.F. du Toit, S.G. du Toit, 
C.P. Hoogenhout, G.J. Malherbe and P.J. Malherbe – “a closely knit group of 
teachers and clerics from wine farming backgrounds in and around Paarl” 
(Hofmeyr 1987:97) – were invited to the mid-August meeting. Yet at that very 
occasion they revealed themselves as champions of a much worldlier cause. The 
time was not ripe for bible translation, it was decided. The argument, as Nienaber 
explains, was that speakers of Afrikaans – or, more accurately, white speakers of 
Afrikaans – did not recognise the language as theirs and had far too little respect 
for it to embrace it as a language of religion (1975:125). To be worthy of respect, 
Afrikaans had to be standardised. Before the language could have a bible it 
needed a dictionary and a grammar book. The important point, though, is that the 
meeting regarded an Afrikaans translation of the bible as but one of the fruits that 
language standardisation would bear. Even more sweet would be the fruit of an 
Afrikaans “commonly recognised in all respects as the volkstaal [national 
language] of our country” (manifesto of the GRA 1909:71–76). 
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This position of the Paarl meeting on the issue of bible translation was at odds 
with that of Pannevis, who was rather pessimistic about the survival prospects of 
Afrikaans, at least at the time when he wrote to the BFBS. In his letter, Pannevis 
complained that “civil and church authorities [were] conspiring to exterminate the 
remains of the Dutch language completely in order to ensure the absolute and 
universal reign of the English language”, yet he apparently accepted that they 
would probably succeed and that “all the inhabitants of South Africa [would] 
eventually use and understand only the English language” (quoted in Nienaber 
1975:121). But until such time, Pannevis told the BFBS, the lack of an Afrikaans 
translation of the bible was a “fearful prospect” as it would remain “one of the 
causes of degradation [...] among the colonists, especially the coloured 
population” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:121–122). To the meeting of eight men, by 
contrast, the idea of an anglicised South Africa was a prospect far more fearful 
than a South Africa temporarily without an Afrikaans bible. They did not share 
Pannevis‟s defeatism about the future of Afrikaans, and if they shared his concern 
about “the spiritual welfare of the coloured population” (quoted in Nienaber 
1975:116) it did not prevent them from founding an organisation from which 
coloured speakers of Afrikaans were excluded.  
The Genootskap fan Regte Afrikaanders [Fellowship of True Afrikaners] (GRA) 
that came into being on that August afternoon in Paarl had a racially exclusivist 
nationalist agenda. Its objective, formulated a month later at its second meeting 
(attended by some forty new members), was to “to stand for our language, our 
nation, and our land”. It went without saying that the nation was a white one. As 
for the definition of the land, we only need consider the emblem of the GRA (cf. 
Figure 5.1).  
Image removed for copyright reasons 
 
Figure 5.1 Emblem of the GRA
221
 
                                                 
221 Source: http://af.wikipedia.org/wiki/L%C3%AAer:GRA_embleem.jpg (accessed March 
2013). 
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Joined at the bottom by a diamond, a bowed vine-shoot (on the left) and a bowed 
ear of corn (on the right) encircle four farm animals, two flags and, in the centre, 
three symbols of faith and one of love: a bible, a cross, an anchor and a heart. The 
slogan at the top reads: “VERENIGDE SUID AFRIKA” [UNITED SOUTH 
AFRICA], “Ver Moedertaal en Vaderland” [For Mother Tongue and Fatherland], 
while the wording on the flags identifies the constituent parts of the as yet to be 
united fatherland: the colonies of the Cape and Natal, and the republics of the Free 
State and Transvaal. The GRA‟s dream was a political one; what the organisation 
ultimately wanted to see, said the designer of the emblem, G.R. von Wielligh, was 
the four South African “states” under one flag (Meiring 1949:21). It was a dream 
reminiscent of Arndt‟s vision expressed in his song of 1813 (“Was ist des 
Deutschen Vaterland?”) to see the whole of Germany united “[a]s far as the 
German tongue rings out and praises God with songs!” (Düding 1987:30). 
It should be borne in mind that when the GRA members vowed to stand for their 
language, their nation, and their land the position of that language was not the 
same as the position of Hebrew, for example, when Eliezer Ben-Yehuda 
committed himself to “the renaissance of the Jewish people, their land, and their 
language”222. In fact, the challenges facing Ben-Yehuda and the GRA were 
exactly the opposite of each other. When Ben-Yehuda left Russia in 1878 to settle 
in Palestine and lead the revival of the Hebrew language, there was an ancient 
written tradition to which he could resort. The trouble was that nobody spoke the 
language. Afrikaans, by contrast, was widely spoken by 1875 but, lacking a 
standard orthography, it was hardly a written language and it had no literature to 
speak of (at least not in the Latin alphabet – cf. section 4.3.2) To the GRA, this 
was no reason why Afrikaans could not be their organisation‟s language of record. 
Article IV of the “Rules and Regulations of the Genootskap fan Regte 
Afrikaanders” (GRA 1909:64–68) stipulated that 
                                                 
222 Source: Jack Fellman, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/ben_yehuda.html (accessed March 
2013). 
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[a]t all our meetings and in all official documents the Afrikaans language must be 
used. 
A guiding principle for anyone who wished to use Afrikaans in writing had 
already been laid down in 1874 in contributions to De Zuid-Afrikaan by S.J. du 
Toit and C.P. Hoogenhout. It was a simple one: write as you speak (Nienaber 
1975:119). Before long, the GRA now promised, normative sources of reference 
would be available. In Article XIV of its “Rules and Regulations”, the Fellowship 
undertook 
to publish a dictionary and a grammar as soon as possible along with other little 
school booklets. 
Intention soon translated into action or, more precisely, Afrikaans language 
activism. The political hopes of Afrikanerdom‟s pioneering language activists, as 
sketched above, belie Leerssen‟s claim that nationalism is always born as a purely 
cultural movement (2006:562). But regardless of their ultimate aspirations, the 
initiatives of the GRA men in the fields of language, discourse, material culture 
and performance culture mirrored those of their European counterparts and fit 
comfortably into the model represented in Table 5.1. Already at its founding 
meeting, the Fellowship identified an existing Afrikaans grammar for revision and 
those present were requested to compile lists of “pure” Afrikaans words. The 
immediate aim, in terms of the Leerssen model, was to salvage or inventorise 
Afrikaans. Within a year, Di eerste beginsels fan di Afrikaanse taal [The first 
principles of the Afrikaans language] appeared in book form – a typical example 
of productivity in the field of language. 
What is noteworthy, however, is that the publication of a dictionary, a grammar 
and “little school booklets” was not the GRA‟s priority. Our first task, reads 
Article XII of the “Rules and Regulations”, will be to publish a monthly 
newspaper called Die Afrikaanse Patriot [The Afrikaans Patriot].
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 The thinking, 
one can assume, was that an Afrikaans-language newspaper could do almost all 
                                                 
223 Henceforth, Die Patriot. 
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that lists of spelling and grammar rules could do and more. Die Patriot would 
disseminate linguistics norms (form) as it was disseminating its patriotic message 
(content); an instrument of linguistic standardisation would be at the same an 
instrument of nationalist mobilisation. 
The second meeting of the GRA (held on 25 September 1875) elected an editorial 
team for Die Patriot and on 15 January 1876, the first edition of the paper 
appeared with S.J. du Toit as editor. During the following year, Du Toit published 
a textbook example of what Leerssen calls national history-writing: a booklet 
entitled Di geskiedenis fan ons land in di taal fan ons volk [The history of our 
country in the language of our nation]. This “history of the Afrikaner in 
Afrikaans” was complemented in Die Patriot by “poems” – many by Hoogenhout 
– on the topic of “fatherland and mother tongue” (Nienaber 1975:24). Together 
with Pannevis and the Du Toit brothers, Hoogenhout was also responsible for the 
first (unofficial) Afrikaanse folksliid [Afrikaans national anthem]: 
Each and every nation has its LAND,  
We dwell on Afrikaans strand.  
To us there is no better soil  
Anywhere in the whole wide world.  
Proud we are to carry the name  
Children of South Africa.  
 
Each and every nation has its LANGUAGE,  
We speak from the Cape to the Transvaal  
A language that everyone can easily understand,  
What do we care about the other languages?  
We speak like Dad and Granddaddy,  
The language of South Africa.  
 
[...] 
 
For all the nations have one God.  
He determines the destiny of every volk;  
He determined the language of every volk,  
its land, its law, its time.  
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Who disbelieves this will bear His punishment.  
O God, protect South Africa!  
(Brink (ed.) 2000:7). 
Hoogenhout‟s second attempt to create an anthem for the Afrikaner volk was a 
solo one. Entitled Ons toekomstige folksliid [Our future national anthem], the 
lyrical poem envisions a united nation living in a united country that stretches, 
like the one in the original anthem, from Table Mountain to the Transvaal. Again, 
language is the concern of the second stanza after land has been dealt with in the 
opening stanza: 
The Afrikaans language, it sounds so sweet to us;  
It is our mother-tongue – sits in our marrow and blood;  
For no other tongue, however beautiful, do we give it up,  
For it we suffered scorn, insult and mockery  
(Brink (ed.) 2000:8). 
In the field of discourse, then, as in the field of language, GRA activism fits into 
Leerssen‟s categories. There were hardly any old Afrikaans texts to salvage 
(though later activists would discover a few – cf. Table 5.2b below), but a 
considerable body of “literary” and “historical” texts (read: nationalist 
propaganda) were freshly produced by D.F. du Toit and Co – a firm established 
by S.J.‟s brother which also published Die Patriot. And notwithstanding the 
GRA‟s decision to put the project on hold, S.J. du Toit spent much of his time 
doing what first-generation nationalists typically did, at least in Europe.
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 His 
was the earliest significant attempt to translate the bible into Afrikaans.  
Following Leerssen, one may conclude that S.J. du Toit and his followers were 
late-coming “relay stations in a spreading cultural movement” (2006:566) or, to 
be more accurate, a cultural-cum-political movement. What certainly had spread 
to southern African shores by 1875, as is clear from the poetry quoted above, was 
that basic Herderian principle that lay at the heart of virtually all historical cases 
                                                 
224 According to Leerssen (2006:570), bible translation was normally the first sign that a 
vernacular language was aspiring to literary prestige. 
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of ethnic nationalism in the Judeo-Christian world: that God created languages to 
differentiate between nations. Roughly a third of the manifesto of the GRA 
(1909:71–76)225 was dedicated to the promotion of this idea: 
OUR DEAR LORD put different nations on the earth and gave each nation its 
language. Because of the sins of man, our Dear Lord separated the volke and 
confused the languages at the tower of Babel (Genesis 11). And this institution has 
always been respected and reinforced by God himself. Just think about the Day of 
the Pentecost (Acts 2:5–12). God could have made his will known in one language, 
in the language that all people had spoken before the confusion (Genesis 11:1) [...] – 
But no, through the Holy Ghost our Dear Lord let „divided tongues‟ sit on the heads 
of his disciples: „tongues‟, to preach God‟s will; „divided tongues‟, to do so in all the 
languages. It was therefore indeed according to the will of God that „Parthians and 
Medes and Elamites‟ etc. had to call out, „we hear them speak, each in our own 
language in which we were born‟. 
Quoting from the book of Revelations, the authors of the manifesto went on to 
argue that “even in heaven, before the throne of God, the variety of volke and 
languages are recognised” – all in an attempt to persuade potential Afrikaners “to 
acknowledge along with us that the Afrikaans language is our mother tongue that 
the Dear Lord gave us”.  
Had the appeal to Afrikaners-to-be ended here, one could have made a case that 
the GRA project was one of cultural consciousness raising for the sake of cultural 
consciousness raising – a manifestation of purely cultural nationalism. Yet 
Afrikaners were called upon not only to embrace Afrikaans as their language and 
to see themselves on that basis as a nation, but also to stand for their language 
“through thick and thin” (GRA 1909:76) and not to rest before it was – to use one 
of the terms that I introduced into the Leerssen model – institutionalised. Right 
from the start, the demand was that Afrikaans – or at least, initially, Dutch – 
should be used in the Cape Colony‟s schools, churches and courts of law. Most 
importantly, Afrikaans/Dutch had to become a language of parliament. 
                                                 
225 First published in pamphlet form as an open letter to Afrikaners, then in De Zuid-Afrikaan, 
and finally in the first edition of Die Patriot (Nienaber 1974:3). 
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As the GRA manifesto represented the state of affairs at the Cape, the English 
authorities “have done everything in their power to disregard our language and to 
supplant it by importing their language”. In a protest that echoed the well-known 
Hoogenhout poem on anglicisation (cf. section 4.4), the manifesto drew attention 
to the colony‟s language policy: 
Look at OUR parliament: the assembly of our country must be conducted in THEIR 
language [...] Look at OUR courts of law: there, too, they have imported THEIR 
language [...] And how are things going in OUR schools? Even worse. Their rules 
stipulate that the ENGLISH language [...] is the language of tuition (GRA1909:73; 
emphasis in the original). 
The programme of anglicisation was threatening not only the Afrikaner identity 
but also Afrikaner interests, and the leading members of the GRA made no 
attempt to conceal this concern of theirs. “We must stand in our own courts of 
law”, complained their manifesto, “like strangers while being accused and 
convicted in a strange language that we do not understand.”226 In “our” schools 
“our” children have become parrots: “they must learn a strange language so that 
they can be taught further in that language”. And, last but not least,  
we cannot send the Fathers of our country [to parliament] because they know no 
English. Now only strangers, merchants, fortune seekers and all such kinds of people 
are going there only because they can speak a bit of English; and they are utterly 
incapable of looking after our interests (GRA1909:73–74). 
It should be borne in mind that the Afrikaans-speaking section of the Cape‟s 
electorate had had the numerical advantage over English-speakers ever since 
representative government was granted to the Colony in 1853. The problem, 
according to J.H. (Onze Jan) Hofmeyr, who in the 1880s would become the 
political leader of the Cape Dutch, was that “[i]f it comes to the election of a 
parliamentary representative... then the influential [community leader] felt that he 
ought not offer himself as a candidate because he could speak no English” (quoted 
in Giliomee 2003:203). Afrikaner nationalist linguist and historian P.J. Nienaber 
                                                 
226 The manifesto added: “And even if the judge knows our language, he must pretend that he 
does not, and we must rely on an interpreter” (GRA 1909:73–74). 
232 
 
explained it as follows: “the Boer, who was on one hand not used to having a 
voice in national affairs, was on the other hand not attracted to politics for 
understandable reasons, among which the language issue was paramount” 
(Nienaber 1975:2). This could not continue, felt the GRA, hence its “aim and 
aspiration”, as Von Wielligh phrased it, “to have Afrikaans recognised as a 
language of South Africa: then Afrikaners can go to parliament to fight for our 
legitimate rights and our share in the government of our country” (quoted in 
Meiring 1949:21–22). GRA Activism in the field of language was, ultimately, 
political activism. 
To claim, then, as Davenport did in his study of 1966, that the GRA “paid next to 
no attention to the question of political organization [...] but its nature was such 
that it could, without incongruity, step into the political arena at any time” (p. 50) 
is perhaps to underemphasise the Fellowship‟s desire to change the political status 
quo and its labours in the “cultural” arena toward that aim. Linguistic and cultural 
nationalism did not follow “a separate dynamic and chronology from political 
nationalism” (Leerssen 2006:559); from the outset, linguistic and cultural 
nationalism was political nationalism. The GRA men shared Brill‟s dream of 
Afrikaners producing “the finest fruits on the terrain of language and literature”; 
in fact, they made a start at that production. But part and parcel of the dream of 
“an own language and one day, perhaps, an own literature” was the dream of an 
“own independent national existence” (Brill quoted in Nienaber 1975:102) – a 
united Afrikaans-speaking South Africa and a government of co-nationals. 
The GRA faded away before it could step into the party-political arena, but its 
founding fathers eventually did. In 1880, S.J. du Toit established the 
Afrikanerbond and Die Patriot (then under editorship of his brother) became the 
mouthpiece of the Cape Colony‟s new political party (Du Plessis 1986:91; 
Nienaber 1975:196). By the following year, the newspaper, which started with 
fifty subscribers in 1876, was the second biggest “Dutch” paper in the Cape with 
sales reaching 3,700 (Davenport 1966:34). As Hofmeyr argues, it must have been 
the Colony‟s Afrikaans-speaking petty bourgeoisie who preferred Die Patriot 
(where they first saw the language they spoke in print) to De Zuid-Afrikaan 
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(which continued to use “proper” Dutch). The populist programme of the 
Afrikanerbond, says Hofmeyr, to which Die Patriot gave some cultural and 
historical content, would have appealed to “the legion of dubiously certificated 
teachers, the clerics in poor parishes, faced with having their state stipends 
removed and small shopkeepers and traders” (1987:97–98). In language activism, 
these men (and perhaps a woman or two) on the margins “must have glimpsed a 
partial solution to their clogged careerist mobility” (1987:106). Language activism 
was economic activism. 
According to Du Toit, shopkeepers had an important role to play in the language 
movement: 
Just one thing, the Boer shops must be exclusively Dutch or Afrikaans. No English 
signboards; no English advertisements in English newspapers; no English 
bookkeepers; no English accounts; everything Dutch or Afrikaans. Just as the 
English shops help to sustain English newspapers, English schools and an English 
community in the towns, our Boer shops must work in the opposite direction and 
prevent the English element from controlling the towns; they must protect the 
Afrikaner spirit in the towns against the English (quoted in Du Plessis 1986:54). 
If we map these demands onto Table 5.1, some belong in the block where 
language and propagation intersect: Du Toit wanted to see the spread of 
Afrikaans/Dutch as a language of commerce. The call for Afrikaans/Dutch 
signage, however, constituted propagation in the field of material culture. In 
Leerssen‟s European examples, the latter process aimed to “suffuse the public 
sphere with a sense of collective national identity”: 
Historical monuments proclaim the nation‟s rootedness and presence. Historicist 
architecture (neo-Gothic or otherwise) is used; newly built streets are given 
dedicatory names taken from the nation‟s past (2006:571).  
To phrase it differently, propagation in the field of material culture entailed the 
“dedicatory investment of public space” (Leerssen 2006:571). It also must have 
entailed the linguistic investment of public space. It certainly did in the case at 
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hand. The visibility of the Afrikaans/Dutch language on public and commercial 
signs in a town,
227
 as Du Toit interpreted it, was a reflection of the Afrikaner spirit 
of that town; non-visibility of Afrikaans/Dutch meant that the town was an 
English one, with an English spirit. 
The point that I am trying to make is this: language (as has been pointed out more 
than once) is both an instrument of communication and a symbol, and material 
culture, as the term is used in Leerssen‟s model, refers to both artefacts (“painting, 
sculpture, antiquities, monuments, architecture”) and symbols (“flags and 
heraldry” – Leersen 2006:569). While the promotion of a language as a medium 
of communication constitutes cultural activism in the field of language, I would 
argue that its promotion as a visible symbol (comparable to a monument or a flag) 
constitutes cultural activism in the field of material culture. The promotion of a 
language as a communication instrument (activism in the field of language), as we 
have seen, may be part and parcel of a quest for political and economic power. 
What is at stake when language visibility is promoted (activism in the field of 
material culture) is cultural power or “symbolic articulation and presence” 
(Schöpflin 2000:8). 
Significant accomplishments by the first Afrikaner nationalists in the fields of 
material culture and performance culture only followed after the GRA had met 
for the last time in January 1878. A lesser-known story that merits to be retold 
here is that of the first Afrikaans language monument and the first Afrikaans 
language festival (Nienaber 1975:1–3). It began in 1882, when the use of Dutch 
was finally allowed in the Cape parliament, following a campaign led by Onze Jan 
Hofmeyr. The occasion, Hofmeyr and S.J. du Toit decided, called for a 
monument. Funds were raised and a life-size female statue was ordered from Italy 
and brought to Burgersdorp in the district of Albert, where many of the supporters 
of Hofmeyr‟s campaign resided. There, on a three-metre-high pedestal, the white 
marble figure was erected as a symbol of the mother tongue. The latter was 
identified on the inscription as “the Dutch language”, yet on the basis of Du Toit‟s 
                                                 
227 In other words, an Afrikaans/Dutch linguistic landscape. Cf. footnote 153. 
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involvement alone, it is reasonable to assume that the term was understood to 
include Afrikaans (cf. also footnote 165).  
The female statue was only unveiled on 17 January 1893 during celebrations 
which assumed, ironically, a male and militarist character: 
The festival lasted quite a few days and took on a national character. From all 
corners of the country, festival-goers streamed into Burgersdorp. The two most 
prominent champions of the Dutch language, Onze Jan and the Reverend S.J. du 
Toit, were there. A mounted commando of 500 burgers [literally: citizens] drove out 
to meet Onze Jan; leading the commando he entered the town. Two salvos, fired in 
his honour, were followed by a speech. The Reverend Du Toit was also honoured in 
a speech: he was hailed for his part in the victory, and especially for the support he 
had offered through his paper, Die Afrikaanse Patriot [...] Impressive was the arms 
exhibition in which 500 burgers participated [...] 
The unveiling of the monument [...] was the climax of the festival. Silence prevailed 
as telegrams from President Kruger of the Transvaal and President Reitz of the Free 
State were read [...] The Reverend S.J. du Toit presented the keynote lecture. 
Referring to the monument, he declared: „It is a national altar where we pledge our 
loyalty to the language. It is an image of future greatness. Like the marble of the 
statue, the language is solid. The statue will melt before the Dutch language will 
disappear from South Africa.‟ 
The festival was concluded that night with a huge banquet, during which Onze Jan 
proposed a toast to the Dutch language (Nienaber 1975:2–3). 
Marble may not melt, but many a nationalist monument has been destroyed in 
other ways. So it was in the case of the first Afrikaans language monument. After 
it had been vandalised and eventually toppled during the Anglo-Boer War by 
“enemies of the Boers and their language” (Nienaber 1975:3), Alfred Milner 
ordered that the site should be cleaned up. In the wake of the war, the inhabitants 
of Burgersdorp demanded an exact replica of their white marble woman from 
Britain, who replaced it. The statue was re-erected on the old spot, along with the 
vandalised one and a Boer War monument (cf. Figure 5.2), and unveiled on 28 
May 1907 during “the second language festival in our country” (Nienaber 
1975:4). Among the dignitaries this time were General J.B.M. Hertzog and former 
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Free State president M.T. Steyn. One of the public lectures at the second language 
festival – Advocate F.S. Malan‟s reply to the Reverend D. Postma‟s toast to Onze 
Taal [Our Language] – was entitled, “Of what use is it to talk about language 
rights if nothing practical is accomplished?” (Nienaber 1975:4). In the course of 
the following two years, as will be recalled (cf. section 1.1), Hertzog and Steyn 
would lead a successful lobby for the recognition of Dutch as a co-official 
language of the Union of South Africa, accomplishing something practical. These 
men, however, belonged to a new generation of language activists – the Second 
Afrikaans Language Movement, to which I turn in the next section. 
Image removed for copyright reasons 
 
Figure 5.2 The Language Monument at Burgersdorp
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5.1.2 The post-Boer War language and cultural movement 
The GRA barely survived three years, but the broader language and cultural 
movement did not lose momentum when the organisation disintegrated, as noted 
above, early in 1878. For the following decade, S.J. du Toit in particular remained 
committed to the cultural, political and economic empowerment of Afrikaans and 
its speakers. By the 1890s, however, efforts to promote Afrikaans seemed to have 
fizzled out as Giliomee (2004:29) recounts: the Afrikaans-/Dutch-speaking Cape 
elite preferred Dutch as the language of their church and newspapers and used 
English in the letters and diaries they wrote. Afrikaans, observers believed, stood 
no chance of surviving. 
But then came the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) and, in its aftermath, the 
modernisation and anglicisation programme of Alfred Milner. The latter played a 
key role in the events that led to the war. An “ardent imperialist and a doctrinaire 
social engineer” (Saunders and Southey 1998:113), his bold ambition was to “turn 
South Africa into a modern capitalist state with Johannesburg as its economic 
heart, and begin the process of sweeping away pre-modern black and Boer 
                                                 
228 Source: http://newhistory.co.za/irish-volunteers-fighting-for-freedom-in-anglo-boer-war/ 
(accessed March 2013). 
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pastoralism” (Louw 2004b:8). As far as Milner was concerned, Dutch and 
Afrikaans belonged the pre-modern era. His language-in-education policy for the 
conquered Boer republics was simple: “Dutch should only be used to teach 
English, and English to teach everything else” (quoted in Davenport and Saunders 
2000:239). This was a crucial part of his nation-building project which, as Louw 
sums it up (2004b:19, quoting Pyrah), aimed to create one nation out of the “two 
white races” of South Africa by assimilating “backward Boers” into “progressive 
British” culture. The effect was quite the opposite: anglicisation contributed to the 
shaping of a distinct Afrikaner identity and provided the catalyst to the 
development of the Second Afrikaans Language Movement.  
Unlike the first one, the second movement was a truly trans-colonial – or, as those 
involved would have viewed it, national – movement.229 This time, the Transvaal 
Colony and the Orange River Colony (as the former Boer republics had been 
renamed) took the lead when their representatives founded Die Afrikaanse 
Taalgenootskap [The Afrikaans Language Society] (ATG) in Pretoria on 13 
December 1905. In November of the following year, a meeting in Cape Town led 
to the establishment of Die Afrikaanse Taalvereniging [The Afrikaans Language 
Association] (ATV). A Bloemfontein branch of the ATG was created early in 
1907 (cf. Pienaar 1920:29–47).  
These organisations fought a battle on two fronts. The intensified struggle against 
English was complicated by an internal struggle between Afrikaans speakers who 
propagated Dutch as the national language, and those who agreed with D.F. Malan 
when he said in 1908: 
Raise the Afrikaans language to a written language, make her the bearer of our 
culture, our history, our national ideals, and in that way you will also raise the volk 
who speak the language (included in Malan 1964:175).  
                                                 
229 To say this is not to suggest that the First Afrikaans Language Movement was exclusively a 
Cape Dutch initiative. We only need consider Brill‟s Bloemfontein speech and 
Hoogenhout‟s reaction to it: “I would say we can count on [Brill‟s] cooperation. Our 
helpers increase by the day [...]; many who have been quick to attack Afrikaans, are now 
heart and soul for it” (quoted in Nienaber 1975:85). 
238 
 
The Afrikaans-Dutch part of the battle was a war of words, which Onze Jan 
Hofmeyr started in March 1905 with a talk he gave at Stellenbosch. Titled “Is het 
ons ernst?” [Are we serious about it?], the speech advocated Dutch as the official 
and cultural language of South Africa. Within a month, the Pretoria-based 
journalist, Gustav Preller, responded with a series of fifteen newspaper articles 
under the heading “Laat ‟t ons toch ernst wezen!” [Let us be serious about it!]. 
The interests of Dutch, Preller argued, should not be protected to the detriment of 
Afrikaans. The battleground shifted back to the Cape Colony in October 1906 
when the twenty-five-year-old D.F. Malherbe, who had just returned from 
Germany with a doctorate in linguistics, asked the following question in a public 
lecture: Is Afrikaans a dialect? Speaking in Afrikaans, Malherbe delivered a 
powerful plea for the cultivation of the language. There was a rebuttal from the 
Dutch lobby but, as Frits Ponelis (1998:50) sums it up, the latter was being 
outsmarted by the intellectually more sophisticated Afrikaans lobby. During 1909, 
both sides were united in the Zuid-Afrikaansche Akademie voor Taal, Letteren en 
Kunst [South African Academy for Language, Literature and the Arts].
230
 For the 
time being, the working language of the Academy would be Dutch, just like the 
co-official language of the Union of South Africa would be Dutch rather than 
Afrikaans, but Dutch was on its way out. 
A cursory glance of the constitutions of the ATG and the ATV (as reproduced in 
Pienaar 1920:30–31; 41–42) reveals there to be significant resemblances between 
their projects and that of the GRA. Activism in the post-Boer War language 
movement was also primarily aimed at the “national awakening” of Afrikaners 
and at the cultivation and institutionalisation of their language. While I would not 
go as far as Du Plessis (1986:39, 69), who claims that the role of the ATG and the 
ATV in the rise of the Afrikaner nationalist movement was negligible compared 
to that of the National Party, it is true that the prominent members of the ATG and 
ATV made their significant contributions to the nationalist project in other 
                                                 
230 Henceforth, Academy. In 1940, the Academy merged with the Afrikaanse Akademie vir 
Wetenskap en Tegniek [Afrikaans Academy for Science and Technology] to become the 
Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns [South African Academy for Science and 
the Arts]. 
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capacities: J.B.M Hertzog (1866–1942) as the founder of the NP; Eugéne Marais 
(1871–1936) as poet and journalist; C.J. Langenhoven (1873–1932) as author and 
journalist, and as the politician who in 1914 successfully proposed that Afrikaans 
replaced Dutch as medium of tuition in primary schools; D.F. Malan (1874–1959) 
as newspaper editor and as the cabinet minister who saw the official recognition 
of Afrikaans through in 1925; and Gustav S. Preller (1875–1943) as the 
“historian” and filmmaker who almost single-handedly created the Afrikaner myth 
of origin.
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According to Giliomee (2003:367), Langenhoven was “[t]he man who did most to 
[demonstrate the truth of] the argument that the Afrikaners should use Afrikaans 
for all purposes”. Isabel Hofmeyr, in turn, seems to think that the contribution of 
Gustav Preller cannot be overemphasised. Preller‟s mission, as Hofmeyr interprets 
it, was to “professionalise” Afrikaans in an attempt to enable its speakers to find 
occupational mobility on the basis of their linguistic skills (1987:104). Activism 
aimed at the propagation of Afrikaans in the public sphere and the 
professionalisation (or what I would call the institutionalisation) of the language 
constituted, once again, economic activism.  
The institutionalisation of Afrikaans did not hinge entirely on the political success 
of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. Afrikaans would not become an official 
language of South Africa before two of Afrikanerdom‟s most prominent language 
activists became prime minister (J.B.M. Hertzog) and minister of the interior, 
education and public health (D.F. Malan), respectively. However, by then (the 
mid-1920s), Afrikaans had already replaced Dutch as the medium of instruction in 
primary schools across the Union of South Africa. Afrikaans now boasted a 
growing collection of works of literary merit – the first of which had appeared 
even before the Academy could appoint a Taalkommissie [Language Commission] 
in 1914 to standardise the orthography of Afrikaans. In 1917, the Language 
Commission published the first edition of what was to become the ultimate 
                                                 
231 These activists did not always work together in harmony. For a reflection on dissonances in 
the Second Language Movement, cf. Swart and Van der Watt (2008:126–150). 
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authority on Afrikaans: the Afrikaanse woordelys en spelreëls [Afrikaans word list 
and spelling rules]. Dutch newspapers and magazines were switching to 
Afrikaans. 1932 saw the first Supreme Court judgement being delivered in 
Afrikaans. When the Afrikaans translation of the bible was completed in 1933, 
some Afrikaner churches had already been using the language for a decade.  
The Second Afrikaans Language Movement was successful. However, like its less 
successful predecessor, it was more than a language movement. Nationalist 
activists were cultivating (i.e., salvaging, producing, propagating and 
institutionalising) not only a language but also a literature and a history, as well 
as an “own” material culture and performance culture – all in an effort to 
create an Afrikaner nation and to empower its members. In the English-language 
literature, this process is best documented in Isabel Hofmeyr‟s aforementioned 
contribution from 1987, titled “Building a nation from words: Afrikaans language, 
literature and ethnic identity, 1902–1924”. Hofmeyr explains the post-Boer war 
expansion of “the Afrikaans and literary industry” in Marxist-inspired terms: an 
ignorant proletariat was mobilised by a marginalised petty bourgeoisie 
(journalists, teachers, clerics, clerks and small farmers), who realised that the 
proletariat “could turn language and educational broking into a new professional 
avenue for [them]” (1987:103).  
The process can also be explained in Gellnerian terms. As Gellner‟s critics would 
have it, he assigned too strong a role to industrialisation as a source of 
nationalism. However, unlike those historical cases where industrialisation was 
not accompanied by nationalism and vice versa, the rise of Afrikaner nationalism 
supports Gellner‟s thinking. South Africa‟s mineral revolution – the discovery of 
diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886, respectively – and the resultant shift in the 
country‟s economic base away from agriculture proved to be fertile ground for the 
seed of Afrikaner nationalism.  
Industrialisation per se did not produce Afrikaner nationalism, but it did 
contribute to mass and rapid Afrikaner urbanisation. The Boer War marked the 
beginning of the end of the Afrikaners‟ agrarian age (which was soon to be 
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mythologised in nationalist literature, particularly in plaasromans [farm novels]). 
Between 1890 and 1926, the proportion of urbanised white Afrikaans speakers 
grew from two or three percent to 41 percent. Ten years later, every second 
Afrikaner was living in a town or a city (Giliomee 2003:323). In the urban 
environment, work was semantic and required a shared high code. Both English 
and Dutch were available, but Afrikaans suited the purposes of Afrikaner 
nationalism – and particularly its efforts to mobilise the poor – best. 
While she does not mention the work of Ernest Gellner, Karl Deutsch or Benedict 
Anderson, Hofmeyr‟s argument supports those parts of their theories which 
attribute the rise of nationalism to industrialisation (Gellner), modern 
communication facilities (Deutsch) and print-capitalism (Anderson). Echoing 
Anderson, whose theory essentially holds that print-capitalism “made it possible 
for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves [...] in 
profoundly new ways” (1991:36), Hofmeyr points out that “nationalisms can find 
a broader popular resonance by entering into a communication network which 
unites previously divided communities and promotes a sense of commonality 
among citizens [read: potential members of a nation]” (1987:106).  
It was in an attempt to promote a sense of commonality among white Afrikaans 
speakers – an attempt to make Afrikaners of them – that nationalists set up 
publications such as Die Brandwag, De (later Die) Huisgenoot, Die Boerevrouw 
and Landbouweekblad early in the twentieth century. Within the growing press 
infrastructure of the Union of South Africa, these magazines, like the newspapers 
and the novels in Anderson‟s examples, “provided the technical means for „re-
presenting‟ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson 
1991:25; emphasis in the original). Hofmeyr explains: 
The pages of Die Brandwag and Die Huisgenoot, for example, carried articles, 
advertisements, pictures and stories which took every imaginable phenomenon of 
people‟s worlds, and then repackaged all these phenomena as “Afrikaans”. A brief 
list would include food, architecture, interior decoration, dress, etiquette, health, 
humour, landscape, monuments, the plastic arts, music, handicrafts, transport, 
agriculture, nature study and so on. For the readers of these articles, what had 
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previously been furniture became “Afrikaans” furniture and what had been a house 
became an “Afrikaans” house built in an Afrikaanse bouwstijl (an Afrikaans style of 
architecture) (1987:111). 
This is but one example of what early Afrikaner nationalist activism entailed in 
the fields of material culture and performance culture: the invention of 
Afrikaner artefacts and Afrikaner traditions, manners and customs. During the 
1910s and 1920s, as Hofmeyr (1987:108) points out, it also involved the 
establishment of debating societies, drama associations and reading circles. 
However, the men traditionally associated with the Second Afrikaans Language 
Movement are best known for their labours in the fields of language and 
discourse (literature and history production).
232
 In Table 5.2, their endeavours are 
mapped onto Table 5.1, along with other activist initiatives mentioned thus far in 
this section. Owing to constraints of space, these initiatives cannot be discussed in 
detail.  
                                                 
232 Documented, inter alia, by Pienaar (1920:195–388), Moodie (1975:39–51), Hofmeyr 
(1987:103–108), Giliomee (2003:364–369; 372–376) and Kannemeyer (2005:59–110). 
However, I relied most heavily on Ponelis (1998:47–54). 
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 TYPES OF CULTURAL 
ACTIVISM 
   
 Salvage, retrieval, inventory Fresh cultural production Propagation/Proclamation in 
the public sphere 
Institutionalisation/ 
Official recognition 
FIELD OF CULTURAL 
ACTIVISM: Language 
1914 Language Commission 
tasked by the Academy 
to standardise Afrikaans 
 
1917 1
st
 edition of the 
Afrikaanse woordelys 
en spelreëls [Afrikaans 
word list and spelling 
rules] published by the 
Language Commission 
 
1917 Afrikaanse taalboek 
[Afrikaans grammar 
book] published by 
D.F. Malherbe 
 
1923 Oor die Afrikaanse 
sintaksis [On Afrikaans 
syntax] published by 
J.J. le Roux 
 
1923 Afrikaanse spraakkuns 
[Afrikaans phonology] 
published by A.C. 
Bouman and E.C. 
Pienaar 
 
1924 Afrikaanse 
spreekwoorde en 
verwante vorme 
[Afrikaans proverbs and 
related forms] 
published by D.F. 
Malherbe 
... though the printed media 
 
1903 De Goede Hoop [The 
Good Hope] established 
(with Afrikaans 
contributions) 
 
1905 Journalists such as 
Eugène Marais and 
Gustav Preller start to 
use Afrikaans in 
newspapers 
 
1910 Die Brandwag [The 
Sentry] established 
 
1914 Nasionale Pers 
[National Press], 
publishing house for the 
NP, established 
 
1915 De Burger [The 
Citizen], organ of the 
NP, established (with 
Afrikaans 
contributions) 
 
1916 De Huisgenoot [The 
Family Companion] 
established 
1914 1
st
 Afrikaans sermon in 
the Mother Church in 
Stellenbosch 
 
1914– Gradual introduction of 
Afrikaans as a medium 
of tuition in schools 
 
1925 Official status 
 
1930s–Universities of 
Stellenbosch, 
Potchefstroom, Pretoria 
and the Orange Free 
State “Afrikaansified” 
 
1932 1
st
 supreme court 
judgment in Afrikaans 
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 Propagation/Proclamation in 
the public sphere (continued) 
1918 Die Boerevrouw [The 
Boer Woman] – 1st 
Afrikaans magazine for 
women established 
 
1919 Landbouweekblad 
[Arigultural Weekly] 
established 
 
... through education 
 
1914 Afrikaans introduced as 
a school subject  
 
1918 Afrikaans introduced as 
a university subject 
Table 5.2a Afrikaner nationalist activism in the field of language: 1914–1930s 
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 TYPES OF CULTURAL 
ACTIVISM 
   
 Salvage, retrieval, inventory Fresh cultural production Propagation/Proclamation in 
the public sphere 
Institutionalisation/ 
Official recognition 
FIELD OF CULTURAL 
ACTIVISM: Discourse 
1917 Diary of Voortrekker 
leader Louis Trigardt 
published by Gustav 
Preller 
 
1918– Letters and diaries of 
Voortrekkers published 
in six parts by Preller as 
Voortrekker- 
mense [Voortrekker 
people] 
1905 “Winternag” [A 
winter‟s night], poem 
by Eugéne Marais; 
“first significant 
demonstration of the 
creative potential of 
Afrikaans” (Giliomee 
2003:366)  
 
1906 Piet Retief, Preller‟s 
biography of the 
Voortrekker leader, 
published 
 
1908 Poetry debut of Jan F.E. 
Celliers: Die vlakte en 
ander gedigte [The 
plain and other poems]  
 
1908 Poetry debut of Totius: 
By die monument [At 
the monument] 
 
1911 Prose debut of C.J. 
Langenhoven: Stukkies 
en brokkies [Bits and 
pieces] 
 
 
Example of a competition:  
 
1905 Short story competition 
announced in De 
Volkstem (1905/06/14). 
Theme: The Afrikaans 
life. Opening sentence 
of a story (titled: „The 
story of a nickname‟) 
provided as an 
example: „We have a 
custom – a good old 
Afrikaans custom...‟ 
(Hofmeyr 1987:121)  
 
Example of 
commemorations: 
 
1918– Afrikaner Broederbond 
promotes volk festivals 
and the commemoration 
of highlights in 
Afrikaner history such 
as the arrival of Jan van 
Riebeeck, the Battle of 
Blood River and the 
birthday of Paul Kruger 
(Stals 1998:22, 59) 
 
1914 Prestigious Hertzog 
Prize for Afrikaans 
literature (arguably an 
institution) introduced 
by the Academy  
 
1915 1
st
 Hertzog Prize 
awarded to Totius for 
Trekkerswee [Trekkers‟ 
woe] 
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Fresh cultural production 
(continued) 
1912 Poetry debut of C. 
Louis Leipoldt: Oom 
Gert vertel en ander 
gedigte [Uncle Gert‟s 
story and other poems]  
 
1913 Novel debut of D.F. 
Malherbe: Vergeet nie 
[Do not forget] 
 
1914 Novel debut of M. 
Jansen-Pelissier: 
Afrikaner-harte 
[Afrikaner hearts] 
 
1916 Preller produces the 1
st
 
Afrikaans film, De 
Voortrekkers 
 
1918 Novel debut of Jochem 
van Bruggen: 
Teleurgestel 
[Disappointed] 
 
1919 Doctoral thesis 
(Utrecht) of E.C. 
Pienaar: Taal en poësie 
van die Twede [sic] 
Afrikaanse Beweging 
[Language and poetry 
of the Second Afrikaans 
Movement] 
Propagation/Proclamation in 
the public sphere (continued) 
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Fresh cultural production 
(continued) 
1920 Drama debut of J.F.W. 
Grosskopf: ‟n Esau [An 
Esau] 
 
1921 A “history” by S.P.E. 
Boshoff: Volk en taal 
van Suid-Afrika [Nation 
of language of South 
Africa] 
 
1921 Novel debut of Sangiro: 
Uit oerwoud en vlakte 
[Out of jungle and 
plains] 
 
1922 Doctoral thesis 
(Amsterdam) of P.C. 
Schoonees: Die prosa 
van die Twede [sic] 
Afrikaanse Beweging 
[The prose of the 
Second Afrikaans 
Movement] 
 
1922 A “history” by Eric 
Stockenström: 
Beknopte handboek in 
Suid-Afrikaanse 
geskiedenis [Concise 
handbook of South 
African history] 
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Fresh cultural production 
(continued) 
1924 A “history” by S.F.N. 
Gie: Geskiedenis vir 
Suid-Afrika – Deel I 
[History for South 
Africa – Part I] 
 
1933 Afrikaans bible appears 
(delayed by Dutch 
opposition to Afrikaans 
as a language of 
religion) 
Table 5.2b Afrikaner nationalist activism in the field of discourse: 1905–1933: Selected examples 
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The volumes of poetry listed in Table 5.2b under fresh cultural production took 
the Anglo-Boer War as dominant theme, thus transforming Afrikaans into what 
Malan had hoped it would become: the bearer of the volk‟s history. In poems such 
as “Dis al” [That is all], “Vergewe en vergeet” [Forgive and forget], and “Oom 
Gert vertel” [Uncle Gert‟s story] – by Celliers, Totius, and Leipoldt respectively – 
the focus was on “Boer suffering and heroism” (Moodie 1975:41).233 The poetry 
debut of Totius – the pseudonym of S.J. du Toit‟s son (who, like his father, was 
also a minister of the church and a bible translator) – merits special mention. The 
title, By die monument [At the monument], refers to the National Women‟s 
Monument in Bloemfontein (cf. Figure 5.3), which represents the most significant 
achievement of Afrikaner nationalist activists in the field of material culture 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century.
234
 Built between 1911 and 
1913, the monument commemorates the women and children who lost their lives 
during the Boer War (90 percent of them in concentration camps – Grobler 
2012:16).  
Image removed for copyright reasons 
 
Figure 5.2 The National Women‟s Monument in Bloemfontein, with detail; the inscription (in 
Dutch) translates as follows: “To our heroines an beloved children”235  
The Boer War also featured prominently in the work of nationalist historians such 
as Boshoff, Stockenström and Gie. For a group of people to constitute a volk, 
however, a shared history of “suffering and heroism” that goes back further than a 
decade is necessary. A myth of origin is needed. Gustav Preller must have realised 
this when he dug up the Great Trek and started to write a series of articles on the 
Voortrekker leader Piet Retief, the first of which was published in De Volkstem 
early in December 1905. Within a year, the series appeared in book form. Nine 
                                                 
233 To a lesser degree, the focus was also on Voortrekker suffering and heroism. Consider, as 
examples, Verse van Potgieter‟s Trek [Poems on Potgieter‟s Trek] (Totius 1909), 
Trekkerswee [Trekkers‟ woe] (Totius 1915) and Dingaansdag [Dingane‟s Day] (Leipoldt 
1920). 
234 Other examples include the statue of Onze Jan Hofmeyr in Cape Town (unveiled 1920). 
235 Sources:  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Women's_Monument  
and  
http://travelblog.portfoliocollection.com/Blog/Monument-Monday---National-Womens-
Monument (accessed March 2013). 
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editions were to follow and some 15,000 copies were eventually sold. Ten years 
after the publication of Piet Retief, Preller turned the story of the Great Trek into 
what can be regarded as the first Afrikaans film, titled De Voortrekkers (cf. 
Hofmeyr 1988).
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Before the 1880s, as Hofmeyr (1987:109–110) explains, the term Great Trek was 
not used to refer to the mass migration from the Cape Colony in the 1830s, which 
resulted in the establishment of the Boer republics. The white farmers who 
participated in the Trek were thought of as emigrants, not Voortrekkers. By the 
late 1820s, the Day of the Covenant, 16 December, was hardly observed in the 
Union of South Africa (Moodie 1975:97). On this day in 1838, the so-called 
Battle of Blood River was fought between the Zulu warriors of uDingane and the 
Voortrekkers. The latter won, and believed they owed their victory to God, with 
whom they had made a pact a few days earlier, vowing to commemorate the battle 
each year. 
But then Afrikaners read Preller‟s books and saw his movie, and they discovered 
their roots. They must have done so, for in 1938 they celebrated the centenary of 
the Great Trek in extravagant fashion, with an oxwagon procession that retraced 
the footsteps of the Voortrekkers, “calling at all the sacred sites along the way, 
and culminating in a great rally of people on a hill outside Pretoria where a 
monument was to be erected that would be Afrikanerdom‟s most sacred shrine” 
(Sparks 1990:168). An estimated 100,000 people – roughly one-tenth of the white 
Afrikaans-speaking population of South Africa – attended the closing ceremony 
on 16 December 1938, when the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument 
was laid. Those Afrikaners who could not join the celebrations had the 
opportunity to meet the wagons en route in their home towns, where men had 
grown beards and women were wearing Voortrekker dresses that they had 
specially made for the occasion; where babies were christened “Eufeesia” (the 
English equivalent would be something like Centuriana); where streets were 
                                                 
236 It was a silent film, but the subtitles appeared both in English and Afrikaans. This marked 
the first use of Afrikaans in this manner. 
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renamed and monuments erected; where at night “folks would gather around the 
campfires of the trekkers in their hundreds and thousands to sing traditional 
Afrikaans liedjies (“folksongs”) and the old Dutch psalms” (Moodie 1975:180–
181). 
There was, however, nothing spontaneous about the symbolic oxwagon trek of 
1938. It was, as Christoph Marx has demonstrated, “a well-organised event, which 
was skilfully manipulated from behind the scenes by the Broederbond” 
(2008:267). Before I return to the events of 1938, the origins of this now notorious 
organisation must be revisited. 
5.1.3 The Afrikaner Broederbond and the FAK, and the Oxwagon 
Memorial Trek of 1838 
The Afrikaner Broederbond was born in Johannesburg – the urban centre where 
the “poor white problem” was most acute in the early twentieth century. Here, in 
the city of gold, “[t]he Afrikaner professional stratum was much smaller in 
relative terms than in Cape Town or Pretoria” (Giliomee 2003:400) and the 
majority of semi-skilled and unskilled white workers were speakers of Afrikaans 
(Stals 1998:11). One of them was Henning Klopper. He epitomised the new, 
urbanised Afrikaner as described by Sparks: 
[H]e was a product of the painful process of urbanisation. He had left the paternal 
farm at the age of fifteen in the bleak years of Afrikaner discontent during World 
War I and, clutching a Bible given to him by his mother, gone to Johannesburg to 
join that haven of poor-whiteism, the railways (1990:167). 
It was at a railway station that the idea of a secret organisation of young 
Afrikaans-speaking men was born. On Sunday 14 April 1918, Klopper was on 
duty at the Boksburg station. The previous evening he had attended a political 
meeting at the Johannesburg city hall along with his friend and fellow junior 
railway official, H.W. van der Merwe. The speaker was D.F. Malan – Cape leader 
of the NP and editor of De Burger. Malan‟s speech was blatant propaganda for a 
republic. Only republicans were true Afrikaners, he claimed and told his audience 
of about 1,500 people that Prime Minister Louis Botha and his deputy Jan Smuts 
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were not to be trusted with the Afrikaner ideal of independence from Britain (Stals 
1998:12–13). 
In 1918, Johannesburg was a dangerous place to express such sentiments and to 
remove the Union Jack, as Malan‟s supporters had done prior to the meeting, from 
the stage of the city hall. The Allies were winning the war in Europe, but the bitter 
row between the SAP and the NP about South Africa‟s participation on the side of 
Britain raged on. During the two hours that Malan was speaking, a hostile crowd 
of SAP men, many of them soldiers, gathered outside the hall. When the chairman 
adjourned the meeting, he warned the Nationalists that “the English” were waiting 
for them and Malan left through a side entrance. In front of the main entrance, 
violence broke out that soon spread to the NP club. The building was vandalised 
and furniture was set alight in the street. Following the event, De Burger 
expressed its sympathy with “our National friends in Johannesburg”, urging them 
to endure the onslaught as the day of reckoning would certainly come (Stals 
1998:12–13; Wilkins and Strydom 1978:44). 
But the friends in Johannesburg had plans of their own. Disturbed by what had 
happened on the Saturday night, Van der Merwe went to see Klopper the next 
morning at work. Organised Afrikaner action had become imperative, they agreed 
and decided to meet later to discuss the matter. That afternoon they were joined by 
yet another railways colleague, D.H.C. (Danie) du Plessis. The young men – all 
three still in their late teens – met up again towards the end of April 1918, this 
time at Cleveland station from where they took a walk. There, “on the open field, 
in moonlight”, as Van der Merwe noted in his diary, they contemplated their 
volkstoestand [the state of their nation] and made plans for the future (Stals 
1998:14). These included, as a first step, the creation of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond or, as the organisation first called itself, Young South Africa. 
The founding meeting took place on 5 June 1918. Fourteen men were invited. 
Klopper acted as chair and Du Plessis as secretary. Yet curiously, despite being 
elected to the management of the new organisation, the two friends did not see 
themselves as the leaders of the project they had initiated. Klopper told the 
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meeting that he had been in contact with the Reverend Jozua F. Naudé
237
 – a DRC 
minister whom he described as the “real leader of the movement” and as the ideal 
link to “the best brains in the country” (Stals 1998:15). In reality, the long-term 
goal of the founding members of the Broederbond – who at their second meeting 
elected the Reverend Naudé as their president – was to recruit “the best 
[Afrikaner] brains in the country” into the organisation. The Broeders had nothing 
less than a nation-wide network in mind: “Our terrain is vast,” said Naudé, “from 
Table Mountain to the far north; the influence of our association must be felt 
throughout South Africa” (Stals 1998:19). 
Naudé‟s words were prophetic ones, at least according to most latter-day 
commentators. Sixty years after they were uttered, Wilkins and Strydom would 
claim in an exposé that South Africans, black and white, were ruled by “the most 
exclusive and influential underground movement in the Western world”, the then 
12,000-member-strong secret Afrikaner Broederbond (1978:1).
238
 There are, 
                                                 
237 Father of the dissident DRC minister and anti-apartheid activist, Beyers Naudé (cf. footnote 
73). 
238 Much like a political party, the Afrikaner Broederbond had branches in the towns and cities 
of South Africa. Unlike a political party, though, the Bond‟s doors were not open to 
everyone. On the contrary, the point of departure as reiterated at the organisation‟s general 
meeting or national congress (Bondsraad) in 1970 was the that “the AB should remain a 
nucleus organisation, that a mass organisation is by no means envisaged, and that the high 
standards of membership should always be borne in mind”. The basic entrance 
requirements included being an Afrikaner “with a love for the Afrikaner cause” and a 
willingness to serve the Afrikaner volk, a Christian and a dedicated church-goer, a 
community leader with integrity and a respected professional. Taking also the degree of 
occupational diversity in its ranks into consideration, a branch could annually recruit one 
new member who had to be under the age of forty. The most important area of recruitment 
was the Bond‟s youth league, the also secret Ruiterwag [literally: horse guard], whose 
members qualified for membership of the parent organisation in their early thirties. In the 
case of Ruiters [literally: riders] more than one new member per branch per year were 
allowed. For the sake of exclusivity and confidentiality, branches of the Broederbond 
should ideally have comprised no more than twenty men in urban areas and no more than 
fifteen in rural areas (AB 12/4, 1970).  
  Branches appointed representatives to a central committee and/or a regional council 
which respectively coordinated local activities (in urban areas with more than one branch) 
and regional activities. Each branch also sent one delegate to the national congress or 
Bondsraad which met almost every year between 1921 and 1972 and for the following two 
decades more or less every other year. Generally, regional conferences were held in years 
the Bondsraad did not sit. The executive authority of the Broederbond – the council and the 
chairman – were elected by the Bondsraad and supported by a secretariat based in 
Auckland Park, Johannesburg, in a building called Die Eike [The Oaks]. Members of the 
secretariat were the Broederbond‟s only full-time, paid employees and included, ironically, 
a few women who were hired, among other things, to type all the secret documents. The 
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however, historians who dismiss such statements as hyperbole. Giliomee, for one, 
feels that “opponents of the Broederbond have attributed an importance to the 
organisation that is out of all proportion” (2003:420–421). What cannot be denied 
is that the Bond‟s contribution to the consolidation and dissemination of the 
ideology of Afrikaner nationalism – both in its anti-imperial and its white racist 
manifestations – was significant. For what started out in 1918 as meetings in 
church halls of railwaymen, policemen and a DRC minister or two, who thought 
of their association as an Afrikaner version of the Freemasons or the Sons of 
England, was transformed within two decades into an organisation led by the 
ideologues not only of republicanism but also of apartheid – the concept that won 
the general election for the NP in 1948 (cf. section 2.2.3).
239
  
From the outset, the Broeders‟ primary concern was power – their own and their 
nation‟s. The motto of the Broederbond through all seventy six years of its 
existence was, “Be strong”. Unsurprisingly, given that “[p]ower, in the modern 
                                                                                                                                     
fifteen members of the council (or sometimes only the six members of its management 
committee) met as often as circumstances required but were not remunerated for their work 
(Stals 1998:741, 753–755; Wilkins and Strydom 1978:358–362).  
  Decisions of the executive council and information about its activities were 
communicated via circulars which served at branch meetings. More than anything else 
these documents – each of which concluded with a specification of the date at which it had 
to be destroyed – contributed to coherence in the Broederbond or, as it was put at the 1970 
Bondsraad, “served as a unifying factor for the whole organisation” (AB 12/4, 1970). 
Circulars typically dealt with “topical affairs”, as did the so-called study documents that 
were distributed from time to time. Study documents were produced by study committees 
which were asked to look into specific matters. Always on the agenda, however implicitly, 
were the twin concerns of ethnic nationalism: the preservation of the identity of the nation 
and the protection of its interests. For that was the raison d‟être of the Broederbond: to 
ensure the continued existence of the Afrikaner volk with its own peculiar qualities and 
values and to promote Afrikaner interests (Stals 1998:57, 408).  
239 In the four decades that followed the nationalist victory, virtually every NP member of the 
South African parliament and every cabinet minister belonged to the Bond. To imply then, 
as Giliomee does, that the Broederbond never governed South Africa is to understate the 
fact that between 1948 and 1994 virtually all power in the country was in the hands of 
Broederbonders: those men who, once a month, secretly met in their cells to debate a new 
piece of nationalist writing. In the morning they returned to work. As politicians, they 
translated Afrikaner nationalism into apartheid policy and as lawyers and civil servants they 
implemented that policy. As press barons, editors of Afrikaans-language newspapers, board 
members of the South African Broadcasting Corporation and ministers of the Afrikaans 
churches, their potential influence on public opinion – the power to govern the minds of 
Afrikaners – knew no bounds. Most importantly, as principals of universities and teacher 
training colleges, professors, provincial heads of education, school inspectors, headmasters 
and teachers they had every opportunity to “bend the will of the young to the will of the 
nation” (Kedourie 1985:84). 
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world, is principally about control of the state” (Breuilly 1993:1), all Broederbond 
activism was ultimately state-oriented. The Bond might have represented itself as 
a non-party political cultural organisation, but in reality it was an organisation of 
NP members (GNP members after 1934) who paid very little attention to “purely” 
cultural affairs (cf. Wilkins and Strydom 1978:445). To say this is not to suggest 
that cultural concerns were absent from the agenda. The Broeders dearly 
appreciated the power of culture as a key to obtaining – and, after 1948, 
maintaining – control of the state. 
In a speech at the Bond‟s founding meeting, Henning Klopper stressed the need 
for a body that could promote Afrikaner culture. Afrikaners, he said, had to be 
taught to be proud of the history and traditions of their volk; they had to be led to 
self-awareness (Stals 1998:15). In an attempt to achieve that goal, branch 
meetings of the young Broederbond would combine a lecture on a topic such as 
“the influence of language on the national character” with song and recitals in 
Afrikaans. The emphasis was on action at the local level. Every town that 
acquired a Broederbond branch also acquired one or another association – inspired 
by Broeders – which organised eisteddfods and similar events. Bond members 
further formed art associations and library committees – all, of course, to promote 
Afrikaner art, culture and literature. Last but not least, branches were expected to 
arrange and support volk festivals to commemorate highlights in Afrikaner history 
such as the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck, the Battle of Blood River and the birthday 
of Paul Kruger (Stals 1998:22, 59). 
1928 saw the executive council of the Broederbond drawing up a “focussed, 
deliberate and consolidated plan of action to command more respect for 
Afrikaans” (Stals 1998:60), which had become a co-official language of the Union 
of South Africa three years earlier. In circular 2/28 of 19 July 1928 (AB 3/3/7) 
branches were asked to set up “vigilance committees” that could monitor language 
practices in the public sphere, and individual members were instructed to use 
Afrikaans in all written and oral communication with state departments, 
municipalities and school boards. Strangers, professionals and shop assistants had 
to be addressed in Afrikaans and not in English. In fact, according to the 
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Broederbond plan, Afrikaans speakers had to be discouraged from supporting 
English speakers when they chose a doctor, a dentist, a lawyer or a business. Of 
particular concern to the Bond leadership was the dominant position of English in 
the economy. Members of the organisation (and their wives and girlfriends), it 
was thought, could help to rectify the situation by placing orders in Afrikaans and 
insisting on invoices, catalogues and advertisements in their language. From 
banks they should demand Afrikaans cheque books and from the Receiver of 
Revenue Afrikaans income tax forms. If all else failed, English forms should be 
completed in Afrikaans. 
The reasoning behind these appeals must have been identical to Hertzog‟s line of 
thinking in 1916, when he explained in a speech how easy it was for Afrikaners to 
provide for one another at a material level:  
Through speaking Afrikaans to civil servants and through standing on your language 
rights you make room for an Afrikaner in the civil service, through insisting on your 
child being educated in Afrikaans you make room for an Afrikaans teacher, through 
addressing a businessman in Afrikaans you make room for an Afrikaans assistant in 
his shop (quoted in Nienaber 1965:94; Giliomee‟s translation (2003:372)). 
The 1928 campaign set the tone for every other campaign that the Broederbond 
would launch in the field of language, including the promotion of Afrikaans as a 
legal language (circa 1932–1938) and the promotion of mother-tongue education 
for Afrikaners in single-medium schools (1934–).240 The aim of these endeavours 
was the “Afrikaansification” of public spaces or, at least, their transformation into 
Afrikaans-English bilingual ones. Put differently: the Bond wished to see 
Afrikaans institutionalised. Yet the Broeders must have sensed that the Afrikaans 
language and Afrikaner culture were also in need of cultivation at “lower” levels 
by organised activists who could operate in the open. To this end they established 
the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge [Federation of Afrikaans 
Cultural Associations] (FAK) in 1929 as their major front organisation. In 1944, a 
                                                 
240 Source: uninventorised archival material. 
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prominent Afrikaner nationalist historian, G.D. Scholtz, evaluated the work of the 
FAK during the first decade and half of its existence as follows: 
It was the F.A.K. which was the first to urge that Afrikaans music examinations be 
set up; it was the F.A.K. which was the first to concern itself with the right of 
Afrikaans to equality on the radio; it was the F.A.K. which began to gather 
Afrikaans folksongs in a single volume; it was the F.A.K. which initiated the 
establishment of „Culture Days‟; it was the F.A.K. which arranged Afrikaans art 
exhibitions and book weeks; it was the F.A.K. which first thought of the great 
centenary festivals of 1938; it was the F.A.K. which endeavoured in all possible 
ways to awaken concern for the People‟s past in the Afrikaner; it was the F.A.K. 
which first strove for an Afrikaans national anthem (Scholtz quoted in Moodie 
1975:109; Moodie‟s translation). 
This is hardly a complete picture of pre-apartheid FAK activism in the fields of 
language, discourse, material culture and performance culture, but the 
examples mentioned confirm the applicability of Leerssen‟s model to the 
Afrikaner case. In one respect, it should be pointed out, Scholtz was mistaken. It 
was not FAK “which first thought of the great centenary festivals of 1938”. It was 
Henning Klopper. The founder chairman of the Broederbond “had long harboured 
the wish to trek in the footsteps of the forefathers” (Marx 2008:270). In 1937, 
soon after he was elected chairman of the Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging 
[Afrikaans Language and Culture Association] (ATKV) – an organisation 
established in 1930 by and for railway employees – Klopper proposed the 
memorial trek project to an ATKV congress (Moodie 1975:177). Soon afterwards, 
the FAK (and via the FAK the Broederbond) did come on board, as did the 
Voortrekker movement (est. 1931), Afrikanerdom‟s imitation of the Boys Scouts 
and Girl Guides movement. One of the Voortrekkers who participated in the 
festivities of 1938 – first in her hometown of Paarl and later in Pretoria – was Elsa 
Joubert (cf. section 1.4 and footnote 43). In her diary, the sixteen-year-old 
described the arrival of the nine oxwagons, which crossed South Africa along 15 
routes, at Monument Hill (as the future site of the Voortrekker Monument outside 
Pretoria was called): 
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14 December  
Their hearts are singing again, their fatigue is forgotten, because look, in one corner 
of the festival terrain the crowd is parting, like the sea that Moses parted […] and the 
first oxwagon is coming through the tunnel of people like a mole (Joubert 
2005:147–148). 
This is followed in the diary by a description of the arrival of two torches – one 
from Cape Town and one from Umgungundlovu, the former seat of the Zulu king 
uDingane in what is today KwaZulu-Natal. “Literally every single member of the 
Voortrekker movement”, according to Jackie Grobler (2001:54), “was given the 
opportunity to carry one of the two torches for a part of the distance”, thus 
contributing to “the splendour of the occasion”: 
We are leaving our camp [at Monument Hill] in rows of four […] The hills are 
moving, from the thousands of tents in this vast, vast town of tents people are 
streaming. We start to sing, “En hoor jy die magtige dreuning?” [Do you hear the 
mighty roar?]
241
 […] Tears are welling in my swollen eyes, there is a huge lump in 
my throat, the sky is flame red from horizon to horizon […] Then the runners with 
their torches come into sight. By now it is pitch dark […] We stand shoulder to 
shoulder on either side of the road, waiting for our small torches to be lit, so that we 
can fall in line behind the big torches [and march towards] a big open space on the 
festival terrain where a gigantic fire is burning – a fire ignited by the two flames 
which were carried so far, which we helped carrying, around which we are now 
marching in circles until it is time to throw your torch into the big fire [...] 
Everything around me is silenced by the crackle of the flames, which will devour 
our torches and launch them into the high dark night to become stars. In my hear the 
Wagner music that Herr Metzler [her violin teacher] used to play, I think of Herr 
Metzler, I feel his moist kiss on my mouth – from the faraway little green town of 
Paarl to these rough, brown, cruel hills of the north come the words of Herr Metzler: 
as Siegfried is burnt at the stake, Brünnhilde turns around on her horse and storms 
into the fire; I am Brünnhilde, I am approaching the stake, I must throw (Joubert 
2005:152–153). 
In her book, History after apartheid: Visual culture and public memory in a 
democratic South Africa, Annie Coombes interprets the symbolic oxwagon trek of 
                                                 
241 FAK 1937, song 39. 
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1938 as “a calculated attempt to invent a coherent Afrikaner identity where none 
actually existed” (2003:26). It is probably more accurate to argue, as Moodie 
(1975:180) does, that the event marked the spread of national consciousness 
among Afrikaners. While this viewpoint is widely accepted in the literature, 
Giliomee (2005:13) believes that the role of the Trek in the political mobilisation 
of the Afrikaners is overrated. As he sees it, the major catalyst for the formation of 
a mass nationalist movement was provided, not by the grand festival of 1938, but 
by the decision of the South African parliament nine months later to join Britain 
in the Second World War. 
Suffice it to say that by 1949, when the Voortrekker Monument was inaugurated, 
the Afrikaner nationalist movement had gained control of the state. Had South 
Africa not entered into the war, to the dismay of many Afrikaners, D.F. Malan‟s 
Purified National Party might not have won the election of 1948. But Malan also 
might not have been victorious had it not been for Henning Klopper, who must 
have appreciated, however subconsciously, the political potential of activism in 
the field of performance culture. And had it not been for Gustav Preller and his 
activism in the field of discourse, the idea of replicating the Great Trek might not 
have occurred to Klopper. 
Once in power, Afrikaner nationalists did not lose their taste for volksfeeste [volk 
festivals]. More often than not, the Voortrekker Monument – a colossus inspired 
by the Battle of the Nations Monument in Leipzig (cf. Figure 5.4) – was at the 
heart of it all. Each year on 16 December, a religious service was held in the 
monument‟s Hall of Heroes, where an impressive marble frieze of 27 panels 
portrays the “history” of the Great Trek. At noon, a ray of sun would fall though 
an opening in the domed roof on a cenotaph bearing a phrase from Die Stem: Ons 
vir jou, Suid-Afrika [We for thee, South Africa]. 
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Figure 5.4 The Voortrekker Monument
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There is no shortage of other examples of apartheid-era activism in the fields of 
material and performance culture. Space allows for one more monument and 
one more festival to be singled out here: the Language Monument and the 
Language Year. To celebrate the centenary of the establishment of the GRA, the 
NP government declared 1975 the Year of the Language. The FAK published a 
colourful 325-page hardcover book containing contributions from 22 authors and 
ample coloured photographs. Titled Afrikaans, ons pêrel van groot waarde 
[Afrikaans, our pearl of great value], it was a sequel to another FAK publication, 
which appeared a decade and a half earlier to commemorate the 30
th
 birthday of 
the FAK, namely Die wonder van Afrikaans [The wonder of Afrikaans].  
The highlight of the Language Year, however, was the unveiling of the newly-
erected Afrikaans Language Monument in Paarl (cf. Figure 5.5). It was not a 
bronze bust of a poet in the front garden of a museum that had once been the 
poet‟s house (even though the language has been honoured in this way as well). 
Nor was it anything similar to Gallimard‟s Pléiade series of classical French 
literature which can, arguably, be regarded as a language monument (Huigen 
2008:152). Situated on a hill in the Cape winelands and visible from the national 
road, the Afrikaans Language Monument is a 57-meter-high concrete spire 
surrounded by smaller ones – a phallic symbol, as Allister Sparks once described 
it, of a chauvinist ideal (1990:77).
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242 Source: 
http://www.safarinow.com/destinations/groenkloof/GalleriesAndMuseums/Voortrekker-
Monument.aspx (accessed March 2013). 
243 To claim, as a major book on the legacy of apartheid has done (Jansen 2009:33), that the 
Afrikaner nationalist movement was the only one in history to produce such a monument 
would strengthen the point I make in this paragraph. One can even go further and draw 
attention to the fact that the nationalist ideal also found expression in quite a few other, 
humbler, language monuments, including the one at Burgersdorp. But this Afrikaner 
tradition is not entirely unique. The Shaheed Minar monument in Dhaka, Bangladesh and 
its replications elsewhere were by-products of the Bengali nationalism. 
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Figure 5.5 The Afrikaans Language Monument in Paarl
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In August of the Language Year, the celebrated South African novelist and 
liberal-minded anti-apartheid politician, Alan Paton, noted in a newspaper article 
that “[i]t would be a fool or a philologist that would think it possible to discuss 
Afrikaans and not to discuss Afrikaner Nationalism [sic]” (The Daily News, 
1975/08/08; reprinted in Paton 1987:65). That was, perhaps, an understatement: 
even the philologists of the 1970s could not have been unaware of the intimate 
association that had developed by then between the Afrikaans language and 
Afrikaner nationalism. Just how intimate this association was in the minds of 
outsiders was plain for all to see a year later, when young demonstrators took to 
the streets of Soweto with placards declaring: “We do not want Afrikaans”; “To 
hell with Afrikaans”; “Afrikaans is a sign of oppression, discrimination – To hell 
with the Boers”; “Today is the burial of the Boere Taal”.245  
When nationalists are in power, they can protect and promote their language and 
culture through legislation and official policies. In 1976, Afrikaner activism of 
this nature – the attempt to expand the institutional base of Afrikaans by 
introducing the language as a medium of instruction into black schools – 
amounted to linguistic imperialism. The plan, as we have seen, boomeranged. 
Rather than strengthening the position of Afrikaans vis-à-vis that of English in 
South Africa, it led to a revolt that marked the beginning of the end of apartheid. 
Has Paton‟s remark lost its relevance in the post-apartheid South Africa? Is it 
possible now to disregard Afrikaner nationalism when discussing Afrikaans and, 
more particularly, the contemporary Afrikaans language movement? Has an era 
dawned, as the leaders of this movement are asserting, in which Afrikaner 
nationalism had finally run its course? (Giliomee, Die Vrye Afrikaan, 
2005/09/16:8). In the final part of this thesis I return to these questions, 
                                                 
244 Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Afrikaans_Language_Monument.jpg 
(accessed March 2013).  
245 Cf. photographs at: http://saraouniya.wordpress.com/2012/12/02/to-hell-with-afrikaans/ 
(accessed March 2013). 
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demonstrating that Afrikaner nationalism has outlived apartheid. What we are 
witnessing today, if only in certain circles, is not the end of Afrikaner nationalism 
but its revival. 
5.2 After apartheid: preserving a nation through words, monuments 
and festival 
5.2.1 Of swansongs and new beginnings  
For its national congress or Bondsraad of 1991 – the first to be held after F.W. de 
Klerk‟s landmark speech of 2 February 1990 – the Afrikaner Broederbond chose 
the theme of “Afrikaans and education in the new dispensation” (Stals 1998:755). 
Compared to previous themes, this was a telling choice. On the basis of the topics 
that were selected for Bondraad discussion between 1931 and 1993, four broad 
concerns of the Broederbond can be identified: (state-oriented nationalist) politics, 
economics, culture and education, and the organisation itself. The relative 
importance of each of these broad fields is represented in Chart 5.1 below. For 
every congress that was dedicated to culture and education, 3.5 congresses were 
dedicated to politics. Economics was half as important as politics at Bondsrade, 
but almost twice as important as culture. At approximately a quarter of all the 
Broederbond‟s national congresses (including the final two which took place in 
1993) stock was taken of the organisation.
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246 Thematic analysis based on Stals (1998:753–755). It should be stressed that none of the 
Bondsraad themes fits neatly into a single category: in 1946, for example, economics and 
culture were on the agenda and in 1964 economics and education. What is more, politics 
was never absent from the agenda: debates on economics, culture, education and the 
Broederbond as an organisation were always framed within the context of (state-oriented) 
nationalism. 
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Chart 5.1 
The 1991 Bondraad was the first in the history of the Broederbond to focus 
pertinently on language. And yet, to quote Hobsbawm slightly out of context, 
“problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not of communication or 
even culture” (1992:110) continued to lie at the heart of the Bond‟s project. The 
new emphasis on language did not signal a shift in interest away from “heavy-
weight” politics toward “light-weight” culture; rather, it signalled a shift in 
nationalist politics away from the state toward lower-level institutions, and then 
particularly those institutions where “the will of the young [is bent] to the will of 
the nation” (Kedourie 1985:84).  
The turn that the Broederbond took at its national conference in 1991 was an 
indicator of the trajectory on which Afrikaner activism in the field of language 
was about to embark. In the course of the following two decades, education would 
become the primary site of language conflict – or, more accurately, conflict 
between Afrikaner activists and the government
247
 – in South Africa. These 
activists would complain to the Pan South African Language Board (PanSALB) 
about the neglect of their language in every imaginable context – from municipal 
                                                 
247 Today, name changes come a close second as a source of conflict. 
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accounts to televised rugby commentary, from vehicle number plates to automatic 
teller machine facilities
248
 – but the serious cases, those which would end up in 
court, time and time again, would be brought by Afrikaans schools opposing the 
introduction of English as an additional medium of tuition. (Cf. section 2.4, where 
I discuss these court cases against the background of the South African Bill of 
Rights, arguing that they constitute a continuation of Afrikaner nationalism‟s 
“own schools” crusade.) 
During the same year that language politics replaced state-oriented politics at the 
Bondsraad, the Broederbond appointed a committee to devise a strategy for 
Afrikaans in a post-apartheid South Africa.
249
 The majority of the committee 
members were university professors. For this first time, the Broeders invited a 
woman to join them. Crucially, the managing director of the prosperous printing 
house Nasionale Pers [National Press] or Naspers,
250
 member 23162, was also 
invited. In June 1991, as negotiations for a new South African constitution were 
slowly getting underway, the Broederbond circulated a study document under the 
telltale title “The power of Afrikaans”. Broeders were called upon to make the 
presence of their mother tongue be felt – courteously yet firmly –“at all times in 
all places and at all levels, especially in commerce and at the negotiation table” 
(AB 12/44, June 1991). Broederbond activism in the field of language had 
become a desperate attempt to defend the territories that Afrikaans had conquered 
prior to and during apartheid, and then particularly the territories of economics 
and politics. 
One of the outcomes of the Broeders‟ “strategy for Afrikaans” was an 
organisation which is bankrolled, to this day, by Naspers. The establishment of 
the Stigting vir Afrikaans [Foundation for Afrikaans] during May 1992 was part of 
the Broederbond‟s swansong, yet it marked the beginning of a major Afrikaner 
                                                 
248 Cf. Kriel (2010c:67–72; 2010d:71–75) for examples of complaints that have been lodged 
with PanSALB in recent years. 
249 Source: AB archival file marked as “Strategy for Afrikaans”. The Afrikanerbond allowed 
me access to this file on condition that I do not mention any names. 
250 Cf. footnote 28. Today, Naspers is one of most diversified and successful media companies 
in the world. 
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initiative to create a racially inclusive Afrikaans language movement. This 
endeavour was met with a fair degree of scepticism, especially if it entailed efforts 
to foster a new, non-racial, inclusive Afrikaans identity. Explicitly rejecting the 
term Afrikaanses that some proposed for such an identity, commentators such as 
Breyten Breytenbach (Die Burger, 1996/10/05) defined all those who use 
Afrikaans as mother tongue as Afrikaners. They promoted the concepts of white 
and “brown” Afrikaners in the media, but with little success. Apart from rejecting 
the term “brown” as an apartheid category and even more offensive than 
“coloured”, black commentators in progressive circles viewed this as a transparent 
and opportunistic attempt at co-optation – too little too late. For Neville 
Alexander the idea was absurd: “no one in their right mind,” he remarked in 1999, 
“would suggest that people labelled coloureds are Afrikaners, in spite of the fact 
that some 90% of them continue to speak Afrikaans as a home language” 
(Alexander 1999:27; cf. also Alexander, quoted in De Kat, 2002/09). Seven years 
later, he rephrased his opinion more cautiously, warning that he “would not advise 
Afrikaners to try to attach others to their own identity” (Die Burger, 2006/04/24). 
On the face of it, however, a racially inclusive Afrikaans language movement was 
on the rise. The late Professor Tony Links was appointed as the first deputy chair 
of the Stigting vir Afrikaans. When the latter transformed itself into the Stigting 
vir Bemagtiging deur Afrikaans [Foundation for Empowerment through 
Afrikaans] (SBA) in 2000, another academic, Christa van Louw, became its chief 
executive officer. She was succeeded in 2005 by Christo van der Rheede, a former 
teacher. Three years later, the ATKV (then aged 78) asked Danny Titus, a 
professor of law, to be the organisation‟s executive director of culture. Titus also 
currently serves on the Afrikaanse Taalraad [Afrikaans Language Council] (ATR, 
est. 2008), as do Van der Rheede, Waldy Kastoor, Michael le Cordeur, Ria 
Olivier, and Hendrik Theys. All the role players mentioned in this paragraph 
identify themselves as “brown” South Africans, though not “brown” Afrikaners. 
By no stretch of the definition of Afrikaner nationalism can the term be applied to 
a movement of which the SBA forms part. There is nothing nationalist about the 
Foundation‟s activist initiatives, which had come to include: 
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Basic reading, writing and numerical skills development programmes for adults 
Life skills development programmes for adults 
Career-oriented skills development programmes for adults who wanted to enter the 
labour market 
The Funda programme at primary and secondary school level, aimed at overcoming 
reading problems and developing a love of reading 
The Bravo programme, aimed at releasing the creativity of learners and exposing 
them to career possibilities in Afrikaans 
The provision of support to Afrikaans teachers 
Cultural programmes to encourage learners to develop an interest in music, drama 
and poetry recitals 
Special programmes such as comedian festivals, language conferences, youth 
leadership excursions, campaigns against drug abuse, lectures and career expos 
(Die Burger, 2007/11/14). 
However, the SBA is but one branch of the contemporary Afrikaans language 
movement. In the section that follows, I shall consider views that have been 
expressed in the press and in public lectures by prominent language activists in the 
white Afrikaans-speaking community, all of whom support the principle of a 
racially inclusive movement. My objective is to read between the lines in an 
attempt to establish what the group of primary identification in any particular 
instance is. Is it the multiracial language community to which the activist belongs, 
or is it his
251
 ethnic group? If it turns out to be the latter, the question arises as to 
whether these activists and their kindred spirits share the SBA‟s enthusiasm for 
broad-based empowerment through Afrikaans. Or are they preoccupied with the 
preservation of an ethnic identity and the protection of ethnic interests? 
5.2.2 Reading between the lines 
In 2005, the University of the Free State (UFS) invited two of its own professors, 
H.P. van Coller (at the time chair of the Academy) and J.C. Steyn (author of 
Tuiste in eie taal – cf. footnote 163), to present the D.F. Malherbe memorial 
lecture. To say that Van Coller and Steyn‟s lecture contained normative 
reflections on language activism would be an understatement; preparing and 
                                                 
251 All the activists quoted below are men. 
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delivering the lecture was an activist initiative in itself. The speakers were equally 
critical of Afrikaans parents who send their children to English schools (p. 40), of 
Afrikaans scholars who “timidly avoid using Afrikaans in their scientific 
publications and academic discourse” (p. 40), and of Afrikaans novelists and poets 
who “write increasingly, and even exclusively, in English” (p. 42) or who use an 
“English Afrikaans blend” (p. 43). “[W]hen a small language is threatened,” Van 
Coller and Steyn asserted, “indifference and a comfortable unconcern are 
inappropriate reactions” (p. 46): Afrikaans must “be preserved as a fully 
established cultural language”; it must “remain the language of the creative 
imagination, of science, and of the universities”; “the Afrikaans political, business 
and academic elite [must] be persuaded not to desert Afrikaans” (p. 40).  
These appeals are illiberal as they violate the liberal principle of individual 
autonomy which endows people with the capacity to reject their mother tongue 
(Laitin and Reich 2003:91).
252
 However, none of them amounts to a nationalist 
appeal. Were the tone less authoritarian, they might have been made by a non-
Afrikaner. Somebody as opposed to Afrikaner nationalism as the late Neville 
Alexander might have written the sentence which concluded the lecture: “The 
awareness is growing that language activism will be needed to bring about a truly 
democratic multi-lingual society [in South Africa]” (p. 47). But a non-Afrikaner 
would probably not have complained in a lecture on language activism about 
affirmative action (p. 37), about racial quotas in rugby – “a favourite sport among 
Afrikaners” (p. 38), about the fact that South African universities are now “open 
to all” to the detriment of Afrikaans (p. 39),253 or about “enforced” racial 
                                                 
252 Note also the following remark by Laitin and Reich (2003:87):  
  [M]any nationalist commentators write despairingly of individuals who have lost 
„their‟ language as if they had some obligation to speak the language of their 
ancestors. Children of Welsh parents who speak only English are speaking „their‟ 
language, whether nationalists like it or not. Claiming that people of Maori or Welsh 
ancestry have an obligation to carry on the language of their ancestors is to 
primordialize culture, and to force people into cultural milieus from which they 
might want to exit. In disregarding the preferences of potential assimilators, 
nationalist commentators are fundamentally illiberal. 
253 In recent years, critics of parallel-medium tuition at the UFS – including Higher Education 
Minister Blade Nzimande – have often expressed the view that the practice keeps apartheid 
on the campus alive. Steyn‟s response to this is that “the mixing of the [black and white] 
races is not in itself a positive thing, especially where tension already exists between 
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integration in university residences (p. 42). These are Afrikaner grievances, and 
they are recurring themes in Steyn‟s newspaper columns along with the process of 
political and social transformation in South Africa, land reform, the changing of 
Afrikaans place names, Afrikaner emigration, Afrikaner poverty and the lack of 
Afrikaner self-determination. (Cf., inter alia, Beeld, 2006/06/22; Rapport, 
2006/12/17; Die Volksblad, 2008/11/21, 2009/05/27). According to Steyn‟s view, 
1994 marked the beginning of “the disregard of Afrikaans and the marginalisation 
of Afrikaners” (Die Volksblad, 2009/05/27). 
At this point, one particular column that Steyn had contributed to Die Volksblad 
of 21 November 2008 is worth considering in more detail. It provides an overview 
of the activities of the Vereniging van Regslui vir Afrikaans [Society of Legal 
Practitioners for Afrikaans] (VRA). The latter is a 600-member-strong society of 
legal practitioners who seek to promote Afrikaans in the judiciary; further the 
interests of Afrikaans-speaking legal practitioners and law students; and protect 
the legal interests of the Afrikaans-speaking community. 
The establishment of the VRA in 2002 was prompted by the anglicisation of the 
judiciary, at least according to Steyn, who ascribes the decline of Afrikaans in this 
domain to “the state‟s transformation policy of which the cornerstones are 
representativity and unfair affirmative action”. In the early years of its existence, 
the VRA resorted to lobbying: the organisation tried, for example, to persuade the 
department of justice that the linguistic demographics of a specific geographical 
region should be taken into consideration when judges, magistrates and 
prosecutors were appointed. When all such efforts proved to be futile, the VRA 
opted for a more “direct strategy”, as explained by Koos Malan, a founding 
member of the organisation: “Do not ask anybody else to do something for you. 
Do not even try to influence the government [...] There are many things that you 
can do yourself for your language and your people” (quoted by Steyn). 
                                                                                                                                     
groups” (Beeld, 2007/09/10). Quoting a study that was done among Israeli and Palestinian 
students at the University of Haifa, Steyn claims that the integration of Afrikaans and 
English lectures (i.e., predominantly white and predominantly black classes) at the UFS 
may increase racial tensions. Some would argue that such a stance would annoy critics of 
the UFS‟s language policy even further. 
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What, then, has been done? And, more importantly, for whom? Who does Malan 
consider to be “his people”? To further the interests of Afrikaans-speaking law 
students, the VRA has introduced bursaries and internships; to protect the interests 
of the Afrikaans community, the organisation has started to translate laws into the 
language for publication on the internet. On the surface, the preservation of a 
language-based ethnic identity seems to be absent from the agenda. Yet the 
following remark by Malan may suggest that language is not the sole criterion for 
inclusion in the in-group – that is, the group whose interests are being promoted: 
“A lawyer does not even have to leave his office [to do something for Afrikaans]. 
He simply takes in a student for two weeks, offers him/her exposure and training, 
and in this manner provides a service [...] to a young Afrikaner” (quoted by Steyn; 
emphasis added).  
This might have been a mere slip of the tongue; the VRA may be just as 
concerned about the interests of black (including “brown”) Afrikaans-speaking 
law students in an era where, as Steyn asserts, “state institutions are collapsing as 
a result of transformation”. Yet any reader of Steyn‟s column could be forgiven 
for suspecting that, even if the VRA is “politically independent”/“untainted by 
party politics”, the raison d‟être of the organisation is related to identity politics. 
In the final example to be considered here, the primary group of identification was 
revealed not through a slip of the tongue or through the expression of Afrikaner 
grievances, but through identification with a nationalist myth. 
Speaking in Brussels on 30 April 2009 at the official opening of a foreign 
relations office for Afrikaans, former South African state president F.W. de Klerk 
added his voice to the chorus of those who, at the time, were expressing their 
concern about the future of single-medium Afrikaans schools and predominantly 
Afrikaans universities:  
I am particularly worried about the erosion of Afrikaans at our universities. The 
truth is that Stellenbosch, Pretoria, the Free State and Potchefstroom will cease to be 
predominantly Afrikaans in the foreseeable future unless our language community 
works together to develop a clear preventative strategy (Rapport, 2009/05/03; cf. 
also Beeld, 2009/05/01).  
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It is safe to assume that the speaker‟s definition of “our language community” was 
a racially inclusive one. In another talk, given a month earlier in Pretoria (“What 
is the Credo of the Afrikaners in 2009?”, declaration to the IFP Forum, 
2009/03/27), De Klerk had claimed that “Afrikaans now comprises a much wider 
community than ever before and is proudly spoken as a home language by more 
than seven million brown, white and black South Africans”. However, while they 
may be regarded as (potential) allies in the language struggle, “brown” and black 
South Africans are excluded from De Klerk definition‟s of “we” as is clear from 
the way in which he introduced the Pretoria speech:  
We as Afrikaners have had sad, disquieting and even glorious moments in history. 
We experienced and survived many crises: on the borders of the eastern Cape; 
during the swoeg en sweet of the Great Trek; at Dingaan‟s [sic] kraal and at Weenen; 
on the battlefields and in the concentration camps of the Second War of 
Independence (Consensus 6(1):11). 
Was it about the survival of this identity that De Klerk was primarily concerned 
when he told his audience in Brussels that “the struggle to preserve our diverse 
identity in an increasingly homogeneous world is the greatest challenge of this 
century”? (Rapport, 2009/05/03). If it was, the former president‟s language 
sentiments qualify as nationalist sentiments: when it forms part of a broader effort 
to protect the identity and the interests of any specific ethnic group (even if others 
stand to benefit as well), activism aimed at the defence of an institutionalised 
language becomes nationalist activism. 
5.2.3 The Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement: a new generation of Gustav 
Prellers? 
A decade and a half after 1991, in November 2006, the no longer secret, open to 
all yet largely deserted Afrikanerbond (as Broederbond renamed itself in 1994) 
was still trying to demonstrate its philosophy of inclusivity by involving “brown” 
speakers of Afrikaans in a panel discussion on “Afrikaanses and their culture”. 
Christo van der Rheede was invited along with Allan Boesak (a cleric, politician 
and former anti-apartheid activist) and Franklin Sonn (a former South African 
ambassador and at the time a businessman and university chancellor). All three 
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men expressed their doubts about the existence of a community of “Afrikaanses”. 
Boesak said that he still mistrusted the motives of some taalstryders [language 
warriors] and their overtures to “other” speakers of Afrikaans. Power, he 
suspected, continued to be the hidden agenda (Die Burger, 2006/11/09). The SBA 
head remarked that “[w]e have a long way to go before we are likely to reach this 
ideal [of a single Afrikaans community]” (Die Burger, 2006/11/08). Sonn, in turn, 
added that if the new inclusive Afrikaans movement were to succeed, it would 
have to be led by “bruines” [brown people] (Die Burger, 2006/11/09).254 
Just how difficult (impossible?) the creation of a united and non-racial community 
of Afrikaans language activists was going to be, became clear in the course of 
2007 – the year of the De la Rey uprising (to which I shall return below). In April 
2007, in a newspaper article titled “Denkendes lei nou Afrikaner – Führer-loos 
kaap hulle meesterlik kernkringe” [Thinkers now lead Afrikaner – Without a 
Führer they are highjacking core circles masterly] (Beeld, 2007/04/30), the 
Afrikaans research consultant, writer and publisher Charles Malan celebrated 
what he clearly regarded as an Afrikaner revival: 
The unheard of has happened lately: the biggest, once ultra-conservative cultural 
fortresses such as the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (FAK), the 
Afrikaanse Taal- en Kultuurvereniging (ATKV), and the Suid-Afrikaanse Akademie 
vir Wetenskap en Kuns have been conquered by liberal intellectual leaders.  
 Also in domains such as the churches, the Afrikaans media and in trade unions, 
Afrikaners are being led towards a change of direction by strong, thinking leaders. 
 Academics and thinkers are taking over everywhere. In a masterly manner, the 
once old-fashioned FAK has been hijacked by the philosophers Danie Goosen and 
Johann Rossouw to publish the unprecedented Die Vrye Afrikaan. Within the 
Akademie, two scholars of literature, Hennie van Coller and Jacques van der Elst, 
are trying their best to establish a new Akademie for all Afrikaanses. The 
Renaissance man, Coenie de Villiers, is in charge of culture at the ATKV after the 
pioneering work of Frits Kok.  
 Logical, well-considered viewpoints are put forward in the ranks of the church 
                                                 
254 During 2005, Jakes Gerwel had also called for “non-racialism in Afrikaans ideally under 
black leadership” (Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2006/01/20:19) For a rebuttal of Gerwel, cf. 
Duvenage (Die Vrye Afrikaan, 2006/04/21:20). 
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(Coenie Burger and Isak Burger), media management (Tim du Plessis, Peet Kruger), 
trade unionism (Flip Buys, Kallie Kriel), organised business (Johann Rupert) and 
academics (Hermann Giliomee, Jaap Steyn and many others).  
According to Malan, this emergence of a “new leadership corps” demonstrated 
which kind of guidance was needed most in Afrikaner ranks at the time: “not that 
of a sole political fighter, but intellectual leadership on various levels”. Other 
observers might have characterised and explained it differently, yet by 2007 few 
would have disputed the existence of a “new”255 Afrikaner movement. Its 
supporters still defined their mission as the defence of multilingualism and 
minority rights or the defence of the Afrikaans language, but increasingly they 
added, unashamedly, that they were standing up for Afrikaner rights and interests. 
While not monolithic in any way, the new Afrikaner movement was a self-
conscious project that soon became consolidated around a number of 
organisations.  
Today, the leading agents of the new Afrikaner movement are most likely the 
120,000-member-strong trade union Solidariteit/Solidarity, which grew out of the 
white Mine Workers‟ Union (MWU, est. 1902), and its independent civil rights 
initiative, AfriForum (est. 2006). Solidarity has expanded its membership base in 
recent years to include workers from other industries as well as professionals. On 
its English-language website, AfriForum defines its mission as follows: 
Let your voice be heard… AfriForum will directly contribute to giving you and your 
community a voice in a society where minorities are increasingly being ignored. 
AfriForum offers a Forum for the constructive activation of minorities to participate 
in public debate and action, in order to ensure a future for us in Africa.
256
 
Curiously (or rather, tellingly), the Afrikaans version is not equivalent to the 
English version. A direct translation of the organisation‟s mission statement on its 
Afrikaans-language website reads as follows: 
                                                 
255 Henceforth without inverted commas. 
256 Source: http://www.afriforum.co.za/english/about/ (accessed March 2013). 
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Let your voice be heard… Membership of AfriForum is a direct way to ensure that 
your voice and that of your community are heard in a society where minorities – 
such as Afrikaners and the Afrikaans community – are increasingly being 
ignored. AfriForum offers a Forum for the constructive activation of minorities to 
participate in public debate and action, in order to ensure a future for us in Africa 
(emphasis added).
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AfriForum styles itself as the solution to the problem of “apathetic withdrawal” 
among Afrikaners: 
Civil societies in general, and minorities in particular [or, according to the Afrikaans 
website: Minorities in general, and especially Afrikaners] have fallen into a spiral 
of withdrawal that holds negative consequences for the minorities themselves, for 
democratic principles and for the country as a whole […] AfriForum, an 
independant [sic] initiative of the trade union Solidarity, is a non-profit institution 
which endeavours to eradicate this cycle of withdrawal. The process motivates 
minorities to participate constructively in public life (emphasis added). 
In the remainder of this chapter, however, I shall concentrate on another sector of 
the new Afrikaner movement, not least because the philosophy and work of 
Solidarity and AfriForum have been well researched and documented by Jacob R. 
Boersema (2012). Of interest to me is the role of the intellectual elite, and then 
particularly the contribution of two activist-ideologues who have been described 
as a “new generation of Gustav Prellers” (Van Niekerk 2008:84): the philosophers 
Danie Goosen and Johann Rossouw. It was the two of them who, at the turn of the 
millennium, identified “apathetic withdrawal” as a crisis in Afrikaner circles (cf., 
i.a., Goosen 2005). 
According to the argument put forward here, Goosen and Rossouw – the leaders 
of what I call, after their major publications, the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan 
[Fragments-Free African] movement
258
 – bore a closer resemblance to the 
apartheid ideologues of the 1930s and 1940s than they did to the activists of the 
Second Afrikaans Language Movement. I do not wish to suggest that they shared 
                                                 
257 Source: http://www.afriforum.co.za/oor-afriforum/ (accessed March 2013). 
258 Below, I sometimes refer to the leadership of this movement as the Vrye Afrikane [Free 
Africans]. 
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the racism of apartheid‟s architects. But they did share their nationalist view of the 
world – the belief that South Africa was divided along ethnic-linguistic lines that 
had to be preserved. The Vrye Afrikane [Free Africans] might have rejected the 
concepts nation and volk in favour of community of origin, historical community 
or indigenous symbolic tradition; they might have asserted that the era of states, 
nations and volkere was over and that we lived in the age of continents and 
communities (Goosen 2000:64), yet in the final analysis both Goosen and 
Rossouw defined the units that made up South Africa‟s “precious” diversity in 
terms identical to those that the Broederbond and the National Party used, namely 
language and ethnicity.  
The story began in 1998, when Goosen and Rossouw founded a journal for 
philosophy and cultural criticism with the help of two philosophy colleagues and 
two creative arts scholars. No fewer than 23 men and five women – the vast 
majority of them academics (including four from universities in the Low 
Countries) – served on the editorial board. Titled Fragmente, the biannual 
publication added a local flavour to the postmodern critique of modernity.
259
 From 
                                                 
259 It should be noted that Fragmente was not an uncritical disciple of postmodernism. For 
Goosen and Rossouw, the appeal of postmodernism lay in its “fundamental criticism of the 
universal”, in its “recognition of the linguistic nature of our reality and of the role that our 
historical context plays in our reflection” and, finally, in its preference for “small stories 
and the ethics of the particular” rather than grand narratives (Fragmente editorial, 2005:5). 
These elements of postmodern thought they appeared to embrace: the linguistic turn, 
historicism, cultural relativism, localism, particularism. Yet at the same time they were 
critical of certain aspects of postmodernity, above all consumerism and neoliberal 
globalisation (which was understood as “an exponential expansion of the same desire for 
geometric control” that underlies the nation-state – Fragmente editorial, 2005:5).  
  In the 2005 edition of Fragmente (numbers 14 and 15), postmodern philosophy was 
criticised for not sufficiently opposing these trends in postmodern culture. The criticism 
was directed specifically at the nomadic thoughts of Deleuze and the radical ethical 
thoughts of Levinas and Derrida. Neither the details nor the validity of the philosophical 
arguments are important here. Of significance for this discussion is that the conclusions 
drawn by Fragmente suggested a preoccupation not only with community, but with their 
own community. Deleuze‟s work on nomadic/aesthetic energy was rejected since it was 
said to reinforce existing patterns of production and consumption, thus prioritising private 
needs and preferences and perpetuating “a fundamental indifference towards the 
communal”. As regards Levinas and Derrida, Fragmente had reservations about their 
emphasis on the appeal of the other because, so the argument went, it left the self 
“subjected to feelings of powerlessness and paralysis” (Fragmente editorial, 2005:5–7). 
The obvious analogy was between the diagnosis of the postmodern subject in general 
(powerless and paralysed) and post-apartheid Afrikaners in particular (alienated and 
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the position it adopted the revival of Afrikaners and their language could be easily 
promoted: 
[I]f modernity reduces human beings to free-drifting individuals, Fragmente seeks, 
by contrast, to understand them through their participation in and commitment to a 
plurality of communities [...] [I]f modernity never stops trying to dissolve traditions, 
Fragmente continues to emphasise the necessity of a creative maintenance of the 
diversity of „pre-individual finds‟; if modernity persists in establishing its hegemony 
through geometric structures such as the nation-state and the market, Fragmente, on 
the other hand, stresses the importance of democratic practices through which reality 
can into her [sic] own right (Fragmente editorial, 2005:4). 
Under the banner of Fragmente, Goosen and Rossouw invited the “who‟s who of 
Afrikaans-speaking writers, philosophers, economists, political scientists, 
futurologists, educationists, lawyers, historians and classicists” (Mail and 
Guardian, 2000/05/19) to a meeting in May 2000. Sixty-three of the 
(predominantly white male) invitees attended and decided to form the Group of 63 
with Rossouw (and later Goosen) as chair. The media was told that the new 
organisation represented “Afrikaans and Afrikaans interests on the whole” 
(Business Day, 2000/05/08). It formed part of what Rossouw still portrayed as 
“the New Afrikaans Movement” (2003:81) rather than a new Afrikaner 
movement. In his biography of the Afrikaners, Giliomee described the mission of 
the Group of 63 (of which he was a founding member) as “a search for new myths 
in the campaign to secure the future of Afrikaans as a public tongue” (2003:664). 
Officially, however, the Group identified itself with reference not only to 
language but also to culture and politics as “a meta-political forum which stands 
for a radical democratic South Africa within which the diversity of linguistic and 
cultural communities will obtain complete recognition” (Prinsloo 2004:67).  
By 2003, the Group of 63 claimed to have “one of the most active intellectual 
electronic mailing lists in Afrikaans” (Prinsloo 2004:67). The problem was that it 
had little more than virtual assets. It could do with an office, a secretary and a 
                                                                                                                                     
withdrawn). From postmodernism Fragmente seemed to borrow (one is tempted to say, in 
true postmodern style) only those ideas that that could be appropriated to support their case. 
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little money – all things that the FAK, which had been in the business of 
Afrikaner culture since 1929, still had. What followed has been described as a 
takeover. According to Malan‟s newspaper article of 2007, Goosen and Rossouw 
highjacked the FAK. I would use a different metaphor: the two parties entered 
into an all but loveless marriage of convenience. Welcoming the new blood, the 
FAK appointed Goosen to its managing board in 2003 and soon afterwards as 
chair. Rossouw, in turn, was offered a position as communication and research 
officer whose task it would be to communicate the new vision of the FAK “to the 
broad Afrikaans world in a comprehensible and appropriate manner” (Ferreira 
2004:162). To this end he established Die Vrye Afrikaan (henceforth, DVA) – a 
newspaper that was published monthly (and later bi-monthly) in print and 
online.
260
  
The FAK officials also contributed articles and columns to the mainstream 
Afrikaans press – as they had done as members of the Group of 63 – and 
addressed Afrikaner audiences of all sorts and sizes whenever the opportunity 
presented itself. Like the cultural nationalists featured in the work of John 
Hutchinson (1987), they diagnosed a national crisis – “apathetic withdrawal” –and 
set themselves the task to solve it by inspiring their fellow Afrikaners “to break 
free from their withdrawal and alienation” (Rossouw, DVA, 2005/09/16:7). At the 
time, Afrikaans arts (read: cultural) festivals “were multiplying like rabbits”261 
and there was an explosion in Afrikaans cultural production (even if quality was 
in short supply). The problem, as the self-appointed revivalists identified it, was 
that Afrikaners were not participating in politics as Afrikaners. They suffered 
from collective post-apartheid depression: 
whilst the ethnic identity of Afrikaners had been a source of inspiration and 
creativity to them at different points in their history – the Great Trek, the 
establishment of various republics in the 19th and 20th century, the reconstruction 
                                                 
260 Journalist and author Max du Preez suggested that the newspaper should change its name to 
Die Etniese Afrikaner [The Ethnic Afrikaner], in view of its “obsession with Boer matters” 
(Beeld, 2007/05/19). 
261 In the posthumously published Fractured times. Culture and society in the twentieth 
century (2013:34), Eric Hobsbawm makes this remark about cultural festivals in general. It 
is particularly true of the post-apartheid South Africa. 
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after the Anglo-Boer War – it is today a source of depression (Rossouw, DVA, 
2006/02/17:10). 
Like so many nationalists before them, locally and elsewhere, Danie Goosen and 
Johann Rossouw recognised the potential of myths and symbols to unite and 
mobilise a nation (or a community as they called it) and to sustain its identity and 
cohesion over time. By the turn of the twentieth century, these philosophers had 
come to see their primary task as “myth-making” or, in Goosen‟s own words, as 
the production of “a viable network of meaning-giving symbols and space-
creating myths” (2000:61) that could “unleash new cultural-political energy and 
lead Afrikaners out of the cultural-political impasse of the present” (2000:62). In 
February 2000, at an FAK seminar on minorities, Goosen appealed to Afrikaners 
“to activate the cultural-political processes through which the decay of our 
community life [can be] reversed and through which our own worlds of thought – 
that is, our networks of symbols and myths – [can be] imagined in a such way that 
they will have an irrepressible attraction, especially for the intellectual and 
creative elite”:  
When these symbols and myths lose their power and persuasiveness, minorities fade 
away and eventually surrender their place in history to others. The opposite is also 
true. When these symbols and myths captivate minorities and inspire them to 
identify with [their mythology] actively and in a creative way, such minorities enter 
into and participate in history (2000:61). 
Following Hutchinson, one may argue that the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan 
movement was a cultural nationalist movement. In fact, Hutchinson‟s “profile of 
cultural nationalism” (1987:8–15) reads like a profile of the Goosen-Rossouw 
project: just like the examples of cultural nationalist projects described by 
Hutchinson, it attracted “a rising but disaffected intelligentsia” who challenged the 
traditionalism of “ossified political and cultural elites” in an effort to “„re-create‟ 
the idea of the nation as a living principle in the lives of people” (1987:9, 15). It 
was, however, not as nationalists but as adherents of civic republicanism and 
radical democracy (as they interpreted these political philosophies) and as 
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opponents of the (alleged) individualism of liberalism,
262
 the consumerism of neo-
liberalism and the imperialism of “Afro-nationalism” (a term used to include both 
black African nationalism and non-racial South African nationalism) that Goosen 
and Rossouw participated in the Afrikaner debate.  
We Afrikaners are communitarians, they told audiences, not liberal individualists; 
we have a long tradition of community-based politics (Rossouw, DVA, 
2006/03/17:2). Both liberalism and neo-liberalism, so the argument went, stood in 
tension with “the radical-democratic attempt of the multiplicity of cultural 
communities to achieve a say in their respective histories” (Goosen 2000:65). 
Afrikaners had a choice: “we can either take refuge in liberal privatism,” said 
Goosen, “or we can pursue the good life made possible by republican politics” 
(2000:73); we can either “celebrate „the end of history‟ in some kind of privatist 
orgy of consumption” (2000:72), or we can participate in history as a “unique 
historical community” (2000:61).  
The anti-neoliberal, anti-consumerist and anti-corporatist stance of the Vrye 
Afrikane was a rather curious one that prioritised non-material political issues: 
[T]he free market strives to turn human beings into free-standing individuals and 
cuts them off from everything that makes them human beings (religion, ethnic 
bonds, gender, class, language). […] Over the past fifteen to twenty years neo-
liberalism has taken this trend to new heights (Rossouw, DVA, 2006/03/17:2). 
In “Afro-nationalism” neo-liberalism had found an ally. Together, as DVA 
editorials warned incessantly, these two forces posed a threat to the identity, 
symbols and institutions of South Africa‟s communities of origin/historical 
communities/traditional communities – terms which Goosen and Rossouw 
understood to mean ethnic-linguistic communities (Rossouw, DVA, 
2006/03/17:1). In short, the claim was that “[t]he market and the state strip man 
                                                 
262 Charles Malan‟s portrayal of the FAK project as liberal thus constitutes a misinterpretation. 
The discourse of rights, it should be noted here, was eschewed by the Vrye Afrikane in 
accordance with their rejection of the individualism of liberalism. Yet for every non-liberal 
in the broader Afrikaner movement there was a self-acclaimed liberal who, rather 
disingenuously, availed himself or herself “of the language of minority rights as deployed 
in European multiculturalist discourses” (Wasserman 2009:68). 
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[sic] from his most significant association, namely his linguistic-cultural 
community” (DVA editorial, 2006/04/21:2). In this respect, Afro-nationalism was 
alleged to be an extension of apartheid: 
I am not saying that Afrikaner nationalism and the new Afro-nationalism are 
identical. But let us also not overemphasise the differences to the extent that we lose 
a clear perspective of the many aspects they have in common. Whilst one was 
exclusive and the other is inclusive, they share a pathological incapability to 
recognise the diversity of communities [and] a resistance against meaningful 
policies that recognise the variety of voices, communities and so forth (Goosen 
2005). 
I would argue exactly the opposite: the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement, 
rather than “the new Afro-nationalism”, constituted a continuation of the apartheid 
project, and then particularly that part of the project that sought to replace 
“negative racial nationalism” in the black community with “positive cultural 
nationalism” (Moodie 1975:265; cf. section 2.2.2). Their motivation might have 
been self-serving, but apartheid‟s ideologues were never “hostile towards 
diversity” (Goosen 2005) – not when they developed the policy in the 1930s and 
1940s and not when they were desperately trying to defend it in the 1980s. The 
development phase was covered in chapter 2 of this study. From the defence 
phase we need only consider the Broederbond‟s attempt of 1984 to devise an 
“Afrikaner strategy” following the spilt to the right in the NP. A study document 
on the topic included the following objectives under the heading 
volkeverhoudinge (relationships between volke): 
Maintenance of the diversity of volke in South Africa. Own identities [...]  
Respect for other cultures and ways of being human (AB 12/28, August 1984). 
In a subsequent study document, entitled “The AB‟s goals and tasks for the 
Afrikaner”, these ideas were fleshed out: 
The question that currently faces our country and all its people […] is without any 
doubt the issue of [internal] national relationships [volkereverhoudinge – 
relationships between volkere].  
[...] Whatever concrete policy we decide to follow, it will have to do justice to both 
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the unity and diversity of our population. Every community, group or nation will 
have to be able to maintain, enrich and develop its own identity to the full (AB 
12/32, February 1986). 
Like the Herderian/Fichtean diversitarian view of the world, the chauvinism of 
apartheid also resurfaced in the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement. This claim, 
made in section 2.2.2 of this study where I argued that certain post-apartheid 
efforts to promote multilingualism in South Africa have their roots in the racial 
paternalism of apartheid, is not difficult to substantiate. “As a rule,” according to 
editorial comment in DVA (2005/08/19:2), “Afrikaans language activists are 
activists for multilingualism.” As a rule, one may add, their thinking echoes that 
of Werner Eiselen: “From the history of the Boer People we learn [and black 
South Africans can learn] how a People can retain its identity [and language]” 
(quoted in Moodie 1975:272–273). Consider the following examples: 
Lawrence Schlemmer, a founding member of the Group of 63:  
[South Africa] is being homogenised through the use of English as the official 
language, cultural diversity is being lost, and in time even indigenous groups will 
find that they have to rebuild their languages (quoted in Business Day, 2000/05/09).  
Hennie de Wet, at the time managing director of the FAK:  
Afrikaans‟s cultural struggle [served as a] model for liberation movements in South 
Africa (2004:69). 
Rossouw‟s condescension, in particular, knew no bounds. Afrikaners, he asserted, 
were proud anti-imperial and anti-colonial democrats. Only between 1948 and 
1994, when they colonised themselves and their fellow Africans, did they lose 
their dignity. Afrikaners did not only contribute to Africa‟s past struggles for 
freedom, but could now play a leading role in the continent‟s most important 
liberation movement ever: the battle against the forces of community destruction 
(DVA, 2005/09/16:7). South Africa had to become a country of “self-respecting 
communities” (DVA editorial, 2006/03/17:1). And as “a self-aware community 
with a long history”, Afrikaners were best positioned to lead a movement of 
ethnic-linguistic self-determination (DVA editorial, 2006/01/20:2). Rossouw 
warned, though, that 
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as the indigenous community who succeeded to maintain the strongest sense of self-
consciousness in opposition to the local colonial situation, Afrikaners must [...] not 
expect all South Africans to embrace their communities of origin at the moment. For 
the time being, those who wish to express themselves via the state-corporate system 
and those who wish to express themselves via the community will have to 
accommodate one another, while the onus is on the communities to continue the 
struggle to decolonise the state-corporate system (DVA, 2005/09/16:7). 
If the Vrye Afrikane were radical democrats, one may argue, apartheid‟s 
ideologues were too. Were they true civic republicans? For the most part, Goosen 
and Rossouw explained the idea of republican politics in metaphorical terms: 
Afrikaners were encouraged to follow the example of the old Athenians for whom 
the highest accomplishment in life was to step out of the private (or economic) 
domain and to “appear” in the public (or political) domain, thus serving common 
interests and acquiring immortality in the eyes of their fellow city-staters. 
Drawing on Hannah Arendt‟s interpretation of classical republicanism in The 
Human Condition (1958), Goosen argued in a speech before the FAK that such 
political participation is intrinsically valuable (2000:67; cf. also 2001:8–29). In a 
later lecture, however, presented in 2001 at the Klein Karoo National Arts 
Festival, he adopted a more pragmatic approach and demanded all of the 
following in the name of civic republicanism: 
(a) the conservation of “recognisable Afrikaans spaces [in the] streets, city 
squares and coffee shops of [our] towns and cities” (2001:49); 
(b) the protection of single-medium Afrikaans schools and universities; (at the 
time, Goosen insisted along with other language activists that two of South 
Africa‟s historically Afrikaans universities had to remain exclusively 
Afrikaans, while the remaining three had to implement parallel-medium 
tuition in Afrikaans and English – 2000:49–50); and 
(c) the establishment of “a politically-negotiated and state-supported 
representative council” for Afrikaners through which they could take control 
of their own affairs (2001:50).  
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Had Goosen been speaking in the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century after South Africa had embarked on a process of mass-scale geographical 
renaming, he would also have called for the retention of Afrikaans place names. 
Within the definitional framework of this study, demands such as these for spaces 
where “our language [is] audible and visible”, where its “sounds and images are 
reflected back at us” (Goosen 2001:49), as well as demands for “our own” 
schools, universities and political structures, are nationalist demands. At stake is 
the collective symbolic and institutional expression of Afrikaners.  
It seems reasonable to conclude that the civic republicanism that was preached by 
the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement in the early 2000s was ethnic-nationalist 
civic republicanism. The Afrikaner community was assumed to be the 
metaphorical equivalent of the classical city-state republic. While other Afrikaans 
speakers might have benefited from Afrikaner activism, they were not in-defined 
as fellow Athenians. Those common interests which, in the minds of civic 
republicans, take precedence over “private desires and interests” (Goosen 
2000:67) were Afrikaner interests. To the Vrye Afrikane, this did not constitute a 
choice for ethnocentrism but a “republican choice for plurality” (Goosen 2000:70) 
– something that was threatened, so they argued, by the nation state and by neo-
liberal globalisation. Yet one has to ask: if the city-state was populated only with 
Afrikaners, would it not be stripped from the very “plurality of shades, accents, 
idioms, shadows and nuances” (Goosen 2000:68) that the Afrikaner disciples of 
civic republicanism claimed to value so highly? This appears to have been the line 
of reasoning of the veteran anti-apartheid activist Justice Albie Sachs when he put 
the following question to a single-medium Afrikaans school which was defending 
its right to remain exclusively Afrikaans in the South African Constitutional Court 
during August 2009: do you not overlook – as apartheid had done – the 
educational value of diversity?
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To me, the clearest indication that the Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan movement was 
apartheid reincarnated was the reaction it provoked in the coloured community. 
                                                 
263 Personal observation by the author who attended the court case. 
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The tension reached boiling point during August 2007, when Goosen and 
Rossouw came under attack from “brown” Afrikaans language activists for 
propagating the idea that cultural/ethnic diversity within the primary Afrikaans 
speech community should be preserved (Rapport, 2007/08/12). What is more, said 
the philosophers, the various cultural/ethnic groups should be mobilised 
independently. Earlier in 2007, Rossouw had explained this position as follows in 
a letter to Beeld (2007/04/12): 
One of the most important reasons why reconciliation amongst Afrikaans-speakers 
and the establishment of an Afrikaans language council are being delayed, is that 
there is a large group of people in Afrikaans-speaking circles who have not yet been 
able to constitute themselves as a community, and whose identity was forced upon 
them in the past, and used to discriminate against them.  
 Other Afrikaans communities, by contrast, such as the Afrikaners, the Cape 
Muslims, the Griquas and the Namas, have succeeded in constituting themselves and 
in writing an own history. Cooperation and progress in Afrikaans will depend on the 
extent to which different communities can meet each other with self-confidence.  
In other words: only when all speakers of Afrikaans had been led to ethnic self-
awareness would it be possible for them to be partners in an inclusive Afrikaans 
language movement. While they rejected the notion of xenophobic ethnicity, the 
FAK officials argued that the answer is neither post-ethnicity nor non-ethnicity, 
but democratic ethnicity “which is recognised world-wide as an important 
condition for successful language politics” (Rapport, 2007/08/12). 
For all its emphasis on democratic politics, however, this line of reasoning was 
eerily reminiscent of Afrikaner Broederbond thinking in the early 1980s when one 
of apartheid‟s most prominent volkekundiges, P.J. Coertze, concluded his book on 
Die Afrikanervolk en die Kleurlinge [The Afrikaner volk and the Coloureds] with 
the following appeal to Afrikaners: 
One cannot call [“the Coloureds”] a volk yet, but that they form a separate ethnic 
entity is beyond doubt [...] They are neither Bantus [sic] nor Whites [sic] but people 
with their own identity [...] It is imperative that they are now provided the 
opportunity to develop into a dignified ethnos alongside the other etnieë [ethnic 
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groups] in South Africa. It is our duty to help them in the fulfilment thereof 
(1983:138). 
In his reaction to the FAK‟s proposal of “separate development”, journalist 
Heindrich Wyngaard reminded readers of Rapport (2007/09/23) that ethnic 
mobilisation among Afrikaners had almost caused the then head of the SBA, 
Christo van der Rheede, to withdraw from the movement, which had been trying, 
since 2004, to establish an Afrikaans Language Council.
264
 Van der Rheede 
himself rejected the philosophy of Goosen and Rossouw as shameless 
paternalism. How could they claim, he asked, that an ethnic revival is the answer 
to poverty and underdevelopment in the “brown” community? As Van der Rheede 
saw it, the “nonsense of compartmentalising Afrikaans-speakers on the basis of 
ethnic, cultural-historical and unscientific assumptions is complicating 
[“brown”/white] relationships even further” (Die Burger, 2007/09/04). 
The wife of Allan Boesak, Elna, was equally critical of Goosen and Rossouw. By 
advocating the idea of “Afrikaners as a unique cultural community”, Boesak 
argued, the FAK philosophers  
are slamming the door, in a breathtakingly unapologetic manner – which reveals 
much about their true intentions – in the faces of coloured/black Afrikaans-speakers. 
Now and then, they rub salt in the wound by opening the door just wide enough to 
leave a chink – when they need statistics, or a brown face, in order to imbue their 
Afrikaans language policy with just the right “colouring”, along with a sprinkling of 
plausible statistics (Beeld, 2007/03/02; translation by Alice de Jager). 
The Fragmente-Vrye Afrikaan project did not survive much longer. Fragmente 
was discontinued in 2005 and Die Vrye Afrikaan in 2008. Johann Rossouw left for 
Australia to complete a PhD at the University of Melbourne.
265
 He was replaced 
as executive officer of the FAK (a position he held since 2007 in addition to the 
editorship of Die Vrye Afrikaan) by Linette van der Merwe who, on assuming her 
                                                 
264 The council eventually came into being on 24 May 2008. 
265 On his return in 2012, shortly after Pieter Duvenage had been appointed as head of 
philosophy at the University of the Free State, Rossouw joined the department as a lecturer. 
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duties, described Die Vrye Afrikaan as “an elitist political newspaper” and “a 
sorry mistake”: 
Never again such a project! It cost the FAK a lot of money. I was among the few 
who recognised its value, and who published in it, but it went over the heads of 
ordinary people (Rapport, 2009/10/31). 
She hit the nail on the head. Scholarly reflection is of little value for anyone 
whose aspiration it is, as Rossouw once put it, to inspire “the broad mass of 
Afrikaners [...] to break free from their withdrawal and alienation [and] to build a 
new vision and a new movement” (DVA, 2005/09/16:7). Community mobilisation 
of this nature – or, to call a spade a spade, nationalist mobilisation – requires for 
philosophy to be translated into appropriate ideology, which the Vrye Afrikane 
managed to do, but also for ideology to be concretised, which they failed to do. To 
work effectively at a popular level, to quote Breuilly (1993:64) again, nationalist 
ideology needs simplification and repetition. In the words of Isabel Hofmeyr 
(1988), nationalist history needs to be popularised. A nationalist movement needs 
Eiselens and Prellers. By 2007, when commentators such as Charles Malan were 
expressing their support for the Eiselens of the new Afrikaner movement, the 
Prellers were already on the rise. 
Perhaps the best example form the time of an Afrikaner activist initiative that did 
not “go over the heads of ordinary people” – an example of nationalist history 
popularised – was the De la Rey uprising (as it has been called). At the end of 
2006, Bok van Blerk (the stage name of Louis Pepler) released a popular song of 
which no fewer than 200,000 copies were sold – an unparalleled achievement in 
the Afrikaans music industry.
266
 The lyrics of the song and the imagery of the 
accompanying video featured the experiences of the Boers on the battlefields of 
the Anglo-Boer War and the suffering of their wives and children in the 
concentration camps: 
                                                 
266 Cf. Grundlingh (2008:177–187). 
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On a mountain in the night  
We lie in the dark and wait  
In the mud and the blood  
As rain and grain bag cling to me  
And my house and my farm were burnt to the ground so they could capture us 
But those flames and those fires now burn deep, deep within me  
 [CHORUS]  
The Khakis that laugh  
A handful of us against a massive force  
With our backs to the cliffs of the mountains  
They think it‟s over for us  
But the heart of a farmer [in Afrikaans: Boer] is deeper and wider, they will come to 
see  
On a horse he comes, the lion of West Transvaal  
 [CHORUS]  
Because my wife and my child are in a camp dying  
And the Khakis are walking over a nation that will rise again  
 [CHORUS]  
(Translation: The Weekender, 2007/03/18). 
In the chorus – which was described at the time as “the most famous and most 
controversial South African chorus of the past decade or so” (The Weekender, 
2007/03/18) – Boer-War hero General Jacobus Hendrik (Koos) de la Rey was 
called on to “come and lead the Boers”.  
De la Rey, De la Rey, can you come and lead the Boers? 
De la Rey, De la Rey 
General, General, we will fall around you as one  
General De le Rey  
(Translation: The Weekender, 2007/03/18). 
The general consensus among commentators was that the thousands of fans who 
sang along as if in a trance whenever they heard the song – whether at concerts or 
at barbecues – identified with the leaderless Boers. Contrary to what Charles 
Malan believed, intellectuals were not providing leadership, at least not at 
grassroots level. 
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As De la Rey fever was running high, Afrikaners in Pretoria took advantage of the 
popularity of the song and incorporated it in protests against government attempts 
to change the name of South Africa‟s administrative and diplomatic capital to 
Tshwane. During August 2007, as the Pretoria News reported, the ANC 
organised a protest march to the Pretoria high court in a show of support for the 
name Tshwane. The Freedom Front Plus staged a similar protest but in support of 
the bid to prevent the council from changing road signs from „Pretoria‟ to 
„Tshwane‟. Led by singer Steve Hofmeyr, the 50-strong group sang Die Stem and 
the Bok van Blerk hit De la Rey to counter the ANC‟s struggle songs (2007/08/29). 
November saw a much larger demonstration when 10,000 people gathered on 
Church Square in Pretoria around the statue of Paul Kruger to hear their favourite 
Afrikaans singers in action. Among them was, again, the very popular Steve 
Hofmeyr, who had emerged in the course of the previous year as an ardent 
defender of the Pretoria name and of Afrikaner heritage in general. This time, Bok 
van Blerk himself gave a rendition of his song. The event, which was organised 
by AfriForum and sponsored by the Afrikaans newspaper Beeld, also included the 
launch of new songs composed in support of Pretoria‟s name (Beeld, 2007/11/14; 
The Times, 2007/11/14; Pretoria News, 2007/11/19).  
Within the framework of the adapted Leerssen model, the anti-renaming protests 
described here constituted activism in the field of performance culture. Their 
goal was to save that component of Afrikaner material culture which this study 
has termed the linguistic landscape of Afrikaner nationalism. The visibility of the 
Pretoria name was at stake, and with it Afrikaners‟ “symbolic articulation and 
presence” (Schöpflin 2000:8). Before 1994, Afrikaner nationalist activism in the 
field of material culture entailed the “dedicatory [including the linguistic] 
investment of public space” (Leerssen 2006:571). Now, it had come to entail 
efforts to prevent the “disinvestment” of public space. Pretoria was, of course, the 
capital of the Boer republic of Transvaal and was named after the hero of the 
Battle of Blood River, the Voortrekker leader Andries Pretorius. The way in 
which DVA objected to the proposed renaming of the city during June 2005 is 
worth noting: 
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Pretoria is one of the few places in South Africa that came into being as a political 
act and not as the result of agriculture [or] commerce. It was a republican city. Later 
the city would be central in the anti-colonial and anti-imperial freedom struggle of 
the Afrikaners […] By rediscovering their anti-colonial, anti-imperial and republican 
traditions, [present-day] Afrikaners may reinvent themselves along with Africans in 
Pretoria (DVA editorial, 2005/06:9; emphasis in the original). 
Consider also the following view that was expressed by Fransjohan Pretorius, a 
professor of history at the University of Pretoria, at a prestige FAK event during 
2006. The topic of his lecture was “Afrikaners and the democratic future” and 
name-changing was one of the main focal points: 
We can dispose of [names such as] Rietfontein, Bultfontein and Warmbad. But the 
ANC must be aware that Afrikaans names with a cultural-historical meaning are 
dear to us and that we wish to retain them. Of these, Pretoria, Potchefstroom and 
Lydenburg are three prominent examples (Beeld, 2006/09/18). 
Today, not all activists in the field of Afrikaner material culture (including the 
linguistic landscape) identify the in-group to which they belong – the “we”/“us” – 
as Afrikaners. The ethnonym is absent from both the English and the Afrikaans 
websites of the Heritage Foundation where the activities of this organisation are 
summarised as follows: 
The Heritage Foundation (Non-Profit Company) was founded in 2002 with the 
purpose of looking after endangered heritage objects, specifically those that the 
Afrikaans speaking [sic] people of the population consider of value. The Heritage 
Foundation raised ±R13.8 million [at the time of writing, £1=R14] towards the 
construction of the Heritage Centre on the grounds of the Voortrekker Monument 
Heritage Site, and also raised nearly R2.5 million for the Research Trust, to be 
awarded for relevant research. […] During 2010, the Heritage Foundation was 
fortunate enough to raise an amount of R3 million towards the rescue effort 
launched at the Nasionale Afrikaanse Letterkunde Museum en Navorsingsentrum 
[National Afrikaans Literature Museum and Research Centre] (NALN) in 
Bloemfontein. […] [T]he South African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA) 
appointed the Heritage Foundation to repair, maintain and control all Burger 
[civilian], Concentration Camp en [sic] Prisoner of War graves nationwide. An 
amount of R750 000 was provided to the Heritage Foundation by Government for 
the first year of the project. The Heritage Foundation already controls, and in many 
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cases owns various heritage sites nationwide that include; Danie Theron Memorial 
in Gatsrand (Gauteng), the Concentration Camp Cemetery in Mafikeng (North 
West), Bloukrans (KZN), Doornbult Camp and the Orange River Station (Northern 
Cape), and the Louis Tregardt Memorial in Maputo. […]  Members of the public, 
who care about heritage conservation, can become members of the Heritage 
Foundation (emphasis added).
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It is difficult to tell the extent to which the emphasis on inclusivity as reflected in 
the wording “Afrikaans speaking [sic] people of the population” is mere lip-
service. The “rescue” of the National Afrikaans Literature Museum and Research 
Centre might have been welcomed in non-Afrikaner circles, and it is unlikely that 
the government-funded grave restoration project would be confined to the last 
resting places of white Afrikaans-speaking concentration camp victims and 
prisoners of war. But Louis Tregardt was a Voortrekker leader; Bloukrans was the 
site where some 500 Voortrekkers were killed by Zulu warriors, then days after 
the murder of Piet Retief (Grobler 2001:108); and Danie Theron was a Boer War 
hero – “the hardest thorn in the flesh of the British advance” as Field Marshall 
F.S. Roberts described him.
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 Moreover, the Heritage Centre is situated on the 
grounds of the Voortrekker Monument Heritage Site. Here, the remembrance of 
the Battle of Blood River continues to takes place on 16 December each year, 
albeit in a watered-down fashion. The Heritage Foundation is, ultimately, an 
Afrikaner organisation. 
To conclude: The Afrikaner initiative of the 1990s to create a racially inclusive 
movement for the maintenance and promotion of the Afrikaans language was only 
partially successful. Within a decade, a significant segment of that movement had 
morphed into an exclusive Afrikaner movement. Afrikaner activism in the field of 
language, the lion‟s share of which was aimed at the defence of the 
institutionalised status of Afrikaans, was complemented with activism in the fields 
of material culture and performance culture, of which a few examples were 
mentioned above. This was nationalist activism: it was informed by Afrikaner 
                                                 
267 Source: http://www.erfenisstigting.org.za/?id=174 (accessed March 2013). 
268 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Theron (accessed March 2013). 
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nationalist mythology and it was aimed at the remobilisation of an Afrikaner 
identity through the revitalisation of Afrikaner “history”.  
Afrikaner language activism has also been complemented with activism in the 
field of discourse. The centenary of the Anglo-Boer War, for example, spawned 
extensive literary activity, especially at a popular level. Like the “De la Rey” 
song, these novels and plays reactivated Afrikaner nationalist myths. But the most 
significant development in the field of discourse has been the re-mythologisation 
of Afrikaner history by mainstream Afrikaner historians (i.e., historians employed 
by universities). One of them is Jackie Grobler from the University of Pretoria. 
For the second chapter of his history of the Afrikaners, published in 2007 as 
Uitdaging en antwoord. ‟n Vars perspektief op die evolusie van die Afrikaners 
[Challenge and answer. A fresh perspective on the evolution of the Afrikaners], he 
chose the title Die volksplanting [The planting of the volk] to depict the onset of 
European colonisation in southern Africa. Elsewhere, in a booklet celebrating 
Afrikaner monuments, Grobler describes the Cape Town statues of Jan van 
Riebeeck and his wife, Maria de la Queillerie, as follows: “The statue monument 
of Jan van Riebeeck commemorates the founder of the white [blanke in the 
original] society in South Africa” (2012:24). 
The glorification of Van Riebeeck‟s role in the history of South Africa is back in 
fashion. According to Johan de Villiers, emeritus professor and research fellow at 
the University of Zululand, 
Jan van Riebeeck was a conscientious official of the [VOC] in the ten years he 
served at the Cape. His gumption, ability to adapt and negotiation skills on various 
terrains made him a pioneer. As leader of the community in Table Valley he acted 
fairly and justly. [...] His ungrateful job as commander in times of crises was not 
always properly appreciated by his contemporaries (local subordinates and his 
superiors abroad) (2012a:44). 
This quote is from one of De Villiers‟s contributions to Geskiedenis van Suid-
Afrika. Van voortye tot vandag [History of South Africa. From pre-historic times 
to today]. Published in 2012 and funded, inter alia, by the Research Trust of the 
Heritage Foundation, this hardcover of 640 pages was the South African 
291 
 
Academy‟s response to black-centric state school syllabi which, so the Academy 
claimed, were demonising the role of the Afrikaners in South African history. The 
aforementioned Fransjohan Pretorius was the editor, and Hermann Giliomee 
contributed six of the 29 chapters. Belying the title, a single chapter was devoted 
to South Africa‟s pre-colonial history.  
When reading what the book has to say about the Great Trek, one cannot help but 
recall S.J. du Toit‟s attempt in 1877 to write Di geskiedenis fan ons land in di taal 
fan ons volk [The history of our country in the language of our volk]: 
With the Great Trek, private Afrikaner initiative assumed leadership relatively 
successfully for the first time in the 1830s. The emigration was marked by great 
suffering and sorrow, but it gave rise to a stronger sense of solidarity and identity. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Afrikaners could look back proudly to the 
achievements of their forebears (Visagie 2012b:149).
269
  
Such interpretations of the Great Trek, I would argue, constitute a revival of the 
tradition in Afrikaner historiography which “has represented the Trek as a 
milestone in the development of conscious Afrikaner nationalism, portraying the 
Voortrekkers as „nationally aware Afrikaners‟ [and] linking the Age of the [Cape] 
Patriotten with the age of Paul Kruger”. As we have seen, 
[h]owever undemonstrable, in the strict sense, this proposition may be, its existence 
became of great significance historically in helping to build up the Trek as perhaps 
the central event in the evolution of an Afrikaner mystique (Davenport and Saunders 
2000:53) 
Eric Hobsbawm, who regarded it as “the primary duty of modern historians to be 
[…] a danger [to nationalism]” would have been disappointed in his South 
African colleagues.
270
 Quoting Ernest Renan, Hobsbawm reminded us in his final 
book that “[f]orgetting history or even getting it wrong is one of the major 
elements in building a nation” (2013:151). In the Afrikaner case, it seems, 
                                                 
269 Johan Visagie is a research fellow of history at the University of Stellenbosch. 
270 He would also have been disappointed, one must admit, by certain African nationalist 
histories of South Africa. 
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forgetting history and getting it wrong has become part of a campaign to reunite 
and preserve a nation that has lost its state. 
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CONCLUSION 
To the late Eric Hobsbawm, both the Jewish and the Irish nationalist movements 
provided evidence that “problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not 
of communication or even culture, lie at the heart of the nationalism of language” 
(1992:110). If communication or culture had been the critical issue, he argued, 
Zionism would have opted for Yiddish – at the time a leading literary language 
spoken by the majority of the world‟s Jews – and not for modern Hebrew. By the 
same token, Irish nationalism would have opted for English. The choice that 
Afrikaner nationalists faced at the beginning of the twentieth century was not 
entirely comparable to the one the Jews and the Irish had to make. Like Yiddish 
and English, Afrikaans was widely spoken. However, unlike these two languages, 
and unlike Dutch, it lacked a literary tradition. Afrikaans was a patois, a kitchen 
language, an inferior, debased tongue of questionable origin. And yet, as I hoped 
to have demonstrated in this thesis, the history of Afrikaner nationalism too 
proves that “problems of power, status, politics and ideology and not of 
communication or even culture, lie at the heart of the nationalism of language”. 
Problems of power also lie at the heart of the Afrikaner-led Afrikaans language 
movement of the post-apartheid era. Afrikaners may have lost state and military 
power, but they still control a significant amount of cultural capital and, as 
Rebecca Davies (2009; 2012) has shown, material culture accumulated under 
apartheid. One way to secure these forms of power is through minority rights 
activism, including language activism. If not as an attempt to protect their own 
economic power, how is one to understand organised Afrikaner resistance against 
the ANC‟s policies of affirmative action and so-called Black Economic 
Empowerment? Or Afrikaner projects in the fields of labour relations, poverty 
alleviation and technical education such as those that have been initiated by the 
trade union Solidarity? Afrikaners may have lost political “control over the means 
of symbolic production” (to borrow a phrase from Brenda Yeoh (1992)), but they 
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retained a fair degree of economic and legal control in this area. They can afford, 
for example, to take the government to court to prevent place name changes.  
If not as an effort to retain their cultural or symbolic power (or their prestige), 
how is one to explain the legal challenges that have been brought by Afrikaners to 
prevent the renaming of places such as Pretoria, Louis Trichardt and 
Potchefstroom? The establishment of these towns, it should be borne in mind, 
marked the end of the story of the Great Trek – that core myth of Afrikaner 
nationalism. Was it not also a concern for national prestige that prompted an 
Afrikaner businessman to withdraw millions of rands‟ worth of advertisements 
from a British magazine following the publication of an article which described 
Afrikaans as the “ugliest language in the world”?271 Finally, if not as a struggle for 
power, how is one to interpret the Afrikaner campaign for the preservation of the 
institutionalised status of Afrikaans, and then particularly the campaign for 
Afrikaans-only schools?  
This study claimed that present-day Afrikaner struggles for power, such as those 
mentioned above, are nationalist struggles. To substantiate this claim, chapter 3 
developed and defended a definition according to which nationalism need not be 
aimed at gaining and maintaining control of a state. Nationalism, as I defined it, is 
the desire of an ethnic community to preserve its identity and express itself 
collectively and freely through symbols and institutions (which may or may not 
include the state). 
The formation and politicisation of an Afrikaner national identity, as has been 
argued, was the ultimate objective of the Afrikaans language and cultural 
movements of the late 1800s and early 1900s. By the 1930s, this goal had not 
been reached. Had all Afrikaners voted in the general elections of 1938 and 1943 
as Malan-defined Afrikaners and not as South Africans (Smuts/Hertzog-defined 
Afrikaners) or as workers, they would have been in a position to take control of 
                                                 
271 Johann Rupert of Remgro and Richemont (Rembrandt). After the Oppenheimers, the 
Ruperts are the second wealthiest South African family. All these examples are discussed in 
Kriel (2010c; 2010d). 
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the state. But the “divinely-created Afrikaner nation”, as O‟Meara succinctly sums 
it up, was “politically divided, culturally disunited, and wracked by severe class 
divisions” (1983:71). That was the reason why the Broederbond induced the 
rebirth of the Afrikaans language and cultural movement in August 1929 (at the 
founding congress of the FAK), and induced the birth of an Afrikaner economic 
movement a decade later in October 1939 (at the FAK‟s first ekonomiese 
volkskongres [economic volk congress]). The economic activists succeeded to 
create a cross-class alliance without which political power would have remained 
out of reach for the “purified” Nationalists. They had help from the cultural 
activists, in whose minds economics and politics were foremost most of time. 
But volkseenheid [unity of the volk] alone would not deliver the political kingdom 
to the Afrikaners. In the long term, they could only govern themselves if they 
could make the political unit, in Gellnerian terms, congruous with the racial unit. 
That was what apartheid had hoped to achieve. It was a strategy, as Mahmood 
Mamdani (2009:142) explains it, that enabled a minority to rule over a majority 
through institutions that “unified the minority as rights-bearing citizens and 
fragmented the majority as so many custom-driven ethnicities”. Put differently, 
the ideology of apartheid made it possible for the minority to claim that there were 
“no majorities, only minorities”.  
This continues to be the premise from which Afrikaner activist-ideologues – 
whether they style themselves as liberal multiculturalists or radical democrats or 
civic republicans – defend their case. They refuse to be called nationalists, most 
likely because the moral status of nationalism remains a highly contested issue, 
especially in South Africa. According to multiculturalists such as Patten and 
Kymlicka (2003:5), the global shift towards official recognition of language rights 
– and, one may add, the realisation that minority language maintenance may 
require ethnic mobilisation – have led to increased acceptance of the legitimacy of 
minority nationalism. In the contemporary Afrikaner case there seem to be certain 
conceptual, theoretical and explanatory advantages to calling a spade a spade and 
not, because it can be also used to kill people, “a tool for digging ground”. 
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